NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF A REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TAV/03/18 AND TAV/03B/18 “AMESBURY INCIDENT”)

1. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) under subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention in relation to an incident in Amesbury on 30 June 2018 involving a toxic chemical and the poisoning and hospitalisation of two individuals and the subsequent death of one. The Director-General decided to dispatch a team to the United Kingdom for a technical assistance visit (TAV).

2. The TAV team deployed to the United Kingdom from 15 July to 18 July 2018 to collect biomedical samples and again on 13 August 2018 to obtain an additional environmental sample.

3. The team received information on the medical condition of the surviving affected individual, Mr Charles Rowley. This included information on his acetylcholinesterase status since hospitalisation, as well as information on the treatment regime.

4. The team was able to collect blood samples from Mr Charles Rowley for transport to the OPCW Laboratory and subsequent analysis by OPCW Designated Laboratories. Mr Rowley was able to give informed consent himself.

5. The team attended and observed the post-mortem (autopsy) of Ms Dawn Sturgess. The team was able to collect a number of biomedical samples (mainly tissue samples) for transport to the OPCW Laboratory and subsequent analysis by OPCW Designated Laboratories. Consent for this procedure was obtained from the next-of-kin of Ms Sturgess, and the activity was carried out in compliance with the United Kingdom Human Tissue Act.

6. The team requested and received splits of biomedical samples collected by the British authorities for delivery to the OPCW Laboratory and subsequent analysis by OPCW Designated Laboratories. This was done for the purposes of comparison and in order to verify the analysis conducted by the United Kingdom.
7. The team was briefed on the identity of the toxic chemical identified by the United Kingdom and was able to review analytical results and data from the chemical analysis of biomedical samples collected from the affected individuals by the British authorities.

8. The results of the analysis of biomedical samples conducted by OPCW Designated Laboratories demonstrate that Mr Charles Rowley and Ms Dawn Sturgess were exposed to and intoxicated by this toxic chemical.

9. During the second deployment, the team collected a sample of the contents of a small bottle that the police seized as a suspect item from the house of Charles Rowley in Amesbury.

10. The results of the analysis of this environmental sample conducted by OPCW Designated Laboratories show that the sample consists of the toxic chemical at a concentration of 97-98%. The sample is therefore considered a neat agent of high purity. The OPCW Designated Laboratories also identified a number of impurities constituting the remaining 2-3% of the sample.

11. The results of the analysis conducted by OPCW Designated Laboratories of environmental and biomedical samples collected by the OPCW team confirm the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that intoxicated Mr Charles Rowley and Ms Dawn Sturgess. The toxic chemical compound, which displays the toxic properties of a nerve agent, is the same toxic chemical that was found in the biomedical and environmental samples relating to the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Mr Nicholas Bailey on 4 March 2018 in Salisbury (S/1612/2018, dated 12 April 2018).

12. Due to the unknown storage conditions of the small bottle found in the house of Mr Rowley and the fact that the environmental samples analysed in relation to the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Mr Nicholas Bailey were exposed to the environment and moisture, the impurity profiles of the samples available to the OPCW do not make it possible to draw conclusions as to whether the samples are from the same synthesis batch.

13. The name and structure of the identified toxic chemical are contained in the full classified report of the Secretariat, available to all States Parties.