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**THE 2007 OPCW ACADEMIC FORUM AND
THE INDUSTRY AND PROTECTION FORUM:
IN SUPPORT OF COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

INTRODUCTION

1. As part of the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”), together with representatives of the chemical industry and a number of prestigious academic institutions, organised the OPCW Academic Forum (held on 18 and 19 September 2007) and the OPCW Industry and Protection Forum (held on 1 and 2 November 2007).
2. Both forums provided a platform for discussion amongst the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other key stakeholders in the Convention, such as the National Authorities, the chemical industry, the scientific community, and other international organisations. A wide range of topics was considered, including a review of the accomplishments of the OPCW, the progress made in national implementation, and the political and technical challenges that will confront the Organisation in the future. Specifically, participants had the opportunity to discuss how the OPCW can adapt to the new security environment and to the changes that are occurring in science, technology, and the chemical industry, especially in regard to new chemicals and processes.
3. These two forums were organised in recognition of the multi-stakeholder nature of the Convention and the need to involve all relevant sectors of society in its implementation. The overall goal involved enhancing cooperation amongst the chemical industry, National Authorities, and other parties interested in full implementation.
4. The proceedings of both forums will be published in due course. Given that the recommendations and conclusions of both forums are relevant to the objectives of the upcoming Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat has prepared this Note to inform the States Parties in a timely fashion of the discussions that took place and the observations that emerged.



5. No funding had been allocated for the forums in the 2007 Programme and Budget, and financial support came in the form of contributions by the Government of the Netherlands as well as by the European Union (EU).

THE ACADEMIC FORUM

6. The Academic Forum was organised in association with the Netherlands Institute for International Relations "Clingendael" ("Instituut Clingendael") and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research or TNO ("Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek"). It brought together leading academics, scientists, diplomats, military officers, and policy-makers involved in shaping and implementing disarmament and non-proliferation policies, in particular those related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.
7. The forum was opened by the Director-General of the OPCW, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, who also chaired the meeting. Welcome addresses were delivered by Dr Ph. de Heer, Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Admiral (ret.) Cees van Duyvendijk from the TNO. Statements at the opening plenary were made by the representatives of the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Training and Research Institute (UNITAR), and the Clingendael Institute. The keynote presentation was given by Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) who, from 1991 and 1997, was Chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).
8. Parallel workshops on four broad themes took place, and covered the following topics: the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, the impact of science and technology on the Convention, and the role of the Convention in a world that is essentially free of chemical weapons. In addition, a multilateral game formed part of the programme. This game simulated some of the scenarios that might unfold and the negotiation-related challenges the OPCW would have to face in relation to future implementation of the Convention.

Issues related to chemical weapons and their destruction

9. The workshop participants noted that all possessor States Parties had at times experienced significant difficulties and delays in destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. Determined to complete their destruction operations as soon as possible, States Parties are aware that they must do so observing stringent requirements with regard to the safety of people and the environment. So far, no deaths have taken place that are directly related to the implementation of chemical weapons destruction operations, although some injuries have occurred. This is noteworthy, given the intrinsic risks involved in the storage, handling, transportation, and destruction of chemical weapons, and especially given the fact that stockpiles are aging. The workshop stressed the need for adequate and timely funding of the destruction programmes and of the provision of assistance where it is needed and requested.
10. The workshop also considered the challenges related to the destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons (OACWs), an issue that will undoubtedly become more important in the future. At this stage, three countries have declared abandoned

chemical weapons (ACWs), and 13 countries have declared old chemical weapons (OCWs). However, it is known that there are many other sites where training with chemical weapons was conducted in the past, or where military operations took place, with chemical weapons forming part of the armoury of the belligerents. One should therefore still expect more—potentially many more—declarations of OACWs in the future.

11. The workshop participants noted that little was known about what changes have ensued to the chemical weapons that had been disposed of by dumping at sea, during a period long before the negotiations of the Convention had been completed. For all practical purposes, given that States Parties have discretion as to whether to declare chemical weapons disposed of in this manner and whether to destroy them in accordance with the Convention, this issue remains outside the purview of this disarmament treaty. It remains to be seen how States Parties proceed in relation to this matter, and what the involvement, if any, of the OPCW would be in terms of any future recovery and destruction operations in regard to these chemical weapons.
12. On a more general note, the workshop concluded that, although destruction deadlines cannot always be met, they are important. Deadlines help to focus the efforts of States Parties and ensure that sufficient funding for the destruction of chemical weapons is provided. Because of the potential danger to the public involved in the destruction of chemical weapons, which can have a major environmental and health impact on the communities concerned, most speakers stressed the importance of public outreach and information, given that this is a topic of public interest. In addition, the Convention points out that the protection of human health and of the environment is an essential precondition for the conduct of chemical weapons destruction operations.

Issues related to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons

13. There was recognition by the workshop participants that the concept of chemical weapons non-proliferation has evolved over the years. Today, it is considered that the use of chemical weapons lacks legitimacy, and the main object of concern is the possibility that some States outside the Convention or non-State actors could acquire chemical weapons covertly.
14. The workshop participants made the observation that, given their regional and political contexts, countries have different reasons for joining the Convention. This has an impact on how they prioritise the responsibilities related to implementation, and underlines the fact that measures in regard to national implementation ought to be country-specific and must take into account the prevailing historical, legal, regulatory, economic (including trade), security and other factors and conditions. No one-size solution fits all conditions and requirements.
15. In terms of implementation of the Convention, there is also a need to find the right balance between prohibitions related to chemical weapons, and free access to chemicals and to chemical equipment and technology.
16. Participants also stressed that effective national implementation remains an essential condition for providing reliable non-proliferation assurances. There is a need to

move from a quantitative approach that focuses simply on numbers of States Parties and National Authorities (and calculations on how many of them have drafted the required implementing legislation) to a more qualitative approach that concentrates on improving the effectiveness of implementation and enforcement measures. Capacity building by the OPCW remains an important tool for improving the situation.

17. National implementation was seen as vital in terms of countering the possible terrorist use of toxic materials. But the Convention's routine verification regime was originally formulated with militarily significant quantities of chemical agents/precursors in mind.
18. The workshop participants were of the view that the comprehensive scope of the Convention—the "General Purpose Criterion"—needs to be preserved and restated, so as to maintain the relevance of the Convention in the light of scientific, technological, and political developments.
19. The conclusion was reached that the Convention needed to be embedded in the scientific community through education, the discussion of ethics, and the raising of the awareness of dual-use issues. It was noted, however, that there are divergent ministerial/departmental responsibilities amongst States Parties, and National Authorities need to persuade and advise other stakeholders in government and society to take action to this end.
20. The workshop raised a number of longer-term issues that may require future consideration and action by the OPCW. These included the following:
 - (a) Should there be a broader implementation concept of the Convention, allowing the Secretariat to consider longer-term strategic issues?
 - (b) It may be useful to learn from the evolution of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which was originally a technical agency, but which now follows a "knowledge-based" model, and which provides policy support at the same time.
 - (c) Are there lessons to be learned from the intersessional process of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, such as the conduct of thematic meetings of States Parties (at expert and diplomatic levels) on key subjects?
 - (d) Is there room for a joint approach with other international organisations in terms of developing a policy on the management of chemicals, and could that be a significant incentive in persuading States Parties to adopt and implement their own plans in terms of national implementation?

Advances in science and technology

21. The starting point for discussions during the third workshop was that the Convention is science-based; in other words, the drafters of the Convention had recognised that advances in sciences and technology could have an impact on the definition of what actually constitutes chemical warfare, on what agents could be produced and by what

means, and on how these developments could have an impact on the verification of compliance.

22. The workshop took account of the rapid developments in the life sciences, including the increasing convergence of chemical and biological sciences, the advances in combinatorial chemistry and nanotechnology, the changing nature of chemical-production processes (including the use of micro-reactors), and the globalisation of chemical production and trade. These developments will bring major benefits to humankind (for example in terms of sustainable development, improved public health, better food production, and enhanced international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry). They may also help to provide better protective measures against chemical weapons (detection, protection, medical counter-measures, forensic analysis, and decontamination).
23. However, there was a recognition that the rapid advances in science and technology, including in chemistry and related sciences, also present a number of challenges to the Convention. These include the following:
 - (a) chemicals of biological origin (CBOs)—developments in this field could lead to the design or discovery of novel chemical weapons agents;
 - (b) databanks of many thousands of novel synthetic chemicals—their existence and enlargement could lead to a future generation of chemical weapons agents;
 - (c) targeted delivery—developments in this area could result in a more efficient dissemination of chemical weapons agents; and
 - (d) incapacitants—advances in science and technology, it was observed, could well add to the existing problems that had been inherited from the original negotiations that took place in regard to the Convention.
24. Concerns were expressed in relation to the fact that, given the way the OPCW is structured and the processes by which decisions are taken, the Organisation simply does not have the flexibility it needs to respond quickly and effectively to developments in science and technology that necessitate changes to the implementation process.
25. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that advances in science and technology create new opportunities for international cooperation between States Parties in the peaceful uses of chemistry. The workshop participants acknowledged the achievements of the OPCW in this field, and also recognised the following:
 - (a) the importance of ensuring that international-cooperation projects correspond to the needs of the States Parties;
 - (b) the importance of developing synergies between the OPCW and other international organisations involved in international cooperation and development projects; and

- (c) the usefulness of academic collaboration projects between developed and developing countries, in that these endeavours support the objectives of the Convention; these projects would also benefit from being linked to the OPCW's International Cooperation Programme.

The Convention in a chemical-weapons-free world

26. The participants acknowledged that the Convention has been successful in reducing the likelihood of State-to-State use of chemical weapons. The military use of chemical weapons is much less likely today than when the Convention was first drafted. The possibility of chemical agents falling into the hands of terrorists, on the other hand, constitutes a potential problem.
27. During discussions, questions were raised as to whether the OPCW needed to take an integrated approach towards regulating toxic chemicals and what its role should be with regard to non-State actors (participants, however, acknowledged that the Convention was not an anti-terrorism instrument). The specific and important question was raised as to whether the Convention was able to deal with the threats that lie ahead. Some argued that there now was a need for a global governance scheme for science and technology, and posed the question as to whether the OPCW was capable of adjusting its mandate to deal with these emerging issues.
28. For example, participants asked whether the present categorisation of chemicals in the schedules of chemicals will remain useful in the future, and whether there is any utility remaining in regard to challenge-inspection schemes. Some stated that there was an enormous role to be played by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and professional organisations, and argued for the further extension of the OPCW's relationships with other international and regional organisations.
29. In any event, participants concluded that the Convention will have to undergo a functional shift after the destruction of chemical weapons has been completed, thus requiring changes to the processes by which it is implemented. It was suggested that a governance approach might be adopted, but to follow such an approach, more stakeholders would need to be involved and allowed to actively participate in comprehensive implementation.
30. To ensure continued success for the Convention in the post-destruction environment, three areas require consideration, that is, whether:
 - (a) to establish networks to assist in reviewing the impact on the verification regime of advances in science and technology; and
 - (b) to facilitate a greater involvement by stakeholders (such as other international organisations, regional organisations and NGOs).
31. Looking beyond the challenges of chemical warfare in the traditional sense, the workshop observed that the Convention now faces new challenges, such as the potential use of toxic industrial chemicals (for example, by non-State actors). This may require States Parties to look again at the assistance-and-protection provisions in

the Convention, and some participants argued it would be necessary to reconsider the definition of what constitutes a chemical weapon.

32. The medical aspects of current and emerging threats were discussed, and the need was highlighted for effective collaboration and coordination with international organisations such as the WHO, regional non-governmental scientific and/or medical organisations, as well as national organisations (such as societies of chemistry and toxicology, others involved in the safe use of toxins and poisons, and groups working on the development of codes of ethics). It was agreed that more training and exercises simulating chemical exposure should be offered to first responders, so that medical-response systems can be improved. The workshop also noted that there was a need for more participation on the part of the chemical industry.
33. The observation was made that the Convention as it is constituted is a delicate balance of rights and prohibitions, making this treaty unique and offering an incentive for countries to join. If that balance is disturbed, then the attractiveness of the Convention may be reduced. It was noted that the OPCW does not simply deal with chemical weapons, but also with the safe use and management of chemicals. Consequently, participants stated that an integrated approach should be formulated, and that the OPCW would be well advised to further develop its partnerships with other treaties or treaty organisations involved in the issue of chemical safety. An integrated framework needed to be developed, and the OPCW should play a part in this.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

34. The discussions of the Academic Forum highlighted a key point: The world has changed since the Convention was negotiated. The Convention has been successful in reducing the threat of State-to-State use of chemical weapons. But as the global context changes, so must the OPCW. For this to take effect, interaction between the OPCW and society, including the academic world and the chemical industry, is becoming ever more vital.
35. The eventual completion of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles will shift the global focus from chemical weapons disarmament to the prevention of the acquisition of chemical weapons. The transition of the verification regime from a focus primarily on disarmament to one which concentrates on non-proliferation, cooperation, and assistance will call for adjustments in the mandates given to the OPCW by its Member States, and for a conceptual rethinking of some of the Organisation's programmes and approaches.
36. The Academic Forum recognised the value of academic input to the OPCW and the processes by which it implements the Convention. Although a range of mechanisms already exist to enable such interaction, there was a sense that it would be beneficial if this dialogue and cooperation were enhanced.

The Industry and Protection Forum

37. With the financial support of the EU, the Industry and Protection Forum was organised in association with the International Council of Chemical Associations

(ICCA) and the European Chemistry Council (CEFIC). It brought together representatives from the chemical industry, government, international organisations, National Authorities, national laboratories and agencies, academia, and other institutions that work in the different fields (verification, assistance and protection, and the safety and security of chemical weapons) that formed the focus of this Forum.

38. A non-commercial exhibition that demonstrated solutions for how the different requirements of the Convention can be met was also organised.
39. The Forum was opened by the Director-General of the OPCW, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter. Welcome addresses were delivered by Mr René van Sloten, Executive Director for Industrial Policy of the CEFIC, and Ms Ana Gomes, Vice-President of the Committee for Security and Defence of the European Parliament. The Director-General delivered a second statement at a joint plenary session attended by Forum participants and National Authority representatives. This was followed by a statement by Mr Jack Gerard, Chief Executive Officer of the American Chemistry Council (ACC) and Secretary of the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA), speaking on behalf of the latter organisation.
40. Three parallel workshops were organised on the following subject areas: issues surrounding verification and implementation of the Convention that are of relevance to the chemical industry (including sampling and analysis), assistance and protection, and the safety and security of chemical plants.

Verification and implementation in the chemical industry (including sampling and analysis during industry inspections)

41. The workshop started with the discussion of the idea that the chemical industry, since entry into force of the Convention, considers implementation-related processes as a normal part of their day-to-day activities. Of course, there are issues that still need to be addressed. The complexities inherent in the definitions, terms, and regulations of the Convention can create difficulties. Also, there remain differences in relation to national regulations, the nomenclature used by various countries/associations, the declaration of transfers, and the declaration of mixtures containing scheduled chemicals. In all these areas, the chemical industry needs clarity and consistency in order to implement requirements and to ensure that equitable and similar standards are applied to all States Parties. The adjustments made in the selection methodology for inspection of other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) were seen as a way of devising a fairer distribution in terms of this type of inspection.
42. It was noted that it remains important for the Organisation to provide practical help to countries and companies in order to enable them to identify all declarable facilities and/or activities. A joint CEFIC-OPCW project has made progress on updating a spreadsheet that identifies scheduled chemicals. This update should be made available to States Parties and to companies involved in the chemical industry by April 2008.
43. The workshop recognised that the knowledge that chemical companies have of how the requirements of the Convention are to be implemented needs to be maintained. Preserving awareness and transferring knowledge within and between companies was an important responsibility of chemical-industry associations. In addition, it was

important that the National Authorities remain engaged with the chemical industry as partners and advisors in the implementation process.

44. The workshop reviewed the progress that the OPCW had made with regard to the use of sampling and analysis as an inspection method in the chemical industry, and discussed the results of the trial phase of sampling and analysis during Schedule 2 inspections.
45. One conclusion that emerged during the discussions was that National Authorities should educate facilities about, and prepare them for, the use of sampling and analysis in industry inspections. It was pointed out that the conditions on-site are checked. Regulations may also exist in States Parties that may affect the transportation or use of the equipment and chemicals carried by OPCW inspection teams for on-site analysis.
46. The issue of performing on-site analysis in open or “blinded” mode was analysed. The Secretariat explained that any issues related to this should be resolved during the course of an inspection. It is known that false positives can occur. If the analytical equipment is operated in “blinded” mode, a resolution of any difficulties requires the setting-up of the instrument from scratch and beginning the analysis once again. It was noted, in this context, that operating the instrument in open mode must not be confused with undertaking a full analysis—significant protections exist in open mode to ensure that the sample composition will not be disclosed, except with regard to the confirmation that no scheduled chemicals are present.
47. Concerns were raised in relation to the possibility that, during on-site analysis, small quantities of scheduled chemicals might be detected (for example, unknown impurities). This appears unlikely, however, given the detection limits that are applied. It would be desirable to fill the gaps in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) so as to avoid false positives.
48. There were a number of practical issues that the pilot phase had highlighted, such as the option for inspectors to use a facility for on-site analysis that is in close proximity but outside the perimeters of the inspected facility (in other words, “in-country off-site”) to obtain supplies needed for analysis from local sources, or to shift the check of inspection equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site.
49. To summarise, the workshop noted that sampling and analysis in industry inspections has been demonstrated to work well, and that the necessity to protect confidentiality can be met with the existing equipment, software, databases, and procedures. Whilst it places an extra burden both on the facility to be inspected and on the OPCW, some participants stressed that it was a requirement under the Convention, and the only means of providing scientific proof of the absence of scheduled chemicals.

Assistance and protection

50. The workshop came to the conclusion that the submission of information by States Parties on their national protective programmes under paragraph 4 of Article X is important, in that not only does it provide transparency, but it also enables States Parties capable of providing assistance to be identified, as well as those in need of it.

51. The observation was also made that States Parties are fully supportive of, and recognise the need to meet, the requirements of Article X of the Convention. Despite the newly adopted formats for the annual submission of information on national protective programmes, only 76 declarations about protective programmes were submitted in 2006 (and, by the time of the Forum, only 50 in 2007).
52. As for the assistance offers made by States Parties, the workshop noted a number of examples of what they had offered, which included international or regional training courses, or national-assistance offers (including procedures, and equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination). Forty-four assistance offers had been received from States Parties by the time of the Forum.
53. The workshop also recalled that, by the end of 2007, the databank on protection required under Article X would be made available (by means of a password-controlled network) to the National Authorities and to the Permanent Representatives outside the OPCW headquarters.
54. The provision of expert advice to States Parties that wish to enhance their protective capacity has become an important implementation issue. Whilst in the early years after entry into force, the focus of such measures was on national capacity building, that focus has shifted since 2004 to regional (and subregional) capacity building.
55. States Parties' contributions under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X remains limited, and stands at EUR 1.3 million, well short of what would be required to fund any large-scale operation. The workshop was informed about the exercises conducted in Croatia (in 2002) and in Ukraine (in 2005), and about the efforts to improve cooperation and coordination with other relevant international organisations.
56. The Secretariat reviewed its standard operating procedures and its work instructions so as to take account of the practical experiences gained in the various exercises that had been conducted. The lessons learned also extended to identifying what equipment most suitable for the delivery of assistance and investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons needed to be procured, what training needed to be provided, and what training concepts needed to be developed.
57. The participants of the workshop raised a number of issues that they considered deserved further consideration. These included:
 - (a) whether attacks on chemical facilities with conventional weapons should be considered a violation of the Convention, and whether a State Party so attacked would be able to request assistance;
 - (b) what methods needed to be developed in relation to developing the coordination between the different international agencies and units that would respond to a request for assistance (this included such issues as different languages involved, communications systems, standard operating procedures, equipment, tactics, and so on);

- (c) whether States Parties should focus on building up regional capacity (for example by setting up regional training centres) and whether, consequently, assistance offers could be made on a regional basis;
 - (d) how the Organisation could ensure that the right people attended the training courses; and
 - (e) what would constitute an appropriate level of chemical defence once chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed.
58. The participants recognised the wide range of possible scenarios for assistance operations and what the requirements for such activities would be, and also the need for more information on what the States Parties' assistance offers actually included. There were only limited resources for the building-up of regional networks and for "train the trainers" events. States Parties needed to be better prepared to receive any assistance that was needed; this included enhanced coordination between all organisations involved in an emergency response.

Safety and security at chemical plants

59. This workshop began with the premise that the Convention was neither a counter-terrorism nor a chemical-safety treaty. However, an analysis of its effectiveness indicated that it had helped to make it more difficult for malicious acts involving the use of toxic chemicals to occur. Given that the deadlines for the completion of chemical weapons disarmament are approaching, the view was expressed that new perspectives in terms of implementation need to be formulated, and that more attention should be paid to issues related to the chemical industry.
60. The workshop participants identified a number of challenges that potentially loom ahead:
- (a) the fact that it would take only one incident for trust in the Convention to be lost;
 - (b) the recognition that attacks on chemical facilities or the theft of toxic chemicals would constitute only the beginning of a chain of events that would subsequently start to unfold, and therefore there was a need to consider how to manage all the consequences of such an incident;
 - (c) there remained a lack of clear and internationally agreed definitions of what constitutes terrorism and how to define "criminal acts"; and
 - (d) issues involving safety and/or security needed attention in regard to the entire chain of the existence of chemicals, from their production to their eventual disposal.
61. There were a number of balances that needed to be struck: The provision of enhanced security could help catalyse the development of innovations in industry, but could also become a hindrance. There was also a need to raise awareness about safety and security issues, but also an inherent danger of creating hysteria by doing so. The need also existed to make information available to the public on possible

chemical hazards, but such information could also be useful to malicious actors. Finally, there needed to be an assessment as to what the responsibilities and activities of industry, government, and international bodies were.

62. At the international level, the workshop recognised the need for synchronised action of all stakeholders in the Convention. The chemical industry needs to participate in the efforts being made to enhance safety and security, and these efforts must be inclusive. There was a need to create a level playing field for the chemical industry with regard to security costs. Lessons can be learned from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the WHO in terms of promoting safety and disseminating best practices in the field of safety and security.
63. The workshop recalled that the OPCW has been established by the Convention as a forum for consultation and cooperation between the States Parties, which could include the exchange of ideas and the discussion of best practices in such areas as chemical safety and security. This may, in fact, increase the attractiveness of the OPCW framework for States not yet Party, and may help to improve national implementation by exploiting the synergisms between national implementation of the Convention and measures to ensure the safety and security of activities related to chemicals.
64. The workshop also recognised the relevance of the provisions of Articles X and XI, and that opportunities existed to more fully meet the objectives of these provisions by raising chemical safety and security issues in the context of the OPCW.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

65. The Industry and Protection Forum highlighted the fact that, the chemical industry, like any other modern enterprise, is continuing to evolve, while the Convention's verification mechanism remains relatively stable. The increasing overlaps between chemical and biological sciences, the integration of chemical engineering into the life sciences, and the fusion between these and information technology are factors that are having a significant impact on the Convention.
66. The Forum, at this stage, focused much of its attention on sampling and analysis in industry inspections. There will be a need to broaden this agenda in the future and to continue to address other issues related to the effective and consistent implementation of the Convention in the chemical industry. This would have to include many of the issues that were also discussed at the Academic Forum.
67. Other challenges to non-proliferation are emerging as a result of changes to the security environment. Risks include actions by non-State actors, such as criminals and terrorists, to produce or acquire chemical weapons. There is a need for especial vigilance in establishing and maintaining controls on the manufacturing, transfer, and use of dual-use materials through national and international regulatory mechanisms, as well as through effective self-governance in industry and by scientific and teaching institutions.
68. It is crucial that the OPCW be able to adapt to the changing realities so that the verification and implementation regimes of the Convention can continue to prevent

the proliferation of chemical weapons and the materials for making them, and in a manner that does not impede legitimate developments in the chemical industry. Non-State actors must not be allowed to gain access to toxic chemicals or to the means for producing them.

69. In this ever-changing world, the smooth interaction between the National Authorities and other stakeholders in the Convention, both from the government and private sectors, is of the essence. There is a need to focus more on the quality of implementation, the involvement at the national level of other agencies, and the coordination of national-implementation measures between all the agencies involved. Such an integrated approach at the national-implementation level can lead to the increased adoption and implementation of non-proliferation and safety-and-security regulations, and of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

NEXT STEPS

70. The Academic Forum and the Industry and Protection Forum confirmed that, for the Convention to be comprehensively implemented, it is vital that all stakeholders, including the chemical industry and the scientific community, become involved in the promotion of its goals, especially in relation to national implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and the achievement of universality. In this context, these forums reaffirmed the need for the continuing interaction between the OPCW and all parties that are interested in achieving full implementation of this crucial disarmament treaty.
71. The Conference of the States Parties, at its Twelfth Session (which took place from 5 to 9 November 2007), took note of both forums and encouraged participation on the broadest possible geographical basis of all stakeholders in such events in the future. The overall objective is the continuation of the discussions and interchanges that had been initiated at the forums, especially in terms of promoting national implementation, international cooperation, and universality.
72. The continuation of the forums will provide a useful platform for the active engagement of OPCW stakeholders in promoting and/or supporting comprehensive implementation of the Convention, especially in relation to Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
73. This dialogue between the multiple stakeholders of the Convention could, for example, involve more detailed studies of specific issues by small project groups, specialised workshops on topics relevant to the Convention and that require broad involvement from a variety of parties (including from the chemical industry), and the use of the worldwide web as a platform for raising and discussing issues.
74. The support of the Member States of the OPCW is essential to ensuring the success of the emerging platform for cooperation and dialogue, and thus the Secretariat would like to encourage Member States and their institutions to do all they can to foster its continuing development.

75. No funds will be allocated in the OPCW Programme and Budget for any activities associated with the follow-up process, and thus any such activities would rely on funding through voluntary contributions.

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