



ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Working Together for a World Free of Chemical Weapons

Recommendations from the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board's Report on Verification

Recommendation 1

The Secretariat should consider adopting a comprehensive, more analytical approach to verification utilising all available and verifiable information.




Recommendation 2

The Secretariat should acquire the capability to use open-source information on a routine basis.




Recommendation 3

The Secretariat should put in place an information management structure that can provide the support required for the verification process.




Recommendation 4

Remote/automated monitoring technologies should be added to the list of approved inspection equipment.



Recommendation 5

The Secretariat should look into the option of using satellite imagery for the planning of non-routine missions, in particular for IAU and CI.



Recommendation 6

The Secretariat should visit the National Authorities to obtain assurance on the accuracy and completeness of declarations. The outcome of such visits may impact on the inspection frequency.



Recommendation 7

The Secretariat must commission an independent review of all activities pertaining to the missions carried out in the Syrian Arab Republic.



Recommendation 8

The list of declarable OCPF's submitted by States Parties should include all facilities which fall under the definition/requirement of paragraph 1 of Part IX of the Verification Annex, regardless of the purity level of a DOC or DOC mixtures produced.



Recommendation 9

Not all facilities that fall under Part IX of the Verification Annex should be considered of the same relevance to the object and purpose of the Convention. The TWG recommends a practical approach for enhancing the utilisation of verification resources for OCPF declaration and on-site inspection processes.



Recommendation 10

The verification thresholds for OCPF's producing highly relevant chemicals, and the possibility of revision of the product group codes, should be addressed by the SAB as well as the industry cluster.



Recommendation 11

The OPCW should increase the staff of the OPCW Laboratory to cope with various aspects of IAU, biomedical samples, trace environmental analysis, toxins, and on-site analysis. Establishing a network of DLs for biomedical sample analysis should be a high priority.



Recommendation 12

Lessons on chemical sampling and analysis from the OPCW's support to the 2013 United Nations Mission to Investigate the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and all subsequent OPCW activities in relation to the Syrian Arab Republic must be identified and implemented.




Recommendation 13

PTs should incorporate a broader range of chemicals, and at a wider range of concentrations, to prepare laboratories for IAU-type scenarios.




Recommendation 14

The Secretariat should expedite toxin identification exercises.



Recommendation 15

Continuous additions to the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) are recommended to allow the OPCW to meet all its mandated inspection aims, including IAU.




Recommendation 16

Developments in analytical instrument portability, miniaturisation and disposable biosensors should be periodically reviewed by the Secretariat and the SAB for potential applicability to on-site analysis.




Recommendation 17

The Secretariat should monitor developments in attribution analysis/chemical forensics.



Recommendation 18

The Secretariat should augment its capability to monitor and forecast developments in science and technology of relevance to the Convention and its verification regime.



<https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/science-technology/science-technology-monitor/>

