## OPCW Scientific Advisory Board Briefing to States Parties





## **Successes of the Chemical Weapon Convention**

192

NATIONS COMMITTED TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION

98

PERCENT OF WORLD

POPULATION LIVING UNDER

THE PROTECTION OF THE

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

CONVENTION

95

PERCENT OF WORLD'S


DECLARED CHEMICAL WEAPON

STOCKPILES VERIFIABLY

DESTROYED

(APPROXIMATE)





## Key points from Director-General's response

- Engagement to inform inputs to SAB reports
  - Technical Secretariat
  - Scientific communities
  - Other scientific advisory mechanisms
  - Other relevant disarmament forums



- Forward looking advice
- Practical advice
- Understanding driving forces and transdisciplinary nature of new developments
- Encourages States Parties to review RCA report
  - Detailed resource to accompany 2014 S-Note
  - Publication in peer-reviewed scientific literature

















## International Workshop on Innovative Technologies for Chemical Security

03-05 JULY - 2017

# INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR CHEMICAL SECURITY

Science for Peace







## Thematic content

Emerging technologies and the implementation of the CWC

Recognizing biochemical change:

if plants could talk
large scale environmental monitoring
chemical sensing



Mobile and wearable technologies and point-of-care device Digital health

Collecting data in remote and dangerous environments
International monitoring networks

Computer aided engineering tools applied to CWC

## Contingency operations and challenges

Starting with the 2013 UN-led mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, the TS has undertaken non-routine inspection, verification and technical assistance activities in Syria, Libya and Iraq



These contingency operations have required investigations, analysis, and fact-finding, with collection and evaluation of oral, material, and digital evidence of the use of toxic chemicals



## Contingency operations and challenges

Non-routine situations in which these operations have occurred are insightful for consideration of new technologies with potential to enhance capabilities available to inspectors

Access to sites is time-limited; harsh environmental conditions; requirement for chain-of-custody, care required while obtaining and shipping samples; evidence needs authenticating, and requires expertise extending beyond chemical analysis





#### **Outcomes**

A broad set of technology exists that can potentially find application in some areas of implementation of the CWC. In general, such tools appear best suited toward non-routine (contingency) and/or assistance and protection operations, investigations, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and stakeholder engagement.

Technologies that integrate informatics tools, mobile devices and remote sensing with an expanding range of capabilities are becoming increasingly accessible. The Convention's science review process should continue to keep abreast of developments in these areas.

#### **Outcomes**

A number of the technologies considered during the workshop have potential for reducing the risks to personnel operating in dangerous environments. Further consideration of these technologies could assist with development of recommended best practices for operating under such conditions.

Many interesting and potentially enabling technologies were discussed. Their suitability for field use requires field testing to meet operational requirements (and fit within mission specific goals).

Opportunities to engage with technology developers and evaluate new tools should be encouraged.

## OPCW Press Release 7 July 2017





## **Brazil Academy of Science**

http://www.abc.org.br/centenario/?Ciencia-para-a-paz





## **Science for Diplomats at EC-86**

## **Innovation**

and

## the Chemical Weapons Convention:

The Scientific Advisory Board's Report on **Emerging Technologies** 















**00ms Room 13:30-14:45 LIGHT LUNCH AVAILABLE AT 13:00** 















## International Workshop Trends in Chemical Production




Occupational











## Trends in chemical production



## Examine trends in all sectors of the chemical industry

- Chemical economy
- Commodity chemicals
- Pharmaceuticals
- Fine/speciality chemicals
- Custom automated synthesis
- Proteins and nucleic acids
- Agricultural chemicals
- Regulatory issues

#### **Outcomes**

As technological advances related to the discovery and production of chemicals are adopted, a fit-for-purpose verification regime should maintain up to date operational knowledge of chemical (and biological) production methods (including aspects of synthesis and analysis).

Recognizing unusual processes or aspects of a laboratory or production facility that are inconsistent with allowable activities under the Convention is valuable for both prevention of re-emergence and post-event fact-finding.

Training exercises and proficiency testing could usefully take into account such considerations.

#### **Outcomes**

The workshop served as a reminder of the highly transdisciplinary (convergent) nature of 21<sup>st</sup> century technology development, with scientific disciplinary convergence going well beyond the fields of chemistry and biology.

This observation supports the view that the scientific review process must engage broad scientific communities and look for opportunity in technological change to ensure that implementation of the Convention remains fit-for-purpose.

Sharing of experience on science advice with other relevant disarmament communities (especially the Biological Weapons Convention stakeholders) should be encouraged.



Reports of the Scientific Advisory Board SAB-23/1, dated 22 April 2016 SAB-24/1, dated 28 October 2016





SAB-24



EC-82




**EC-84** 



**Director-General's Response to Reports** of the Scientific Advisory Board EC-82/DG.13, dated 7 June 2016 (SAB-23) EC-84/DG.9, dated 18 January 2017 (SAB-24)





Response to the Director-General's Request to the Scientific Advisory Board to Provide Further Advice on Scheduled Chemicals

23/WP.1, dated 28 April 2016)





Response to the Directo-General's Request to the Scientific Advisory Board to Provide Further Advice on Chemical Weapons Sample Stability and Storage (SAB-23/WP.2, dated 25 May 2016)



Report of the Scientific Advisory Board's Workshop on Chemical Forensics (SAB-24/WP.1, dated 14 July 2016)





Report of the Scientific Advisory Board's workshop on Chemical Warfare Agent Toxicity, Emergency Response and Medical Countermeasures (SAB-24/WP.2, dated 14 October 2016)

Briefing to the 21st Conference of the States Parties, December 2016:






Slides






























The Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Januaru and Kashnir agreed upon by India and Pakinian. The final status of Januaru and Kashnir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties



Road Distance & Policy





## SAB-26



## **Developments at OPCW**

## **Open-Ended Working Group on Future Priorities**

"Evolution of the verification regime" (Feb 2017)



## Most noted topics and issue areas:

- Risk based/holistic approach to verification
- Strengthening analytical capabilities of TS and Lab
- Additions to OCAD
- Increasing number of designated laboratories
- Need to keep up with S&T advances
- Tenure policy/knowledge management

## **Developments at the OPCW**

## **Countering chemical terrorism**

Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors











EC-86/DEC.9 of 13 October 2017, addressing non-state actors:

Requests the Director-General (DG) to provide technical assistance within the DG's mandate, in accordance with the Convention, in connection with the CW use by a non-state actor

## **Developments at the OPCW**

## **Advisory Board on Education and Outreach**

**Knowledge management update** 

#### **Verification**


- OPCW Fact-Finding Mission
- Report of workshop on chlorine
- On-site sampling and analysis
- Training/preparedness for new challenges
- Results of survey on biomediated processes
- OPCW Laboratory





## Decontamination of sarin

Professor Joseph Wang (University of California, San Diego) described the accelerated decontamination of CW agents with nano-motors and -rockets



#### CHEMISTRY

#### Micromotors detox chemical weapons

Synthetic micromotors might provide a faster, better way to decontaminate nerve agents.


Converting harmful organophosphate chemicals, such as sarin, into innocuous substances requires high concentrations of hydrogen peroxide and constant stirring over long periods. Such conditions are challenging when eliminating chemical-weapons stockpiles in remote or hostile locations.


Joseph Wang at the University of California, San Diego, and his team overcame these requirements using micromotors made of polymers tipped with platinum. These zip around the contaminated fluid, propelled by bubbles that are produced as platinum reacts with peroxide.

### Decontamination of sulfur mustard

Dr Matteo Guidotti (Institute of Molecular Science and Technologies, Italy) presented research on catalytic decontamination of toxic chemicals







## Decontamination of sulfur mustard

Professor Roberto Martinez-Álvarez (University of Complutense, Madrid) described decontamination studies on sulfur mustard and its impurities

Sulfur mustard, HD





Sesquimustards

$$CI$$
 $S \stackrel{\longleftrightarrow}{n} S$ 
 $CI$ 
 $n = 1,2,3,4,5$ 






## Theoretical study on sulfur mustard


Professor Ponnadurai Ramasami (University of Mauritius) presented computational studies on the chemistry of sulfur mustard







## Computational tools applied to CWC implementation

Dr Evandro de Souza Nogueria (MCTIC, Brazil) discussed some computer-aided tools useful for gas plume modelling in response to, and the investigation, of chemical incidents (e.g. chlorine releases)



Such tools can be applied to CWC implementation e.g. in disarmament, non-proliferation matters, assistance and protection, and international cooperation






## Artificial intelligence (AI) and potential applications to OPCW

Ms Hoe Chee Chua (DSO Laboratory, Singapore) provided several examples of where AI may benefit the OPCW


- Structure generation of unknown impurities found in toxic chemicals (Al might help match analytical data to reference data (e.g. in OCAD))
- Planning of synthesis pathways
- Information management







## Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group







49 participants representing over 27 US/international organizations at the workshop to establish the CFITWG

# **Engagement with forensic science experts**



# **Engagement with forensic organisations**

- Academia Ibero-americana de Criminalística y Estudios Forenses
- African Society of Forensic Medicine
- Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society
- European Council of Legal Medicine
- European Network of Forensic Science Institutes
- Ibero-american Network of Forensic Medicine and Forensic Science Institutions
- International Association of Forensic Sciences
- EUROPOL / European Cybercrime Centre
- International Academy of Legal Medicine

# **Engagement with forensic organisations**

- International Forensic Strategy Alliance
- INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation
- INTERPOL International Forensic Science Managers
   Symposium
- Indo-Pacific Association of Law, Medicine and Science
- New Mediterranean Academy of Forensic Sciences
- Arab Union of Forensics and Toxicology
- Southern Africa Regional Forensic Science Network
- United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNITAR/UNOSAT
- World Association for Medical Law

# Engagement on science advice to policymakers





The National Academies of

SCIENCES · ENGINEERING · MEDICINE

#### Meeting of the Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology

:00 PM Session 2: Chemical and Biological Defense/Advances in Chemical Sensing

Moderator: Fran Ligler

Discussion with Federal Leaders

John Fischer, Director, Chemical and Biological Defense Division, Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

D. Christian Hassell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (invited)

Ronald Hann, Director, Chemical and Biological Technologies Department, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency

2:00 PM Presentation: Sampling and Analysis of Chemical Agents and the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Capabilities, Challenges and Opportunities

Jonathan Foreman, Science Policy Adviser, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

2:30 PM Panelists:

Kenneth Suelick, Marvin T. Schmidt Professor of Chemistry, Professor of Materials Science & Engineering, and Professor of the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-

Brandy White, Research Chemist, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

Brandi Vann, Lead, C/B Detection Systems Development, Chemical and Biological Technologies Department, Defense Threat Reduction Agency







"I encourage you to be forward thinking, innovative and bold as you draft this report

The value of the report and its advice is the independent expert voice the SAB provides"

### Part A: Issues that may impact the scope of CWC

Summary of overall content of report as well as a section that provides insight into issues underlying advances such as the diffusion of knowledge and drivers of technology development

#### Part B: Issues related to the Technical Secretariat

Relevance of general trends to work of the Secretariat, including advice of trends to follow and S&T of relevance beyond then SAB report to the Fourth Review Conference

### Advances in science and technology

Convergence

Enzymes

**Metabolic engineering** 

**Green chemistry (connection to goals of CWC)** 

Nanotechnology (catalysts, medicines, toxicology)

**Chemical production technologies** 

**Additive manufacturing** 

Big data, informatics, artificial intelligence

**Delivery systems** 

Horizon scanning, monitoring trends and technology foresight

### Advice on chemicals including Schedules of Chemicals

Scheduled chemicals (isotopic labels/stereoisomers)

Riot control agents, CNS-acting chemicals, toxins

**OCAD**, Proficiency Testing

**Verification technologies** 

**Analytical instrumentation** 

Forensic science methods (including chemical forensics)

**Biomedical samples** 

Sampling and analysis

Sample preparation, sample storage and stability

**Environmental samples (including plant biomarkers)** 

Remote sensing, sensors and smart devices, drones

### **Destruction of chemical weapons**

CW destruction methods Decontaminants (including enzymes)


### **Assistance and protection**


Treatment and therapeutics (including long-term effects)
Medical countermeasures and physical protection

### Science advice/science policy-maker engagement

Science advice mechanisms
Work of science advisor bodies

### Timeline for SAB report to the Fourth Review Conference





- Ongoing contingency operations have increasingly involved investigations, analysis, and fact-finding, with collection and evaluation of oral, material, and digital evidence of the use of chemical agents
- Objective is to review the science and technology relevant to investigations mandated under the CWC
- This will include science and technology for the validation and provenancing (i.e. determining the chronology of ownership, custody and/or location) of evidence, and integration of multiple and diverse inputs to reconstruct a past event

- Work of the TWG is intended to identify capabilities, skill sets, and equipment that would augment and strengthen the investigative capabilities of OPCW
- TWG will comprise individuals who collectively have expertise in the theory and practice of investigative work, including but not limited to investigational chemical analysis, evidence collection, forensic sciences, informatics, crime scene reconstruction, toxicology, inspection, or experience of implementation of the CWC
- Dr Veronica Borrett appointed as TWG Chairperson



# ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

#### Working Together For a World Free of Chemical Weapons

#### **Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology**

Reporting to the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Temporary Working Group (TWG) will in particular consider the following questions:

#### Question 1:

Which methods and capabilities used in the forensic sciences could usefully be developed and/or adopted for Chemical Weapons Convention-based investigations?



#### **Ouestion 2:**

What are the best practices and analysis tools used in the forensic sciences for effectively cross-referencing, validating, and linking together information related to investigation sites, materials collected/analysed, and individuals interviewed?



#### Question 3:

What are the best practices for management of data collected in investigations, including compilation, curation, and analytics?



#### **Question 4:**

What are the best practices for the collection, handling, curation and storage, and annotation of evidence?



#### Duestion 5:

Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) allow point-of-care and non-destructive measurements at an investigation site to help guide evidence collection?



#### Question 6:

Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used in the provenancing of chemical and/or material samples collected in an investigation?



#### **Ouestion 7:**

Which methods are available (or are being developed) for the sampling and analysis of environmental and biomedical materials and can be used in the detection of toxic industrial chemicals relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention?



#### Question 8:

Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used in ensuring chain of custody and verifying authenticity (especially in regard to digital images and video recordings)?



#### **Question 9:**

Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used to ensure the integrity of an investigation site?



#### **Ouestion 10:**

Do collections of physical objects, samples, and other information for chemical weapons-related analysis exist and can they be made available to investigators for retrospective review? How might these collections be used to support investigations?



#### **Ouestion 11:**

Are there stakeholders that the Technical Secretariat could usefully engage with to leverage their capabilities on investigative matters?

opcwonline



In addition, the TWG will provide advice on Technical Secretariat proposals for methodologies, procedures, technologies, and equipment for investigative purposes.













Veronica Borrett (TWG Chair) Australia

Augustin Baulig France

Christophe Curty Switzerland

David Gonzalez Uruguay

Robert Mikulak USA

Syed Raza India

Valentin Rubaylo Russian Federation

Francois van Straten South Africa

Farhat Wagar Pakistan

Cheng Tang (SAB Vice-Chair) China

Christopher Timperley (SAB Chair) United Kingdom

Crister Åstot FOI Sweden

Brigette Dorner RKI, Germany

Caros Fraga PNNL USA

Daan Noort TNO The Netherlands

Paula Vanninen VERIFIN Finland

Ed van Zalen Netherlands Forensic Institute

#### **Publications**




Special issue with workshop participants (to be published in 2018)



SAB sample storage and RCA reports?

Others?



# Thank you for your attention

