Mr Chairperson,  
Mr Director-General,  
Excellencies,  
Distinguished delegates,

On 14 April 2018 it was a sad day for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since some States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention attacked another Member State on the pretext of the use of chemical weapons, which has not yet been verified by this august Organisation. The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically condemns the missile strikes against the Syrian Arab Republic.

It is highly urgent that all States Parties fulfil their historical responsibility vis-à-vis such international chaos-provoking behaviour and strongly condemn this arbitrary and unilateral move against the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of an independent State, which is a member of the United Nations and this Organisation. Such military action will definitely undermine further the pillars of peace and security in the world, bring about more instability and unrest across the globe and promote extremism and terrorism and hence more use of chemical weapons by terrorists in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Such a barbaric act amounts to a flagrant breach of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is quite odd that some countries such as Canada and Australia who allegedly show loyalty to peace, supports the unlawful use of force instead of inviting others to the table of political negotiations as suggested by some European Union members and others. The aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic without any substantiated evidence that the Syrian Arab Republic has used chemical weapons and by utilizing unverified and fabricated open sources in favour of terrorist groups is an act of crime and those who were engaged in this crime should be held accountable and brought to justice.

Surprisingly, the perpetrators of such an illegal attack played the role of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and in less than hours from thousands of miles away, found that chemical weapons have been used in the Syrian Arab Republic and who has used it. We are of the view that this approach has seriously jeopardised the credibility of the OPCW as the only competent authority to verify the use of chemical weapons.
The OPCW is at stake now and some delegations take hostage of this technical forum for their political intents. The Technical Secretariat is under constant pressure of these States. Calling for this extraordinary meeting without having a document or a report from the FFM or convening a briefing session in advance and diverting the Organisation to rely on information from open sources and off-site samplings are clear examples of this political pressure.

Disappointedly, these States Parties, including some European Union Member States, Canada and Australia, deliberately or inadvertently, remain silent against heinous chemical attacks by terrorist groups, in particular Al-Nusra Front and so-called ISIS and Jaysh al-Islam, in Um-Housh and all other regions in the Syrian Arab Republic, while questioning the Syrian worthwhile actions to dismantle its chemical weapons program and ignoring its significant progress in a very short period of time and despite facing dire situation, as well as neglecting the Syrian prominent cooperation with the Technical Secretariat under the Convention.

Despite all these unfortunate facts which have exacerbated the situation for the existing mechanisms of the OPCW, we do still acknowledge the important role of the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat, in particular the FFM in the Syrian Arab Republic, in establishing the truth regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April 2018.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the findings of the FFM should rely on verifiable and independent sources and refrain from ambiguity and vagueness. In this due, the inspection team, itself, must visit the site of the incident and its report must devise a satisfactory way of unravelling any predicament in the investigation. Otherwise, all material evidence find its way to the FFM via “third parties” which manifests a lack of compliance with the basic chain-of-custody principle for safeguarding evidence.

In closing, Mr Chairperson, may I request that this statement to be circulated as an official document of the Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the Executive Council and be posted on both the external and public websites.

Thank you.