



Fifty-Third Meeting
26 August 2016

EC-M-53/DEC.2
26 August 2016
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DECISION

**ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY
GOVERNING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AT THE GESELLSCHAFT ZUR
ENTSORGUNG VON CHEMISCHEN KAMPFSTOFFEN UND
RÜSTUNGSALTLASTEN MBH (GEKA MBH) MUNSTER, AND AT THE PORT OF
DISEMBARKATION IN GERMANY**

The Executive Council,

Recalling that, in decision EC-M-52/DEC.2 (dated 27 July 2016), which sets forth, inter alia, the detailed requirements for the destruction of Libya's remaining Category 2 chemical weapons, the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") requested the Director-General to present a plan for the destruction of Libya's remaining Category 2 chemical weapons, including removal to a chemical disposal facility outside Libya;

Noting that, pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of its decision EC-M-52/DEC.1 (dated 20 July 2016), Germany has offered, through an in-kind contribution, to undertake the destruction of Libya's remaining Category 2 chemical weapons in a manner which is consistent with paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex");

Recalling also that, in operative paragraph 12 of its decision EC-M-52/DEC.2 on the detailed requirements for the destruction of Libya's remaining Category 2 chemical weapons, the Council requested the relevant State Party hosting destruction activities, in close consultation with the relevant States Parties providing assistance with destruction and with the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat"), to provide the Secretariat with the detailed facility information specified in paragraphs 30 and 31 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex, to the extent needed by the Secretariat for verification, not later than 30 days before the facility begins destruction operations;

Recalling further that in operative paragraph 13 of EC-M-52/DEC.2, the Council requested the Secretariat, consistent with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, "to develop, for any destruction facility outside Libya and together with the relevant State Party hosting destruction activities and relevant States Parties providing assistance with destruction, an agreed detailed plan for verification and a draft facility agreement, and to forward them to the Council for review and approval"; and

Noting that the Secretariat and the Government of Germany have agreed on an arrangement governing on-site inspections at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen



Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), Munster, and at the port of disembarkation in Germany, which is annexed hereto;

Hereby:

Approves the negotiated text of the arrangement between the OPCW and the Government of Germany annexed hereto.

Annex (English only):

Arrangement Between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Governing On-Site Inspections at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), Munster, and at the Port of Disembarkation, Federal Republic of Germany

Annex**ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY GOVERNING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AT THE GESELLSCHAFT ZUR ENTSORGUNG VON CHEMISCHEN KAMPFSTOFFEN UND RÜSTUNGSALTLASTEN MBH (GEKA MBH), MUNSTER, AND AT THE PORT OF DISEMBARKATION, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

WHEREAS the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter “the OPCW”) in decision EC-M-52/DEC.2, dated 27 July 2016, set forth, inter alia, the detailed requirements for the destruction of Libya’s remaining Category 2 chemical weapons, and requested the Director-General to present a plan for the destruction of the remaining Category 2 chemical weapons, including removal to a chemical disposal facility outside Libya;

WHEREAS, pursuant to paragraph 3 of its decision EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016, the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter “the Host State”) has offered, through an in-kind contribution, to undertake the destruction of Libya’s remaining Category 2 chemical weapons (hereinafter “the chemicals”) in a manner which is consistent with paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex;

WHEREAS the destruction activities to be undertaken are to take place at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), Munster (hereinafter “the facility”), upon receipt of the chemicals at the port of disembarkation, both the facility and the port of disembarkation being located on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany;

WHEREAS, consistent with subparagraph 11(a) of decision EC-M-52/DEC.2, the Host State will not be regarded as a possessor State Party;

WHEREAS, consistent with subparagraph 11(f) of decision EC-M-52/DEC.2, the Host State is to take all measures to implement the relevant provisions of EC-M-52/DEC.2 and to meet the requirements provided for under paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Convention with respect to the safety of people and to protecting the environment;

WHEREAS the activities to be undertaken by the facility on the territory of the Host State will be subject to verification by OPCW inspection teams; and

WHEREAS the implementation of this Arrangement is to be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Convention and relevant decisions by the OPCW policy-making organs;

The OPCW and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, both constituting the Participants to this Arrangement, have jointly decided upon the following arrangements for the conduct of verification at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), located at Humboldtstr. 110, Munster, Federal Republic of Germany (geographic coordinates Latitude 53° 00’ 16, 2’’ N, Longitude 10° 08’

43'E) and at the port of disembarkation, Bremen Neustadt, Federal Republic of Germany, Latitude 53° 06' 10"N, Longitude 8° 44' 9,6"E:

Section 1 General Provisions

1. The purpose of this Arrangement is to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and relevant decisions by the OPCW policy-making organs regarding verification activities conducted at the facility, the port of disembarkation, and any other area as specified in this Arrangement.
2. The Participants have jointly decided to apply for planning purposes the general factors and verification arrangements contained in Attachment 1.
3. The relevant provisions for verification contained in Part II, Section B of Part III, and Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex of the Convention will apply.
4. The Host State will ensure that its representative(s) can at all times be reached by the inspection team leader and designated members of the inspection team either in person or by telephone. The Host State will provide the names and means of contact for its designated representative(s) to the inspection team leader.
5. Upon request of the inspection team, the Host State will provide or arrange for the provision of the amenities listed in detail in Attachment 2. Requests from the inspection team for the Host State to provide or arrange amenities will be made in writing by an authorised member of the inspection team using the form contained in Attachment 2. Costs incurred by the Host State in relation to the provision of or arrangement for amenities will be borne by the OPCW, unless agreed otherwise.
6. The language for communication between the inspection team and the Host State during the conduct of verification activities at the facility will be English.

Section 2 Health and Safety

1. Health and safety matters will be handled in accordance with the Convention; the OPCW Health and Safety Policy and Regulations, and applicable national, local, and facility safety and environmental laws and regulations.
2. All applicable health and safety regulations relevant to the conduct of verification activities on the territory of the Host State, including inspections at the facility, are listed in Attachment 3 and are to be made available, in English, to the inspection team prior to the beginning of the inspection.
3. In the course of the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team is to be briefed on all health and safety matters which, in the view of the representatives of the Host State and the facility, are relevant to the conduct of verification activities by the team.

4. During the course of its activities, the inspection team will refrain from any action which by its nature could endanger the safety of the team, the facility, or personnel or could cause harm to the environment. Should the Host State refuse certain inspection activities on the grounds of health and safety, it may explain the circumstances and considerations involved, and will provide alternative means for conducting the inspection activities.
5. In the case of emergency situations or accidents involving inspection team members while on the territory of the Host State, the inspection team will comply with the directions of the Host State representatives and facility personnel. The Host State will facilitate the provision of medical and other assistance in a timely and effective manner with due regard to the rules of medical ethics if medical assistance is requested. Such assistance includes first aid, the arrangements for transport by ambulance, and contacts with and evacuation to a mutually agreed hospital.

Section 3 Confidentiality

Matters related to confidentiality are governed by the Convention, including its Confidentiality Annex and the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality.

Section 4 Media and Public Relations

Media requests will be coordinated by the Press Office of the German Federal Foreign Office and the OPCW Public Affairs Branch, in coordination with the German Federal Ministry of Defence and the inspection team leader. Participation in a media event by the inspection team will be subject to the OPCW Media and Public Affairs Policy (contained in decision C-I/DEC.55 of the OPCW Conference of the States Parties, dated 16 May 1997). In particular, the inspection team leader will consult with, and seek the authorisation of, the OPCW Director-General and the Press Office of the German Federal Foreign Office before the team has any contacts with the media or the public. Any resulting press release regarding activities at the facility will be coordinated by the respective Press Office of the German Federal Foreign Office and the OPCW Public Affairs Branch.

Section 5 Verification Activities

6. The Host State, in close consultation with the facility, is to allow and facilitate, consistent with national legislation, relevant provisions of the Convention, and relevant decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, the conduct by OPCW inspection teams of the verification measures specified in general terms below in paragraph 7 and in greater detail in Attachment 1. The Host State is to, inter alia:
 - (a) upon notification of the arrival of the inspection team, ensure its immediate entry into its territory and, through an in-country escort by the Bundeswehr Verification Centre (ZVBw), ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the facility and/or the port of disembarkation, and to a point of exit; and

- (b) subject to the provisions of paragraph 29 of Part II of the Verification Annex, apply no restriction on the entry into its territory or on the use of any approved inspection equipment.

- 7. The purpose of the verification measures will be:
 - (a) to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemicals received at the port of disembarkation and destroyed at the facility;
 - (b) to confirm that the chemicals have in fact been destroyed; and
 - (c) to provide assurance that no chemicals are diverted.

- 8. Verification measures may include:
 - (a) access of OPCW inspection teams to tank containers, storage, or other relevant areas at the port of disembarkation, or areas of the facility specified in Attachment 4;
 - (b) installation and use of monitoring instruments, including photographic and video recording equipment;
 - (c) results of sampling and analysis; and
 - (d) access to and review of relevant monitoring and process data, weighing data, and operational records.

- 9. The inspection team is to be given a pre-inspection briefing by representatives of the Bundeswehr Verification Centre (ZVBw) of the Federal Armed Forces and the facility in accordance with paragraph 37 of Part II of the Verification Annex.

- 10. Upon completion of an inspection, the inspection team will meet with representatives of the Bundeswehr Verification Centre (ZVBw) and personnel responsible for the facility to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities, in accordance with paragraph 60 of Part II of the Verification Annex.

- 11. The activities of the inspection team will be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the Host State and disturbance to the facility or area inspected. The inspection team will avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of the facility and avoid affecting its safety.

Section 6

Support and Privileges and Immunities

12. In accordance with the Convention, the OPCW and its inspection teams will enjoy the applicable privileges and immunities, in particular those set forth under its Article VIII and Section B of Part II of the Verification Annex for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the Host State, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions.
13. The Host State is to provide the necessary support in accordance with Part II of the Verification Annex.

Section 7

Costs

Any cost arising out of the conduct of verification activities at the facility, at the port of disembarkation, or any other area as specified in this Arrangement will be borne by the OPCW.

Section 8

Attachments

The Attachments form an integral part of this Arrangement. Any reference to the Arrangement includes the Attachments. However, in case of any inconsistency between this Arrangement and any Attachment, the sections of the Arrangement will prevail.

Section 9

Amendments and Modifications

14. Amendments to the sections of this Arrangement may be proposed by either Participant and will be jointly decided upon and take effect under the same conditions as provided for under Section 11.
15. Modifications to the Attachments of this Arrangement may be jointly decided upon at any time by the representative of the OPCW and representative of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, each being specifically authorised to do so. The Director-General will inform the Council about any such modifications. Each Participant to this Arrangement may revoke its consent to a modification not later than four weeks after it has been decided upon. After this time period, the modification will take effect.

Section 10

Settlement of Disputes

Any dispute between the Participants that may arise out of the application or interpretation of this Arrangement will be settled in accordance with Article XIV of the Convention.

Section 11 Taking Effect

The Arrangement will provisionally apply as from the date it is jointly decided upon between the representative of the OPCW and representative of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, each being specifically authorised to do so, and will take effect upon approval by the Council and signature by the two Participants. If there is more than one date of signature, the latest date will be the date from which this Arrangement will become effective.

Section 12 Duration and Termination

This Arrangement will cease to have effect no later than 30 days after the completion of the activities by the facility, as certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with this Arrangement.

The undersigned representatives of the OPCW and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively, have signed this Arrangement in two copies in English.

For the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany:

For the OPCW:

Christoph Israng
Permanent Representative to the OPCW

Ahmet Üzümcü
Director-General

Date

Date

Place signed

Place signed

Attachment 1. General Factors for Planning Purposes and Verification Arrangements

General Factors for Planning Purposes

16. The destruction process will consist of four phases. Phases may run concurrently.
 - (a) Phase I – destruction of 2 chloroethanol
 - (b) Phase II – destruction of tributylamine
 - (c) Phase III – destruction of phosphorous trichloride (PCl₃)
 - (d) Phase IV – destruction of thionyl chloride (SOCl₂)
17. The disposition of the discharged and decontaminated ISO-tanks will be arranged bilaterally between the Libyan owner and the Host Nation.
18. The identity of the chemicals will be confirmed at an OPCW designated laboratory. The OPCW and GEKA will accept this analysis.
19. Estimated frequency and duration of inspections:
 - (a) At the port of disembarkation: one inspection upon the receipt of the chemicals and hand over to the Host State; duration of the inspection will be decided in consultation with the Host State, depending on necessary activities; and
 - (b) At the facility: provided that the monitoring and recording equipment installed at the facility for the purpose of verification is fully functional, one inspection at the end of each phase of destruction operations and one inspection every two months for an estimated duration of up to three (3) days for each inspection.
20. Inspections will be notified, to the extent possible, a minimum of fourteen days in advance and, in any case, not later than five days in advance.
21. The inspection team will consist of no more than four persons.
22. Two representatives of the possessor State may accompany the inspection team to witness arrival of the chemicals and completion of each phase of the destruction operations
23. The planned period of inspection will be notified in advance.
24. Inspections at the port of disembarkation and the facility will take place only on working days (Monday to Friday) and, to the extent possible, during administrative working hours (7:00 to 18:00). No inspection will take place on the following holidays in 2016: 3 October (Day of German Unity), 1 November (All Saints' Day), 25 December (Christmas Day), 26 December (Boxing Day) as well as in 2017: 27 February (Carneval Monday), 14 April (Good Friday), 17 April (Easter Monday), 1 May (Labour Day), 25 May (Ascension Day), 5 June (Whit Monday),

15 June (Corpus Christi), 3 October (Day of German Unity), 1 November (All Saints' Day), 25 December (Christmas Day), 26 December (Boxing Day)

Incineration Destruction Process (2 chloroethanol and tributylamine)

25. The Incineration Plant No. 1 ("Munster-1") at the facility is designed to destroy chemical warfare agents, contaminated materials and comparable hazardous waste by thermal decomposition. The incinerator will be used for the incineration of 2 chloroethanol.
26. The Incineration Plant No. 2 ("Munster-2") is a plasma arc system designed to destroy various materials, such as contaminated soil, contaminated materials and comparable hazardous waste by high level plasma technology. The combustion furnace (afterburner) of the plasma arc system will be used for the incineration of tributylamine.
27. The tanks containing tributylamine will be stored in a temporary holding area in the southern area of the facility (AUL0001). One tank, containing 2 chloroethanol will be stored adjacent to Incineration Plant 1.
28. The 2 chloroethanol will be transferred to the incineration reactor via a direct piping system installed between the tank and the incinerator. A flow meter will record the transfer of 2 chloroethanol from the tank to the incinerator and this data will be recorded.
29. The incinerator will operate at a burning temperature of 800° C – 1,000° C. Under these conditions all 2 chloroethanol will be thermally treated resulting in aqueous non-hazardous sodium chloride. A thermal post-combustion unit is placed beyond the main incineration chamber to ensure complete destruction of all relevant compounds and to meet environmental and legal requirements.
30. The tributylamine will be treated using the afterburner of the plasma arc system. Each ISO tank will be pumped through a flow meter which will be recorded. Three tributylamine tanks will be pumped sequentially into an underground holding tank near the pumping station. The contents of the underground storage tank will be pumped into an intermediate tank within the facility. This tank feeds into either the afterburner chamber or the oxygen burner. Should the facility require additional capacity, it may pump directly into the oxygen burner of the plasma arc system. The resulting gases are passed through a denox unit. The reaction products consist of nitrogen, carbon dioxide and water.
31. The flue gas from this process is cooled to a temperature of 70° C and subsequently passed through an acidic and a caustic scrubber respectively, followed by an electrical precipitator, and a carbon filter. In the case of 2 chloroethanol, an oxidation catalyst unit will be used; in the case of tributylamine, the denox unit replaces the need for an oxidation catalyst.
32. The clean off-gas is continuously monitored by an environmental control unit consisting of a FTIR spectrometer, FID analyser, scattered light detector and specific mercury detection unit. All emission data collected from these analytical

devices is sent electronically to the local supervisory authority in accordance with national and European Union regulations.

33. After being discharged the ISO tank containers will be transferred to the Decontamination Area and subjected to a special triple rinse cleaning procedure (heated wash water, detergents). This process will conclude with an analytical test to certify the absence of any residual contaminants.

Neutralisation Destruction Process (phosphorous trichloride (PCl₃) and thionyl chloride (SOCl₂))

34. The neutralisation system under construction (part of M1) will treat the PCl₃ and SOCl₂.
35. The ISO tanks will be stored at the AUL31 in the northern area of the facility.
36. A direct line from the ISO tanks to the reactor will be established.
37. The PCl₃ and SOCl₂ in the ISO tanks will be pumped to the reactor through a flow meter and recorded. The reactor will hold a combination of water and caustic soda. PCl₃ and SOCl₂, respectively, will be pumped at a very slow rate and injected beneath the water level into the caustic soda solution.
38. At this point it will be stirred intensively until hydrolysis is completed. As hydrolysis occurs the temperature of the reaction mass will increase. The temperature increase will be monitored via process data in the control room. The pH will then be adjusted to 7 through the addition of either caustic soda or hydrochloric acid. If necessary, hydrogen peroxide will be added to ensure that oxidation is completed. Due to the exothermic nature of the process, the reaction mass will be circulated through a heat exchanger unit connected to the reactor.
39. Upon completion, the reaction mass will be pumped into Tank 27.
40. Pending the final sample analysis, an approved incineration option may be used and is being kept in readiness for the eventuality, that other by-products might require alternative procedures than hydrolysis.
41. Different methods are under consideration for the disposal of the resulting by-product. The facility will notify the Secretariat when a decision is made.

The Host State is to ensure that:

- (a) The facility treats and disposes of the chemicals in isolation from other chemicals and related material handled at the facility to facilitate the conduct by the OPCW inspection teams of their verification activities.
- (b) The facility isolates any pipelines/flexible hose connections running from the ISO tank to the incineration unit or reactor to ensure that they cannot be diverted. These pipelines/flexible hose connections are also to be accessible for physical inspection at any time by the OPCW inspection teams. The

chemicals to be disposed of are to be isolated so that the material can be traced and tracked from the storage location to the point of destruction. Any potential routes for diversion will be monitored via Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and recorded.

Verification Arrangements

42. The Host State is to allow and facilitate the conduct by the OPCW inspection teams of the necessary verification measures in respect of the chemicals and the facility, in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its Verification Annex, as well as this Arrangement, at the port of disembarkation, or any other area as specified in this Arrangement, during transit and at the facility for the purpose of confirming the identity and quantity of the chemicals received and destroyed, and to provide assurance that no chemical is diverted.
43. In particular and without prejudice to the conduct of additional activities as the OPCW inspection teams may reasonably require, the Host State is to allow and facilitate the conduct by the OPCW inspection teams of the verification activities specified below:
 - (a) access of OPCW inspection teams, subject to safety requirements, to storage or other relevant areas at the port of disembarkation to verify the receipt of the chemicals, including the integrity of the sealed ISO tank containers;
 - (b) access of OPCW inspection teams, subject to safety requirements, to the facility, including agreed-upon areas of the facility where the chemicals will be stored upon their arrival at the facility and where operations related to the destruction operations take place, including storage areas;
 - (c) The quantity of chemicals will be confirmed through the use of flow meters that will monitor the chemicals being pumped from each ISO tank. Flow meter data will be recorded and made available to the inspection team;
 - (d) CCTV cameras will be installed at each storage location to ensure non-diversion. Additionally, CCTV cameras will be installed and recorded at the following locations:
 - (i) flow meter measuring the transfer of 2 chloroethanol from the ISO tanks into the process;
 - (ii) flow meter measuring the transfer of tributylamine from the ISO tank to the underground tanks;
 - (iii) inside the pumping station (M-2) to monitor the non-diversion;
 - (iv) inside the facility (M-2) two cameras to monitor internal piping points where possible diversion could occur;
 - (v) flow meter measuring of the transfer of PCl_3 and $SOCl_2$ from the ISO tank into the hydrolysis process;

- (vi) if required, additional cameras and/or seals will be agreed between the Secretariat and the Host State; and
 - (vii) the inspection team may confirm, through physical access of OPCW inspection teams and/or by monitoring through CCTV cameras and/or reviewing video recordings of such CCTV cameras and/or process parameters, the temporary storage, treatment, and destruction of the chemicals;
- (e) sampling and analysis to confirm destruction:
- (i) to confirm the destruction process, samples will be taken from the residue of the destruction process; and
 - (ii) sample taking, handling, splitting, and analysis will be conducted by the facility, with its equipment and procedures, in the presence of the OPCW inspection team;
- (f) access to, as applicable, relevant monitoring and process data, weighing data; operational records (i.e. as applicable, shipping and receipt documents, hazardous waste manifests, flow-meter records, agreed process trend data, weight tickets, agreed calibration records, results of analyses conducted by the facility for their own operational and regulatory purposes relevant to the destruction of the chemicals, etc.);
- (g) any CCTV camera installed for the purpose of verification in relation to contemplated activities will be connected to a recording device, with the capability to record 24 hours per day using a daily dedicated medium for 31 days in a monthly cycle. Recorded media will be stored pending review of the inspection team; and
- (h) upon arrival at the facility, the OPCW inspection teams will be briefed by the facility's representatives, with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate, on the activities carried out at the facility, safety measures, and administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the visit.
44. Notwithstanding the above, for the conduct of their verification activities, the Host State will observe the rights of the OPCW inspection teams as set forth in Section E of Part II and, as applicable, paragraphs 62, and 65 to 70 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex, including but not limited to the right of unimpeded access to storage or other relevant areas at the port of disembarkation, all parts of the facility, including any temporary holding/storage area therein; the right to interview any facility personnel; the right to inspect documentation and records; the right to have photographs taken; the right to apply seals on containers with chemicals to facilitate an accurate inventory thereof; the right to tag, for sampling; and the right to have samples taken and to perform analysis of such samples as appropriate.

45. The Host State will report to the Technical Secretariat on the receipt of the chemicals and their destruction. Inspection teams of the OPCW will verify the reported information in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and as specified below.
46. After verification of the completion of the destruction of the chemicals, the Technical Secretariat will confirm the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of the Chemicals as reported by the Host State by issuing a completion certificate.

Working space

47. The Host State is to ensure that working space for the OPCW inspection teams is provided at the facility for the purpose of the review of the records and recorded media and any other related verification activities in a lockable room located at the facility, able to accommodate up to four (4) OPCW inspection team members and associated equipment on a continuous or intermittent basis.
48. If required, the Host State is to allow for set up of one gas chromatograph-mass spectrophotometer (GC-MS) within the facility laboratory or another identified suitable location.
49. If required, the Host State will provide a separate working space for up to two representatives of the Possessor State accompanying the inspection team.

Monitoring equipment

50. The Host State is to ensure the provision of:
 - (a) the requisite instrumentation and recording equipment to verify that the chemicals have been treated and disposed of; and
 - (b) a sufficient number of CCTV cameras to cover the activities set forth in subparagraph 26(d) above.
51. The Technical Secretariat will be notified within 48 hours of the failure of either the CCTV or recording equipment.
52. Subject to the requirements set forth in subparagraph 26(d)(vi) above, any request from the OPCW inspection team for the Host State or the facility to install additional CCTV cameras will be made in writing by an authorised member of the inspection team using the form contained in Attachment 2. Costs incurred by the Host State or the facility in relation to such request will be borne by the OPCW, unless agreed otherwise.

Attachment 2. Amenities

53. At the request of the OPCW, the Host State will provide or arrange for the provision of the following amenities for the inspection team and up to two representatives of the Possessor State:
- a. Vehicles: Ground transportation will be arranged by the Host State to transport the inspection team and equipment from the Point of Entry to the port of disembarkation and/or the facility and to the Point of Exit. The Host State will provide transportation from/to lodging facilities and the port of disembarkation and/or the facility.
 - b. Lodging: The Host State will arrange adequate lodging.
 - c. Other amenities as may be requested by the inspection team, including medical assistance due to reasons not related to the conduct of verification activities at the port of disembarkation or the facility.
54. Any cost incurred by the Host State in relation to the provision or arrangement of the provision of the amenities listed above (including Attachment 1 para. 6) will be borne by the OPCW.
55. Any request by the inspection team for the provision of amenities will be conveyed to the Host State using the following form.

**REQUEST FOR AND CERTIFICATION OF AMENITIES
TO BE PROVIDED OR ARRANGED**

Date: _____

Facility: Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), Munster

Inspection number: _____

Category of amenities requested: _____

Description of amenities requested: _____

Approval of the request by the Host State: _____

Comments on the request by the Host State: _____

Indication of the costs for the amenities requested _____

Certification of the authorised member of the inspection team that the requested amenities have been provided _____

Comments by the authorised member of the inspection team in regard to the quality of the amenities provided _____

Name and signature of the authorised member of the inspection team _____

Name and signature of the representative of the Host State _____

Attachment 3. Health and Safety Regulations

The following national and facility health and safety regulations are relevant for the performance of verification activities under this Arrangement:

- (a) Rules of conduct
 - (i) Smoking, starting and fuelling fires, and handling naked flame are prohibited in the buildings of the facility.
 - (ii) The incineration plant may be entered only if inspection team members are accompanied by an escort.
 - (iii) When entering the charging area/the displacement room, the NBC mask must be worn.

- (b) Agreed safety measures
 - (i) Low-level perimeter monitoring takes place continuously outside the incineration plant to detect airborne contamination, should it occur.
 - (ii) The inspection team members may use approved safety equipment provided by the OPCW or any equipment provided on site. No other safety equipment may be used during facility inspection.

- (c) Primary safety regulations

Inspectors will be given the appropriate local safety guidance for the potential hazard. Definition of the warning signs that may be posted in the facility:

Meaning of the basic colours:

red	prohibition sign
yellow	safety sign
blue	regulatory sign
green	rescue services, escape routes, first aid

Attachment 4. Additional Areas of Access as referenced in Section 5.3(a) of the Arrangement

At the port of disembarkation:

- Unloading area(s) of the ISO tanks containing the chemicals;
- Temporary holding/storage area(s), prior to the movement of chemicals from the port of disembarkation to the facility;

At the facility:

- The incineration plant used to destroy the chemicals may be visually inspected and inventoried, including:
 - Unloading area(s) as applicable of the ISO tank containers containing the chemicals;
 - Temporary holding area(s);
 - Destruction process area(s);
 - Working space;
 - Facility laboratory.
- Access will be granted to all buildings/structures connected with the destruction of the chemicals in accordance with the existing safety and security regulations and in coordination with representatives of the Bundeswehr Verification Centre (ZVBw) and the personnel of the facility.
- The exact mechanisms for sampling and analysis must be agreed prior to performance of the inspection.
- Approved equipment provided by the OPCW may be used in accordance with local safety regulations.