

**NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT****MEDIUM-TERM PLAN OF THE ORGANISATION  
FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
2017 – 2021****INTRODUCTION**

1. This Medium-Term Plan (MTP) has been prepared for the period from 2017 to 2021. It is intended to endure for several years before it is revised, unless otherwise required by external developments, decisions taken by the Organisation's policy-making organs, or strategic guidance provided by the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Fourth Review Conference"). This MTP replaces the plan for the period from 2015 to 2019 (EC-77/S/1 C-19/S/1, dated 23 April 2014) and provides direction for the annual planning. In accordance with Financial Regulation 3.8, it accompanies the Draft Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2017.
2. In the preamble to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention"), States Parties declare their determination "for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention", making this the ultimate goal of the Organisation.
3. The Organisation's vision is, therefore, to continue to be the premier international organisation working for a world free of chemical weapons, with a focus on preventing their re-emergence, by implementing all provisions of the Convention in an effective, efficient, and non-discriminatory manner.
4. In support of this vision, the mission of the Organisation is to contribute, as a treaty-based international organisation, to the disarmament of chemical weapons, to preventing their re-emergence, to providing assistance and protection against them, to supporting national implementation of the Convention, and to facilitating peaceful uses of chemistry through verification, capacity development, or engagement activities.
5. In order to develop this MTP and to contribute to an integrated strategic direction for the Organisation, a number of assumptions have been made about certain aspects of



the Organisation's external environment in 2021 and its position in relation to this. These assumptions include the following:

- (a) The verified elimination of currently declared chemical weapons stockpiles will remain on track for completion in the Russian Federation and in the United States of America. The verified elimination of non-stockpile chemical weapons (recovered abandoned and old chemical weapons) will continue.
  - (b) New States Parties may join the Convention as chemical weapons possessor States.
  - (c) Due to knowledge about chemical weapons being in the public domain and in view of confirmed reports of recent use of chemical weapons, the use or threat of use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, especially terrorist groups, but also organised criminal groups and individuals, will continue to represent a serious concern and the Organisation will need to strengthen its capabilities to deal with non-State actors.
  - (d) Chemical weapons-related knowledge and expertise will be retained by the Organisation, combined with a rapidly deployable surge capacity in case of requests for challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs), and in support of other contingency operations.
  - (e) Advances in science and technology will continue to evolve at an accelerated pace, driven by an increasing convergence of scientific disciplines, scientific collaboration at both national and international levels, and innovative funding strategies. Enabling technologies will be adopted into daily life and become operational across a broad range of industries and sectors. Especially relevant for the Convention is their use in chemical production and disposal applications.
  - (f) The chemical industry will increasingly integrate new technologies into routine use, requiring the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") to have familiarity with broader ranges of production equipment and processes.
  - (g) The Organisation will fund new priorities in the areas of verification, capacity development, engagement, and organisational governance, despite financial constraints as currently experienced by several Member States.
  - (h) The approaching completion of global chemical weapons disarmament will require that the Organisation re-prioritise the current seven core objectives in a way that is responsive to changing strategic circumstances, and with a focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
6. Efforts to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons will comprise activities in traditional results areas of the Organisation, and will contain elements of verification, capacity development, improved national implementation, effective national protective programmes, engagement with relevant stakeholders through education and outreach activities, promotion of responsible use of science, the continued pursuit of

universality, as well as the monitoring of relevant new developments in science and technology. Dependable results will require implementing activities in each of these areas in a coherent and systematic manner.

7. In light of the complexity of such a holistic approach to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, achieving and measuring results will be a more complex task than was hitherto the case, cutting across the traditional programmatic areas of the Organisation. This will require enhanced resilience and adaptive capacity, including through the adoption of additional new, project-based working methods and tools; continued focus on improving results-based management (RBM); and strengthened knowledge-management structures and processes.
8. Utilising these three strategic enablers, the Organisation will continue to achieve results in four broad areas of activities: verification, capacity development, engagement, and staying fit for purpose over the coming years. This document contributes to achieving the Organisation's vision through the formulation of medium-term goals in each of the four results areas, which are further supported by a set of key indicators of achievement for the period up to 2021. The Annex to this document provides an overview of the key elements in the medium-term implementation of the Convention.

## **VERIFICATION FOR CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE**

### **Medium-term goal 1: Support built for re-balancing the Convention's verification regime from disarmament to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons**

9. With the increasing achievement of results in the area of disarmament of declared chemical weapons, preventing their re-emergence will assume greater importance in order for the Organisation to stay relevant. While the scope of activities to be conducted to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons goes beyond the Convention's verification regime, the shift will be significant here too, with the dramatic reduction of destruction related verification activities from 2016 onwards.
10. For the maintenance of a viable verification regime that continues to ensure confidence in compliance, the Organisation will need to build support, both within the Secretariat and among States Parties, in order to adapt its verification practices. These will have to be based to a greater extent than before on the use of credible information to augment analytical capabilities within the Secretariat.
11. The key performance indicators (KPIs) for the period to 2021 are as follows:
  - (a) Endorsement by the Fourth Review Conference in 2018 of the re-focussing from disarmament to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
  - (b) Support by the policy-making organs (PMO) for the Secretariat to develop a more evidence-based approach to verifying compliance with the Convention.
  - (c) Retention and augmentation of chemical weapons-related knowledge in the Secretariat for the purpose of being able to address concerns about non-State

actors, potential new possessor States, and relevant new technologies that could become available.

**Medium-term goal 2: Augmented routine verification activities with a risk management system**

12. Evaluation and verification of declared data, utilising on-site inspections, will remain an essential part of the Organisation's routine verification activities. In order to maintain the alignment of the verification regime with the goal of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the Organisation will enhance its analytical capabilities, putting in place a system that is geared towards the compilation, validation, and evaluation of information, with a view to enabling a more holistic assessment of risks to the Convention and how it is implemented.
13. The Organisation will also address the relevance of a broader spectrum of toxic chemicals and their precursors that may fall within its mandate, ranging from toxic industrial chemicals, to bioregulators, to chemicals used for example in medicine or law enforcement, including those acting on the central nervous system.
14. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
  - (a) The Secretariat assists States Parties in submitting all their declarations in a timely, complete, and accurate manner through a conceptually new approach that includes additional consultations with States Parties.
  - (b) The development of a risk management system is supported through the establishment of an augmented verification information management structure, the acquisition and use of additional available databases, and the review and strengthening of the existing Verification Information System.
  - (c) The Secretariat has enhanced the effectiveness and efficiency of verification activities through the increased use of secure electronic information transfers.

**Medium-term goal 3: Enhanced capability of the Organisation to conduct contingency operations**

15. Effective means and tools for consultation, cooperation, and fact finding will continue to be essential for addressing and resolving non-compliance concerns within the framework of the Convention. The Secretariat will accordingly need to maintain the resources, technical competence, operational readiness, and professional skills needed to facilitate consultation and cooperation, deliver assistance, conduct CIs, IAUs, and other contingency operations, such as OPCW fact-finding missions, or joint missions with other international organisations. To mitigate any loss of chemical weapons-related knowledge and expertise, the Secretariat will develop new concepts, measures, and partnerships to enable it to maintain readiness to conduct contingency operations.

16. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) The Organisation has increased the efficiency and effectiveness of structures and processes to learn from contingency operations and implement lessons learned for future use. In this context, the Secretariat has enhanced its capability to use satellite imagery and other remote verification methods for the conduct of all types of contingency operations. Options have been identified and developed to allow the Organisation to respond to more than one possible chemical weapons exigency at a time.
  - (b) The Organisation has developed a knowledge management strategy with a particular emphasis on preventing the loss of knowledge related to chemical weapons—including, for example, their production, detection, and destruction—in the Secretariat through a pro-active approach to knowledge retention and transfer.

**Medium-term goal 4: Strengthened capability of the Organisation to monitor scientific and technological developments of relevance to the Convention**

17. Effective implementation of the verification regime in all aspects will be guided by technological change. This will require continuous review of science and technology advances, in particular detection, analysis, countermeasures, and protection technologies. Relevant units of the Secretariat, including the OPCW Laboratory, along with partner designated laboratories, will explore new technologies with a view to augmenting the Organisation's capabilities. This will also involve increasing efficiencies in the use of resources through, for example, the engagement with the wider science and technology community.
18. Developments in science and technology will inform the Organisation's course of action in developing enhanced capabilities to monitor a broader spectrum of relevant toxic chemicals falling within its mandate. In this context, the Organisation will use relevant advice from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), as well as augmented in-house scientific and technical resources.
19. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) The Organisation has an ongoing, robust, and flexible system in place to review science and technology relevant to the Convention. To this end, it has specialised staff competent in extracting information from large amounts of data, information tools for handling such large data sets, and strengthened contacts with relevant international organisations, academia, and chemical industry.
  - (b) The Secretariat has augmented state-of-the-art methods and technologies for sampling and analysis at its disposal, ensures that staff are kept abreast of and trained in these, and actively develops capabilities in chemical forensics, incorporating advice from the SAB and in consultation with the Secretariat's network of designated laboratories, including for the analysis of toxins as well as biomedical and other samples.

20. In addition, the Organisation has the necessary tools, procedures, and skilled and experienced staff in place to achieve the four medium-term verification goals, in particular for data monitoring, analysis and interpretation, and independently verifying the accuracy and veracity of information received.

**CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO THE HOSTILE USE OF TOXIC CHEMICALS AND TO FOSTER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**

**Medium-term goal 5: Augmented assistance and protection capabilities of the Organisation in support of its focus on the re-emergence of chemical weapons, both in terms of prevention and response**

21. The Convention is a global instrument for ensuring security against chemical weapons, and different dimensions of capacity development—such as improving national implementation of the Convention and assistance and protection measures against chemical weapons—support this objective, including in relation to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Such re-emergence could manifest itself through the acquisition and/or use of chemical weapons, including by non-State actors. As a result, the relevant provisions of the Convention to prepare for and respond to chemical weapons attacks apply to them too. The Organisation therefore has an important role in contributing to the global fight against terrorism and to the development of a chemical security culture more broadly.
22. As long as there is a possibility of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, there will be a need to maintain and improve the protective capabilities of all States Parties in terms of their domestic response and their ability to assist other States Parties. Such enhanced capabilities exert an important deterrent effect. As the Organisation already works closely with regional and subregional organisations to enhance their capacity to respond effectively to chemical emergencies, it could reach out to such organisations in other suitable regions, thereby strengthening its facilitation of regionally coordinated response measures.
23. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) Recognition by the PMOs of the major contribution of capacity development activities, in particular in the areas of assistance, protection and response measures, to the goal of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.
  - (b) Strengthened in-house expertise of the Secretariat in order to enhance capacity development activities in the area of prevention and response to the hostile release of toxic chemicals, including possible attacks on chemical installations and transportation infrastructure. As part of this, the Organisation will expand its networking with other international organisations in order to prepare for and respond to major incidents involving the hostile use of toxic chemicals by any actor.
  - (c) The Organisation continues to pursue in a systematic manner the establishment of viable regional capacities to respond effectively to incidents of chemical weapons use or the accidental release of toxic chemicals.

- (d) The Organisation has developed into a leading global platform for issues related to chemical security, and for establishing a chemical security culture.

**Medium-term goal 6: Enhanced capacity development for national implementation, and international cooperation**

24. The Secretariat will augment its capacity development portfolio, also with a view to ensuring the long-term engagement of States Parties for which the security benefits of the Convention are less immediate. The Organisation will therefore ensure that capacity development activities are results-oriented, based on national needs assessments, are implemented in an efficient, effective, and sustainable manner, and create added value for the OPCW, so that the peaceful uses of chemistry continue to be promoted.
25. In terms of international cooperation, the Secretariat will continue to identify opportunities and activities that assist States Parties in the development of technical capacities to foster the peaceful use of chemistry. The Secretariat will also continue to help build States Parties' skills and capacities to achieve higher levels of safety and security in civilian chemical facilities. This will be embedded in the Organisation's broader efforts to assist States Parties to create and maintain regulatory frameworks that fully implement the Convention, thereby furthering conditions for economic development and international exchanges.
26. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) The Secretariat continues to provide implementation support to States Parties with a view to 100% of them maintaining a National Authority and 80% of them having enacted national legislation and administrative measures that cover all key areas of the Convention.
- (b) The Secretariat continues to support States Parties with developing economies and economies in transition to create scientific and technological capacities for the effective and efficient implementation of the Convention.
- (c) The Secretariat has expanded its capacity-building toolbox and established new partnerships with science and technology communities, academia, industry, and international entities for the advancement of peaceful, safe, and sustainable uses of chemistry.

**Medium-term goal 7: Strengthened evaluation capabilities of the Secretariat in the area of capacity development**

27. Evaluation is an integrated process of observation, analysis, and assessment of performance to determine the efficiency, effectiveness, and impact of a policy or programme. Given the wide variety and large number of capacity development activities undertaken by different units in the Secretariat, strengthening its evaluation capabilities in this area will be crucial to ensuring that results continue to be achieved in an efficient, effective, and sustainable manner. This will complement the regular risk-based evaluations undertaken by the Office of Internal Oversight.

28. To this end, evaluations of individual capacity development outputs provided by the Secretariat will be both complemented by follow-up analyses of outcomes achieved in relation to the strengthening of national capabilities and aggregated for assessment of the contribution to the overall goals of the Organisation. This will enable the Secretariat to provide credible, evidence-based recommendations to the policy-making organs for strengthening the achievement of results in capacity development.
29. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) Increased support and feedback from States Parties for an enhanced evaluation approach in the Secretariat.
  - (b) Improvement in evaluation capabilities of the Secretariat, including the provision of augmented resources for analysis of outcomes and assessment of impact, in respect of capacity development activities undertaken.
  - (c) Commitment by States Parties to using capacity development provided by the Organisation, and evaluations thereof, to ensure effective implementation of the Convention.

#### **ENGAGEMENT TO UTILISE OTHERS' CAPABILITIES**

##### **Medium-term goal 8: Augmented the Organisation's efforts to reach universality**

30. Achieving universal adherence to the Convention will remain a high priority to ensure the integrity and comprehensive reach of the Convention as a guarantor of global security against chemical weapons. With very few remaining States not Party to the Convention, a tailored approach will be taken to develop concrete proposals, including measures to persuade those countries to reconsider their position. Endeavours to achieve universality will take into account that one or more of the current States not Party may join with a declarable chemical weapons stockpile.
31. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) The further entrenchment of the Convention as a universally accepted global norm against the hostile use of toxic chemicals is utilised in order to continue to pursue its universality.
  - (b) Concrete proposals for the Secretariat and States Parties to continue to persuade non-State Parties to join the Convention are submitted to the Fourth Review Conference for its consideration.

##### **Medium-term goal 9: Enhanced and sustainable collaboration with other international organisations**

32. The complex and often unforeseen nature of challenges the Organisation faces calls for the augmentation of its networking approach with other relevant international and regional organisations and mechanisms. This will benefit the identification of synergies in the activities carried out in cooperation with them. Areas for broader and

deeper engagement are many, ranging from capacity development to the convergence of chemistry and biology—and other sciences—to non-routine verification activities.

33. In this context, the Organisation needs to ensure that its institutional framework remains viable for the future, and to consider new and improved ways of engagement. Two areas particularly suited to such cooperation lie in countering the threat posed by chemical terrorism and in promoting chemical security, including the development of a chemical security culture, where the knowledge, skills, and expertise of its staff will allow the Organisation to play an important role in support of broader global efforts.
34. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
  - (a) The Secretariat has developed and implements a sustainable strategy for enhanced engagement with other international organisations.
  - (b) The Secretariat further explores the widely acknowledged convergence of chemistry, biology, and other sciences, including the possibility of strengthening institutional links with the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and other relevant international organisations.
  - (c) The Organisation has developed into a leader among international organisations in the global fight against chemical terrorism and the promotion of chemical security.

**Medium-term goal 10: Strengthened engagement with broader group of relevant stakeholders**

35. Successful implementation of the Convention cannot be achieved simply through a regulatory approach by national governments. It also requires instilling a sense of ownership into relevant stakeholders in the chemical industry, research, academia, NGOs, and civil society in order to garner their support and active collaboration. Generating and sustaining such support from a broader base of relevant stakeholders will require that the Organisation establish more regular interaction with them with a view to soliciting their views, putting it in a better position to utilise their capabilities. The Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), established in accordance with a decision by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) at its Twentieth Session (C-20/DEC.9, dated 3 December 2015), will support this process. The Organisation will further develop effective networks and new partnerships with different stakeholder communities in order to leverage their expertise to help it address new implementation challenges as they emerge.
36. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
  - (a) Promoting responsible science through appropriate means, including interaction with national and international scientific societies, is considered an important element of implementing the Convention, and has been adopted as a priority by States Parties in their national school and university curricula.
  - (b) A formal network of cooperation with the science and technology community has been established that is of relevance to the Convention, going beyond the

existing network of designated laboratories and including scientific societies, and which is supported by a broad-based education and outreach programme.

- (c) The Organisation has further institutionalised its relationship with the chemical industry globally, through proactive engagement and common projects in support of the Convention.
- (d) The Organisation pursues a more strategic approach to its stakeholder engagement, supported by the ABEO, with a view to ensuring that the Organisation's education and outreach activities are evidence-based, effective, sustainable, and cost effective.

### **AN ORGANISATION THAT REMAINS FIT FOR PURPOSE**

#### **Medium-term goal 11: Adapted structures and processes, where required, in support of the smooth transition of the Organisation**

- 37. Developments in the Organisation's external environment and achievement of some of its objectives—most notably in the verified elimination of declared chemical weapons stockpiles—will require the Organisation to evolve in order to remain fit for purpose. To this end, the Secretariat will have to continue to support key functions of the Organisation in the three results areas discussed above, and to adapt its structures, resources and processes, where necessary, to the new circumstances. Taken together, this will enable the Organisation to demonstrate its continued relevance. In order to achieve as large a buy-in as possible for the transition, the Organisation will make full use of principles such as inclusiveness, transparency, and consensus building.
- 38. The Convention provides sufficient flexibility for the necessary adaptation through policy development, decision making by the policy-making organs, and gradual modifications of work and operational practices. In order to address the impact of anticipated changes on its staffing, the Secretariat has put forward a proposal on how its structure could be adapted, with a view to supporting the full and effective implementation of the Convention with agility and resilience (S/1292/2015, dated 30 June 2015).
- 39. The key KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
  - (a) The Secretariat develops a plan outlining both continuity and change in its organisational structures and processes.
  - (b) Proposals for the smooth transition of organisational structures and processes are endorsed by the Fourth Review Conference in 2018 and subsequently implemented by Council and Secretariat.

#### **Medium-term goal 12: The Organisation remains the global repository of knowledge and expertise in the field of chemical weapons**

- 40. Ensuring that the Organisation remains the global repository of knowledge and expertise in the field of chemical weapons is significantly increased by systematic use of the strategic enablers, knowledge management, and RBM, and by developing an

enhanced adaptive capacity to deal with both anticipated changes and unforeseen challenges. At the same time, it will be important to continue to maintain organisational structures and processes that have proven their value in achieving the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention and that can be expected to continue to do so.

41. The KPIs for the period to 2021 are as follows:
- (a) Knowledge management strategies, structures and processes that are aligned with the strategic direction of the Organisation and support the delivery of its medium-term goals are in place, consistently implemented, and regularly updated.
  - (b) Policies, structures, and processes that support the full implementation of RBM, while at the same time allowing for a sufficient degree of resilience and adaptive capacity in the Secretariat, are in place and regularly updated.

**Medium-term goal 13: Enhanced capacities to facilitate collaboration among ad hoc groups of States Parties**

42. The Secretariat will augment its capabilities to support the use of the OPCW as a platform for the deliberation of issues related to the object and purpose of the Convention that are of interest to a subset of States Parties. In its role as convenor, the Secretariat will seek to be inclusive, establish a neutral space to ensure an impartial process, overcome institutional impediments, and arrive at action and implementation plans that further strengthen the Convention. Issues that may benefit from such an approach are varied and cut across the three results areas discussed above.
43. The KPI for the period to 2021 is as follows:
- (a) Sustainable Secretariat capabilities for Member States to convene on issues of interest to groups of them are developed to ensure results-oriented and smooth deliberative processes on such issues.

**CONCLUSIONS**

44. The Secretariat submits this MTP to accompany the 2017 Programme and Budget of the Organisation, and in order to advance its transition process, so that it can continue to build on the successes of Convention implementation since 1997. Based on the knowledge and expertise acquired, the Organisation has started a transition process that will allow it to remain a multilateral security instrument that responds to, and is seen to respond to, the evolution of its strategic context. States Parties' continued contributions to this process will be crucial to its success.
45. In order to continue to achieve the goals of the Convention, the transition process will require that the Organisation's verification system be further developed to enhance its monitoring and analytical capabilities while retaining core expertise, and that its capacity development and engagement efforts be strengthened through enhanced capacities to analyse and respond to the implementation needs of States Parties.

Combined with the improvements in organisational governance outlined above, this will enable the Organisation to remain fit for purpose, and to lead the way in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

46. The Conference is scheduled to hold the Fourth Review Conference during the period covered by this MTP, namely in November 2018. Any strategic guidance emanating from this Review Conference will be analysed with a view to updating this MTP.

Annex (English only):           Key Elements in the Medium-Term Implementation of the  
Chemical Weapons Convention

## Annex

### KEY ELEMENTS IN THE MEDIUM-TERM IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

