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MEDIUM-TERM PLAN FOR THE PERIOD FROM 2015 TO 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This Medium-Term Plan (MTP) covers the period from 2015 to 2019, and aims to provide strategic direction in the context of a highly dynamic environment, bearing in mind that the end point of the Organisation's evolution is not yet clear. It sets the direction for the annual Programme and Budget in the medium term, though it is recognised that decisions made by the OPCW policy-making organs during the period covered could affect the MTP's content.
2. In support of the Organisation's mission and vision—i.e. to secure a world free of chemical weapons so that citizens are less at risk of the threat or use of such weapons—the MTP focuses on four strategic enablers. These support the Organisation's seven core objectives, which remain unchanged and must be implemented in an efficient and effective manner. In order to be as well placed as possible to deal with the challenges arising for the Organisation, the MTP addresses as strategic enablers results-based management (RBM), knowledge management, resilience, and engagement. In other words, it covers both the expected results and the enabling methodologies.
3. Delivering results will help to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention"), notably that an effective verification regime remains in place and is improved where necessary, and that capacity is developed that is relevant and tailored to the circumstances of States Parties, thus providing a high level of assurance among States Parties that chemical weapons are neither developed nor used and that the peaceful use of chemicals is not hampered.
4. In support of this, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") must be fit for purpose, and to this end will:
 - collaborate horizontally by fostering national implementation as the foundation for verification, which in turn supports capacity development to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons;
 - make effective use of relevant developments in science and technology, including information technology (IT);



- augment its adaptive capacity and seek to manage uncertainty in a dynamic and fast-changing world;
 - generate new insight on the basis of past experience and existing knowledge;
 - have the right workforce with the right skills and in the right place;
 - excel in the engagement of external actors; and
 - remain conscious of costs and seek only the funding required to achieve the expected results.
5. Delivery of the expected results depends not only on the Secretariat but also on the actions taken by States Parties and the policy-making organs in implementation of the Convention.
6. This MTP contains four sections: (i) background; (ii) objectives and strategic enablers for 2015 to 2019, with a brief explanation of their rationale (anchored to the Organisation's core objectives); (iii) relevant challenges and opportunities in a highly dynamic international environment and their potential impact on Convention implementation; and (iv) the positioning of the Organisation to achieve results in support of the object and purpose of the Convention, while building on its past success.

BACKGROUND

7. This MTP has been prepared for the period from 2015 to 2019. Its duration has been extended by two years in order to align it with the review conference cycle. It covers the period until the outcome of the next review conference is clear, and takes into account the Organisation's annual programming and budgeting cycle. The MTP is intended to endure for several years before it is revised, unless otherwise required by external developments, decisions taken by the Organisation's policy-making organs, or strategic guidance provided by the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This MTP replaces the 2013 to 2015 plan (EC-70/S/1/Rev.1 C-17/S/1/Rev.1, dated 12 July 2013) and provides direction for the annual planning. In accordance with Financial Regulation 3.8, it accompanies the Draft Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2015 and, until it is revised, also subsequent years.
8. This MTP supports the Organisation's overall vision: to secure a world free of chemical weapons.
9. Building on its successes over the past 17 years, the Organisation continues to pursue its mission. In preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, the OPCW contributes to global peace and security by delivering results in respect of all its core objectives—centred on the ultimate beneficiary of full implementation of the Convention—and by being resilient, innovative, and influential.
10. The content of this MTP has been informed by several factors, including:
- (a) recommendations made by the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

(hereinafter “the Third Review Conference”), as contained in its final document RC-3/3*, dated 19 April 2013;

- (b) the core objectives that were approved as part of the Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2005 by the Conference of the States Parties at its Ninth Session (C-9/DEC.14, dated 2 December 2004);
- (c) a supplementary analysis by the Secretariat that scans the longer-term horizon in the coming decade; and
- (d) the higher visibility gained by the Organisation as a result of its work relating to the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons which, in addition to being awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, made 2013 a watershed for the Organisation.

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC ENABLERS

11. The seven core objectives of the Organisation, namely chemical demilitarisation, non-proliferation, assistance and protection, international cooperation, universality, national implementation, and organisational effectiveness (see the Annex hereto for the full wording) will continue to serve as the fundamental guidance for the Organisation, and need to be pursued in a coordinated, balanced and mutually reinforcing manner. Given the current plans for chemical weapons destruction efforts in possessor States, the Convention verification regime will see fundamental changes after 2016, and some rebalancing in the implementation of the core objectives will likely be required during the period covered by this MTP.
12. RBM is one of the strategic enablers for this MTP period. A concerted effort must be undertaken to move towards its full and effective implementation across the Organisation, by systematically aligning results across the different results categories, and by simultaneously developing core RBM pillars: planning and budgeting, evaluation and monitoring, accountability and partnerships, leadership, and statistics.¹ After RBM was used for the first time in the Organisation’s 2011 Programme and Budget, the Third Review Conference “encouraged the Secretariat to further improve ... the implementation of RBM” (subparagraph 9.155(j) of document RC-3/3*). RBM will also incorporate augmented risk management. Fully embedding effective RBM and risk management into the work of the Organisation will take at least the full medium-term period and will require the Secretariat, policy-making organs, and States Parties to join forces to this end.
13. More effective knowledge management will be developed and deployed across the Secretariat. In 2013, the Secretariat started to develop comprehensive concepts for more systematic knowledge management, with the aim that the OPCW remain the global repository of knowledge and expertise with regard to chemical weapons disarmament, the verification of their non-possession and non-use, and their destruction, and that the Secretariat will be able to ensure continuity in its knowledge

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These pillars were first discussed in depth in a development context during the Third International Roundtable – Managing for Development Results, Hanoi, Viet Nam, 5 to 8 February 2007 (summary of proceedings available at http://www.mfdr.org/RT3/SOP/SummaryofProceedings_web.pdf).

base and expertise in these areas. The Third Review Conference added impetus to this initiative (see paragraph 9.14 and subparagraph 9.155(h) of document RC-3/3*). Profound insights into science and technology will continue to be at the centre of Convention-related knowledge, and to inform both verification and capacity-development activities.

14. Increasing the resilience and adaptive capacity of the Organisation is necessary, in particular in this time of rapid change, while preserving all core capabilities and capacities for chemical disarmament and verification. The Third Review Conference recognised that “new challenges related to the Convention continue to arise and that its implementation may need to be improved to continue to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention and to stay abreast of developments in science and technology” (paragraph 9.9 of document RC-3/3*). During the Third Review Conference, States Parties also expressed their intention “to continue providing the Organisation ... with the support that it requires in order to ... deal more effectively with future opportunities and challenges” (paragraph 9.13 of document RC-3/3*). Both anticipated changes and unforeseen challenges, such as the short-notice verification requirement of a chemical weapons destruction programme, demonstrate the need for the right tools and processes, and flexibility in problem solving. Such flexibility is also required for capacity development, which has to be tailored to recipients' needs and, to a large extent, is demand-driven. New insights provided by the assessment of developments in science and technology will be crucial. Sufficient adaptive capacity will allow the Organisation to continue operations without a negative impact on ongoing core functions.
15. The Organisation, including all States Parties, needs to pursue a more systematic and sustainable policy of engagement with relevant external stakeholders. The improvement of such interactions—including education and outreach as well as the involvement of the science and technology community, academia, and the chemical industry—was encouraged by the Third Review Conference in order to further the Organisation’s core objectives (see, for example, subparagraphs 9.79(e), 9.131(l), 9.155(d), and 9.155(n) of document RC-3/3*). Broader and deeper engagement and capacity development will contribute to a more discernible impact on the Organisation’s activities and outputs.
16. In summary, the seven core objectives of the Organisation and the four strategic enablers for the 2015 to 2019 period address both the results that the Organisation plans to achieve during the period of this MTP and how it intends to achieve them. Paragraphs 28 onwards provide more detail.


CHALLENGES IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT

17. The external environment in which the Organisation operates is changing constantly, and at an accelerating pace. The various relevant political, economic, social and technological systems are growing in size and becoming ever more interwoven. Diverse groups of actors are engaging in these dynamic systems for multifaceted pursuits, creating complex environments in which cause and effect relationships can be difficult to establish or control. The recent global financial crisis and the tumultuous events in chemical disarmament in 2013 provide examples of this

phenomenon. Some of the challenges and uncertainties that may have an impact on the implementation of the Convention are discussed in this section.

18. The continuing evolution of the global political and security environment continues to impact upon the Organisation. Instability and conflict exist in several parts of the world and may have an impact on the operation of the Organisation, given the global reach of its activities.
19. As in the political sphere, the world's economic balance of power is shifting significantly: the largest economies are likely to be controlled by different countries than in the past. This trend is reflected in the shift of chemical production capacities between countries, which reinforces the need for increased support and assistance by the Secretariat for the full and effective implementation of the Convention.
20. Different actors in different environments can have an impact—be it positive or negative—on the Convention's implementation. On the one hand, such actors can pose challenges for the Organisation's on-site activities. On the other hand, social actors in academia and think tanks with an interest in supporting the Convention's implementation may be able to make valuable contributions to the Organisation's work. Furthermore, the rapidly increasing use of an ever wider range of social media across the globe could move societal verification closer to reality, but could also support disruptive social actors. The Organisation needs to keep itself apprised of the relevant dimensions.
21. Profound insight into science and technology underpins the effective implementation of all of the Convention's operational articles, from Article II to Article XI. The relevance of science and technology to Convention implementation is acknowledged in the Convention itself, e.g. in the existence of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and the mandate of review conferences to "review scientific and technological developments" (subparagraph 21(h) of Article VIII of the Convention). The Third Review Conference acknowledged the increasing pace of science and technology developments, encouraged States Parties and the Secretariat to keep the convergence of the sciences under review, and recognised the need to create greater awareness of the Convention's implementation and the responsible use of chemistry among a broader range of stakeholders (see paragraph 9.141 and subparagraphs 9.155(c), (d), (i), and (n) of document RC-3/3*). Another dimension of technology is that the most significant technological advances for how actors in the political, economic and social spheres relate to one another are in IT and social media.
22. In the light of the changing environment and the lack of a clear image of the end state of the OPCW's evolution, four equally plausible scenarios (as set out in Figure 1) are discussed hereinafter, in order to trigger the necessary resilience and adaptive capacity. The scenarios differ along two key uncertainties: (i) the level of conflict and/or chemical weapons use, and (ii) the resources available.

Figure 1: Potential medium-term scenarios



23. In the “Resurgence” scenario, both the level of conflict, including the potential for chemical weapons use, and the availability of resources are high. States Parties to the Convention are concerned with the proliferation and/or use of chemical weapons by either state or substate actors. Organisational capacities to deal not only with routine inspections but also with challenge inspections (CIs) and investigations of alleged use (IAUs) are well maintained and have the full support of Member States. The Organisation also devotes significant efforts to developing assistance and protection capabilities. On the other hand, such a focus would leave relatively fewer resources for fostering the peaceful use of chemistry, education, and outreach.
24. The “Mission Improbable” scenario also assumes a high level of conflict, including the potential for chemical weapons use, but little resources are made available to the Organisation. Accompanying a broader crisis of confidence in international institutions, the OPCW budget has shrunk significantly and states are increasingly relying on self-help mechanisms (including alliances of the willing), at the expense of multilateral solutions, to deal with old and new security threats. The dearth of funds also hampers the Organisation’s capacity to maintain a credible verification system and foster the peaceful use of chemistry.
25. A third scenario, “Complacency”, assumes a less conflictual international system in which the potential for chemical weapons threats or use is low. Chemical weapons demilitarisation is seen as a success which requires far less resources for its completion. Owing to the cooperative relations among states, the maintenance of a robust industry verification system is given lower priority. The financial pressures still experienced by many Member States lead to a shrinking budget as the key goal of the Organisation, i.e. to rid the world of chemical weapons, is regarded as largely accomplished.
26. The “Civilian Uses” scenario is based on little conflict and a low likelihood of chemical weapons use, combined with a generous financial climate. This leads to decreased budgets for security-related aspects, but more resources for international


cooperation and assistance, national implementation, capacity building, and the demonstration of compliance through a robust industry verification regime.

27. None of these four scenarios should be expected to materialise exactly as described above. The actual future is likely to contain elements of several of these scenarios, and will be co-determined by the decisions of the policy-making organs. The value of using scenarios lies in ensuring that plans, and the management decisions made by the Director-General in the medium term, are resilient enough to be effective in any scenario. Developing such resilience also needs to take into account the possibility of transitions from one scenario to the other.

ACHIEVING RESULTS

28. The full and effective implementation of the Organisation's core objectives may become more difficult to achieve in a dynamic environment. However, by focusing more on results instead of inputs, improving knowledge management, augmenting the Organisation's adaptive capacity, and pursuing more systematic and sustainable engagement with external stakeholders, the Organisation will be placed in the best possible position to realise the object and purpose of the Convention, irrespective of which shape the future takes.
29. In line with standard RBM practice, three categories of results are distinguished: outputs, outcomes, and impact. Inputs and activities precede outputs. While inputs and activities (i.e. the efficient use of resources) are essential within the context of the Secretariat, outcomes and impact may be influenced by the Secretariat but are largely within the control of States Parties. Outputs depend on joint efforts between the Secretariat and States Parties. Uncertainties exist and must be managed, with a focus on activities, outputs, and outcomes. Figure 2 shows the results chain, including where the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness sit and where indicators should be used to measure performance.

Figure 2: The results chain from inputs to impact



30. Four cross-cutting areas of activity—verification, capacity development, engagement, and organisational governance—are discussed below. This is done in light of their relationship with the strategic enablers, the challenges associated with the four scenarios, and the results to be achieved.

Achieving results in verification

31. Activities to achieve results in verification will undergo the most significant change during the period covered by this MTP. Although such activities will continue to directly support core objectives 1 and 2 (see Annex), the drastic reduction in chemical weapons destruction after 2016 will result in a rebalancing of on-site verification activities related to disarmament and non-proliferation.
32. The Third Review Conference reaffirmed that the complete destruction of chemical weapons and the conversion or complete destruction of chemical weapons production facilities are essential for the realisation of the object and purpose of the Convention. It also noted that the OPCW has established a verification system that meets the requirements of the Convention. It further noted that the verification system should continue to be improved in a manner consistent with the Convention in response to advances in science and technology (paragraphs 9.46 and 9.71 of document RC-3/3*).
33. The realisation of core objectives 1 and 2 is related to the strategic enablers in a number of ways. For example, the projected reduction in the verification of destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles has a direct impact on knowledge management within the Organisation, a strategic enabler for this MTP period. The Third Review Conference stressed the importance for the Secretariat to maintain verification expertise relating to chemical weapons, and requested the policy-making organs to support this objective (subparagraph 9.79(c) of document RC-3/3*). Given the turnover of staff in both the Secretariat and States Parties, improved knowledge

management, in particular in relation to core objective 1, is urgent. Improved knowledge management can also contribute to enhanced adaptive capacity and improved resilience when, because of unforeseen, rapid external developments, a larger number of experts with chemical weapons-related knowledge is required on a temporary basis.

34. Verification requirements and capabilities can be expected to vary under the four scenarios mentioned above. In the Resurgence scenario, both the demand for verification results and the organisational capacities to provide them will be high. In contrast, under the Mission Improbable scenario, demand may be high, but the provision of verification services will pose a challenge due to scarce resources. The Complacency scenario is likely to see low levels of verification activities because of the lack of perceived need and correspondingly reduced budgets. Under the Civilian Uses scenario, and in the absence of perceived security threats from chemical weapons, verification activities are likely to focus on Article VI verification.
35. The aim of the verification regime is to provide confidence among State Parties. However, the focus of activities to achieve this aim will change dramatically during the period covered by this MTP. During the first two years, chemical weapons destruction is expected to be significantly reduced. Subsequently, the main focus of the verification system will be on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, in particular through Articles VI, IX, and X, while ensuring that the Organisation remains the global repository of knowledge and expertise on chemical weapons-related issues. The number of Article VI inspections conducted in 2014 is considered sufficient (with the caveat of fully meeting the requirements of the policy guidelines as contained in decision EC-66/DEC.10, dated 7 October 2011), and is not expected to change significantly in the medium term.
36. Based on advice from the SAB and its Temporary Working Group on Verification, the Secretariat will consider new approaches, methodologies, and technology for any and all verification activities.
37. Furthermore, the Secretariat will continue to work on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of verification, in particular based on the analysis undertaken to refine the conduct of inspections to improve the consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Article VI verification regime (S/1066/2013, dated 11 February 2013).
38. Further improving the completeness, timeliness and accuracy of declarations will contribute to the efficient, effective, and consistent implementation of the Convention. Enhancing the completeness of declarations is an especially important goal. Advances in IT enable the timely exchange of declaration information in a secure manner—as shown by the secure information exchange (SIX) project—and could also be used for the resolution of transfer discrepancies and the communication of inspection reports. In addition, information management and data analysis will become more important, also using advances in IT. This will result in the improvement of the verification system in a manner consistent with the Convention: analysis of data declared under Articles III, IV, V, and VI will augment the Organisation's capability to detect any anomalies, and to do so prior to on-site inspections.

39. As part of its core capabilities and capacities, the Secretariat is expected to maintain its preparedness to promptly respond to a request for an IAU or CI as provided for in Articles IX and X of the Convention. To this end, the Secretariat will ensure that a core group of staff are available to perform a CI, provide assistance and protection, conduct an IAU, and provide support for the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons (in accordance with paragraph 27 of Part XI of the Verification Annex to the Convention). Based on lessons learned (e.g. from events in 2013 and previous exercises), the Secretariat will augment its capabilities under Articles IX and X. Furthermore, verification activities will continue for old and abandoned chemical weapons, and ad hoc inspections in the form of technical assistance of suspected chemical weapons might occur.
40. The Secretariat's routine verification activities will undergo a significant rebalancing during the period covered by this MTP. Chemical weapons-related missions will see a reduction between 2015 and 2017, with a return to a stable level of activity in 2018 and 2019. The number of Article VI inspections conducted in 2014 is also forecast to remain similar for the period 2015 to 2019, unless the policy-making organs decide to change the policy. Resources released through the decrease in routine Article IV and V inspections can be utilised in support of the other goals of the Organisation, including capacity development, training (as part of knowledge management), and the development of a multi-skilled workforce.
41. Based on the experience gained in past Article IV and V inspection activities, a number of factors might have an impact on the rate of chemical weapons destruction, including unexpected technical challenges on site, maintenance of facilities and destruction process equipment and systems, financial pressures, or environmental and safety regulations—with a concomitant reduction in verification activities.
42. The Secretariat's ability to conduct missions under Articles IX and X of the Convention will be improved by enhancing the adaptive capacity of the Organisation. In addition, it cannot be excluded that some States that might accede to the Convention during the period covered by the MTP could possess chemical weapons, or that it will again be necessary to support the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanism. These eventualities are not included in routine inspection planning. Instead, they will be addressed by enhancing the Organisation's adaptive capacity through, for example, the possible hiring and training of former Secretariat staff at short notice.
43. Effective implementation of the verification regime in all aspects will be informed by technological change. This will require continuous review of science and technology advances, in particular detection and analysis technologies. The OPCW Laboratory and other units of the Secretariat, along with partner designated laboratories, will explore new technologies that have the potential to augment the Organisation's capabilities, while also increasing efficiencies in the use of resources.

Achieving results in capacity development

44. Achieving results in capacity development under the Convention can draw on a broad range of activities that are related to core objectives 2, 3, 4, and 6. The Third Review

Conference supported, inter alia, further efforts by both States Parties and the Secretariat to promote a high level of readiness to respond to chemical weapons threats as articulated in Article X of the Convention. The Third Review Conference also underlined that the comprehensive implementation of Article XI reinforces capacity building in each State Party and, in so doing, reinforces the ability of States Parties to fully implement the Convention. It also highlighted the need for a comprehensive approach to national implementation (respectively paragraphs 9.114, 9.123, and 9.100 of document RC-3/3*).

45. Given the multitude of capacity-development activities in which the Secretariat and States Parties are engaged, effective knowledge management in this area is crucial to capture lessons learned, prevent duplication of effort, and achieve results. Developing capacities, especially in the area of assistance and protection, will increase the Organisation's adaptive capacity and build resilience. The Third Review Conference also acknowledged the role of education, outreach, and awareness-raising as a relevant activity for Convention implementation at the national level (paragraph 9.101 of document RC-3/3*).
46. Given that the Resurgence scenario envisages a relatively higher level of use or threat of use of chemical weapons than is currently the case, States Parties with limited means would, in such a scenario, bring greater pressure to bear on the Organisation to facilitate or to provide equipment for countering the use of chemical weapons. Such a situation would require a significant realignment of resources, as well as policy positions with regard to the provision of such equipment and expertise. Under the Mission Improbable scenario, capacity-development activities would be largely irrelevant. In the Complacency scenario, the role of capacity development would become more enhanced as a means of ensuring the continued focus of States Parties on the work of the Convention, at a relatively low input cost. Under the Civilian Uses scenario, the Secretariat would play the fundamental role of continuing to retain and build interest in and focus on the Convention, by providing States Parties with the support and services to ensure their continued active participation.
47. Assistance and protection is a fundamental aspect of the Convention. The Secretariat will work in a number of ways to increase efficiencies. This will be achieved by offering States Parties more standardised training and capacity-building activities, based on a regional and subregional roll-out strategy. By developing and delivering a standardised system of training and capacity building, founded on a framework of basic and advanced training courses and capped by table-top and practical training exercises, all delivered within a calendar year, States Parties will be enabled to establish a core pool of expertise, based upon which national capacities can be further augmented. The existing network of specialist training facilities made available to the Secretariat will be used as a source of specialist training for trainers who, in turn, will serve as specialist resources for the above-mentioned regional and subregional training regime. An additional element of the assistance and protection regime will be the identification, development, and management of national offers as required under Article X of the Convention, which will also have a more regional and subregional focus to allow for a more cost-effective and logistically simplified process of assistance provision. The desired result of these activities is the establishment of a growing capacity for regionally based assistance and protection training among States

Parties, as well as the development of regionally based, and practiced, assistance and protection structures and capabilities that can engage in effectively mitigating a chemical incident at a local level and at an early stage, ahead of international efforts.

48. In terms of international cooperation, the Secretariat will continue to identify opportunities and activities that assist States Parties in the development of technical capacities to foster the peaceful use of chemistry. The Secretariat will also continue to build States Parties' skills and capacities to achieve higher levels of safety and security in civilian chemical facilities. These activities will help to further develop capacities at the national level to employ chemistry for peaceful purposes, and to manage such developments through the strong and dedicated chemical technical support of National Authorities by technical experts trained in the specialist areas of the Convention.
49. National implementation under Article VII of the Convention will continue to be crucial. Innovative programmes will be deployed to support the training of customs authorities in the details of the transfer regime, the training of National Authorities in the development and submission of Article VI declarations, the effective management of National Authorities, direct capacity-development activities, and the facilitation of regional cooperation among National Authorities. In addition, legislative support will be augmented. The aim of this engagement is to support the establishment of well-resourced, active, and effective National Authorities. In order to achieve effective national implementation of the Convention, it will be necessary to ensure a sustained resource base. The achievement of the goals outlined above will otherwise remain a long-term prospect.
50. In the medium term, a number of resource requirements will have to be addressed if results are to be achieved. It will, for example, be necessary to maintain an appropriate level of equipment to train participants in the practical use and application of chemical weapons protective equipment, in order to adequately address the needs of the new assistance and protection initiatives outlined above.
51. In general, effective capacity development requires sufficient human and financial resources, complemented by innovative approaches (e.g. peer review) and robust evaluation. While some of these initiatives will be based on on-site activities, the expanded use of e-learning tools will be pursued in support of achieving results in all areas of capacity development.

Achieving results in engagement

52. Engagement with external actors supports all of the Organisation's core objectives. Concerning core objective 5, the Third Review Conference expressed its unqualified commitment and urgently called upon all of the States not Party to "join the Convention without delay and precondition" (paragraph 9.6 of document RC-3/3*). In addition, the Third Review Conference requested the States Parties to further intensify their efforts with all States not Party to encourage them to ratify or accede to the Convention at the earliest, and further requested the Secretariat and the Director-General to make full use of all available opportunities and resources,

including new mechanisms to achieve outcomes relevant to the goal of full universality of the Convention.

53. Achieving the universality of the Convention will therefore remain a priority for the Secretariat throughout this MTP period. To this end, a results-oriented work plan will be prepared by the Secretariat to proactively implement tailor-made projects based on case-by-case country assessments, to increase the number of States Parties to the Convention, and to develop capacities in new States Parties to effectively implement the Convention.
54. Outreach to relevant stakeholders will be critical to the full and effective implementation of the Convention. As acknowledged by the Third Review Conference, the chemical industry, the scientific community, academia, and civil society organisations engaged with issues relevant to the Convention make important contributions to the realisation of its goals (paragraph 9.144 of document RC-3/3*). The Third Review Conference also called upon States Parties and the Secretariat, as part of efforts to promote the ethical norms of the Convention, to encourage and promote efforts by the appropriate national and international professional bodies to inculcate awareness amongst scientists and engineers at an early stage in their training that the knowledge and technologies used for beneficial purposes should only be used for purposes not prohibited under the Convention (subparagraph 9.155(d) of document RC-3/3*).
55. While progress toward universal adherence to the Convention is most relevant for core objectives 1 and 2, a more systematic and sustainable engagement with relevant stakeholders will additionally strengthen capacity development, including knowledge management. Engagement of external actors across the spectrum will further augment the Organisation's adaptive capacity and build resilience through the establishment of more flexible networks.
56. While until recently a high level of conflict, including the potential for chemical weapons use, may have pointed towards a reduced likelihood of achieving universality, recent events have shown that a Resurgence-type scenario can in fact accelerate accession to the Convention. Similarly, the Civilian Uses scenario carries considerable uncertainty for the prospects of universal adherence. Under both the Complacency and Mission Improbable scenarios, reduced incentives to join the Convention may pose a challenge for universality. Engagement with relevant stakeholders under the four scenarios will be more sustainable under the assumptions of well-resourced Resurgence and Civilian Uses scenarios, while the Mission Improbable and Complacency scenarios are likely to negatively affect the Organisation's ability to build strong networks with relevant stakeholders.
57. Science and technology continues to change the world around us. This will require periodic review of the policies that govern implementation of the Convention. Maintaining a network of engaged, multidisciplinary scientific expertise to expand the reach of the SAB will allow the OPCW to thoroughly monitor and review advances in science and technology in real time, as well as to increase the effectiveness of the SAB to produce sound and actionable scientific advice for policy.

58. In order to build strong relationships with the science and technology community, the Organisation will approach these important stakeholders with a positive message, instilling the concept of innovation for a better world. As scientists are well placed to understand how new technologies are being adopted and implemented for both ongoing scientific development and societal use, this also places them in a strong position to recognise when science is being misused, and to promote responsible scientific practices. Engagement through innovation concepts from the laboratory to society and the market will result in linking science and security in a positive way, where the benefits of scientific involvement in security are promoted and encouraged. Promotion of scientific collaboration as a means of building peaceful relationships across international borders is already one element of Convention implementation (Article XI). The Secretariat will increasingly use modern communication tools to develop and maintain an extended network of scientific expertise, building on connections with existing scientific organisations. Key activities and outputs in this regard will include conference participation, science- and security-themed workshops, sponsorship of scientific events, outreach using the tools and communication channels of the scientific community, and the leveraging of SAB members' networks.
59. Achieving results in engaging the scientific community will also require thinking outside the silos of individual scientific disciplines. Convergence of the sciences is not limited to chemistry and biology, but has been and will continue to be the norm across all scientific and engineering disciplines. Engaging with the full range of relevant stakeholders, therefore, also requires both scientific and policy expertise to understand important, though not always obvious, relationships across scientific fields. For example, climate and environmental science projects produce data that is used to make policy decisions, which in turn impact one of the Convention's key stakeholders—the global chemical industry—and motivate changing industrial practices and technology development. For any forward-looking and results-oriented assessment of science and technology developments and their impact on the Convention, it is critical to understand diverse drivers and applications of technology in order to ensure effective implementation of the Convention.
60. Achieving results in engagement with external stakeholders through education and outreach has to take account of the fact that the global education landscape is changing dramatically. It is characterised, inter alia, by the mobilisation of students (and teachers), increasing access to technology and knowledge in the developing world, and regional networks of universities. The Secretariat will therefore move towards a holistic approach to education and outreach, encompassing general education and awareness-raising (for students, teachers, civil society, scientists, etc.), targeted outreach and training (for National Authority staff, chemical industry personnel, escort teams, Secretariat staff, OPCW delegates), and public diplomacy (for media, commentators, research institutes, other international organisations, etc.).
61. The implementation of this approach to engagement will focus on sustaining recommendations from the SAB's Temporary Working Groups and liaising with relevant external sources in the field of disarmament. This will support the embedding of appropriate tools, materials, and approaches into OPCW training, workshops, meetings, etc., and into national and regional education and outreach initiatives.

62. Achieving results in engagement will be further enhanced through the development of partnerships with educational institutions, particularly those with high numbers of students and global, or at least regional, reach and reputation. The use of online tools to reach a large audience could be explored in this regard. The Secretariat will continue to produce, update, and disseminate innovative and relevant educational tools and materials—both in hard copy and for e-learning—for use by students and teachers, and seek their translation into other languages (if feasible, even beyond the six official OPCW languages).
63. The building of sustainable networks with relevant external stakeholders will benefit from an increased use of social media, and digital communications more broadly, both to increase awareness of the Convention and to better understand the perception of the Organisation in the wider world. Expanding the use of the Organisation's Headquarters, including its facility in Rijswijk, as a place for engagement on Convention-related issues through the support of, inter alia, study visits and fellowships will further enhance the Organisation's engagement activities.
64. The chemical industry continues to be an important stakeholder, and its contributions since the negotiation of the Convention have been crucial. The Third Review Conference acknowledged industry's important role, and encouraged the Secretariat to continue to strengthen its relations with the chemical industry, including through regional and international chemical industry associations (see subparagraphs 9.79(e), 9.95(h), and 9.155(n) of document RC-3/3*). The Secretariat plans to broaden and deepen its interactions with industry accordingly.
65. Engagement with the chemical industry will be instrumental in enhancing the Organisation's profile in the development of a chemical safety and chemical security culture. In addition, industry input could be utilised to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Article VI verification measures, thereby contributing to the realisation of core objective 2. The Secretariat will further seek to enhance the Organisation's standing as one of the lead actors in relation to chemical security by identifying best practices, catalysing international partnerships, and promoting national capabilities in this area.
66. As part of its engagement activities, the Secretariat will augment its working links with other international organisations such as the United Nations to further develop cooperation in support of the Organisation's core objectives. This has been encouraged by the Third Review Conference (see subparagraph 9.131(l) of document RC-3/3*). Networking with specialised science-based disarmament organisations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), will be enhanced with respect to using concepts such as "responsible science" and "product development" as potential approaches to awareness-raising and education for science students and teachers.
67. Expanding engagement with other international organisations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) can contribute to the achievement of results in the areas of verification—especially in relation to Articles IX and X—and capacity building. Expanding engagement with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) can contribute to the achievement of results in science and

technology, while wider chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) concerns could be addressed with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

68. In order to assess its approach to engagement, the Organisation will monitor the take-up of materials and tools by the different user groups and stakeholders, and actively encourage feedback and participation. The Secretariat will also develop metrics for assessing the impact of engagement activities and the increase in the OPCW's level of awareness.

Achieving results in organisational governance

69. Improving governance, especially in the Secretariat, directly supports the implementation of core objective 7, and indirectly supports all the other core objectives. The Third Review Conference reaffirmed that full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of Article VIII is essential for the realisation of the object and purpose of the Convention. Furthermore, achieving results in OPCW governance underpins the realisation of all core objectives, and requires adequate levels of funding as well as efficient and effective interaction between the Secretariat and States Parties. Governance is also closely related to most of the strategic enablers for the period covered by this MTP, such as knowledge management, RBM, and the strengthening of the Organisation's adaptive capacity.
70. Depending on the nature of the environment in which the OPCW operates, challenges to the achievement of governance results will vary considerably. Resource constraints would be most pronounced during two of the four scenarios mentioned above. In the Mission Improbable and Complacency scenarios, the governance of the Organisation will be under severe pressure, with associated risks in the areas of information and communication technology, human resource and knowledge management, and the levels of service the Secretariat is able to provide to the policy-making organs. In the scenarios where higher levels of resources are available to the Organisation, i.e. Resurgence and Civilian Uses, the different areas of OPCW governance would benefit and provide greater confidence in the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

Being clear about results

71. The Third Review Conference encouraged the Secretariat to further improve the budgetary process of the OPCW and the implementation of RBM. The implementation of RBM across the Organisation will therefore be undertaken in a systematic and sustainable manner, with a view to aligning results across the different levels, from outputs to outcomes and impact. RBM will become increasingly important to demonstrate the Organisation's relevance, its contribution to securing a world free of chemical weapons, and its comparative advantage in this quest. The Secretariat's use of augmented RBM capabilities will provide a structured approach to its planning, monitoring, and reporting on progress and achievements in implementing the Organisation's core objectives, beginning with the Annual Programme and Budget for 2015. Full and effective embedding of RBM into the work of the Organisation will crucially depend on States Parties' support.

Preserving the Organisation's institutional memory

72. Building on the OPCW knowledge-management activities that have taken place so far, the structural realities of the Organisation—particularly its tenure policy, but also the fact that the elimination of chemical weapons as a core element of national arsenals results in fewer people being trained in the field in the national context—mean that there is a clear, present, and ongoing need for active measures to not only retain current knowledge and expertise, but also to augment it in a coherent and sustainable manner. The Secretariat intends to do so more systematically from 2015 onwards, and to seek the necessary resources. While this will initially focus on knowledge related to the destruction of chemical weapons, other areas of Convention implementation will be progressively incorporated as relevant to research, training and engagement, and with a view to ensuring that a duplication of work is avoided.

Making the most of technology

73. IT, and its availability to the Organisation in an up-to-date form, plays an essential role in achieving results across all areas of the Organisation's activities. A strategic approach to the development of the Organisation's IT infrastructure will be required in order to better address its operational requirements, both in the conventional physical sense, as well as in taking advantage of the new paradigm generated by the IT virtual environment, so as to better face new challenges in communication, dissemination, interactive engagement (including e-learning), the impact of social media, and the potential needs for cyber security and protection.
74. Major IT investments will be needed during this MTP period and include:
- (a) support for verification activities, including IT applications for States Parties, secure electronic transmission, and an integrated, robust, and fully developed verification information system in the Secretariat, the latter of which is mission-critical;
 - (b) an integrated enterprise information management (EIM) system that will ultimately serve as the central repository of all OPCW information and knowledge;
 - (c) the improvement and streamlining of internal processes through the provision of a new enterprise resource planning (ERP) system aimed at integrating and automating streamlined business processes, which will result in increased efficiencies; and
 - (d) implementation of a comprehensive disaster recovery plan to support the business continuity requirements and emergency preparedness (e.g. in case of substantial fire or water damage to the Headquarters of the Organisation).

Having the right talent in the right place

75. The workforce is crucial to achieving results. Therefore, Secretariat staffing structures will need to be adapted to support the full and effective implementation of the Convention with agility and resilience. Key components include:

- (a) having a reasonably clear view of the staffing needs (both in terms of the types of expertise and the number of staff): depending on the scenario, Secretariat staffing needs in verification, capacity development, engagement and governance may vary considerably. In any case, recruitment and workforce management will increasingly have to rely on multi-skilling across the entire Secretariat;
 - (b) recruiting the right talent: attracting the right people to a non-career organisation is challenging, and will likely become more challenging in the medium term. Strategic recruitment will be imperative to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right skills and competencies;
 - (c) further developing talent on the job: staff development and learning is a key component and is closely related to the achievement of knowledge management-related results. Training will be augmented to support the multi-skilling of the workforce; and
 - (d) measures to mitigate the negative effects that the change process might have on staff.
76. OPCW governance initiatives in RBM, knowledge management, IT, and human resources management are critical for the Organisation to realise its core objectives, and to significantly contribute to developing an adaptive capacity, thereby increasing its resilience to handle events such as the accession of new possessor States, scientific and technological breakthroughs, and the conduct of CIs or IAUs. Augmenting the Organisation's governance will also strengthen its position vis-à-vis external actors, and provide it with more credibility and agility in its engagement efforts.

Dealing with strategic risks to achieve results

77. Uncertainties exist in relation to achieving results in both substantive and governance areas, and risk management is guided by the Organisation's vision to secure a world free of chemical weapons. As the four illustrative scenarios seek to highlight (see paragraphs 23 to 26), there is no one pre-determined trajectory of world events in which implementation of the Convention will take place.
78. Considering the conflict axis of the scenario matrix (see Figure 1), uncertainties range from a high level of conflict, including threat of use of chemical weapons, to a complete absence of conflict. While knowledge-management activities related to chemical weapons and prudent verification planning can serve as risk-reduction tools during periods of high levels of conflict, low levels of conflict represent an opportunity to improve the achievement of results in capacity development and to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, without losing sight of the possibility that a scenario in which there is a high level of conflict could reappear.
79. Uncertainty along the resources axis of the scenario matrix will affect the implementation of all the Organisation's core objectives. While a dearth of resources may be triggered by a sense of the Organisation having its mission accomplished, this may create tensions with Convention-imposed deadlines should a chemical weapons possessor join the Organisation and/or a combination of CI/IAU be requested

simultaneously. Thus, improved knowledge management and enhanced adaptive capacity will play a crucial role in the Organisation's risk response strategy, also under conditions of resource scarcity.

80. Effectively managing uncertainty (i.e. risk, which comprises both threats and opportunities) is essential to delivering the expected results, no matter which scenario materialises. Uncertainties will be managed through the annual Programme and Budget and through the in-year management of all programmes, in accordance with RBM principles.

Annex: Core Objectives of the OPCW

Annex

CORE OBJECTIVES OF THE OPCW

Core objective 1: Elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) subject to the verification measures provided for in the Convention.

Core objective 2: Non-proliferation of chemical weapons, through the application of the verification and implementation measures provided for in the Convention, which also serve to build confidence between States Parties.

Core objective 3: Assistance and protection against chemical weapons, their use, or threat of use, in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the Convention.

Core objective 4: Economic and technological development through international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in accordance with the provisions of Article XI.

Core objective 5: Universal adherence to the Convention.

Core objective 6: Full and effective implementation by States Parties of the provisions of Article VII of the Convention.

Core objective 7: Full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention by the OPCW.

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