OPCW

Executive Council

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DECISION

AGREED DETAILED PLAN
FOR VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION AT THE ABANDONED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS MOBILE DESTRUCTION FACILITY
OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
ABANDONED BY JAPAN ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The Executive Council,

Noting that the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of Japan,
and the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) have agreed on a detailed plan
for verification of the destruction at the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Mobile Destruction
Facility (ACW-MDF) of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China;

Noting further that the above-mentioned agreed detailed plan for verification of the
destruction at the ACW-MDF of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of
China is without prejudice to the relevant provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(hereinafter “the Convention”); that nothing in the agreed detailed plan shall be applied or
interpreted in a way that is contradictory to the provisions of the Convention; and that, in the
event of a conflict between the provisions of the agreed detailed plan for the verification of
destruction and the Convention, the Convention shall take precedence;

Noting also that the specific verification elements described in the present agreed detailed
plan are complementary to any verification arrangements set out in the arrangement for the
destruction at the ACW-MDF of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of
China, the mutually agreed plan for destruction established in accordance with
paragraph 14 of Part IV(B) of the Verification Annex to the Convention, or other separate
arrangements, and are subject to the provisions of the Convention and/or relevant decisions
of the Conference of the States Parties; and

Recognising that States Parties remain free either to draw upon the present agreed detailed
plan for verification of destruction for the conclusion of other such agreed detailed plans for
the verification of destruction or to depart from it, where they deem this to be appropriate,
provided that the new agreed detailed plans for the verification of destruction conform to the
Convention;
Hereby:

Approves the agreed detailed plan, annexed hereto, for verification of the destruction at the ACW-MDF of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China.

Annex (English only):

Agreed Detailed Plan for Verification of the Destruction at the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Mobile Destruction Facility of Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan on the Territory of the People’s Republic of China
Annex

AGREED DETAILED PLAN
FOR VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION
AT THE ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS MOBILE DESTRUCTION
FACILITY
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ABANDONED BY JAPAN
ON THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

1. Introduction

This document is an agreed detailed plan for verification of the destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan, hereinafter referred to as the “Abandoning State Party (ASP)”, on the territory of The People’s Republic of China, hereinafter referred to as the “Territorial State Party (TSP)”, at the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Mobile Destruction Facility (ACW-MDF) and has been developed on the basis of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (“the Convention”) and applicable sections of the Verification Annex. The specific verification elements presented below are complementary to any verification arrangements set out in the facility arrangement, the mutually agreed plan for destruction as per paragraph 14 of Part IV(B) of the Verification Annex, or other separate arrangements, and are subject to the provisions of the Convention and/or relevant decisions of the Conference of the States Parties. Any substantive change to the verification regime anticipated for the facility, as described in the present plan, will be mutually decided among the Technical Secretariat (TS), the ASP and the TSP and submitted to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for review and approval prior to its implementation.

The ACW-MDF consisting of mobile abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) destruction units, individual or combined in groups of two or more, will destroy explosively and non-explosively configured ACW located in China. The ACW-MDF will be deployed to various operational locations, as required. Nanjing is the initial deployment location for the ACW-MDF.

Two destruction technologies are currently applicable for the destruction of ACW in China: a detonation chamber and a static kiln detonation furnace. If other mobile destruction technologies become available to the ACW-MDF after approval of the present plan, the necessary information will be submitted to the TS by the TSP and the ASP prior to the planned destruction operations, but preferably not later than 180 days in advance of such operations. Any modifications of the present plan required due to the introduction of new technologies will be mutually decided among the TS, the ASP and the TSP and submitted to the Executive Council for review and approval prior to its implementation.

The Executive Council will be also informed on a regular basis with respect to destruction operations verified under this plan.
The TSP and the ASP will jointly establish a point of contact (POC) for contacts with the inspection team during on-site activities, which will comprise representatives from the TSP and the ASP, and will inform the IT prior to the commencement of on-site inspection activities at the ACW-MDF.

2. Planning data

(a) Anticipated start and end dates of destruction:

ACW-MDF operations will be verified, as they occur, through the physical presence of inspectors during operations and/or subsequent review of relevant documentation.

(b) ACW considered for destruction using the ACW-MDF:

The ACW-MDF will destroy both explosively and non-explosively configured ACW with chemical fills including, inter alia, sulphur mustard/lewisite (yellow), phosgene (blue/white), diphenylchloroarsine/ diphenylcyanoarsine (red), chloracetophenone (green) and hydrogen cyanide (brown).

(c) Approximate inspection team size: three to four inspectors

(d) Frequency and duration of inspections: the frequency and duration of inspections will be determined upon consensus among the TS, the TSP and the ASP, dependent upon, inter alia, quantity, type, anticipated fill of the ACW to be destroyed at the deployment location, and anticipated duration of the ACW-MDF destruction operations, including the possibility of consolidation of ACW storage areas, which may be decided by the TSP and the ASP. It is planned that destruction activities conducted during each ACW-MDF deployment will be inspected on-site at least once.

(e) Number of inspection sub-teams to be accommodated: one or two sub-teams

(f) Estimated weight of equipment to be brought on-site by the inspection team: 200 kg

3. Proposed measures for verification

(a) The inspection team will conduct verification of the destruction of ACW in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, and the facility arrangement.

(b) The verification of the ongoing destruction process will be carried out at the location notified for the ACW-MDF operations and, if appropriate, the associated storage area at that particular deployment location. Additionally, the review of relevant records and documentation related to ACW-MDF operations not witnessed by an inspection team may be conducted at the location of destruction operations or at any other location decided upon.
(c) Verification measures will take into account the following factors:

(i) The ACW-MDF will consist of mobile units, which are designed to destroy explosively and non-explosively configured ACW. Two technologies are currently applicable for the destruction of ACW in China – a detonation chamber and a static kiln.

(ii) The static kiln is designed to destroy both explosively and non-explosively configured ACW within a furnace. The destruction process consists of the detonation of the explosive components and burning of the residual munition fill. Off gases are routed through a chemical scrubber to complete the process.

(iii) The detonation chamber is designed to destroy both explosively and non-explosively configured ACW within a containment vessel. The chamber employs an explosive charge to breach the munition wall, detonate any explosive components, and thermally destroy the chemical fill. Off gases are further treated in a combustion furnace.

(iv) Each ACW-MDF deployment and operation will be notified to the TS preferably not later than 90 days in advance of the actual deployment. Such notification will include location, administrative support and arrangements, specific item(s) to be destroyed, physical or other potential constraints on inspection activities, safety requirements and medical support. In the event ACW are determined by the TSP and the ASP to be unsafe for storage and require emergency destruction, the TS will be notified prior to destruction.

(v) On-site verification activities during ACW-MDF operations will comprise the inspection of the destruction facility and associated destruction activities, as well as inspection of the related ACW storage area at that particular deployment location.

(vi) An inventory of all chemical weapons received and destroyed during an ACW-MDF operation will be maintained by the TSP and the ASP and made available to the inspection team.

(vii) Relevant documentation will be provided by the TSP and the ASP to the inspection team for its review, including, as applicable: shipping/transfer and destruction records, results of non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and assessment data, ACW-MDF operational records and process documentation, video recordings of destruction operations, photographs of the ACW before and after destruction, analytical results of wastes, and air-monitoring data.
(viii) The inspection team will be granted unimpeded physical access to the location notified for individual ACW-MDF operations and, if appropriate, the associated storage area at that particular deployment location, subject to safety requirements.

(ix) During its presence on-site, the inspection team will have the opportunity to access the Control Room and observe the operating conditions of the process as well as the ACW delivery, preparation, and destruction activities via the real-time views provided by closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras installed by the TSP upon request of the ASP or by the ASP at the ACW-MDF. All CCTV cameras will be positioned in a manner to allow observation of ACW delivery, preparation and destruction activities within the operational area and remain under the control of ACW-MDF personnel. Recordings of ACW destruction operations which occur in the absence of the inspection team will be available for the review of the inspection team.

(x) The inspection team may use seals and tags, as applicable and decided with the TSP and the ASP, to maintain the integrity of the facility and in support of inventory. Items to be destroyed may, at the discretion of the inspection team, be clearly marked with OPCW tags, as decided with the TSP and the ASP. The inspection team may perform periodic checks of the tags and seals that have been applied.

(xi) If, in accordance with facility procedures and requirements, samples are collected and analysed by the TSP and the ASP, the inspection team may observe, via physical presence or CCTV cameras, these activities or, alternatively, the inspection team may review, upon request, relevant analytical data.

(xii) Administrative workspace and space for secured storage of inspection equipment will be available in an administrative building or other suitable area at the facility. In the absence of on-site administrative buildings or other suitable area at the facility, at remote locations, administrative workspace may be made available off-site.

(d) Utilisation of inspectors:

The destruction of ACW will be verified, under normal circumstances, by physical presence of inspectors during ACW-MDF operations and use of monitoring equipment.

In the event that the TS chooses not to have inspectors present during an ACW-MDF operation or part thereof, the TSP and the ASP will provide video recordings related to the process of destruction as well as other relevant documentation as listed under subparagraph 3(c)(vi) above, for subsequent review by the TS.
(c) Both in the case of currently available technologies as well as in the case of future mobile technologies, the TS will conduct visits to familiarise itself with the deployment location and the destruction technology to be used as well as to assess the adequacy of the mutually decided verification measures. Such visits may be conducted in conjunction with other verification activities at the deployment location.

(f) Activities during on-site verification of ACW-MDF operations may include those listed below.

(i) Receive a pre-inspection briefing, to include the health and safety regulations, procedures and requirements applicable at the site.

(ii) Perform a walk-through of the facility, to include, if appropriate, the ACW storage area associated with the ACW-MDF operation.

(iii) Discuss any outstanding issues concerning notified activities. Review and, if appropriate, update verification activities with the TSP and the ASP.

(iv) Verify the receipt of ACW at the facility by observing the delivery of ACW at the ACW-MDF operational area during inspectors’ physical presence in that area and/or by means of CCTV monitoring and reviewing of the shipping/transfer documents.

(v) Verify by physical access or by means of CCTV cameras, and by reviewing shipping/transfer documents, the temporary holding area at the ACW-MDF and/or the storage area associated with the ACW-MDF and perform an inventory of the ACW stored in that area.

(vi) Verify the specific type and quantity of ACW being destroyed through monitoring with facility monitoring instruments, physical presence, and/or by reviewing relevant documentation. Review destruction and daily operation records provided by the TSP and the ASP and reconcile any discrepancies.

(vii) Verify the process of destruction of the ACW by observing the destruction process with monitoring equipment, and by performing periodic walks throughout the ACW-MDF.

(viii) Confirm the complete and irreversible mutilation of metal parts through direct visual observation, subject to safety requirements, the use of the CCTV system, or by a review of the available documentation, including photographs and/or video-recordings.
(ix) Observe the collection and analysis of waste samples, which may be performed by the TSP and the ASP in accordance with site procedures and requirements, or alternatively review the results of such analyses.

(x) Review and confirm environmental monitoring for the purpose of the health and safety of the inspection team, as applicable.

(xi) Discuss anomalies and obtain clarification from the TSP and the ASP, if required.

(xii) Prepare a report covering the notified activities.

(g) Upon completion of destruction operations at each ACW-MDF deployment location, the TS will prepare a report covering the entire period of operations for that deployment (the “Report on Destruction Operations”). The report will be based on the results of verification activities conducted by the TS during individual on-site inspections as well as on the review of destruction-related records. The report will provide a summary of all ACW destroyed during a particular ACW-MDF deployment, including their type and quantity, and highlighting the main developments. The report will be provided to the representatives of the TSP and the ASP for their review as soon as practicable but not later than 30 days following the completion of operations for a specific deployment.

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