



**STATEMENT AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
STATEMENT ON AGENDA ITEM 6 (f)  
ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE (UKRAINE)  
TO THE 110TH SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**

Chair, my fellow colleagues,

When we gathered in July, many of us noted with concern the latest reports from the Technical Secretariat containing evidence that riot control agents were used as a method of warfare against Ukrainian forces. The United States commends the Technical Secretariat for the rigor, objectivity, and professionalism demonstrated in these reports, and further commends the Government of Ukraine for providing evidence in accordance with the highest international standards.

The TAV reports represent five instances involving chemicals, which by themselves are five too many. But the reality of Russia's chemical use against Ukrainian forces far exceeds five. Indeed, it exceeds the scale of use in any conflict in decades. Ukraine has reported more than 10,000 chemical attacks on the battlefield since 2023. The United States assesses that Russia has used chemicals, including the chemical weapon chloropicrin, across the frontlines of the battlefield. This finding is based on U.S. laboratory analysis and further reinforced by assessments of Germany and the Netherlands.

We should imagine ourselves in the position of Ukraine's forces. You are holding a defensive position in a trench. Approaching Russian drones drop not conventional weapons of war, but chemicals that fill the space you have built for shelter, perhaps too quickly to put on gas masks. In such spaces, chloropicrin and the chemicals we call "riot control" agents can be lethal. Your options are to hold your position and continue exposing yourself to chemicals, or to leave the trench

and face lethal conventional fire. This terrible dilemma is precisely what the Chemical Weapons Convention exists to prevent.

As OPCW Member States, we are not helpless bystanders. We have the ability – indeed, the moral responsibility - to take action against violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Our collective efforts over the years showed that we can take action – for example by adopting decisions to suspend rights and privileges as well as by depriving violators of leadership roles. But we should also be realistic; these actions alone have not been enough to deter the use of CW. More needs to be done.

We call on the Russian Federation to cease its campaign of chemical attacks against Ukraine, and to dismantle the CW program it employed to poison Alexsey Navalny and the Skripals with Novichok nerve agents. We ask those States Parties who are committed to upholding the integrity of the CWC to join us in condemning Russia's chemical warfare.

If we want to turn our words to action, we must support attribution of any and all confirmed chemical attacks in Ukraine. We must start thinking collectively about meaningful accountability. We encourage and welcome the support of responsible States Parties to the Convention for the OPCW's work in this regard. Treaties without meaningful accountability for violators run the risk of losing credibility. That is not a path we want to go down. We must redouble our efforts to prevent the reemergence and proliferation of CW use and reverse its course. And that requires this body to hold violators to account.

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