



English only

**Permanent Representation
of Ukraine to the OPCW**

Point 6 (f) Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use.

**Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine
at the 110th session of the Executive Council**

Mr Chairperson,

Director-General,

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is essential for our delegation to participate in today's discussion on the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons. Ukraine fully aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union.

As a dedicated State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Ukraine remains unwavering in its commitment to uphold its principles. Yet once again, we must draw attention to the ongoing and flagrant violations of the Convention—most notably by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation continues to employ chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces.

These criminal acts by Russian military units are not isolated incidents but a part of a systemic pattern across entire front line, posing a grave threat to Ukraine's national security. Ukraine has been continuously monitoring violations of the Convention by the aggressor state and promptly notifying the Technical Secretariat and States Parties to the Convention about such violations.

In particular, it includes: almost **11,000 documented instances** of the Russian military's use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals, including **chloropicrin**, in direct violation of the Convention.

As a result of these crimes, **2,862** Ukrainian servicemen sought medical care for symptoms of chemical exposure, including acute poisoning by an unidentified toxic substance.

The OPCW has confirmed Ukraine's concerns about the use of chemical weapons against Ukrainian military personnel in three Technical Assistance Visits reports.

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine confirms deliberate efforts by the Russian Federation to conceal or destroy traces of chemical weapons use, including by erasing factory markings on grenades. The information gathered already by Ukraine clearly indicates a pattern of use of toxic chemicals as weapons by the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine in violation of Article 1 of CWC.

Mr. Chairperson,

Ukraine continues to collect and submit evidence of use of chemical weapons, in line with the OPCW's standards. As a responsible State Party to the Convention, we remain fully committed to our obligations and to strengthening cooperation with the OPCW.

Ukraine in close cooperation with the Technical Secretariat continues ensuring compliance with international law and the Chemical Weapons Convention. This includes supporting and coordinating collective efforts aimed at ensuring **effective attribution — identifying perpetrators, organizers, sponsors of chemical weapons use** and advancing accountability through appropriate international mechanisms.

We remain determined to deepening cooperation with TS in strengthening Ukraine's capabilities in countering the threat of chemical weapons use by the Russian Federation.

Let me express my appreciation for all the statements in support to Ukraine from the OPCW Member States. We are deeply grateful for their strong international position.

I kindly request you to carefully examine the attached information provided by Ukrainian competent authorities and consider this statement as an official document of the 110th Session of the Executive Council and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you for your attention.

*Addendum to the Statement of the
delegation of Ukraine (110-th session of the EC)*

**GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE VIOLATION
OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

The global framework for non-proliferation and disarmament, which plays a crucial role in upholding international security and stability, is currently under significant strain, particularly as a result of the actions of the Russian Federation.

Since Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been an increasing use of hazardous chemicals and chemical riot control agents (RCAs) by Russian forces, in blatant violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Evidence indicates that Russia has extensively relied on these chemical agents during combat operations, using them alongside other weapons to impede the offensive operations of Ukrainian forces.

Russia's actions violate the CWC and pose a direct threat to global peace and security. These ongoing violations not only endanger the safety of the Ukrainian people but also undermine the integrity of the international community's commitment to a world free of chemical weapons.

From February 2023 to September 2025, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported more than 10,950 cases of Russia's use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals in violation of the CWC. More than 2,862 Ukrainian servicemen have sought medical care due to symptoms of chemical exposure.

The overwhelming majority of the recorded cases involve the use of munitions of unspecified types. Known delivery systems for chemical weapons include K-51 and RG-Vo gas grenades, which are riot control agents prohibited as a method of warfare under Article I, paragraph 5, of the CWC. The total number of such cases continues to rise.

At the same time, the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine do not use K-51, RG-Vo gas grenades, or any other types of RCAs in repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian authorities are actively compiling evidence of violations of the CWC, with updates on the investigations to be shared with the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the States Parties to the CWC in due course. These violations have been confirmed in three OPCW reports dated 18 November 2024, 14 February 2025, and 20 June 2025, as well as in a Joint Statement of 59 countries adopted at the 29th Session of the States Parties to the CWC.

The reports emphasize that the evidence provided by Ukraine – specifically, seven grenades marked RG-Vo, along with corresponding soil and grass samples – was collected and transferred to OPCW representatives in full compliance with chain-of-custody procedures and relevant protocols.

Two independent OPCW-designated laboratories have confirmed that the evidence provided by Ukraine contained CS, a substance used in riot control agents.

According to the competent authorities of Ukraine, RG-Vo grenades are produced at Russian enterprises, including the Russian Research Center for Applied Chemistry and the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry.

Ukraine is actively assessing further actions to ensure compliance with international law, particularly the CWC. These efforts will focus on identifying perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors, as well as pursuing further international accountability to uphold the provisions of the CWC.

Ukraine urges all states that consistently uphold the principles of justice and international law to take decisive measures to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its use of chemicals as weapons.

Ukraine highly values the strong and consistent position of the international community aimed at preventing the Russian Federation from securing a seat in the Executive Council of the OPCW for a second consecutive year. This outcome represents yet another clear indication of the continued international isolation of the aggressor state.

We are fully aware that the Russian Federation will seek to reverse this outcome and secure a seat on the Executive Council for the 2026–2028 term. It is therefore imperative to take all necessary measures to prevent Russia’s election to the Council for a third consecutive term and to ensure that the aggressor state is held fully accountable for its actions.

Ukraine, in its part, stands ready that, should it be elected to the Executive Council for the 2026–2028 term, it will make a steadfast and meaningful contribution to the promotion and effective implementation of the objectives and principles of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

REPORTS OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE


The Security Service of Ukraine

Key topics covered:

- Specific chemicals used by the Russian Federation in Ukraine
- Escalating number of confirmed chemical incidents
- Patterns of use: widespread dropping of chemical grenades from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
- Evidence of planned war crimes: video footage and intercepted communications
- Grenade types: focus on markings and manufacturing features
- Information on Russian legal entities involved in production of chemical-agent-filled grenades (*under ongoing verification*)
- Special focus on chloropicrin (Schedule 3A, Chemical Weapons Convention)
- Riot control agent simulants (e.g. “UKOV-1”), modified mixtures in non-standard packaging (including labelled as “baby food”)
- Data on key Russian research institutes coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, many already under international sanctions

ESCALATION IN THE USE OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

- In the initial phase of Russia's full-scale invasion, use of toxic chemicals was limited and not systematically documented



► *Turning point – 2023:*

→ All competent authorities (Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, Security Service of Ukraine) implemented mechanisms for **systematic documentation and verification**

→ As of September 2025: **10978 documented cases**



- de-occupied territories of Ukraine



- occupied territories of Ukraine



- indicative area

TACTICAL PATTERNS AND CHEMICAL GRENADE TYPES USED BY RUSSIAN FORCES

► Core methods and tactical patterns in the use of banned toxic chemicals by Russian forces have remained **consistent since the start of the full-scale invasion**

► **Two primary grenade types** regularly deployed:

- **RG-Vo** (*“Hand Grenade – Toxic Substance”*)

- Modern Russian-manufactured device

- Specifically documented during the full-scale invasion

- First recovered units bear **2023 manufacturing markings**, likely designed for **battlefield deployment** in Ukraine as replacements for depleted Soviet-era stocks

- *K-51*

- Soviet-developed **aerosol tear gas grenade**

- Originally a non-lethal riot control device,

now routinely used in **combat operations**

► **Chemical fillers most commonly used:**

- **2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)**

- **Chloroacetophenone (CN)**



K-51



RG-Vo



AERIAL DELIVERY: NEW USE OF FPV DRONES

➤ Russian forces continue to rely on **unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)** — especially **quadcopters** — to deliver chemical grenades onto Ukrainian defensive positions

➤ *New tactical development in 2025:*

→ Deployment of **first-person view (FPV) strike drones** equipped with **improvised chemical warheads**

➤ Warhead construction based on **RG-Vo grenades** filled with

2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)

➤ **Illustrated case:**

→ Device recovered on **3 April 2025**, near the village of **Kizomys**, Kherson region


→ Though it failed to detonate, the device yielded **valuable forensic evidence** on intent and technical configuration



FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF RECOVERED GRENADE: TRACES OF ORIGIN AND CONCEALMENT




- ▶ Findings revealed:
 - **Mechanical tampering** with factory markings
 - Most of the stamp was **deliberately erased**→ Remaining visible elements: **“RG-Vo”, “862-8-?”**
- ▶ These findings confirm:
 - The **Russian Federation is fully aware** of the illegality of its actions
 - It is making **deliberate efforts to conceal the origin** of munitions used in chemical attacks
- ▶ The **Research Institute of Applied Chemistry** is a major actor in Russia’s military-industrial complex:
 - Specialises in **military pyrotechnics** (smoke, illuminating, aerosol systems)
 - Produces components for **Shkval torpedoes, Kub and S-300** systems
 - Involved in **thermobaric, missile, and flamethrower** warhead development (Buratino, Solntsepyok, Iskander, Yars, Topol-M)



► **Decryption of marking:**

- **862** – manufacturer code for the former **Special Plant No. 862**, now **Joint Stock Company “Federal Scientific and Production Centre ‘Research Institute of Applied Chemistry’”**
- **8** – month of production
- **?** – final digit (year) – **intentionally removed**

FOOTAGE OF RUSSIAN FORCES USING CHEMICAL GRENADES



CHLOROPICRIN ON THE BATTLEFIELD

- ▶ Laboratory analyses in Ukraine (2024) confirmed **chloropicrin (PS)** residues in samples from suspected chemical attacks
- ▶ **Attribution of PS** is technically challenging due to its **volatility** and rapid degradation in open environments
- ▶ The Russians use **improvised chemical munitions** containing the formulation 'XП-04 XAB' (a mixture of chloropicrin (**PS**) and chloroacetophenone (**CN**)), which is designed to reduce the effectiveness of respiratory protective equipment (gas masks). It is informally known as the '**gasmask-breaker**'
- ▶ This substitution complicates detection and reflects a **deliberate attempt to obscure legal liability**
- ▶ Although listed under **Schedule 3**, the use of PS in **warfare** constitutes a **prohibited act** under **Article I, paragraph 5** of the Chemical Weapons Convention




Independent Confirmation and Medical Attribution

- ▶ The use of toxic chemicals by the Russian Federation has been confirmed by:
 - Ukrainian state authorities
 - The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
 - Independent international media investigations
- ▶ One such investigation was carried out by **Max Tucker**, journalist at *The Times*
 - Collected **witness statements and material evidence** from positions held by the *65th Separate Mechanised Brigade “Velykyi Luh”*
 - Documented the case of a Ukrainian serviceman exposed to toxic chemicals, suffering **lung damage** and **coughing up blood**



- ▶ As chemical attacks increase, a key priority is the development *of methodologies to detect CS, CN, and chloropicrin (PS) in biological samples* from affected personnel
- ▶ Such methods would allow:
 - Attribution of exposure based on medical symptoms
 - **Precise identification** of the chemical agent involved
 - Strengthening of **legal and forensic conclusions** under the Chemical Weapons Convention

National Measures to Ensure Accountability



Roman Shkroba

- ▶ On **7 February 2025**, the **Security Service of Ukraine** formally notified **Colonel Roman Shkroba** (Russian Federation) of suspicion under **Article 438(1)** and **Article 28(2)** of the Criminal Code of Ukraine
 - Commander of the **123rd Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade**
 - Suspected of issuing orders to use means of warfare **prohibited by**

international law

- ▶ On **18 April 2025**, **Presidential Decree No. 247/2025** imposed sanctions on **Artem Muranov**, Director General of the Joint Stock Company *“Federal Scientific and Production Centre ‘Research Institute of Applied Chemistry’”*

→ Entity responsible for production of **RG-Vo chemical grenades**

- ▶ These national actions demonstrate Ukraine’s resolve to ensure **accountability for both military command decisions and industrial supply chains** in connection with the **use of chemical weapons in violation of international**

humanitarian law

Artem Muranov

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