



**OPCW**

**Conference of the States Parties**

Third Review Conference  
8 – 19 April 2013

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ENGLISH and RUSSIAN only

**RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

**STATEMENT BY G.V. KALAMANOV  
DEPUTY MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
AT THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Distinguished Mr Chairman,  
Distinguished Director-General,  
Distinguished delegates,

Allow me, on behalf of the Russian delegation, to welcome you, Mr Chairman, to this responsible position. We are confident that under your leadership the work of the Third Review Conference will proceed at the appropriate level.

Russia attaches great importance to the process of reviewing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is a unique and successful international instrument that places an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under effective prohibition. It is precisely the Convention and the Organisation which represent a reliable safeguard against the threat of chemical weapons. We expect the Review Conference to conduct a substantive review of the implementation of the Convention over a five-year period, on the basis of which it will be possible to establish the fundamental points of emphasis of the future work of the OPCW. We also expect the Review Conference to produce balanced decisions designed to determine the future vector of development of the Organisation and to facilitate the reinforcement of its standing, as well as to ensure the efficiency of the Convention's regime. In addressing these issues, Mr Chairman, you can wholly count on the support of the Russian delegation.

The Russian Federation, as one of the countries that helped to draft the Convention, consistently proceeds on the basis that its main objective is to rid the world of chemical weapons definitively and irrevocably. The complete destruction of the remaining chemical arsenals remains, therefore, as far as we are concerned, imperative.

In this context, the Russian Federation is consistently and unremittingly increasing the rates and capacities of chemical weapons destruction, while strictly observing the safety regulations with regard to the population and the environment. Four chemical weapons destruction facilities are currently in operation in Russia; in the period from 29 April 2012 to 8 April this year alone, 4,000 tonnes of chemical weapons have been destroyed at these facilities, which exceeds the planned targets. To date, Russia has destroyed a total of 29,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, which is practically as much as has been destroyed by all the other possessor States.



The targets reached are testament to Russia's commitment to the fulfilment of its obligations, and its willingness to overcome difficulties of a financial, economic and technical nature and to meet the increasing demands of environmental standards in order to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons within the shortest possible time. A reliable basis for this is ensured by the decision of the Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, which is worthy of the highest praise.

Directing its main efforts towards the destruction of chemical weapons, putting into practice the disarmament process, and preventing the re-emergence of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, the Organisation plays an extremely important role in ensuring international peace and security, and is helping to strengthen multilateral tools and instruments, on the basis, inter alia, of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

In this context, States Parties' fulfilment of their obligations under Article VII of the Convention acquires particular significance. At the moment, less than half of States Parties have aligned their legislation with the requirements of the Convention, and this is a serious obstacle on the road to achieving the main objective of the Convention, namely an effective, universal ban on chemical weapons. It is our belief that the Third Review Conference should pay the most serious attention to this problem.

The mandate of the Convention provides for the implementation of control measures to prevent enterprises in chemical industry from reproducing chemical weapons. We attach great importance to this area of the work of the OPCW. In this sphere it is important to continue to maintain a reasonable balance between the efficiency of verification and the minimisation of the verification workload for industrial enterprises, and this also ensures that there are no obstacles to the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful chemistry. Discriminatory, politically motivated measures which prevent States Parties from practising peaceful chemistry contradict both the spirit and the letter of the Convention.

It will be impossible to achieve the objectives of the Convention unless all States which currently remain beyond its scope accede to it. Only full universality of the Convention, together with effective implementation of the verification regime, can provide a safeguard against the use of chemical weapons. We believe that it is necessary for the Conference to make itself clear on this matter. Furthermore, active steps need to be taken to implement the plan of action adopted within the Organisation. At the same time, when making provision for universality, it is necessary to avoid discriminatory approaches of any sort: the OPCW must call upon all States that remain outside its legal framework, without exception, to join the Convention without delay.

Russia has no doubt that the OPCW must preserve its identity while continuing to implement its disarmament mandate, which is ongoing. The threat of chemical warfare will completely disappear if the OPCW preserves the efficiency of the verification regime, which must continue to be improved, without lagging behind the development of science and technology, and adapted to the changing situation in chemical industry around the world, while heeding the opinion of scientists and industrialists. Therein lies the OPCW's unique contribution to the strengthening of peace and international security. We must not, therefore, seek to re-orient the OPCW towards the solution of problems that are not particular to it, problems, moreover, which are being addressed by other international organisations that have their own sphere of competence. If we do, such attempts will cause the OPCW's mandate to weaken, and that, of course, is unacceptable.

At the same time, it is important to understand that the OPCW does not exist in a vacuum and therefore needs to strengthen mutually beneficial contacts with related international organisations and those which have similar objectives. We therefore welcome the actions of the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in conjunction with the United Nations Secretary-General in the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons, which investigation was initiated at the request of the Government of Syria.

The situation in Syria demonstrates that the use of chemical weapons in modern times is a real threat. We consider the incident which took place in the province of Aleppo on 19 March this year involving the alleged use of chemical agents by the armed opposition, which resulted in a number of human fatalities, to be an extremely disturbing and dangerous turn of events in the Syrian crisis. As you know, the Syrian government addressed an official request to the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct an investigation into this specific incident and to establish the truth of the matter.

The Government of Syria has officially expressed serious concerns more than once over the possible use of chemical weapons, including those of foreign origin, on Syrian territory by non-State actors as provocation to justify military intervention in the internal conflict in Syria.

In this context, the obscure manoeuvres involved in the organisation of the investigation into the possible use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic are a cause for serious concern. This kind of approach calls to mind the line taken in relation to the investigation once conducted into the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

We can only conclude, therefore, that, under pressure from certain States, the investigation of certain information, which has yet to be verified, on the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria on 19 March this year is essentially being undermined.

Under these circumstances we believe that it is necessary to launch the United Nations mission without delay to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons about which the Syrian government notified the United Nations Secretariat.

In future, the importance of reinforcing practical, results-based links between the OPCW and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will increase, due to the affinity of the problems they address; this reflects the development of science and technology.

There is also an important link between the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. The Geneva Protocol maintains considerable importance in its own right, particularly in the context of the obligations it imposes on States which remain outside the framework of this Convention.

In the interests of strengthening the regime prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, Russia, together with Armenia, Belarus, Iran and South Africa, has come up with the proposal to States Parties to the Convention to withdraw reservations with regard to the Geneva Protocol. These reservations relate to the possibility of retaliatory use of chemical weapons, and to maintain such reservations contradicts the objects and purpose of the Convention. This initiative reflects, inter alia, a broad international consensus on this matter, reinforced by the United Nations General Assembly and review conferences of the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention. The co-sponsoring States have distributed a working document, RC-3/NAT.7, dated 3 April 2013, which explains the essence of the problem and includes concrete proposals for inclusion in the report of the Third Review Conference. We hope for the support of all delegations in this matter.

To conclude, Mr Chairman, I should like to assure you that the delegation of the Russian Federation intends to work very constructively during the Review Conference in close cooperation with you and all delegations in order to achieve positive results.

We request that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Third Review Conference.

Thank you for your attention.

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