PROMOTION OF NON-PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. It has been ten years since the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) came into force in 1997; still, some countries have yet to accede to this epoch-making treaty, which prohibits the production and retention of chemical weapons as well as their use. An attempt on total elimination of chemical weapons is yet to be achieved. During the last decade, the proliferation of nuclear-related technologies emerged as a serious problem. This problem is not limited to nuclear technologies but may also appear in the area of chemical weapons. In particular, many materials related to chemical weapons are so versatile that these materials are also used in various industries for peaceful purposes. From this point of view, efforts on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons are vitally important.

2. Furthermore, against the backdrop of frequent terrorism, including the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, several agreements have been made to enhance counter-terrorism measures within the framework of the United Nations and various regional bodies. Back in 1995, Japan also suffered sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo Subway, which killed 12 and injured over 5,000. The development and use of chemical weapons by non-State actors are palpable threats to international peace and security.

3. Japan is of the view that, in order for the global community to actively address these issues, non-proliferation of chemical weapons is very important, and accordingly, the Convention should be implemented in a more effective way, with a higher priority given to non-proliferation.

I. Universality

4. In 1997, when the Convention came into force, the number of States Parties was only 87; however, today this number has increased to 183. As universality advances, it is becoming increasingly difficult to induce the remaining hard-core States not Party to join. However, for the purpose of complete elimination and non-proliferation of chemical weapons, the efforts to achieve universality should be sustained with a view to avoiding any loopholes.

5. The obstructions to States not Party in acceding to the Convention vary from security reasons to the lack of human resources. States Parties and the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) need to take coordinated and tailor-made approaches to
accommodate the actual situation of each State not Party. Assistance towards preparation for national implementation before the accession contributes to promotion of the understanding of the Convention, which helps in creating an encouraging atmosphere for accession, as well as early effective national implementation afterwards. Accordingly, this assistance should be actively provided.

II. Assistance for effective national implementation

6. Effective implementation of the Convention for ensuring non-proliferation of chemical weapons and for promoting disarmament requires full national implementation by all States Parties. States Parties take the primary responsibility for their national implementation. However, those States Parties whose national implementation is not sufficient create loopholes for the proliferation of materials and technologies related to chemical weapons, and have the potential to affect other States Parties and the global community. Technical assistance by the other States Parties and the Secretariat, providing their knowledge and experiences with such States Parties whose national measures are insufficient, is highly effective in ensuring compliance with the Convention and for effective counter-terrorism measures.

Assistance by States Parties

(a) Japan has provided assistance that has included seminars for ASEAN members held in Tokyo and Kyoto in 2002, seminars on prevention and crisis management of chemical terrorism held in Tokyo in 2003 and Malaysia in 2004 and 2007, seminars co-hosted by Australia and/or the Secretariat in Brunei in 2005, in Cambodia in 2005 and 2008, in Indonesia in 2007, and in the Philippines in 2007, as well as industrial training for the OPCW Associate Programme since 2004.

(b) In implementing the Convention, industry plays a key role in submitting declarations and in receiving inspections. Industry has also amassed its own experiences in these ten years. Dialogue among industries may also be beneficial in sharing their experiences. At the same time, as globalisation and inter-dependence are growing, the transfer of chemical materials is also on the increase. Assistance for enhancing trade control should gain and maintain on-going importance.

Assistance by the Secretariat

(a) The Secretariat has carried out various programmes to assist national implementation and has accumulated knowledge and experience on effective assistance methods. Reviewing and organising this knowledge and experience and sharing it with States Parties will be of great benefit to all stakeholders.

(b) Japan believes that expert visits, aimed at direct bilateral talks with many personnel in charge of the Convention, are more effective than general regional meetings. In addition, general regional meetings could be more useful, should their theme be narrowed down or should they be followed by intensive bilateral consultations with States Parties.
(c) In addition to the above technical assistance, as the human and financial resources of the Secretariat are limited, it might be an idea to explore the possibility of establishing a system for the inspectors to report to the relevant divisions of the Secretariat any insufficiencies in national implementing measures—in the event that some are found during the inspections.

III. Prevention and response to “chemical crisis”

7. With respect to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime of chemical weapons and to the prevention of chemical terrorism, States Parties should, in cooperation with chemical industries, forestall disasters caused by dangerous chemical agents. Today, threats of terrorism are imminent and the chemical industry is in steady development. Damages could be vast in the case of malicious misuse of chemical agents (for example, terrorism targeting chemical industry facilities containing a huge volume of toxic chemical agents) or if accidents in such facilities occur. Prevention and response to such a “chemical crisis” has become a critical issue of concern. Therefore, it is of vital importance that States Parties share the best of their relevant prevention and/or response measures. The OPCW may be requested to consider providing an appropriate forum in this respect (a meeting of National Authorities, for example).

IV. Challenge inspections

8. Challenge inspections are an indispensable mechanism for the Convention to remain capable of swiftly clarifying questions on non-compliance by inspection. Japan considers this particular mechanism as part of the mission assigned by the international community to the Convention. The request for a challenge inspection should not be abused, nor should it be regarded in unduly pejorative terms. Challenge inspections work as a deterrent against non-compliance. For that deterrent to be effective, the OPCW, particularly the Executive Council and the Secretariat, must stand ready to consider and, when necessary, act upon a request for a challenge inspection at any time. In this context, Japan highly appreciates the fact that the Secretariat regularly requests States Parties to update operational information.

V. Optimisation and improvement of verification

9. The verification system constitutes the fundamental pillars of the Convention. Japan contributes actively to the effective operation of the verification system, for instance, by dispatching experts to the Secretariat. The verification system should take appropriately into account advances in science and technology, in order for the non-proliferation regime of chemical weapons to become more effective. Nevertheless, human and financial resources being finite in the OPCW, it has become more important than ever to make the best use of the OPCW’s expertise and to review the verification system, so as to optimise it. In particular, the following issues merit further consideration:

(a) Concerning inspections of other chemical production facilities (OCPFs): allocation of resources with inspections of scheduled chemical facilities and a methodology for site selection (including contents of information to be declared for site selection); and
(b) Concerning the inspection of Schedule 2 facilities: the necessity of conducting on-site analysis and of concluding facility agreements, from the standpoint of rational implementation of the Convention, within the background of the national situation, also taking cost-effectiveness into account.

VI. Structure of the Technical Secretariat and the role of the OPCW

10. To reinforce the non-proliferation regime of the Convention, it is important to streamline the structure of the Secretariat by constant review of the allocation of human and financial resources, using a scrap-and-build approach, along with the progress of chemical weapons destruction and developments in the chemical industry. To this end, the administrative and financial issues need to be addressed more vigorously. At the same time, it is necessary to cooperate more closely with other international organisations, such as the Security Council 1540 Committee, and to assess the task of the OPCW with a view to avoiding the duplication of roles.