1. Introduction

1.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) requires that all States Parties provide information annually on their national protective programmes to the Technical Secretariat. Article X, paragraph 4, of the Convention states that:

“For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21(i).”

1.2 To date, few States Parties have submitted any information regarding their protective programmes to the Technical Secretariat under Article X. Between entry into force of the Convention in 1997 and the end of 2002, only 35 of the then 147 Member States had provided this information to the Technical Secretariat at least once. During 2002, only 22 States Parties submitted declarations of this type.¹

1.3 Not all States Parties have protective programmes against chemical weapons (CW). However, declarations of a “single small scale facility” (SSSF), or an “other facility for protective purposes” (OFPP), and notifications of transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals, either domestically, or internationally, all strongly suggest that activities related to protective purposes are taking place. To date, 23 States Parties have declared either an SSSF, an OFPP, or Schedule 1 transfers for protective purposes. Yet despite this, only 11 of these States Parties submitted Article X information on their protective programmes in 2002. Three of these States Parties have never submitted such Article X information since entry into force of the Convention. There is therefore a significant and worrying discrepancy between what is being declared and what appears to be taking place in individual States Parties.

¹ Report by the Director General, Updated Annexes to the Status of Implementation of Articles X and XI as of 31 December 2002 (EC-31/DG.2/Add.1, dated 18 March 2003).
1.4 Where States Parties have submitted information, there has been no consistency in terms of the information included or amount of detail. Unlike in the case of other types of declaration, for which other types of information is provided under the CWC, no agreed guidance or standard format for the declaration of protective programmes is provided to State Parties.

1.5 To help States Parties report such information in a consistent form, thereby allowing the transparent flow of information on national protective programmes and facilitating analysis of the information by the Technical Secretariat, the United Kingdom proposes that a standard reporting template be provided to all States Parties for the submission of annual information on protective programmes. As requested by the Director-General, the information reported should be unclassified, or if deemed absolutely necessary, classified at the lowest possible level of confidentiality, in order to facilitate the handling and distribution of these documents within the Technical Secretariat and between States Parties. We also propose that it be mandatory for all States Parties to submit such information every year, even if they have not carried out activities relating to protective programmes. Nil returns are especially important because they help to ensure that accurate information is provided with the greatest transparency both to the Technical Secretariat and to other States Parties.

1.6 In determining the scope of information required under Article X, paragraph 4, we believe that the term ‘national programmes’ should not be interpreted narrowly. It should not be limited to a single co-ordinated set of activities, but should include a broad range of government-sponsored activities which are intended specifically to enhance the protection of the States Party’s armed forces and civil population from the threat of CW attack, whether immediately or in the long term. In many countries, there may not indeed be a single, unified national programme. The design of the reporting template therefore must allow for the organisational and functional differences that are likely to be encountered in States Parties.

Outline of the proposed reporting template

1.7 We propose that information should be reported on the following four broad areas which are explained further below:

(a) a general overview of the State Party's policy with regards to protection against CW;

(b) information on the measures taken to protect the State Party’s armed forces against CW;

(c) information on the ways in which protection from CW is afforded by the State Party to its civil population; and

(d) a list of openly-available publications in the reporting year generated by protective activities.
1.8 The aim of the document as a whole should be to provide the Technical Secretariat and other State Parties with an appreciation of the general organisation and scope of the States Party’s defensive programme against CW. This will help promote confidence and the transparent flow of information, and assist those with less advanced programmes to identify areas in which they can improve their defensive capabilities.

1.9 General policy overview: This introductory section should provide a clear statement of the State Party’s general policy with respect to protection against CW, giving a broad overview of the top-level aims of the State Party’s approach to CW defence. This statement should be sufficiently detailed to provide the context for the various elements of the national defensive activities reported in the document as a whole. If more detailed official information is available in the public domain regarding the State Party’s approach towards CW defence, reference to it should be made. This section should also describe the State Party’s approach to the provision of assistance to other State Parties with regards to CW protective measures, list the government departments responsible for protection against CW, and summarise procurement related with protective measures. It should additionally provide a broad overview of the types of research and development supported by the State Party in this field.

1.10 Protection of the armed forces: This section should provide readers with an understanding of the principal aspects of the State Party’s programmes to defend its armed forces against the use, or threat of use, of CW. This should include details of any units within the armed forces, or civilians working in support of the armed forces, that have special responsibility for CW defence, along with a synopsis of armed forces training in CW defence. An appreciation of the overall scope of activities carried out is important to provide transparent information on the State Party’s military defensive preparations against CW.

1.11 Protection of the civil population: The threat from CW is not solely limited to the battlefield. In recent history, there have been a number of occasions in which civilians have been exposed to CW by the actions of military forces or terrorists. It is therefore important that each State Party’s report on its protective programmes include information regarding its efforts to afford protection against CW to its civil population, as well as measures taken to protect key first responders such as police, fire-fighters, and ambulance and medical personnel.

1.12 Listing of publications: in order to promote a greater understanding of each State Party’s protective programmes and to share details of such programmes without compromising national security or commercial confidentiality, it is proposed that each annual report should also include a list of the openly-available publications generated by government-sponsored CW protective programmes during the reporting year. We anticipate that for some States Parties, particularly those with very extensive protective programmes, it would be difficult to obtain an exhaustive list of publications relating to their efforts. However, State Parties should provide a far-reaching a list of references as possible. These should illustrate key research and development on protective measures. Such information will add considerable transparency to the understanding of national work by other States Parties to the
Convention and assist the Technical Secretariat in ensuring that they are well-appraised on key developments in the field of CW defence.

2. **Conclusion**

The United Kingdom believes that the introduction of such a format would encourage more States Parties to submit useful declarations to a common standard. This would have the effect of increasing confidence and transparency in this important area. The Review Conference should instruct the Executive Council to agree a standard format for the annual reporting of national protective programmes.