OPENING STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
AT ITS SIXTH SESSION

Mr Chairman,
Distinguished delegates,
Dear guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen

1. Let me first of all congratulate my good friend, Ambassador Reimann of Switzerland, on his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Conference of the States Parties. Ambassador Reimann has been his country’s Permanent Representative to the OPCW for a number of years and has over this time demonstrated exemplary leadership, as well as strong support for the objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is, of course, fully consistent with Switzerland’s exemplary record of national implementation of the Convention, as well as with its consistent support for the OPCW in a wide range of areas – from inspector training, to assistance and protection, to international cooperation. Ambassador Reimann is a man of honour, vision and many talents, a distinguished diplomat and a devoted artist. The Conference could not have made a better choice, and under his wise leadership will, I am sure, achieve its desired objectives.

2. Let me also express my heartfelt gratitude to the outgoing Chairman of the Conference, my friend Ambassador Lagos of Chile. His skilful leadership of the OPCW during his term of office greatly contributed to the success of the Fifth Session of the Conference last year, as well as to our work in the succeeding months, when he visited The Hague to facilitate the discussion of a number of delicate and sensitive issues.

3. My thanks also go to the outgoing Chairman of the Executive Council, Mr Bernhard Brasack of Germany. Chairing the Executive Council is a very difficult task, but he dealt with the challenges facing this office with perseverance and dedication, always seeking to get the job well done.

4. We are honoured today by the presence of the Director-General of the United Nations Office in Geneva and the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr Petrovsky, who is attending this forum as the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General.
5. Let me also take a moment to again inform this audience of our grief. It is with profound sadness that we learnt of the death of Dr Johan Santesson, the Head of the Secretariat’s International Cooperation Branch, early on Friday morning. The OPCW flag was flying at half-mast on that day. Dr Santesson joined the Provisional Technical Secretariat in September 1993 and was, therefore, not only a founding member of the International Cooperation and Assistance Division, but also of the Secretariat itself. His efforts extended into many areas of the Secretariat, and in particular, to the establishment of the OPCW website, for which he was the driving force. During his time with the Organisation he had the opportunity to visit many Member States, and assisted in the training of many of their National Authority personnel, including, I understand, a number of you here today. Prior to joining the Secretariat Johan was one of the leading Swedish experts in the field of chemical defence and was known both nationally and internationally for his work in the field. He also played a major role in the work of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from its inception in April 1991 to 1993.

6. Johan fought his long illness with the same determination and perseverance that he showed with all projects that he undertook. He refused to let it beat him, and retained his sense of humour through all the adversities and difficulties that he faced. He will be greatly missed, and our thoughts go out to his bereaved family.

Mr Chairman,

7. Sessions of the Conference of the States Parties duly call for a reflection on “the state of the Chemical Weapons Convention”. They call for in-depth discussion and analysis of the OPCW’s achievements, as well as of the obstacles which hamper our progress toward a world free of chemical weapons. Sessions of the Conference also offer States Parties a unique opportunity to demonstrate strategic vision and foresight – to shrug off the burdens of everyday routine, and to think big about the well-being of the Organisation as a whole and its global objectives.

8. This session of the Conference is particularly important in this regard – the time has come to start preparations for the CWC review process to be launched next year.

9. The political and security environment in which the Chemical Weapons Convention operates remains highly complex. No new disarmament treaties seem to be in the offing. There would appear to be little, if any, progress on disarmament issues under discussion in various international fora. There is no consensus on possible elements for the future multilateral disarmament agenda at the Conference on Disarmament. And there is a growing perception of a conceptual vacuum in the arms control community.

10. Against this background, traditional concepts of international security are being challenged. New models of strategic stability are being put forward. Yet the required level of detail to allow for their comprehensive evaluation is still missing, even though it will surely follow. At present no clear and unambiguous answers to the fundamental questions raised are readily apparent. In the meantime the promise of further significant nuclear arms reductions also remains uncertain. So, it would appear, is the promise of a credible verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. The future of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hangs in the balance.
Tensions are running high in the Middle East, where the danger of the possible use of chemical weapons is not an abstract supposition. Progress on the Korean peninsula seems to have slowed down after the euphoria of last year, and there are new tensions in other parts of East Asia. As a result, the global disarmament status quo is becoming increasingly fragile.

11. In this uncertain environment the preservation and strengthening of those mechanisms and instruments – such as the Chemical Weapons Convention - which have already contributed and continue to contribute to making the world a safer place becomes increasingly critical. Perhaps at this point we should ask the question “Is the world indeed safer today because of the CWC? Have the joint efforts of the States Parties in building up the OPCW really been worthwhile?”

12. Before April 1997 no international legally binding obligation to destroy existing stockpiles of chemical weapons or their production facilities or not to acquire new ones existed. Four years later 143 States Parties of the CWC have pledged to forego the chemical weapons option, and have refused to allow their territories to be used to develop, produce, or stockpile these weapons of mass destruction. States Parties with declared holdings of such weapons or of chemical weapons production facilities have committed themselves to complete the destruction of such stocks and the related production capacity within the timelines established by the Convention. The CWC has become the most rapidly growing multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaty in history.

13. Before April 1997 only Russia and the United States admitted to the possession of chemical weapons. After April 1997 two more countries, having become States Parties, declared holdings of these weapons, and are now destroying them in accordance with the Convention’s timelines under international verification. All 70,000 tonnes of chemical weapons declared by these four States Parties have now been fully inventoried, and are subject to stringent systematic verification. Three of the four declared possessors of chemical weapons – with Russia the only exception - have complied with the first CWC timeline for the destruction of their stocks of chemical weapons. They have by now destroyed a total of 5,600 tonnes of chemical agent and 1.6 million of munitions and containers, or almost 20 percent of the total declared quantity of such munitions and containers. The United States of America, which has already destroyed almost one fifth of its chemical weapons arsenal, has set an impressive example in this regard. The first continuously operating chemical weapons destruction facility, which has completed destruction of its share of the US chemical weapons stockpile and was recently certified as closed, is also in the United States. In addition, more than half of the chemical weapons production capacity declared by eleven States Parties has been certified as either destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. China, France, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, and another State Party have all completely destroyed their former CWPFs, or have converted them to peaceful uses. The United States of America has destroyed five out of its 13 CWPFs, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has destroyed or converted six out of eight such facilities, and the Russian Federation has destroyed or converted eight out of 24 of its CWPFs.
14. The world’s chemical industry has opened up its facilities to inspection, and in the period since the first chemical industry inspection was launched, in 1997, the OPCW has inspected all declared Schedule 1 facilities, almost all the declared Schedule 2 facilities, and one fifth of the Schedule 3 plant sites, and has started inspections of the more than 4,000 plant sites producing discrete organic chemicals. The 376 inspections conducted under Article VI of the Convention since entry into force testify eloquently to the full and active role played by the chemical industry in enabling States Parties to meet their obligations under the Convention.

15. All but the three most recent States Parties have submitted their initial declarations to the Organisation. The legal and factual basis for the evaluation of States Parties’ compliance with the CWC has thus been established. An increasingly detailed picture is emerging of the global traffic in scheduled chemicals, even though individual pieces of this jigsaw do not always fit very easily with one another. Restrictions on transfers of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals to States not party to the Convention are already in place, and, although they may require further strengthening, they apparently have already had some positive effect on our progress toward universality.

16. The Secretariat’s regular reports to the Executive Council on the implementation of the verification regime provide detailed and in-depth information about the OPCW’s inspection activities, and serve as a reliable basis for evaluating the overall compliance of States Parties with their verification-related obligations under the Convention.

17. Considerable work has been undertaken to develop a framework for the implementation of the requirements of Article X – to ensure that assistance in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons is provided in a timely and meaningful manner. After much consideration a concept document outlining the principles for the provision of assistance under Article X of the CWC has been completed by the Secretariat, and will be submitted to the Executive Council for review in the near future.

18. In spite of the continuing lack of agreement on the overall framework for the implementation of Article XI, concrete international cooperation projects have been developed and are being implemented by the Secretariat in close cooperation with States Parties, chemical industry companies and academic institutions. In particular one such project – the Associate Programme – is a promising model for the future.

19. States Parties can and should also be justifiably proud of the OPCW which they established in May 1997 to implement this ground-breaking treaty. Four years down the road they have a functional and lean Secretariat composed of nationals from 66 States Parties. This Secretariat is fortunate to have at its disposal much of the current global knowledge and expertise about chemical weapons and dual-use chemicals, complemented by the experience gained from the conduct of about 1,000 inspections at military and industrial facilities and plant sites in 49 States Parties.

20. In short, the international community now has an efficient working multilateral tool for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention. And the world has indeed become a safer and better place as regards chemical weapons since the Convention entered into force.
21. It is, however, my duty as Director-General to draw your attention to those outstanding broad policy matters that require urgent attention. Action on some of these matters has been postponed again and again. Other issues have emerged as a consequence of decisions taken in the past. These issues threaten, in some cases, even the very survival of the OPCW. All of them, therefore, require attention at high political levels, coupled with the necessary political will.

22. Let me start with universality. This is one area in which some may think that the OPCW is not yet facing a serious challenge. Indeed, so far all the signs have been positive. Membership of the Organisation has continued to increase at a steady pace during the past twelve months. Since May 2000 the OPCW has welcomed a total of ten new States Parties into its fold, the same number as in the preceding twelve months. The new States Parties are: Dominica, Gabon, Kiribati, Malaysia, Mozambique, Jamaica, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Zambia.

23. We are closely working with countries in regions where, in the view of the Secretariat, joining the Chemical Weapons Convention would not invoke any particular security considerations. A number of events specifically aimed at expanding CWC membership in the Caribbean and the Pacific are planned for this year, or have already taken place. We also hope to receive the necessary funding to enable us to sponsor an important regional event on the Korean peninsula designed to promote universality.

24. The OPCW is, however, rapidly reaching a point where every new accession will, inevitably, be achieved only as the result of a targeted and carefully considered programme of action. Such a programme will require coordination at various levels, and will need to include measures to be undertaken by individual States Parties in a particular region, as well as by major powers with historic, political and economic ties to that region. It will need to include collective actions by groups of OPCW States Parties, including in other international organisations, actions by policy-making bodies of the OPCW, and, of course, measures to be taken by the Secretariat and by me. Such a programme must be developed on the basis of a comprehensive and realistic assessment of circumstances pertaining in each particular country. Its implementation will need to be continuously monitored. It must also be understood that any such programme will inevitably have a budgetary impact, and will accordingly need the political backing of Member States. Yet, if universality is not to be an empty phrase, there is no alternative. It would be naive to believe that universality can be achieved from The Hague and at no cost to the OPCW.

25. The other danger to universality emerges from within the Organisation itself. More than 20 percent of States Parties have by now lost their voting rights in the OPCW. These statistics are a source of increasing concern to me as the Director-General. The fact that, as of today, 31 countries have not paid their budgetary contributions for two years or more, may suggest that many of them might not see the practical benefits deriving from their active participation in the work of the Organisation. Indeed, if the OPCW is not able to provide some of its members with meaningful benefits, and is in fact perceived only as a burden, it may well be that many countries – particularly some of the smaller ones – will come to question increasingly the value of remaining
within the OPCW. The misguided belief that, by virtue of being fundamentally a “security” treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention should concentrate solely on its verification mandate, and should not worry about, among other things, meaningful “membership rewards”, is a recipe doomed to failure.

26. The Organisation’s second biggest challenge is directly related to the Convention’s “raison d’être” – the complete destruction of chemical weapons worldwide. Three out of the four declared chemical weapons possessor States Parties are successfully fulfilling their obligations in this regard. Last year the fourth and largest of these possessor States Parties received the Conference’s agreement to a delay in the implementation of the Convention’s requirement to destroy 1 percent of its stockpile by 29 April 2000. It remains a fact, however, that four years after the entry into force of the Convention, the Russian Federation has yet to report to the international community on precisely how and when it plans to destroy all of its 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons in accordance with the requirements of the treaty. The absence of such a programme can not, in itself, be attributed to a shortage of funds. Russia should be able to devote its efforts to the preparation of a meaningful programme for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile.

27. Russia is a great nation and a major player in international affairs. Administrative reforms, and the reorganisation of functions within the Government bureaucracy were all essential for the destruction of chemical weapons, but now they must lead to concrete results. I visited the Russian Federation in early February. I was yet again given assurances at high levels that - after three years of inaction under the previous Government – in November of last year President Putin personally gave instructions to submit the revised chemical weapons destruction programme to him by the end of March. We are now in the middle of May. The Conference of the States Parties – the highest political decision-making body - is starting its annual session, and the new Russian CW destruction programme is still not with us. No one can accuse the OPCW of lack of patience. It would, however, only be fair to observe that this patience of the international community may be approaching its limits.

28. By the end of April next year all declared chemical weapons possessor States Parties will be under an obligation to report to the OPCW the destruction of at least 20% of their chemical weapons stockpiles. It is by now clear that Russia will not be in a position to meet this second timeline either. And, frankly, it is simply unrealistic to expect that it will be able to destroy all of its chemical weapons by 2007. The fundamental issue here is that the primary objective of the Convention – the complete elimination of chemical weapons arsenals - is not being achieved within the timelines required by the Convention itself. This cannot but have a deleterious effect on the general political will to ensure full compliance with these obligations – by other States Parties, and in other areas of implementation.

29. Last year, the Conference took an important political decision in favour of increasing international assistance to the Russian Federation to destroy its chemical weapons. However, there is one critical condition for meaningful support from the international community for the Russian Federation in this regard – the existence of a credible destruction programme with clear indications of where and which international assistance would be indispensable for its success. I intimated this in my opening statement to the Conference last year. I repeat it now, and I urge the Russian
authorities to promptly conclude their consideration of their programme, and to submit it to the OPCW. I strongly support increased international assistance for Russia, and never tire of saying this. However, the lack of such assistance cannot be used as a pretext for continuing delays by the responsible authorities in Moscow. This situation needs to be redressed without delay.

To conclude with the subject of chemical weapons, it is deeply disquieting that some States Parties have been publicly accused of non-compliance with the Convention by other States Parties while, at the same time, no justification for such accusations has been provided within the mechanisms offered by the Convention. The Convention, of course, has procedures for dealing with concerns about compliance, including a challenge inspection. It would be logical to follow these procedures negotiated with great care in Geneva. Unsubstantiated accusations of non-compliance launched outside of the Convention’s framework erode the very fabric of the OPCW, and can only diminish the value of the Convention and of the Organisation as instruments for cooperation, conflict resolution and clarification.

The third challenge to the effective implementation of the Convention requires urgent action by the policy-making organs to ensure the establishment of a level playing field for the implementation of the industry verification regime. Four years after the entry into force of the Convention, the chemical industries in many States Parties are still subject to differing national interpretations of the Convention’s declaration requirements. This creates an intolerable situation in which similar facilities producing the same toxic chemicals for commercial use declared and opened for inspection by some States Parties may not be declared by other States Parties. Unilateral interpretations of the provisions of the Convention also make it possible for substantial amounts of scheduled chemicals to literally leak out through cracks in the system, without being reported to the OPCW. In addition, attempts in some countries to “overprotect” chemical industries “at home” can also undermine the credibility of the verification regime in general.

The destruction of chemical weapons is clearly a key objective of the CWC. Accordingly three quarters of our inspector resources over the past four years have been consistently applied to the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and of chemical weapons related infrastructure. However, we should also not underestimate the importance of verification of non-prohibited activities. Confidence can be built only through credibility. And for the OPCW the criteria for credibility are the same wherever an inspection is conducted.

It is equally true that, while each inspection should be credible, the total number of such inspections which the OPCW is authorised to conduct should also be credible. This number is unfortunately unlikely to be higher in 2002 than it was in 2000, even though the number of inspectable facilities increased last year from 600 to more than 4,600. If this does not contribute to a crisis of confidence, what does?

The Secretariat is intensifying its dialogue with the chemical industry. This dialogue will be vital in enabling a direct exchange of views on matters of interest to both sides. The exchanges which took place last week proved to be extremely useful, and gave the Secretariat an opportunity to dispel some of the misconceptions about what it
is attempting to achieve, and why. This dialogue, which we intend to pursue in the months ahead, will be critically important as we approach the First Review Conference. It is also clear from these exchanges that industry does not want – and does not need - to be “overprotected” by governments. It simply expects to be able to demonstrate its full compliance with the Convention, while at the same time seeking to protect real commercial secrets. One thing is certain, the chemical industry does not want to waste money on inspections that undermine, rather than strengthen, confidence in industry’s compliance with the Convention. The Secretariat fully shares these views.

35. I am grateful for industry’s continuing strong support for the Convention. I will continue to do everything in my power to maintain and strengthen our cooperative relationship. I am confident that industry will make a meaningful contribution to the forthcoming review conference, and I wholeheartedly welcome this.

36. While inspections of chemical industry facilities have generally gone well, the regime that has been established to monitor trade in scheduled chemicals, and to identify or prevent possible proliferation attempts has, quite frankly, failed thus far. If proliferation is indeed an issue of concern, one needs to think about the following. Firstly, the necessity to streamline the existing provisions under the Convention so that they actually work, and, secondly, the need to discuss additional measures (regulatory, voluntary, or both) that would allow the actual (real-time) tracking of major transfers of scheduled chemicals. Without such action, there will be little confidence in the ability of the regime to detect and prevent the diversion of relevant chemicals for prohibited purposes. As long as the current situation persists, some Member States will continue to cling to unilateral export control policies outside the framework of the Convention as the only remedy for dealing with the non-proliferation problem. Without such action, there will be little confidence in the ability of the regime to detect and prevent the diversion of relevant chemicals for prohibited purposes. As long as the current situation persists, some Member States will continue to cling to unilateral export control policies outside the framework of the Convention as the only remedy for dealing with the non-proliferation problem. This can only undermine the credibility of the CWC regime, and in particular its appeal to states that, for the time being, have not committed themselves to it. A functioning model for transfer tracking measures has been developed in the area of narcotic drugs and their precursor chemicals. There is no reason why something similar cannot be accomplished by the OPCW.

37. The fourth challenge to the Convention relates to international cooperation. It is simply unacceptable that, four years after EIF, we do not have policy guidance on the overall framework for the implementation of Article XI. A 6% share for international cooperation and assistance programmes in the OPCW budget is also singularly inadequate. If the current deadlock is not overcome soon, we may face serious difficulties.

38. International cooperation is intrinsically linked to the security nature of the CWC. If managed properly, and without unjustified fears, international cooperation can become an additional vehicle for strengthening compliance and enhancing transparency in global chemical activities. Properly managed international cooperation will contribute to creating an anti chemical weapons culture amongst chemical scientists and engineers in all Member States, will facilitate the implementation activities of National Authorities, and, in the longer term, will open new market and investment possibilities for chemical companies.
39. The fifth challenge to the efficient implementation of the Convention relates to the OPCW budget. For the last several months budgetary issues have been dominating discussions in The Hague, overshadowing everything else. One does not have to be a fortune teller to predict that the Conference at this session will also devote most of its efforts to this subject. So, I shall dwell on this, especially for the benefit of those delegations that did not take part in the lengthy discussions under the auspices of the Executive Council in the first months of this year.

40. In 2000 our expenditures to complete in full the adopted programme of work were EUR 59.9 million - just below the budgeted amount of EUR 60.2 million. Yet because part of the budgeted income did not arrive we ended the year with a cash deficit of about EUR 5 million. In reality, a good amount of expected income was “fictitious”. It included anticipated reimbursements for inspections of chemical weapons facilities under Articles IV and V which – because of delays in chemical weapons destruction – did not take place. Reimbursements, as mandated by the relevant Conference decision, include payment for inspector salaries for the period of an inspection. They have to be paid even if inspections do not take place.

41. I am not blaming the declared possessor States Parties for this. The destruction of chemical weapons is a highly complex undertaking, and unexpected delays are inevitable. The problem is rather that a significant part of the OPCW budget income still depends on the capacity of the possessor States Parties, and of the Secretariat, to accurately predict the unpredictable. This leads to automatically built-in deficits in any adopted budget. Unless the system is changed, as destruction operations pick up in Russia and elsewhere, this deficit is likely to increase. Just think of the implications.

42. In addition, a lack of incentives, coupled with bureaucratic foot-dragging, as well as, in some instances, a lack of proper legal mechanisms, have all produced situations in which even real reimbursements are either not paid at all, or are paid only after considerable delays. I am therefore calling on the Conference to request the Executive Council to come up with a workable solution to this problem before the end of this year. The continuation into 2002 of the current practice of built-in deficit budgeting will, quite simply, sound the death knell for the Organisation. I am extremely concerned in this regard about the implications of the current language in the draft decision on the 2002 budget, which, unless it is changed today or tomorrow, or coupled with some other measures may be submitted by the Executive Council to the Conference at this session. This language will force the OPCW to live with the existing flawed budget structure in the next financial year and will - yet again - jeopardise the Secretariat’s ability to fully implement its programme of work.

43. The Convention itself is built on the principle of a gradual but steep increase in chemical weapons destruction activities. This is clearly established in Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex. Such activities currently consume most of the OPCW’s inspector resources, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. As a consequence the Organisation’s budget simply can not continue to be based on the “zero growth” principle. Member States must finally accept this. A significant increase in the budget will be inevitable in 2003 if only because three more chemical weapons destruction facilities are expected to be fully operational throughout that year. There are only two such continuously-operating facilities at present.
The Secretariat has already given States Parties an indication of the possible scope of such an increase, with a view to allowing them to take the necessary advance planning steps internally. The Secretariat will, in the very near future, submit to States Parties more detailed estimates of the financial resources that will be necessary to adequately implement the annual programme of work in 2003.

44. Last year was our most productive year in terms of programme delivery. I think that we should all be proud of this achievement - both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is regrettable that 2001 has become the year of austerity. On current estimates, we continue to expect a shortfall of EUR 6.7 million this year. This is partly due to the fact that we had no choice but to cover the irrecoverable part of the 2000 deficit, not only with the cash surplus from 1999, but also with the funds from 2001 budgetary contributions. And partly because the budget adopted last year for 2001 did not include sufficient funds for increases in personnel-related costs mandated by the United Nations which we are legally obliged to implement. And, last but not least, because the above-mentioned “fictitious income” – the main reason for deficits - is prominently featured therein as well. This problem arises as a result of the fact that it is simply not possible to foresee all possible contingencies in the work of a young, growing organisation like the OPCW. Our internal cash monitoring procedures also turned out to be far from perfect. But, most importantly, the source of the deficit is structural, and we should now unite to repair the damage, to restore adequate financing, and to ensure, through changes to the structure of the budget, that such a situation never recurs again.

45. As you well know, painful decisions of an emergency nature had to be taken, to try to establish the required seriousness, competence and responsibility at the level of the Chief Financial Officer, until a qualified replacement can be chosen – this time by me. And, by the way, this process is nearing completion now. As recommended by the Office of Internal Oversight, a meaningful restructuring of critical budgetary and financial areas of the Secretariat inherited from the transition period between the Prepcom and the establishment of the OPCW has been implemented. Very stringent additional oversight powers were given to the Office of the Internal Oversight. And the key position of my new Chief of Cabinet is now occupied by a person with extensive experience and an impeccable reputation in budgetary, financial and auditing areas.

46. As for the shortfall we are facing this year, the Secretariat has already carried out a number of draconian cuts in non-operational programme areas, and I repeat - in non-operational programme areas, which would result in its total reduction by EUR 4.7 million. Regrettably, if no additional funds are provided, the remaining amount will have to be found through cuts in both inspections and international cooperation and assistance. The financial situation is being monitored on a daily basis, and I can assure States Parties that all possible economies will continue to be relentlessly pursued, and that every additional cent saved will be spent only on inspections, only on inspections and international cooperation. If the Conference approves the Secretariat’s proposals for additional funding for this year, the Secretariat will still be in a position to conduct most, if not all, of these two programmes.
47. I hope that delegations to this Conference will be fair, will be honest and objective, in evaluating this critical situation. I hope that they will take into account the excruciating restrictions imposed on the Secretariat in relation to budgetary, legislative, personnel, and structural matters. Give us a sound budget, as in any other similar international organisation. Give us sound, consistent and complete financial regulations -- not a grouping of an incoherent selection of some language extracted from other similar legal instruments. Give us the staff to perform the tasks. Let us jointly take all the necessary decisions now. Let us start from a clean slate. And let us think big about the future of the OPCW in order to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

48. And finally I would like to share with you some of my thoughts about the CWC review process.

49. This is yet another new task of the Organisation, without any institutional precedent. Review conferences are, of course, a common feature of previously negotiated global disarmament treaties. None of them, however, has so far involved such a great volume of individual and collective work as the CWC, and none has created its proper fully organised operational mechanism. The purpose of the review conference is to see how the Convention has been working, and how the OPCW has been serving the interests of States Parties in the first five years of its existence. Where do new threats to the regime come from? Thorough and effective preparation is the only way of ensuring a meaningful and productive review conference. This, in turn, requires the active and thoughtful cooperation of all States Parties, the OPCW policy-making organs, and the Secretariat itself.

50. Many of the issues raised in this statement will need to be assessed in detail during the preparations for the 2003 Review Conference. The review process – to be formally launched next year – will offer an opportunity to study some of the trends that we have been seeing recently, with the potential to weaken the CWC. The review process is thus neither a technical nor a legalistic exercise, but a political matter of major importance that deserves the closest attention of Member States, and at a high level.

51. Many aspects of the Convention and of its implementation would require close scrutiny during the review process. Member States may wish to consider additional measures with a view to strengthening the non-proliferation regime which may be applied to States not party. There will also be a need to comprehensively review developments affecting the manufacturing technologies for chemicals relevant to the CWC, and to examine how the current industry regime, in its design and relative emphasis, relates to these developments. The Secretariat sees a lot of merit in instituting a practice of “nil” declarations, and - on a more technical level – of refining declaration requirements for DOCs and establishing a “bottom” declaration ceiling for transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals.

52. An important aspect of the preparations for the review conference is an assessment of the scientific foundations of the Convention. Does the present verification regime under Article VI, and the Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals, adequately reflect the scientific and technological progress that has been made over the past decade, and the current trends in science and technology? Much has changed, as is
evidenced by the completion of the human genome project and the emergence of genomics, as well as by advances in chemical production technologies, a better understanding of the functioning of certain biomolecules and receptors, etc. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry has proposed to the Secretariat that it undertake a review of key areas of science, with a view to identifying developments and trends that are relevant to the CWC. We welcome this offer, and look forward to the results of this international scientific review. Its results will, of course, be passed on to Member States for advice and action well before the review conference.

53. Actors outside the OPCW framework will also closely monitor the preparations for the 2003 Review Conference. It is important for the credibility and the attractiveness of the Convention that these preparations are conducted with a view to strengthening the regime, as well as to making adherence to the Convention attractive for all present and future Member States.

54. Improving the transparency of OPCW’s work is also critically important. The proceedings of the Executive Council are kept away from public scrutiny. From the documentation that the OPCW provides to the public it is practically impossible for an outsider to understand what the Organisation is actually doing, whether all Member States are implementing their obligations in full, and what their compliance status is. Public support and understanding are important to fight off challenges to our work, and to stabilise the CWC regime. However, public support cannot be generated if the OPCW continues to abuse its confidentiality regime to prevent non-confidential information from entering the public domain for what, in most instances, are reasons of political convenience. This, frankly, is undermining the credibility of the Organisation, and was definitely not envisaged when the Convention was negotiated in Geneva. In addition, a precious opportunity is being lost to mobilise public support in support of universal adherence to the Convention.

Mr Chairman,

55. States Parties need to remain constantly aware that their ratification of the Convention is just the first step in the long and arduous process of implementing it, and that it is just as important, if not more important, than the negotiations that led to the signature of the CWC in 1993. The Convention will fulfil its function only if it is implemented scrupulously and fairly by all States Parties without seeking special treatment.

56. This session of the Conference of the States Parties bears a special significance for the future of the OPCW. The Conference is facing a critical challenge, and consequently has a choice – to build on the Organisation’s historic success since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or to let the OPCW stumble on, uncertain of the real degree of political support from its States Parties. Our Organisation remains one of the very few recent examples of success on the part of the international community in dealing with global security issues. It must not be allowed to fail. All that is needed for it to continue to excel is strong and consistent political backing from its Member States.

Thank you.