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### REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

#### PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISION C-SS-4/DEC.3 ON ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE

1. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference), at its Fourth Special Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use” (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018). In paragraph 24 of the decision, the Conference decided that “the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and a report on its initial implementation to all States Parties and to the United Nations Secretary-General within 30 days of this decision and thereafter provide a report on progress to each regular session of the Council”, in reference to the Executive Council (the Council).
2. In furtherance of paragraph 7 of the decision, the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) continued its engagement with the Syrian authorities to clarify all gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies noted in the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration and subsequent submissions.
3. Following the change in government in December 2024, the Secretariat has endeavoured to assist and support the new Syrian authorities in their efforts to fulfil legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic under the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention), as well as to facilitate the Secretariat’s mandated activities in this regard. Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (both dated 27 September 2013) and other relevant decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs continue to provide the legal framework for the Secretariat’s efforts aimed at eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme.
4. On 8 February 2025, at the invitation of caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, the Director-General and his delegation held a meeting with President Ahmed al-Sharaa and another meeting with the Foreign Minister in Damascus. The delegation included the Deputy Director-General and, for the first time in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, a member of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). The Syrian authorities expressed their recognition of their obligations under the Convention, the mandates of the Secretariat, and their intention to cooperate with the OPCW and fulfil their obligations under the Convention.
5. As previously reported, since 1 June 2025, the Director-General has reorganised the conduct of the Secretariat’s activities, inter alia, in the Syrian Arab Republic through the Office of Special Missions (OSM). The coordination and organisation of these activities through the OSM allow the Secretariat to carry out its mandates more efficiently and effectively in the Syrian Arab Republic, including, inter alia, verification



of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and the destruction of chemical weapons and related materials and equipment, establishment of the facts surrounding the allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons, identification of perpetrators in instances where use or likely use has been established in the Syrian Arab Republic, and other relevant activities. In channelling this work through the OSM, the Secretariat strengthens its capacity to organise and coordinate—both internally and externally—its activities in the Syrian Arab Republic and beyond.

6. In October 2025, the Secretariat re-established a continuous presence in Damascus. Since then, the Secretariat has been regularly deploying multidisciplinary teams of experts to the Syrian Arab Republic, coordinated by the OSM, in support of the implementation of the Secretariat's mandates.
7. During the reporting period, the Secretariat continued its activities related to verifying the completeness and accuracy of the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration. In the course of several deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat teams held meetings with the Syrian authorities, conducted interviews with former Syrian chemical weapons experts, visited a number of sites that had either previously been declared or were locations suspected to be related to the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and collected multiple samples for further analysis.
8. Through the interviews with former Syrian chemical weapons experts, the Secretariat obtained additional information that further supports its previous conclusions that the previous Syrian authorities had not declared the entirety of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons programme.
9. During these field deployments, the Secretariat teams, working jointly with Syrian counterparts, visited eight locations that had not previously been declared to the Secretariat and were identified as potentially related to the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons programme. During these visits, a total of 15 samples were collected from three locations.
10. The Secretariat continues its work to define the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities at the locations already visited by its teams in the Syrian Arab Republic, based on, inter alia, the results of sample analyses and information obtained through the interviews with former chemical weapons experts and other sources.
11. The Secretariat has initiated a comprehensive reassessment to determine the full extent of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. This includes conducting a complete inventory of all chemical weapons-related sites, equipment, munitions, and other programme components.
12. Consistent with paragraph 8 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, and following current practice, the Secretariat continues to update States Parties on the operations under the mandate of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), through, inter alia, the monthly progress report entitled "Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme", the annual report entitled "Summary Update of the Activities Carried Out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria", and through reports detailing the activities of the FFM and findings regarding specific incidents of alleged use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

13. Activities under the mandate to establish the facts surrounding the allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons, as coordinated by the OSM, resumed in the Syrian Arab Republic in November 2025, shortly after the re-establishment of the Secretariat's continuous presence in the country. The Secretariat teams conducted interviews in relation to allegations under investigation, held meetings with the Syrian authorities, and continued planning activities, including potential visits to incident locations, in coordination with Syrian counterparts.
14. In December 2025, as part of its field activities, the Secretariat team conducted a site visit to a location associated with one of the allegations in the Aleppo area. During this visit, the team documented the location of interest and collected samples and other items of potential evidentiary value. This activity contributed to the ongoing effort to gather, corroborate, and assess information relevant to the reported incidents.
15. Since the last session of the Council, the Secretariat has maintained regular communication with the Syrian authorities in support of the mandate to establish the facts surrounding the allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons, activities in relation to which are now being conducted through the OSM. Through notes verbales sent to the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat requested additional information regarding the device allegedly linked to the incident in Tallet al-Kbayneh on 19 May 2019, as well as documentation pertaining to military locations, including logs, daily reports, and flight records, that may be relevant to ongoing investigations. Further details were shared in the Note by the Secretariat S/2473/2025 (dated 24 December 2025).
16. The Secretariat continues the analysis of information pertaining to reported incidents and, in due course, will issue a report covering five distinct allegations encompassing a total of 16 reported incidents.
17. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat established the IIT to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report. The Secretariat has continued to make progress in identifying the perpetrators of several incidents involving the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat continues to implement the mandate of identifying perpetrators in instances where use or likely use of chemical weapons has been established through the activities of the OSM.
18. On 21 January 2026, the Secretariat issued a report on the incident that occurred in Kafr Zeita, in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 October 2016 (S/2478/2026). This was the fifth report of the IIT, relating to the seventh incident it investigated, consistent with the mandate conferred by the Conference to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic.
19. The IIT conducted its investigation between March 2024 and December 2025 and reached its conclusions on the basis of the degree of certainty of “reasonable grounds”, the standard of proof consistently adopted by international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. On the basis of all information obtained, analysed, and corroborated, the IIT concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, on 1 October 2016, between 19:00 and 19:40 (UTC+3), one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the

Syrian Arab Air Force dropped at least one yellow pressurised cylinder that struck a cave system in the Wadi al-Aanz valley in Kafr Zeita. The IIT reached its conclusions through a holistic assessment of the information relating to the different hypotheses pursued during the investigation.

20. Through Note Verbale No. NV/ODG/OSM-23/25 (dated 22 December 2025), the Secretariat requested the Syrian authorities to provide any information that may be relevant to determining the origin of the chemicals used as weapons and to identify the perpetrators in the remaining incidents according to Note by the Secretariat EC-91/S/3 (dated 28 June 2019).
21. The Secretariat also continues to preserve and review information and evidence for potential transfer to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM), as mandated by the Conference in paragraph 12 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3. In this process, paramount importance is accorded to the applicable rules and procedures of the OPCW governing the protection, control, and release of confidential information and evidence, including measures to protect witnesses' identifying information in line with their informed consent. All transfers of information to the IIIM are being implemented in a manner consistent with the OPCW rules and policies on confidentiality.
22. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions stood at EUR 64 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. This does not include the more than EUR 48 million received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in 2013 and 2014.
23. The Secretariat will continue to keep States Parties informed of activities and progress regarding the Syrian chemical weapons programme through existing reporting modalities, as mandated, and through briefings, as deemed appropriate.
24. In accordance with paragraph 18 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat continues to develop options for further assistance to States Parties to help prevent the chemical weapons threat posed by non-State actors, and to aid States Parties' contingency planning in the event of a chemical weapons attack. Taking into consideration, inter alia, the decision of the Council entitled "Addressing the Threat Posed by the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors" (EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017), the Secretariat has continued to build on existing activities related to preparedness, prevention, and response.
25. Pursuant to paragraph 20 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating possible chemical weapons use on its territory, can provide technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons. Accordingly, the

Secretariat continues to ensure that it has the necessary capabilities to respond to such State Party requests, including through assessing relevant forensic tools and capabilities that may be useful in fulfilling them.

26. As reported previously, the Secretariat is implementing a series of capacity-building measures to expand the existing skills of relevant Secretariat staff. These measures include, inter alia, training to further build investigative capabilities, the revision of job descriptions, the assessment of potential additional investigative tools and capabilities, and support for the procurement of software and equipment through the creation of a test and evaluation programme.
27. The Secretariat will continue to expand these activities to scale up its internal knowledge and expertise. The capabilities provided by the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology continue to further reinforce these efforts, including in the adaptation of the Inspectorate Division to facilitate the readiness and flexibility of staff resources to support all types of missions and training. The Secretariat has developed specific projects, which are expanded upon in the Note entitled “Update on Programmes and Activities at the Centre for Chemistry and Technology” (S/2304/2024, dated 8 July 2024). States Parties are invited to consider providing voluntary contributions to support these priority projects.
28. In furtherance of paragraph 23 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat will continue to prioritise the realisation of the universality of the Convention, on the understanding that this goal is essential to achieving its object and purpose, to enhancing the security of States Parties, and to international peace and security. The Director-General continues to call upon all States Parties to support the Secretariat’s efforts in this regard.
29. At its Twenty-Eighth Session, the Conference adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use” (C-28/DEC.12, dated 30 November 2023). The Secretariat has been integrating reporting requirements on the elements in the decision concerning the Syrian chemical weapons dossier into its existing reporting.