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### REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

#### PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (the Council) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.



5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference), at its Twenty-Fifth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
7. The Council, at its 110th Session, adopted a decision entitled “Expedited On-Site Destruction of Any Remnants of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-110/DEC.1, dated 8 October 2025).
8. This, the 148th monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period 24 December 2025 to 23 January 2026.

**Obligations undertaken by the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention**

9. The Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) on 14 September 2013. The Convention entered into force for this State Party on 14 October 2013. To date, as regularly and consistently reported by the Secretariat, the work to verify the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme has continued, and due to the numerous gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies uncovered by the Secretariat over more than 11 years, this declaration still cannot be considered as accurate and complete.
10. As previously reported, all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Convention remain valid, regardless of any change in government. Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (both dated 27 September 2013) continue to provide the relevant legal framework for the Secretariat’s efforts under the Convention aimed at eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
11. The transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2024 presents an opportunity for the Organisation to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to ensure the Syrian Arab Republic’s long-term compliance with the Convention.

**Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1**

12. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

- (a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.
- (b) As required by paragraph 19 of decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian authorities are to report on a monthly basis regarding activities on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat received two outstanding reports from the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2025, which are currently being processed for publication in accordance with established practices. Additionally, and in line with the above-mentioned obligation, on 22 January 2026, the Syrian National Authority shared with the Technical Secretariat its monthly report, dated 20 January 2026 and covering the reporting period of 15 December 2025 to 15 January 2026, for submission to the Council, regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs.

**Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities**

13. As stated in previous reports, all the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5**

14. Since 2014, the Secretariat continued to address the shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT).

15. Of the 26 outstanding issues that have been reported by the Secretariat since 2014, 7 have been resolved. The substance of the 19 remaining outstanding issues remained a serious concern to the Secretariat, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared and/or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to complete all the measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

16. Following the transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2024, the Secretariat has continued to address the shortcomings in the initial declaration with the Syrian authorities. In addition to 26 declared chemical weapons-related locations, information available to the Secretariat indicates that over 100 additional locations may have been involved in activities related to chemical weapons. Since March 2025, the Secretariat has been deploying its teams to the Syrian Arab Republic and has started conducting visits to these locations, subject to security and other relevant requirements.

17. On 1 June 2025, the Office of Special Missions (OSM) was established to coordinate, inter alia, all the Secretariat's activities in the Syrian Arab Republic and to implement the mandates previously carried out by the DAT, the FFM, and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), together with other mandated activities. As reported previously, the OSM deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic in June, August, and September 2025.

18. In October 2025, the Secretariat re-established a continuous presence of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (OPCW Mission) and continued work on securing accommodation and office space at a designated facility that meets United Nations safety and security standards.
19. On 3 November 2025, in response to a letter of the Director-General dated 23 October 2025 and a Note Verbale of 16 October 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed a letter to the Director-General with information concerning the new Syrian National Authority. On 20 November 2025, the newly appointed Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW presented his credentials to the Director-General.
20. Despite several meetings to discuss the provision of suitable office space that would ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the Secretariat's activities, these commitments have not yet fully materialised. The OPCW requested the Syrian authorities to continue to address this matter with the management of the designated facility to secure an adequate working environment for the OPCW Mission.
21. In November 2025, the Secretariat team present in the Syrian Arab Republic held several meetings with Syrian authorities aimed at coordinating all substantive activities. The Secretariat provided, *inter alia*, the Syrian authorities with a list of 17 suspected chemical weapons-related locations in the Damascus region to be visited.
22. Following preparatory activities, including reconnaissance visits by the Syrian support teams and pre-deployment meetings, the Secretariat conducted visits to six suspected chemical weapons-related locations in November 2025. The Syrian authorities provided support and facilitated these deployments. Two samples were collected at one of the locations and will be analysed at two OPCW designated laboratories. No relevant documents were discovered during these visits, and the Syrian authorities were requested to ensure that any documents that may have been removed from these sites are made available to the Secretariat. The Secretariat also requested the Syrian authorities to keep track of and report on any movements of materials at these locations.
23. Through notes verbales sent in October 2025, the Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide copies of all relevant documents pertaining to the Secretariat's mandates in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat also provided a list of names of personnel formerly involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and other relevant individuals, requesting interviews with such personnel.
24. In meetings held in October and November 2025, the Syrian authorities and the Secretariat discussed the possibility of visiting several high-priority chemical weapons-related locations in the coastal and northern areas close to Latakia. Subsequently, through notes verbales dated 11 November 2025 and 4 and 13 January 2026, the Syrian authorities shared reports of the visits that their reconnaissance teams had conducted at four locations suspected of containing remnants of undeclared chemical weapons. The Secretariat is analysing these reports and will coordinate further activities with the Syrian authorities.
25. Some of the above-mentioned sites are located in dangerous areas. On 22 August 2025, the Secretariat prepared and shared a "Draft Field Deployment Protocol" for comments by the Syrian authorities, requesting their inputs on the plan by 1 September 2025. The Secretariat also provided the Syrian authorities with a list of operational requirements,

including necessary resources, measures, steps, and activities to be conducted before any such visits take place. On 11 November 2025, the Syrian authorities informed the Secretariat that they would share these operational requirements with their national and international partners, coordinate necessary activities, and provide feedback to the Secretariat as soon as this work is completed.

26. On 10 December 2025, the Secretariat transmitted Note Verbale NV/ODG/OSM-19/25 to the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW, reiterating its previous requests regarding the need to preserve the integrity of declared and suspected chemical weapons locations and to provide the Secretariat with copies of all documentation and archival materials, as well as information on any other materials discovered at these locations, including any electronic equipment and devices available. The Secretariat also reiterated its request that copies of all available documents relevant to the Secretariat's mandates, including interviews or other materials generated through internal investigations conducted by Syrian authorities, be made available to the Secretariat. Additionally, the Secretariat requested the Syrian National Authority to record and document any movements of equipment or materials to and from declared and suspected chemical weapons locations, to report on visits to locations conducted in the absence of the Secretariat, and to share such information, documentation, and reporting with the Secretariat. On 21 and 23 December 2025, respectively, the Permanent Representation and the Secretariat continued to engage on these matters through Notes Verbales.
27. On 8 January 2026, the Secretariat shared with the Syrian authorities a summary report of the results of the analysis of samples collected in August 2025 from deteriorated barrels buried under the soil, showing the presence of a chemical warfare agent and its degradation product. On 11 January 2026, the Secretariat collected four additional samples from the contents of the barrels for further analyses at OPCW designated laboratories.
28. On 8 January 2026, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted 25 pages of documents related to the former chemical weapons programme, recently discovered by the current authorities. The Secretariat is analysing these documents and will report to the Council on their contents as appropriate.
29. On 15 January 2026, the Syrian authorities handed over to the Secretariat team in Damascus 34 sealed cardboard boxes containing documents. These boxes will be opened in the presence of the Syrian authorities, their contents will be documented and scanned, and the originals will be returned to the Syrian authorities. The Secretariat will determine the relevance of these documents after translation and analysis. Regarding the interviews requested in October 2025 per the above-mentioned Note Verbale, on 15 January 2026 the Syrian authorities informed the Secretariat that 11 out of 23 individuals are available for interviews. The Secretariat has begun preparations to conduct interviews with these individuals and will report to the Council in due time as appropriate. In addition, the Secretariat team requested interviews with former chemical weapons experts previously interviewed in August 2025. The Syrian authorities confirmed the availability of these experts at a time agreed with the Secretariat.

30. Since March 2025, the Secretariat has visited 19 locations (4 declared and 15 suspected chemical weapons-related locations), conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts, collected 10 samples, and obtained over 6,000 documents from the locations visited. More than 95% of the documents have been processed and their analysis is ongoing.
31. Based on the information gathered through the Secretariat's deployments in 2025, including the results of the analysis of samples collected in April 2025 and August 2025 and the information received during interviews with Syrian chemical weapons experts in August 2025, at least two locations visited by the Secretariat could be declarable under the Convention. The Secretariat is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability.
32. In accordance with Council decision EC-110/DEC.1, the Secretariat has initiated measures to operationalise the provisions of the decision and ensure consistency with the decision's objectives.
33. The Secretariat has continued consultations with the Syrian authorities on the implementation of expedited on-site destruction in exceptional cases, as provided for in paragraphs 3 to 6 of decision EC-110/DEC.1. These consultations relate to the development of destruction plans and verification arrangements for an expedited on-site destruction process that ensures that the methods to be used for this process include and take account of, *inter alia*, a verification process in line with applicable requirements, the safety of personnel, the protection of the environment, and the preservation of evidence related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
34. The Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under the Convention, decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, and United Nations Security Council resolutions, and will continue to engage with the Syrian authorities on this matter.

**Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic**

35. On 6 November 2025, the Director-General sent a letter to all members of the Council (L/ODG-769/25), in which he noted that States Parties have been fully informed of what the Secretariat has already done in its capacity, and recalled that the Convention clearly distinguishes between the roles of declaring possessor States and the Secretariat. Attached to the letter was a needs and gaps assessment prepared by the Secretariat, following its consultations with the Syrian authorities, notwithstanding written inputs from the Syrian authorities that are pending.

36. The needs and gaps assessment outlines a non-exhaustive list of gaps between what the Syrian Arab Republic must provide and the capacity it has at its disposal. It also informs States Parties and other partners willing to support the Syrian Arab Republic as to what is to be provided for the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a successful end. The needs and gaps assessment focuses on:
  - (a) means and equipment required for safe access to locations, protection of teams, or to support verifiable inventory, storage, transport, and destruction of chemical materials;
  - (b) relevant expertise required to ensure the safety, legality, and credibility of activities to be carried out;
  - (c) training of personnel with relevant expertise to minimise the risk of incidents and chain-of-custody breaks, and to reduce the chance of jeopardising verification activities; and
  - (d) minimum operational requirements for deployment to suspected chemical weapons sites, for regular as well as expedited on-site destruction.

37. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission to facilitate the Secretariat's mandated activities there. The OPCW and UNOPS extended their Cooperation Agreement regarding UNOPS services for OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, which is valid until 31 March 2026.

**Activities carried out pursuant to the Technical Secretariat's mandate to establish the facts related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic**

38. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the OSM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
39. During the reporting period, the Secretariat team present in the Syrian Arab Republic undertook preparatory activities at the OPCW office in the Syrian Arab Republic aimed at ensuring organisational and logistical readiness in support of activities conducted under the Secretariat's mandate to establish the facts related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
40. In addition, the team conducted three coordination meetings with the Syrian authorities, during which the schedule of activities to be undertaken for the months of January and February was discussed and agreed, including witness interviews and field visits. The Syrian National Authority informed the Secretariat team of its willingness to facilitate access to witnesses and physical evidence in relation to ongoing investigations.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic**

41. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), the Secretariat established the IIT to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the Secretariat determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.
42. The Secretariat is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course. In accordance with paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat will continue to preserve and provide information to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM), established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, the Secretariat is finalising the integration of knowledge and expertise from the previous activities carried out by the IIT into standard operations, in line with the Convention and decisions adopted by the policy-making organs.
43. In December 2025, the Technical Secretariat transmitted Note Verbale No. NV/ODG/OSM-23-25 (dated 22 December 2025) requesting the Syrian Arab Republic to provide any information that may be relevant to determining the chemical used as a weapon and to identifying the perpetrators in relation to ongoing investigations. Following receipt of the Note Verbale, the Syrian authorities requested a meeting to discuss the specifics of the request.
44. On 21 January 2026, the Secretariat issued a report entitled “Fifth Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’ Kafr Zeita (Syrian Arab Republic) 1 October 2016” (S/2478/2026).
45. In this fifth report, on the basis of all the information obtained, analysed and corroborated, the Secretariat concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, on 1 October 2016, between 19:00 and 19:40 (UTC+3), in the context of a military offensive aimed at halting the opposition’s advance towards Hama city, an Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force dropped at least one yellow pressurised cylinder which hit a cave system in the Wadi al-Aanz valley in Kafr Zeita. The helicopter departed from Hama Airbase and operated under the control of the Tiger Forces.
46. The pressurised cylinder impacted near two ventilation openings located approximately 300 metres from the Al Maghara Hospital in Kafr Zeita. The cylinder then tumbled down and came to rest near the entrance of the cave system. Upon impact, the cylinder ruptured and released pressurised chlorine gas, which dispersed through the Wadi al-Aanz valley, injuring 35 named individuals and affecting dozens more.

47. These conclusions were reached on the basis of the degree of certainty of “reasonable grounds”, which is the standard of proof consistently adopted by international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. In reaching its conclusions, the Secretariat carefully assessed the information obtained from the FFM, States Parties, and other entities, coupled with interviews conducted by the IIT and analyses of samples, munition remnants, computer modelling, satellite imagery, authenticated videos and photographs, as well as advice from independent experts, specialists, and forensic institutes, along with primary documentation and other relevant materials and sources. The IIT reviewed over 15,600 files, amounting to more than 980 gigabytes, obtained and assessed 53 witness statements, 3 of which were from women, and considered data related to 13 samples. The IIT assessed this information holistically, carefully scrutinising its probative value through a widely shared methodology in compliance with best practices of international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. In so doing, the Secretariat strictly adhered to applicable OPCW procedures, supplemented as appropriate. The conclusions in this report are based on the combination, consistency, and corroboration of all the information gathered as a whole.
48. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, through its Office of Special Missions, the Secretariat will continue its investigations to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2**

49. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided:
  - to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:
    - (a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;
    - (b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and
    - (c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.

50. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.
51. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat continues to closely monitor the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to deploying for this purpose, provided that favourable security conditions are met.

**Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference of the States Parties decision C-25/DEC.9**

52. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.
53. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, *inter alia*, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.
54. The Conference, at its Thirtieth Session, adopted a decision entitled "Reinstatement of the Rights and Privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic" (C-30/DEC.8, dated 28 November 2025). In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Conference decided to delegate to the Council the authority, taking into account any progress made, to consider and decide on the reinstatement of the suspended rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention. In paragraph 2, the Conference recognised that the purpose of the decision is to respond to the specific circumstances in the Syrian Arab Republic, and that the decision does not create any precedent for the future. The Conference further decided to remain seized of this matter.
55. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to the completion of the measures or any progress made and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

**Decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use**

56. As previously reported, at its Twenty-Eighth Session, the Conference adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use" (C-28/DEC.12, dated 30 November 2023). The Secretariat is reporting on the elements in the decision concerning the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical weapons dossier in accordance with existing reporting obligations.

**Supplementary resources**

57. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions stood at EUR 61 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. This does not include the more than EUR 48 million received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in 2013 and 2014.

58. Given that the Syrian chemical weapons programme still needs to be declared to its full extent and destroyed by the Syrian Arab Republic, with the corresponding verification by the Secretariat, the Organisation will need to rely on support from States Parties for additional financial and human resources to carry out any future missions in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will also continue to adapt its presence in the Syrian Arab Republic as appropriate, in line with its anticipated activities.
59. The current funding capacity for OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic totals EUR 12.1 million, which includes the balance of the Trust Fund for Syria Missions, in addition to contributions and pledges being actualised.
60. To date, additional funding of EUR 4.3 million in 2026 and EUR 12.5 million in 2027 is estimated to be required. This funding is required to maintain and conduct OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, and to provide capacity-building support to the Syrian authorities for measures to, *inter alia*, prevent the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons and their use. The Secretariat will continue to keep the Council informed of developments related to its mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

### **Conclusion**

61. The future activities of the Secretariat in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on engagement with the Syrian authorities to identify the best way for the Secretariat to continue implementing its mandates in accordance with the Convention and all relevant OPCW decisions and United Nations Security Council resolutions, as well as to support and assist the Syrian authorities in fulfilling all the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention.

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