



111th Session
10 – 13 March 2026

EC-111/DG.3
24 December 2025
Original: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL**PROGRESS IN THE ELIMINATION
OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME**

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (the Council) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.



5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference), at its Twenty-Fifth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
7. The Council, at its 110th Session, adopted a decision entitled “Expedited On-Site Destruction of Any Remnants of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-110/DEC.1, dated 8 October 2025).
8. This, the 147th monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period 24 November to 23 December 2025.

Obligations undertaken by the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention

9. The Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) on 14 September 2013. The Convention entered into force for this State Party on 14 October 2013. To date, as regularly and consistently reported by the Secretariat, the work to verify the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration of its chemical weapons programme has continued, and due to the numerous gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies uncovered by the Secretariat over more than 11 years, this declaration still cannot be considered as accurate and complete.
10. As previously reported, all legal obligations binding upon the Syrian Arab Republic as a State Party to the Convention remain valid, regardless of any change in government. Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (both dated 27 September 2013) continue to provide the relevant legal framework for the Secretariat’s efforts under the Convention aimed at eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
11. The transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2024 presents an opportunity for the Organisation to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to ensure the Syrian Arab Republic’s long-term compliance with the Convention.

12. In line with a note verbale to the Secretariat from the Permanent Representation of Qatar to the OPCW (Ref. SQH.3.25.1, dated 7 January 2025), Qatar had represented the interests of the Syrian Arab Republic before the OPCW. The Syrian Arab Republic has since appointed a new Permanent Representative to the OPCW, H.E. Ambassador Mohamad Katoub, who presented his credentials to the Director-General on 20 November 2025.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

13. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:
- (a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.
 - (b) As at the date of this report, no monthly report had been received from the Syrian authorities for the reporting period regarding activities on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, as required by paragraph 19 of decision EC-M-34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

14. As stated in previous reports, all the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5

15. Since 2014, the Secretariat has continued to address the shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT).
16. Of the 26 outstanding issues that have been reported by the Secretariat since 2014, 7 issues have been resolved. The substance of the 19 outstanding issues remained a serious concern to the Secretariat, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared and/or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to complete all the measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
17. Since the transfer of power to new authorities in the Syrian Arab Republic in December 2024, the Secretariat has continued to address the shortcomings in the initial declaration with the Syrian authorities. In addition to 26 chemical weapons-related locations officially declared, information made available to the Secretariat indicates that over 100 additional locations may have been involved in activities related to chemical weapons. Since March 2025, the Secretariat has been deploying its teams to the Syrian Arab Republic and has started conducting visits to these locations, subject to security and other relevant requirements. The DAT deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic in March and April 2025.

18. On 1 June 2025, the Office of Special Missions (OSM) was established. The OSM is responsible for, inter alia, coordinating all the Secretariat's activities in the Syrian Arab Republic and for implementing the mandates previously carried out by the DAT, the FFM, and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), together with other mandated activities. As reported previously, the first OSM deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic took place in June 2025, and the Secretariat deployed OSM teams twice more, in August and September 2025.
19. In October 2025, the Secretariat re-established a continuous presence of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (OPCW Mission) and secured accommodation and office space at a designated facility that meets United Nations safety and security standards.
20. On 16 October 2025, the Secretariat addressed Note Verbale NV/ICA-IPB-419/25 to the Permanent Representation of Qatar to the OPCW as acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, inviting the Syrian Arab Republic to notify the Secretariat of the details concerning the establishment of its National Authority. On 23 October 2025, the Director-General sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic addressing the re-establishment of the continuous presence of the OPCW in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the same letter, the Director-General requested the Syrian authorities' assistance in ensuring movement, security, logistics, and communications, as well as necessary arrangements to enable the OPCW Mission to carry out its tasks effectively and safely. The Director-General further requested information concerning the designation of the official Syrian point(s) of contact for these matters. In a letter to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria dated 23 October 2025, the Director-General requested that the OPCW Head of Mission be integrated into all relevant safety and security meetings.
21. On 3 November 2025, in response to the Director-General's letter of 23 October 2025 and the aforementioned note verbale of 16 October 2025, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed a letter to the Director-General with information concerning the new Syrian National Authority, including the names of two designated points of contact. On 20 November 2025, the newly appointed Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW presented his credentials to the Director-General.
22. Despite several meetings to discuss the provision of suitable office space that would ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the Secretariat's activities, these commitments have not yet fully materialised. The OPCW requested the Syrian authorities to continue to address this matter with the management of the designated facility to secure an adequate working environment for the OPCW Mission.
23. In November 2025, the Secretariat team present in the Syrian Arab Republic held several meetings with Syrian authorities aimed at coordinating all substantive activities. The Secretariat provided, inter alia, the Syrian authorities with a list of 17 suspected chemical weapons-related locations in the Damascus region to be visited.
24. Following necessary preparatory activities, including reconnaissance visits by the Syrian support teams and pre-deployment meetings, the Secretariat conducted visits to six suspected chemical weapons-related locations in November 2025. The Syrian

authorities provided support and facilitated these deployments. Two samples were collected at one of the locations and are to be sent to two OPCW designated laboratories for analysis. No relevant documents were discovered during these visits, and the Syrian authorities were requested to ensure that any documents that may have been removed from these sites be made available to the Secretariat. The Secretariat also requested the Syrian authorities to keep track of and report on any movements of materials at these locations.

25. Through notes verbales sent in October 2025, the Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide copies of all relevant documents pertaining to the Secretariat's mandates, and specifically those of the DAT, FFM, and IIT. The Secretariat also provided a list of names of personnel formerly involved in the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and other relevant individuals, requesting interviews with such personnel. The responses to these requests are pending. As at the date of this report, apart from several pages relating to two suspected chemical weapons-related locations, no other requested documents, or personnel, were made available to the Secretariat.
26. In meetings held in October and November 2025, the Syrian authorities and the Secretariat discussed the possibility of visiting several high-priority chemical weapons-related locations in the coastal and northern areas close to Latakia. Subsequently, through two notes verbales dated 11 November 2025, the Syrian authorities shared reports of the visits that their reconnaissance teams had conducted at two locations suspected of containing remnants of undeclared chemical weapons. The Secretariat is analysing these reports and will coordinate further activities, including possible visits to these locations, with the Syrian authorities.
27. Some of the above-mentioned sites are located in dangerous areas. The Secretariat prepared and shared on 22 August 2025 a "Draft Field Deployment Protocol" for comments by the Syrian authorities, requesting their inputs on the plan by 1 September 2025. The Secretariat also provided the Syrian authorities with a list of operational requirements, including necessary resources, measures, steps, and activities to be conducted before any such visits take place. On 11 November 2025, the Syrian authorities informed the Secretariat that they would share these operational requirements with their national and international partners, coordinate necessary activities, and provide feedback to the Secretariat as soon as this work is completed. The Secretariat stands ready to engage in any further activities aimed at ensuring safe deployments to dangerous locations, in line with the Syrian Arab Republic's responsibility under the Convention.
28. On 10 December 2025, the Secretariat transmitted Note Verbale NV/ODG/OSM-19/25 to the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW, reiterating its previous requests regarding the need to preserve the integrity of declared and suspected chemical weapons locations and to provide the Secretariat with copies of all documentation and archival materials, as well as information on any other materials discovered at these locations, including any electronic equipment and devices available. The Secretariat also reiterated its request that copies of all available documents relevant to the Secretariat's mandates, including interviews or other materials generated through internal investigations conducted by Syrian authorities, be made available to the Secretariat. Additionally, the Secretariat requested the Syrian National Authority to record and document any movements of equipment or materials to and from declared and suspected chemical weapons locations, to report on visits to locations conducted in

the absence of the Secretariat, and to share such information, documentation, and reporting with the Secretariat. On 21 and 23 December 2025, respectively, the Permanent Representation and the Secretariat continued to engage on these matters through notes verbales.

29. The overall number of locations visited by the Secretariat since March 2025 now stands at 19. Of these, 4 were locations previously declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, while 15 were suspected chemical weapons-related locations. The Secretariat also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts, collected a total of six samples, and collected over 6,000 documents from the visited locations. As at the date of this report, more than 90% of the documents had been processed and their analysis was ongoing.
30. Based on the information gathered through the Secretariat's deployments in 2025, including the results of the analysis of samples collected in April 2025 and the information received during interviews with Syrian chemical weapons experts in August 2025, at least two locations visited by the Secretariat could be declarable under the Convention. The Secretariat is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability.
31. In accordance with Council decision EC-110/DEC.1, the Secretariat has initiated measures to operationalise the provisions of the decision and ensure consistency with the decision's objectives.
32. The Secretariat has commenced consultations with the Syrian authorities on the implementation of expedited on-site destruction in exceptional cases, as provided for in paragraphs 3 to 6 of decision EC-110/DEC.1. These consultations relate to the development of destruction plans and verification arrangements for an expedited on-site destruction process that ensures that the methods to be used for this process include and take account of, inter alia, a verification process in line with applicable requirements, the safety of personnel, the protection of the environment, and the preservation of evidence related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
33. The Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under the Convention, decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, and United Nations Security Council resolutions, and will continue to engage with the Syrian authorities on this matter.

Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

34. On 8 February 2025, at the invitation of Syrian caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, the Director-General, accompanied by a high-level delegation from the OPCW that included members of the DAT, the FFM and, for the first time, the IIT, visited Damascus to meet both with Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and caretaker Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani.

35. On 26 February 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note on “The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in Relation to the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme and the Way Forward” (S/2376/2025). The Note includes, inter alia, details on the activities and elements necessary to draw up an inventory of chemical weapons, chemical weapons sites, equipment, munitions, and other components of the activities related to the Syrian chemical weapons programme, as well as activities and elements necessary to prepare a full and complete declaration and destruction plan. The Note also outlines the anticipated resources that the OPCW will need in 2025 to set up the requisite in-country components of the OPCW Mission and to initiate activities. As detailed in the Note, the Secretariat’s upcoming activities in the Syrian Arab Republic will rely on significant financial and in-kind support from States Parties and the international community at large.
36. On 5 March 2025, the Syrian caretaker Foreign Minister, Mr Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, delivered an in-person statement at the 108th Session of the Council (EC-108/4). In his statement, the caretaker Foreign Minister reaffirmed the commitment of the Syrian authorities to dismantle any remains of the chemical weapons programme developed under the previous regime, as well as to ensure that justice is achieved for the victims, and to establish solid international standards to prevent the recurrence of chemical weapons use.
37. On 29 April 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note on “Estimated Costs of OPCW Mandated Activities to Resolve the Remaining Issues Surrounding the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme” (S/2397/2025). This Note provides further details on the changed situation in the Syrian Arab Republic since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, including the recognition by the Syrian authorities of all the mandates entrusted to the Secretariat by the decisions of the OPCW policy-making organs, as well as the associated tasks carried out by the Secretariat related to the mandates of the DAT, the FFM, and the IIT. The Note focuses on the Secretariat’s estimates of costs of OPCW-mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, including operational costs and capacity-building assistance related to measures to prevent the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons and training and equipment to enable the Syrian National Authority to respond to and investigate chemical weapons issues and incidents effectively. The Note also underscores the importance of in-kind contributions from States Parties or international actors that could provide timely and effective support to OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic. Finally, as highlighted in the Note, all the Secretariat’s mandates in relation to the Syrian chemical weapons programme stand, and deployments will continue to be carried out without deprioritising any of them.
38. On 5 June 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled “Call for Voluntary Contributions to Participate in Financing the OPCW Activities in the Syrian Arab Republic” (S/2413/2025). The Note includes additional background information on the work to verify the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration, the multiple cases of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic documented by the Secretariat, and the identification of perpetrators of such use in a number of these cases by the Secretariat. The Note provides updated estimates on the cost of activities in the Syrian Arab Republic for the remainder of 2025 and estimated funding requirements for 2026 and 2027.
39. As reported in the Note referenced above (S/2413/2025), the Syrian authorities have informed the Secretariat that they do not have the knowledge needed to identify what elements of the Syrian chemical weapons programme have not been declared. The Note

further underscores that the Secretariat will need to visit and assess more than 100 additional locations across the Syrian Arab Republic, including military facilities, airfields, and research centres, all of which may be in varied, and hazardous, states of disarray, damage, or destruction. The Syrian authorities will need to declare all chemical weapons-related items, sites, and equipment as they are discovered, and the Secretariat will need to verify this declaration.

40. During the Secretariat's deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic that took place in June 2025 an agreement on the privileges and immunities of the OPCW and its personnel for the conduct of operations in the Syrian Arab Republic was concluded through an exchange of letters between the Director-General of the OPCW and the interim Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, effective as of 16 June 2025.
41. On 22 July 2025, in response to the request made on 16 July 2025 by the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the OPCW as acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, and in consultation with the Chairperson of the Council, the Director-General convened the Sixty-Eighth Meeting of the Council to receive and consider information on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Following statements by the Director-General, the Syrian Arab Republic, Council members, and observers, the Council considered and adopted the report of its Sixty-Eighth Meeting.
42. On 24 July 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled "Review of Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies and an Outline Plan for their Selection in Support of the Destruction, Including Expedited Destruction, of Syrian Chemical Weapons Subject to Verification by the Technical Secretariat" (S/2428/2025). The Secretariat prepared two annexes to the Note to further enhance the Syrian Arab Republic's ability to carry out the destruction of its remaining chemical weapons: a review of well-established chemical weapons destruction technologies (Annex 1), and an outline plan detailing how these technologies may be selected and utilised in the Syrian Arab Republic (Annex 2).
43. In a note verbale to the Secretariat (Ref. SQH.25.TS.Syr.7, dated 29 July 2025), the Permanent Representation of Qatar to the OPCW transmitted the "Concept Plan by the Syrian Arab Republic for the Destruction and Verification of Any Remaining Chemical Weapons and Other Remnants of the Former Chemical Weapons Programme Established under the Assad Regime", as prepared by the Syrian Arab Republic. Upon request, the Secretariat circulated this Concept Plan to all States Parties.
44. On 7 August 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled "Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme – Status Update" (S/2433/2025). The Note highlights the activities carried out by the Secretariat between December 2024 and August 2025, including the work carried out together with the new Syrian authorities directly and/or through the Permanent Representation of Qatar to the OPCW, as acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, and outlines key considerations to advance on this dossier, both in the field and at the OPCW. The Note further informs on the next steps which include, in addition to legal and financial requirements, elements that will need to be in place for the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat, and the international community to proceed with the activities aimed at completing the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, such as both expedited in situ (on-site) and regular on-the-go destruction.

45. On 27 August 2025, the Secretariat provided the Permanent Representation of Qatar, as acting on behalf of the Syrian Arab Republic, a model facility agreement and two examples of a draft agreed detailed plan for verification, and proposed consultations on these documents as well as destruction technologies that might be used by the Syrian Arab Republic to destroy any chemical weapons that might be discovered.
46. On 30 September 2025, the Secretariat conducted a briefing for States Parties on the status of the Secretariat's mandated activities pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
47. On 6 October 2025, the Secretariat issued a report by the Director-General entitled "Financial, Administrative, and Programme and Budget Implications of the Proposal for an Executive Council Decision on the Expedited On-Site Destruction of Any Remnants of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic" (EC-110/DG.20). The report underscores the importance of international support, and emphasises the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction costs under the Convention, while noting that in light of the current economic, humanitarian, and security situation, international financial and in-kind contributions are needed to ensure timely and effective destruction of any remaining chemical weapons or chemical weapons-related materials and facilities under verification by the Secretariat.
48. On 6 November 2025, the Director-General sent a letter to members of the Council (L/ODG-769/25), in which he noted that States Parties have been fully informed of what the Secretariat has already done and can do in its capacity, as the Convention clearly distinguishes between the roles of declaring possessor States and the Secretariat. Attached to the letter was a needs and gaps assessment prepared by the Secretariat, following its consultations with the Syrian authorities, notwithstanding written inputs from the Syrian authorities that are pending.
49. The needs and gaps assessment outlines a non-exhaustive list of gaps between what the Syrian Arab Republic must provide and the capacity it has at its disposal. It also informs States Parties and other partners willing to support the Syrian Arab Republic as to what is to be provided for the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a successful end. The needs and gaps assessment focuses on:
 - (a) means and equipment required for safe access to locations, protection of teams, or to support verifiable inventory, storage, transport, and destruction of chemical materials;
 - (b) relevant expertise required to ensure the safety, legality, and credibility of activities to be carried out;
 - (c) training of personnel with relevant expertise to minimise the risk of incidents and chain-of-custody breaks, and to reduce the chance of jeopardising verification activities; and
 - (d) minimum operational requirements for deployment to suspected chemical weapons sites, for regular as well as expedited on-site destruction.

50. On 21 November 2025, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled “Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme – Status Update” (S/2465/2025). The Note highlights the activities carried out by the Secretariat since its last update in August 2025 (see aforementioned Note S/2433/2025, dated 7 August 2025), including the work carried out together with the Syrian authorities and outlines the necessary next steps and considerations for progress to be made.
51. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission to facilitate the Secretariat’s mandated activities there. The OPCW and UNOPS extended their Cooperation Agreement regarding UNOPS services for OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, which is valid until 31 December 2025.

Activities carried out pursuant to the Technical Secretariat’s mandate to establish the facts related to allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

52. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 23 November 2015), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution 2209 (2015), the OSM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
53. During the reporting period, the Secretariat team present in the Syrian Arab Republic undertook a series of activities related to establishing the facts surrounding allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. These included sustained coordination with the Syrian authorities as well as with supporting non-governmental organisations operating in the country to facilitate the implementation of the work of the FFM.
54. With the support of the Syrian authorities, the team conducted interviews with witnesses relevant to the allegations under review. In addition, the Secretariat team collected samples and other items of potential evidentiary value that were made available by the Syrian authorities, in accordance with established procedures.
55. As part of its field activities, the team also carried out a site visit to a location associated with one of the allegations under investigation in the vicinity of the city of Aleppo. This visit contributed to the ongoing efforts of the OPCW Mission to corroborate information and to further assess the circumstances surrounding the reported incident.
56. During the reporting period, the Secretariat maintained regular communication with the Syrian authorities in support of ongoing FFM activities. On 11 December, the Secretariat transmitted Note Verbale NV/ODG/OSM-21/25 to the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW requesting the Syrian authorities’ assistance in completing and corroborating information received by the Secretariat in previous years.
57. In addition, the Secretariat transmitted a further note verbale (NV/ODG/OSM-22/25, dated 11 December 2025) to the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic requesting the Syrian authorities to adopt the necessary security, safety, and logistical measures to enable the Secretariat to prepare for and conduct its planned field visits in January and February 2026. This communication sought to ensure that all operational

arrangements are established in a timely manner to support the safe and effective implementation of upcoming activities. On 22 December 2025, through notes verbales, the Permanent Representation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW informed the Secretariat that the Syrian National Authority was working on the requests sent by the Secretariat on 30 October and 11 December 2025.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

58. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), the Secretariat established the IIT to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.
59. The IIT is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course. In accordance with paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat will continue to preserve and provide information to the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM), established by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, the Secretariat is finalising the integration of knowledge and expertise from the IIT into standard operations, in line with the Convention and decisions adopted by the policy-making organs.
60. In June 2025, members of the IIT travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic as part of a broader delegation of the OSM and held meetings with relevant Syrian authorities. The support of Syrian authorities for ongoing and future IIT investigations, as well as broader coordination in relation to addressing the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, was extensively discussed.
61. In September 2025, members of the IIT deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic as part of an OSM mission, together with members of the FFM. The team received information relevant to its current investigations, held meetings with Syrian authorities, and conducted a witness interview.
62. During the reporting period, the IIT also continued its work on the identification and prioritisation of persons and locations of interest to its ongoing investigations, as well as of new potential sources and repositories of information and documentation.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2

63. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided:
- to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:
- (a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;
 - (b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and
 - (c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.
64. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.
65. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat continues to closely monitor the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to deploying for this purpose, provided that favourable security conditions are met.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference of the States Parties decision C-25/DEC.9

66. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.
67. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, inter alia, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

68. The Conference, at its Thirtieth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Reinstatement of the Rights and Privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-30/DEC.8, dated 28 November 2025). In paragraph 1 of that decision, the Conference decided to delegate to the Council the authority, taking into account any progress made, to consider and decide on the reinstatement of the suspended rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention. In paragraph 2, the Conference recognised that the purpose of the decision is to respond to the specific circumstances in the Syrian Arab Republic, and that the decision does not create any precedent for the future. The Conference further decided to remain seized of this matter.
69. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to the completion of the measures or any progress made and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

Decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use

70. As previously reported, at its Twenty-Eighth Session, the Conference adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use and the Threat of Future Use” (C-28/DEC.12, dated 30 November 2023). The Secretariat is reporting on the elements in the decision concerning the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons dossier in accordance with existing reporting obligations.

Supplementary resources

71. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions stood at EUR 61 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. This does not include the more than EUR 48 million received in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in 2013 and 2014.
72. Given that the Syrian chemical weapons programme still needs to be declared to its full extent and destroyed by the Syrian Arab Republic, with the corresponding verification by the Secretariat, the Organisation will need to rely on support from States Parties for additional financial and human resources to carry out any future missions in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat will also continue to adapt its presence in the Syrian Arab Republic as appropriate, in line with its anticipated activities.
73. The current funding capacity for OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic totals EUR 12.3 million, which includes the balance of the Trust Fund for Syria Missions, in addition to contributions and pledges being actualised. The Secretariat estimates that EUR 1.0 million in resources from the current 2024–2025 Biennium Budget can be reprioritised effectively for OPCW activities in the Syrian Arab Republic without impacting its other mandated activities. This provides a funding capacity of EUR 13.3 million, which is sufficient to cover the 2025 activities. An amount of EUR 9.1 million in 2025 is expected to be used in 2026.

74. To date, additional funding of EUR 4.3 million in 2026 and EUR 12.5 million in 2027 is estimated to be required. This funding is required to maintain and conduct OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, and to provide capacity-building support to the Syrian authorities for measures to, inter alia, prevent the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons and their use. The Secretariat will continue to keep the Council informed of developments related to its mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Conclusion

75. The future activities of the Secretariat in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on engagement with the Syrian authorities to identify the best way for the Secretariat to continue implementing its mandates in accordance with the Convention and all relevant OPCW decisions and United Nations Security Council resolutions, as well as to support and assist the Syrian authorities in fulfilling all the Syrian Arab Republic's obligations under the Convention.

--- 0 ---