

# **RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

## **STATEMENT**

**BY KIRILL LYSOGORSKY, HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION,  
DEPUTY MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE THIRTIETH SESSION  
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES  
TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

(The Hague, 24 – 28 November 2025)

Chairperson,  
Director-General,  
Distinguished delegates,

First of all, on behalf of the Russian Federation, we would like to congratulate the distinguished Ambassador Agustín Vásquez Gómez of El Salvador on his election as Chairperson of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and assure you of our willingness to engage in constructive cooperation.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a highly professional technical and expert structure. It has a modern laboratory and analytical base, good analytical potential, keeps track of developments in science and technology, and responds to new challenges of the modern world. Most of the States Parties to the CWC are steadfastly pursuing the goals and objectives originally set out in the Convention.

However, at this stage, the Organization is going through a rather difficult period in its development. Regretfully, we must point out that many countries associate the activities of the OPCW with injustice, falsification of facts and arbitrariness in decision-making.

We are forced to note that the OPCW member states are divided in their interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. The atmosphere is tense and characterized by a high degree of polarization. Professional dialogue and the joint, objective search for methods of performing technical functions without regard to political differences are practically a thing of the past. Contrary to the provisions of the Convention, key decisions are taken solely by vote.

There is growing concern among the majority of countries worldwide about the eagerness of some states to make unsubstantiated accusations against other CWC parties of non-compliance with its provisions and the use of chemical weapons, including on the basis of information from fake media or any other dubious sources.

Nowadays, the destructive efforts of Western countries are focused on attempts to undermine Russia's position in the OPCW by means of baseless accusations of violating the Convention. In this regard, the eagerness to incriminate Russia for allegedly engaging in some kind of covert chemical activity or using chemical weapons is revealing.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Russia is fulfilling all its obligations under the CWC in good faith. In September 2017, we completed the destruction of our national chemical weapons stockpiles under strict international control, as certified by the OPCW.

Russia has repeatedly offered to conduct a professional expert analysis of the allegations made against it. However, our constructive proposals have been rejected. A similar situation is now developing with regard to the use of toxic chemicals and riot control agents (RCAs) in the area of the special military operation.

Russia regularly informs the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the States Parties to the CWC about the use of toxic chemicals and RCAs by Ukrainian armed formations against citizens of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye regions of the Russian Federation, and representatives of the leadership of the aforementioned regions. To this end, Ukraine receives from NATO countries non-scheduled chemicals, RCAs and their delivery systems.

Documented evidence, including the results of analyses of samples taken at the line of combat contact, is being forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The research is being conducted at a chemical analysis laboratory certified by the OPCW in strict compliance with the CWC requirements.

We would like to remind you that a number of States have adopted a “peculiar” national approach to compiling lists of chemicals related to the aforementioned RCAs. Thus, according to the conclusion of the Scientific

Advisory Board, of the 59 chemicals declared by the States Parties as RCAs in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1(e) of the Convention, only 17 chemicals meet the requirements for safety and the degree of physiological impact on human body. The other 42 chemicals, in the opinion of the Scientific Advisory Board, are toxic and their use as RCAs leads to "fatalities".

The Russian Federation has repeatedly proposed measures so that the specific list of 17 toxic chemicals that fall under the definition of RCAs could be approved as soon as possible. We once again call for the speedy resolution of this matter. The absence of a relevant document on this issue blurs the responsibility of states, including for the use of RCAs in the conduct of combat operations. We propose that all States Parties and the OPCW Technical Secretariat take measures to approve the list of RCAs as soon as possible.

This year we celebrate 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Nevertheless, the issue of withdrawing the reservations to this document by certain states, despite Russian Federation's repeated calls and relevant decisions by OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, remains unaddressed.

The United States, when ratifying the Protocol, reserved the right to use chemical agents in armed conflicts. Russia, in turn, withdrew all its reservations to the Geneva Protocol back in 2000. We call on all states to follow our example.

Dear Chairperson,

I would like to point out a number of issues that have a negative impact on the OPCW's capabilities to strengthen the CWC.

One of them is the procedure for selecting members of the OPCW Executive Council applied unilaterally. Not only does it violate the Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, but it also contradicts the principles of democracy and freedom of choice.

It is also worth mentioning that any initiatives that do not serve the interests of Western countries are ignored at the OPCW. Thus, Iran's official proposal at the 67th special session of the OPCW Executive Council to launch an open-ended

working group to discuss the security of civilian chemical facilities and include this issue in the scope of the CWC was rejected without discussion.

Appeals by a number of delegations to discuss the mandate of the Office of Special Missions of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, established by decision of the Director-General, in relation to “attribution” for compliance with the provisions of the CWC, also remain unaddressed. The Russian Federation reaffirms its fundamental position of not recognizing the legitimacy of "attribution" in the OPCW.

The persistent request by several regional groups for the establishment of a special fund for international cooperation, assistance and financing of regional development programmes from the regular budget is not taken into account.

There is a tendency to condone the unlawful actions of individual States Parties, including illegal unilateral extraterritorial economic coercive measures. All this restricts the legitimate rights of OPCW members, in particular under Articles X and XI of the CWC.

Furthermore, the example of Russia shows how the fulfillment of obligations to make payments to the Organization’s budget is being obstructed, which hinders the implementation of the goals and objectives set out in the CWC.

We are witnessing the continuation of harmful practice of making decisions on budgetary matters within the framework of a single document and imposing financial obligations on States Parties to the CWC on the basis of unconventional decisions pushed through by votes.

We’ve repeatedly mentioned the unresolved issue of discrepancies in the annual data of States Parties on exports and imports of the CWC-related toxic chemicals. According to data presented in the OPCW Report on the implementation of the CWC in 2024 (document EC-109/5 C-30/CRP.1 dated 10 July 2025), 567 violations were identified out of a total of 1,613 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. All this creates the conditions for the uncontrolled spread of chemicals.

In accordance with the Russian Federation’s proposals, the resolution to this issue shouldn’t create any complications. However, the OPCW Technical

Secretariat has not yet taken any steps to settle it. We insist that this matter be resolved as quickly as possible.

Dear Chairperson,

The Russian Federation welcomes the course taken by the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the States Parties to the CWC to normalize the situation surrounding the Syrian “chemical dossier”. We note the efforts made by Qatar, which was temporarily representing Damascus' interests in the Organization, to establish cooperation with the transitional government of Syria in this regard. We welcome the recent appointment of the new Permanent Representative of Syria to the OPCW. We proceed from the assumption that all remaining issues related to the former Syrian chemical weapons programme must be resolved strictly within the framework of the Convention.

The universalization of the Convention is an absolute priority for all of us, including not only the involvement of all States but also a unified interpretation of the Convention. We call on the intensification of all efforts in this direction, including by making OPCW membership more relevant through additional prospects for enhancing relevant inter-State cooperation in the field of “peaceful chemistry”.

Once the declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed, we consider the elimination of all abandoned chemical weapons located in a number of States to be one of the key tasks of the Organization. We advocate for the early destruction by Japan of the chemical arsenal it abandoned in the People's Republic of China.

We attach great importance to the counter-terrorism efforts of the OPCW. We are grateful to the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Terrorism, Ambassador Vusimuzi Madonsela of South Africa, for his contribution to the work in this area.

Head of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Troops of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Hero of Russia and Hero of Labour Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov took an active part in defending the principles and provisions of the CWC. His firm and consistent position on exposing military chemical and biological programmes of Ukraine, which pose a

clear threat to global security, has further irritated the Kiev regime and its accomplices.

As a result, and this has been proven by the Russian investigative bodies, the Ukrainian authorities resorted to their most familiar barbaric method – a treacherous and vile terrorist act, which led to the tragic death of Igor Kirillov. The explosive was set off right in the courtyard of his apartment building.

General Kirillov was a true professional officer, brave father and husband, a noble man who truly cared. For example, not a lot of people know that he was among those who contributed to the developing of the Russian COVID vaccine and launched a large number of other peaceful initiatives. I'm stating this for the sake of countries that support the Kiev regime. You must be aware of the fact that you're supporting terrorists and murderers.

We would like to draw attention to the fact that Ukraine continues to carry out terrorist attacks using UAVs equipped with toxic substances and chemicals, including those not scheduled, not only against Russian military personnel, but also against the civilian population.

In October 2025, Russian investigative authorities opened a criminal case against Captain Sergei Filimonov, commander of the 108th separate assault battalion of the 59th separate motorized infantry brigade of the armed forces of Ukraine, who in March 2025 ordered the use of a toxic substance against servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by dropping chloropicrin ammunition from a UAV, resulting in 16 servicemen being injured.

Another striking example is the attempted assassination of an officer of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which was prevented by Russian special services in November this year. The main source of poisoning was intended to be the chemical tert-butyl bicyclopophosphate. This chemical is not scheduled, but it is highly toxic and has been actively researched as a chemical weapon by the US, the UK, Japan, and other countries since 1973.

This approach by Ukraine is attractive to terrorist and criminal structures from all over the world.

Now it becomes clear why Russia's initiative to develop an International Convention on Combating Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism is being

blocked. This proposal was first announced by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in March 2016 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The new Russian initiative to develop the Convention was supported by China and many other countries. This Convention should be aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and countering chemical and biological terrorism. The development of the Convention would make it possible to establish the responsibility of states and non-state actors for terrorist activities involving the use of non-scheduled toxic chemicals.

Dear Chairperson,

The CWC mandate provides for the implementation of control measures to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons by chemical industry enterprises. The States Parties to the Convention are united in their understanding of the need to regularly improve the verification regime and adapt it to modern realities, taking into account developments in science and technology. We support China's initiatives to strike a reasonable balance between effective verification and minimizing the verification burden on chemical industry enterprises, as well as limiting obstacles to international cooperation in the field of "peaceful chemistry".

Among the processes that may in one way or another affect the implementation of the CWC's objectives, artificial intelligence plays a special role. The development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies creates not only new opportunities but also threats to the non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, discussion of this topic within the framework of the CWC seems entirely justified.

We join the statement on behalf of the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and China.

It seems that the time has come for each CWC State Party to ask itself some fundamental questions.

Are we prepared to accept that the OPCW will continue to develop according to a scenario imposed by a group of countries with consolidated bloc aspirations, moving away from the technical, independent and impartial nature of the OPCW?

Are we prepared to accept that the opinions of a number of States Parties will continue to be ignored?

Are we prepared to continue ignoring the fact that a group of Western countries still does not consider it necessary to provide advance notice of its initiatives, let alone discuss them openly and in good faith, rather than for show, and seek compromise solutions?

Do we want to continue to allow the mechanisms of the CWC to be abused for the purpose of settling political scores and imposing demonstrative punishments on individual countries?

Will we continue to allow pressure to be exerted on the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and let irresponsible actions damage the reputation of the Organization?

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to His Excellency Mr. Fernando Arias, Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, who is completing his term of office.

At the same time we sincerely congratulate Ms. Sabrina Dallafior Matter on her nomination as Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW and trust that the new Director-General will perform her duties in a highly professional, impartial and depoliticized manner. We stand ready to provide all possible assistance in this regard.

I request that the full text of this statement be circulated as an official document of the thirtieth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, posted on the Catalyst network and on the Organization's website.

I kindly thank you for your attention.