

**Statement by Brazil**  
**Agenda subitem 9(d) – draft decision on**  
**“Reinstatement of the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic”**

Mr. Chair,

I would like to begin by stating Brazil’s full support to the efforts being deployed by our Syrian friends.

They lead the important mission of moving past the legacy they inherited on many fronts, but particularly on the chemical file. We should all offer our assistance.

We look forward to welcoming our Syrian colleagues back as full members of the OPCW. We also look forward to interacting directly with them.

Brazil is home to one of the world’s largest Syrian diasporas in the world. We have a fair title to claim brotherhood with the Syrian people.

The Syria chemical file is a challenge that concerns all State Parties of the CWC. No single country holds the monopoly on dealing with the Syria file. It affects the entire membership.

But we are not where we are today because of Syria.

And Brazil regrets that we have come to this point.

Brazil did not call for a vote.

We always favor building negotiated solutions. We are for diplomacy. We are against confrontation.

We are for defending our views, and working collectively. We are against the imposition of views.

We are for the respect of rules. We are against cutting corners when it comes to compliance with legal commitments.

We abhor shady procedures designed to curtail inclusiveness. Brazil operates in the open.

It was with this constructive spirit that Brazil engaged in the discussion of this draft decision which we were presented with woefully short notice.

Mr Chair, you were witness to our commitment to negotiate—and we thank you for your efforts in trying to facilitate a negotiated solution.

We also want to thank the Technical Secretariat for their constructive contribution to find a solution.

Let the membership know that we have closed in on a draft text with which Brazil the TS and several members could live with.

But unfortunately, we could not see any sign of genuine engagement—let alone flexibility.

All along the consultations mediated by you, Mr. Chair, we heard a loud call for flexibility, when in fact we never saw any flexibility.

No: “flexibility” in this case meant Brazil should take the draft decision as it was proposed, or face a vote. Take it or leave it. This is the message we have received.

In contrast, Brazil showed it was willing in good faith to compromise in order to reach consensus.

We asked in our suggested amendments for two minor adjustments in the text.

The first of these adjustments was meant to explicitly acknowledge in OP1 the 2021 Decision in which this Conference laid down criteria for the reinstatement of Syria.

What we were asking is for a simple reference to the 2021 Decision. We cannot understand that the Conference cannot uphold in writing a decision it took four years ago, and which remains fully in force, as duly recalled by the DG.

The way we see it, the only reason to resist making a reference to the 2021 Decision is because there might be a hidden agenda to disregard the criteria it stipulated back in 2021.

Brazil, on the other hand, strongly favors preserving these fundamental criteria, which were the object of intense negotiations.

But if there is an obscure objective of discussing changing such criteria, and asking the Executive Council to do so, this should not be smuggled into wilful vague language, as contained in OP1. Rather, this should be made clear as the ultimate and true intention of the draft decision.

Let us not dissimulate that this text is circumscribed to procedure. The draft decision, let us acknowledge, raises much more than a procedural question. That is precisely why we sought to retain and put forward language that preserves the integrity of decision C-25/DEC 9, adopted in 2021.

The other proposal Brazil submitted was designed to clarify and reaffirm the authority of this Conference even when it makes a delegation to the Executive Council.

Regarding this second proposal, we offered a flexible solution that could accommodate our concerns. This is true flexibility.

Brazil understands that the third operative paragraph of the draft decision being discussed accommodates our concerns, and safeguards the authority of the Conference at any moment in the future.

So, the focus of our concerns was—and remains—on the reference to the 2021 Decision.

Mr. Chair,

As I mentioned at the beginning of my intervention, Brazil did not call for a vote.

We do not support moving on to a vote that will deliberately expose a rift in the membership. Moving to a vote in these circumstances appeals only to those who thrive in confrontation, while falsely claiming unity. This makes a mockery of diplomacy.

For these reasons, Brazil withdraws its proposed amendments and dissociates from the consensus.