OPCW

Executive Council

110th Session
7 – 10 October 2025

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C-30/NAT.3
3 October 2025
ENGLISH and RUSSIAN only

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

REQUEST FOR CIRCULATION OF A DOCUMENT

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW has requested that a note verbale addressed to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (dated 3 October 2025) be circulated as an official document of the 110th Session of the Executive Council and the Thirtieth Session of the Conference of the States Parties.

Annex: Note Verbale No. 70 from the Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW Dated 3 October 2025

CS-2025-5331(E) distributed 17/10/2025

Annex

NOTE VERBALE NO. 70 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT OF THE OPCW DATED 3 OCTOBER 2025

Unofficial translation

**ПОСТОЯННОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ
ПРИ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ПО ЗАПРЕЩЕНИЮ
ХИМИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ**

PERMANENT REPRESENTATION
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
TO THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

№ 70

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) presents its compliments to the OPCW Technical Secretariat and in addition to the Notes Verbales of the Permanent Representation № 5 dated by 10 March 2022, № 6 dated by 22 March 2022, № 7 dated by 30 March 2022, № 9 dated by 6 April 2022, № 11 dated 7 April 2022, № 14 dated by 11 April, № 16 dated by 25 April 2022, № 17 dated by 7 May 2022, № 18 dated by 12 May 2022, № 19 dated by 18 May 2022, № 23 dated by 30 May 2022, № 25 dated by 31 May 2022, № 26 dated by 1 June 2022, № 27 dated by 6 June 2022, № 28 dated 6 June 2022, № 29 dated by 9 June 2022, № 33 dated by 29 June 2022, № 34 dated by 5 July 2022, № 37 dated 25 July 2022, № 38 dated by 25 July 2022, № 39 dated by 12 August 2022, № 12 dated by 8 April 2023, № 22 dated by 8 June 2023, № 38 dated by 12 October 2023, № 54 dated 12 December 2023, № 16 dated by 29 February 2024, № 39 dated by 8 July 2024, № 51 dated by 3 October 2024, № 66 dated by 12 November 2024, № 68 dated

**TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT OF
THE ORGANISATION FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

The Hague

by 19 November 2024, № 11 dated by 26 February 2025, № 67 dated by 30 September 2025, as well as the official documents of the UN Security Council (S/2023/770 dated by 24 October 2023) and UN General Assembly (A/78/551 dated by 24 October 2023) has the honour to draw the attention of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, as well as the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to the following.

The Ukrainian armed formations and special services continue to use munitions and improvised explosive devices, equipped with toxic chemicals listed in the Schedule 3 of the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC, as well as riot control agents against the Russian servicemen and civilians in the special military operation zone in violation of the key CWC provisions.

The Russian Federation repeatedly circulated such evidence to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, States Parties to the CWC, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

For the illustrative purposes, information on several cases of the use of and preparation for the use of toxic chemicals and RCAs by the Ukrainian side is provided by the Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation.

On 8 July 2025, Ukrainian armed formations released munitions filled with toxic chemicals from a copter-type unmanned aerial vehicle on the positions of units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation near the village of Ivanovka (Donetsk People's Republic). Following the use of the munitions four Russian servicemen were affected by toxic chemicals in the area of explosion of munitions. They experienced ocular burning, lacrimation, nausea, emesis and asthenia. The related information is presented in Annex 1.

On 18 August 2025, near the village of Rakitnoe in the Belgorod Oblast, servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian

Federation found a munitions cache, which harboured four prefabricated hand grenades with the inscription "Teren-6" of NVP EKOLOG JSC design (Kiev, Ukraine) and five improvised explosive devices in form of plastic bottles filled with toxic munitions with built-in hand grenade fuses. The related information is presented in Annex 2.

On 8 September 2025, an explosive device consisting of two sealed glass containers with brown liquid and a glass vial with white powder, with an electric detonator mounted in the stopper, was discovered at the positions of the armed forces of Ukraine in the Serebryansk forestry area (Lugansk People's Republic). The related information is presented in Annex 3.

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW requests the OPCW Technical Secretariat to distribute the copy of this Note Verbale with annexes as an official national document of the Russian Federation at the 110th session of the Executive Council and 30th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, and make it available on the OPCW website and Catalyst platform.

Encl.: 20 pp.

The Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Technical Secretariat assurances of its highest consideration.

The Hague, « 3 » October, 2025

Unofficial translation

Annex 1

Use Of Toxic Chemicals Against Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by the Ukrainian Armed Forces On 8 July 2025

On 8 July 2025, Ukrainian armed formations released munitions filled with toxic chemicals from a copter-type unmanned aerial vehicle UAV on the positions of units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation near the village of Ivanovka (Donetsk People's Republic of the Russian Federation).

Following the use of the munitions four Russian servicemen were affected by toxic chemicals in the area of explosion of munitions. They experienced ocular burning, lacrimation, nausea, emesis and asthenia.

In order to establish the reasons of the personnel exposure (poisoning) two sets of uniform were taken from the affected servicemen on 8 July 2025

Identification of the presence of toxic substances in the clothing items (military uniform) was carried out by the Laboratory of Chemical and Analytical Control of the 27th Scientific Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on 11 July 2025.

Studies were conducted by means of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and high-performance liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry in accordance with operating procedures recommended by the OPCW for chemical disarmament analysis.

The examination revealed the following toxic chemicals:

1. Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin) which is included in Schedule 3 (position 4) of the Annex on Chemicals of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on its Destruction (hereinafter – the CWC).

2. Chloroacetophenone (2-chloro-1-phenylethanone) – a toxic chemical which is classified as riot control agent. Chloroacetophenone was widely used by the US during the Vietnam War. Its use as a chemical warfare agent was prohibited pursuant to the 1925 Geneva Protocol reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly in 1969.

Chromatograms and mass spectra of the identified chemical compounds (Trichloronitromethane and Chloroacetophenone) obtained from the analysis of samples taken from two sets of uniform of the servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, are attached hereto (figures 1-8).

The fact of release of munitions filled by mixture of toxic chemicals by Ukrainian armed forces proves that the Ukrainian side continues to use chemical weapons in violation of Articles I and II of the CWC.

Conclusion:

The use of munitions specifically designed to cause harm to the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, containing trichloronitromethane (a toxic chemical chloropicrin included in Schedule 3 of the Annex on Chemicals of the CWC) in mixture with chloroacetophenone by Ukrainian armed formations indicates a violation of Articles I and II of the CWC, and qualifies as the use of chemical weapons.

3

Uniform set №1
Trichloronitromethane



Figure 1. Chromatograms of control sample not containing trichloronitromethane (upper), analyzed sample (middle) and standard solution (lower), obtained using gas chromatography with mass spectrometry detection in the electron ionization mode



Figure 2. Mass spectra of analyzed sample (upper) and standard trichloronitromethane solution (lower) proving the presence of trichloronitromethane in the samples studied

5

Chloroacetophenone



Figure 3. Chromatograms of control sample not containing chloroacetophenone (upper), analyzed sample (middle) and standard chloroacetophenone solution (lower), obtained using gas chromatography with mass spectrometry detection in the electron ionization mode



Figure 4. Mass spectra of analyzed sample (upper) and standard chloroacetophenone solution (lower) proving the presence of chloroacetophenone in the samples studied

7

Uniform set №2
Trichloronitromethane



Figure 5. Chromatograms of control sample not containing trichloronitromethane (upper), analyzed sample (middle) and standard solution (lower), obtained using gas chromatography with mass spectrometry detection in the electron ionization mode

8



Figure 6. Mass spectra of analyzed sample (upper) and standard trichloronitromethane solution (lower) proving the presence of trichloronitromethane in the samples studied

9

Chloroacetophenone



Figure 7. Chromatograms of control sample not containing chloroacetophenone (upper), analyzed sample (middle) and standard chloroacetophenone solution (lower), obtained using gas chromatography with mass spectrometry detection in the electron ionization mode



Figure 8. Mass spectra of analyzed sample (upper) and standard chloroacetophenone solution (lower) proving the presence of chloroacetophenone in the samples studied

Unofficial translation

Annex 2

Preparation for Use of Toxic Chemicals by Special Services of Ukraine on 18 August 2025

On 18 August 2025, near the village of Rakitnoye in Belgorod Region of the Russian Federation, servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation found a munitions cache, which harboured four prefabricated hand grenades (Figure 1) with the inscription "Teren-6" of NVP EKOLOG JSC design (Kiev, Ukraine) and five improvised explosive devices (Figure 2) in form of plastic bottles filled with toxic chemicals with built-in hand grenade fuses.

Figure 1. Teren-6 hand grenades

Figure 2. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

The above mentioned pieces of munitions were transported to the Laboratory of Chemical and Analytical Control of the 27th Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation for a chemical analysis.

The identification of the presence of toxic chemical substances in the grenades and plastic bottles was performed from 28 to 29 August 2025.

The examinations were conducted in accordance with the OPCW Recommended Operating Procedures for Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament using the methods of gas and high-performance liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, as well as atomic emission spectroscopy with inductively coupled plasma.

The conducted examinations determined the following,

1. Pelargonic acid morpholide and ortho-Chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) were identified in four Teren-6 hand grenades. The identified chemical compounds are riot control agents characterized by strong physiological effect.

2. The chemical analysis of five improvised explosive devices revealed the presence of the following chemical compounds – trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin) listed as Schedule 3 toxic chemical (item 4) of the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC as well as anthracene smoke mixture containing phenanthrene, potassium chlorate, magnesium powder, and aluminium powder as additives.

3. The presence of chloropicrin (about 6 ml per each plastic container) as well as anthracene mixture with burning temperature of 350-400 degrees Celsius in the improvised explosive devices can lead to a thermal decomposition of chloropicrin and the formation of phosgene (carbonic acid dichloroanhydride) Phosgene is included in Schedule 3 (item 1) of the Annex on Chemicals to the CWC. The combined toxic exposure of chloropicrin and phosgene can enhance the damaging effects of improvised explosive devices on military personnel and civilian population in the Russian Federation.

Chromatograms and mass-spectra of the identified toxic chemicals and chemical compounds as a result of the analysis of hand grenades labelled as Teren-6 and five improvised explosive devices are attached (Figures 1-4).

Conclusion: Preparation for the use of prefabricated hand grenades with the inscription Teren-6 filled with CS as well as improvised chemical munitions containing chloropicrin in combination with anthracene smoke mixture attests to a violation of Article I and Article II of the CWC by Ukrainian armed formations and is qualified as preparation for use of chemical weapons.

3

Trichloronitromethane
Total ion current chromatogram (GC)



Mass spectrum of the substance identified as trichloronitromethane and library mass spectrum



Figure 1. Chromatogram of trichloronitromethane (upper), mass spectrum of trichloronitromethane in the analysed samples (middle), and library mass spectrum of trichloronitromethane (lower)

Phenanthrene
(liquid contained in vials inside IED)



Figure 2. Total ion current and ion chromatogram (GC) of phenanthrene (upper). Mass spectrum of substance identified as phenanthrene (middle), and library mass spectrum (lower)

Anthracene
(powder taken from IED)

5



Figure 3. Total ion current and ion chromatogram (GC) of anthracene (upper). Mass spectrum of substance identified as anthracene (middle), and library mass spectrum of anthracene (lower)

2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)

Total ion current chromatogram (GC)

6



Mass spectrum of the substance identified as 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile and library mass spectrum



Figure 4. Total ion current chromatogram (GC, upper) and mass spectrum of substance identified as 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (middle), and library mass spectrum of the substance (lower)

Unofficial translation

Annex 3

Preparation for the use of toxic chemicals by special services of Ukraine (September 8, 2025)

On September 8, 2025, an explosive device consisting of two sealed glass containers with brown liquid and a glass vial with white powder, with an electric detonator mounted in the stopper, was discovered at the positions of the armed forces of Ukraine in the Serebryansk forestry area (LPR of the Russian Federation). The appearance of the explosive device is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. External view of the explosive device

The above samples (two glass ampoules with a dark brown liquid substance and one glass vial with a white solid) were seized and sent for chemical analysis to the Laboratory of Chemical and Analytical Control of the 27th Scientific Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The identification of toxic chemicals in these samples was carried out from September 11 to September 12, 2025.

The received samples were examined using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and high-performance liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry in accordance with the operational procedures recommended by the Organization for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for analysis in the field of chemical disarmament.

The results of the conducted research are as follows:

1. Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin) has been identified in two sealed glass ampoules with brown liquid, which is included in Schedule 3 (item 4) of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter referred to as the Convention).

2. The white powder in a glass vial is an explosive consisting of a mixture of hexogen and a plasticizer (dioctyladipate), similar to the plastic explosive C-4.

Chromatograms and mass spectra of the identified chemical compounds are presented below (Figures 1, 2).

Conclusion:

1. The discovered sample is a chemical munition designed to cause harm to the military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the civilian population as a result of the toxic effects of chloropicrin.

2. The preparation for the use of a munition loaded with a toxic chemical of Schedule 3 of the Convention (chloropicrin) indicates a violation by the armed forces of Ukraine of the provisions of Articles I and II of the Convention and qualifies as preparation for the use of chemical weapons.

3

Trichloronitromethane (liquid)



Figure 1. Chromatograms (GC) of total ion current and trinitrochloromethane ions (upper), the mass spectrum of the substance identified as trinitrochloromethane, and the library mass spectrum of the substance

4

Hexogen (white mass)



Figure 2. Chromatograms (GC) of total ion current and hexogen ions (upper), the mass spectrum of hexogen in the analyzed samples, and the library mass spectrum of the substance

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