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**DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,  
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND  
ON THEIR DESTRUCTION IN 2024**



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## INTRODUCTION

1. In 2024, progress continued to be made in addressing the use of chemical weapons, verifying the destruction of non-stockpiled chemical weapons, implementing and enhancing industry verification, delivering international cooperation and assistance, addressing the challenges posed by chemical terrorism, and broadening and sustaining the education and outreach efforts of the OPCW.
2. The OPCW continued to focus on post-destruction phase activities in 2024, following the verified destruction of the remaining declared chemical weapons stockpiles by the United States of America, the last possessor State Party, in July 2023.
3. Between the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) and the destruction of the last chemical weapons stockpile in July 2023, the Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) had verified the destruction of 70,493.640 metric tonnes (MT)<sup>1</sup> of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, accounting for 100% of the total amount of declared agents. This significant milestone marked the completion of the full elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles declared by all eight former possessor States Parties.
4. On 8 December 2024, the former President of the Syrian Arab Republic fled the country, leaving his Prime Minister to transfer power to new authorities. Following the transfer of power, the Secretariat immediately began planning and preparing to scale up and intensify its activities related to obtaining clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, the establishment of facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons, and the identification of perpetrators in instances where use or likely use has been established.
5. The Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the Executive Council (the Council) was convened on 12 December 2024, at the request of the Director-General, to discuss the ongoing developments with respect to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. On 26 December 2024, the Director-General held telephone consultations with H.E. Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, to lay the groundwork for a deployment of OPCW experts to the Syrian Arab Republic.
6. Prior to the collapse of the former government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the transfer of power to new authorities, work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of chemical weapons in that country. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and subsequently submitted declarations, continued throughout 2024. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) also continued its activities in 2024, guided by the relevant decisions of the Council and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The Secretariat also focused on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) at its Fourth Special Session (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018), including the operation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established pursuant to that decision, as well as on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021).

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<sup>1</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (the Verification Annex).

7. In 2024, the Secretariat received a request from Ukraine for a technical assistance visit (TAV) in relation to an incident reportedly involving a toxic chemical in the Dnipropetrovsk region, to conduct a technical evaluation. The Director-General dispatched a TAV team to Ukraine, where it collected related documentation and digital files and also received samples collected by Ukraine. The results of the analyses of these samples conducted by two OPCW designated laboratories indicated that they contained the riot control agent 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, known as CS.
8. The Secretariat, in consultation with relevant States Parties, conducted six inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCW). China and Japan continued to cooperate bilaterally in relation to the destruction, excavation, and recovery of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. In 2024, a total of 13 abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) inspections were conducted in China. Additionally, the Secretariat conducted one mission in Germany to verify the quantity of the chemical weapons that were declared by the State Party as ACW.
9. The OPCW carried out 200 inspections of industrial facilities in 2024 as mandated by the Conference through the Programme and Budget for 2024.
10. The OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre), which became fully operational in 2023, continued to play a central role in advancing the training, capacity-building, and international cooperation efforts of the OPCW. In 2024, the Centre supported a wide range of activities, including training for inspectors and experts from States Parties, laboratory exercises, scientific research, and online learning initiatives.
11. The Secretariat continued its programme of capacity building in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention in 2024, conducting 97 activities and programmes for 2,765 experts from all regional groups.
12. In 2024, the OPCW intensified its engagement on artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies, recognising their growing relevance to the Convention's implementation. Key initiatives included an expert meeting at the OPCW Main Building and ChemTech Centre, and the launch of the "AI Research Challenge", among others. The Organisation also co-hosted with Morocco the "Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Rabat. Additionally, the Council agreed to include emerging technologies as a standing item on its regular agendas.
13. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the contribution of the OPCW to global counterterrorism efforts. The Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) held three meetings, focusing on enhancing coordination with regional and international partners, highlighting the importance of capacity building in addressing the evolving threat landscape of chemical terrorism, and conducting follow-up activities from its 2023 tabletop exercises.
14. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates.

15. Public interest in the work of the OPCW remained strong. The social media platforms of the OPCW again experienced an average growth rate of 8% in 2024. In-person visits continued, while the Secretariat also employed digital outreach tools.
16. In 2024, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party during the course of the year.

## 1. VERIFICATION

- 1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2024 is provided in Table 1 below. The OPCW conducted 229 inspections in 2024, of which 13% were related to chemical weapons. Operations connected with non-routine missions accounted for a further 820 inspector days.

**TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2024**

Type of Facility	Number of Inspections	Number of Facilities or Sites Inspected	Number of Inspector Days
<b>Chemical Weapons-Related Inspections</b>			
CWDF <sup>2</sup>	7	4	163
CWSF <sup>3</sup>	0	0	0
CWPF <sup>4</sup>	2	2	25
OCW	6	6	58
ACW <sup>5</sup>	14	11	241
Non-routine missions	N/A		820
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1,307</b>
<b>Article VI Inspections</b>			
Schedule 1	11	11	229
Schedule 2	42	42	755
Schedule 3	10	10	98
OCPF <sup>6</sup>	137	137	1,141
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>2,223</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>3,530</b>

- 1.2 As at 31 December 2024, eight States Parties (a State Party,<sup>7</sup> Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared a combined total of 72,304.343 MT<sup>8</sup> of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons, as well as 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3 to this report.

### Chemical weapons destruction

- 1.3 During the reporting period, one CWDF, the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) non-contiguous Static Detonation Chamber 2000, located in the United States of America, was involved in the destruction of resultant containerised

<sup>2</sup> CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

<sup>3</sup> CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

<sup>4</sup> CWPF = chemical weapons production facility.

<sup>5</sup> This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

<sup>6</sup> OCPF = other chemical production facility.

<sup>7</sup> As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as “a State Party”.

<sup>8</sup> This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

component waste from the destruction of chemical weapons<sup>9</sup> (see Annex 2). Four quarterly visits were conducted by the Secretariat to verify this destruction.

- 1.4 Prior to the reporting period, all declared Category 1 chemical weapons stockpiles (70,493.640 MT) had been verified as destroyed, including withdrawals from chemical weapons stockpiles for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. All declared Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons had been verified as destroyed.

#### **Chemical weapons storage facilities**

- 1.5 Following the completion of destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, the Secretariat verified the removal of chemical weapons from all CWSFs and terminated verification activities at storage facilities in 2023.

#### **Chemical weapons production facilities**

- 1.6 By 31 December 2023, all 97 CWPFs declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, with 74 having been certified as destroyed and 23 as converted. In 2024, the Secretariat conducted two inspections at two converted CWPFs in Libya.

#### **Old chemical weapons**

- 1.7 Progress continued with respect to OCW. States Parties that declared possession of OCW continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner. As at 31 December 2024, 19 States Parties had declared 157,445 items of OCW produced either before 1925, or between 1925 and 1946. Approximately 78% of these were reported as destroyed. In 2024, the Secretariat conducted six OCW inspections in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

#### **Abandoned chemical weapons**

- 1.8 Since entry into force of the Convention, four States Parties have reported ACW on their territory. One State Party, Japan, reported ACW on the territory of another State Party, China.
- 1.9 The Secretariat continued to engage with China and Japan on ACW matters. Two trilateral meetings were conducted in 2024 to ensure transparency, to discuss technical and practical issues, to implement projects in accordance with the appropriate verification measures, and to plan for future activities.
- 1.10 China and Japan continued to cooperate on ACW and their destruction, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2024, China and Japan continued to cooperate on implementing the “Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2022 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China”, jointly submitted to the Council by China and Japan at its 101st Session

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<sup>9</sup> Not counting OCW or ACW (see Annex 2).

(EC-101/NAT.4\*, dated 30 September 2022) pursuant to the Council's decision (EC-101/DEC.2, dated 4 October 2022) and attached as annex 3 to Council decision EC-67/DEC.6. The plan includes time frames for the destruction of ACW items by Japan, with appropriate cooperation from China.

- 1.11 As at 31 December 2024, China had declared 153,677 items of ACW, while Japan had declared 153,665 such items. A total of 118,620 items of the declared ACW on the territory of China had been destroyed. The destruction rate of ACWs in China was at its highest ever in 2024, as a result of the operation of the four large, controlled detonation chambers in Haerbaling and the mobile destruction facilities in Harbin and Wuhan.
- 1.12 In June 2024, the Secretariat conducted one mission in Germany to verify the quantity of the chemical weapons that were declared by the State Party as ACW.

### **Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use**

- 1.13 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2024. The Secretariat focused its training on improving preparedness for both CIs and IAUs and, in particular, reconnaissance, scene documentation, access management, negotiations, evidence management, sample collection, and interviewing witnesses. In doing so, the Secretariat continued the integration of lessons learned from contingency operations and non-routine missions conducted in the course of the past 12 years.

### **Declaration Assessment Team**

- 1.14 In 2024, the Secretariat continued its efforts to verify fulfilment by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements in accordance with the Convention, paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 (dated 27 September 2013), paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4 (dated 23 March 2016), paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2 (dated 9 July 2020). The shortcomings noted in the declarations are raised with the Syrian National Authority as outstanding issues until the Secretariat receives sufficient information to consider these issues as resolved.
- 1.15 Since 2014, the Secretariat has raised and reported a total of 26 outstanding issues. Between April 2014 and 31 December 2024, a total of seven issues were considered by the Secretariat as resolved, while 19 issues remained unresolved. The substance of these outstanding issues remains of concern to the Secretariat since it involves large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical agents and chemical munitions. Additionally, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of the declaration-related measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
- 1.16 As a result of the efforts of the DAT to clarify gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies noted in the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and related submissions, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted 20 amendments to its initial declaration. Through these amendments, the Syrian Arab Republic added several previously undeclared substantive elements of its chemical weapons programme. These include one CWPF; four chemical weapons research and development facilities; activities involving

six previously undeclared chemical warfare agents; a substantial amount of previously undeclared chemical munitions; and other supplementary information about all of the segments of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

- 1.17 The Director-General continued to report on all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions through his Notes circulated to the Council at its 105th, 106th, and 107th Sessions. In the last Note issued in 2024 (EC-107/HP/DG.2), the Director-General concluded that “the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 (dated 27 September 2013), EC-81/DEC.4 (dated 23 March 2016), EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), EC-94/DEC.2 (dated 9 July 2020), Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018) and C-25/DEC.9 (dated 21 April 2021), and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013)”.
- 1.18 Following the transfer of power from the previous regime in December 2024, the Secretariat established contacts with the new caretaker Syrian authorities regarding fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s obligation under the Convention. The Secretariat will continue its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic on all declaration-related issues.

#### **Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre**

- 1.19 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities “on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings”.
- 1.20 The Secretariat conducted the eleventh round of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC in November 2024.
- 1.21 With regard to the presence of the Schedule 2.B.04 chemical detected during the third round of inspections in November 2018 at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC, the Secretariat has engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic mostly through the exchange of correspondence. The issue was discussed during the eleventh round of inspections in November 2024. The inspection team did not receive any new technical information that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.
- 1.22 Concerning the origin and use of a chemical of a dual-use nature observed by the inspection team during the previous round of inspections in September 2022, the inspection team discussed this matter with the Syrian National Authority during the eleventh round of inspections. The Syrian National Authority did not provide any new information during this discussion.
- 1.23 With the change in government in the Syrian Arab Republic on 8 December 2024, the Secretariat will engage with the Syrian interim authorities on all matters relating to the declaration and inspections of the SSRC, pending the creation of a new National Authority. The Secretariat had planned to conduct the twelfth round of SSRC inspections in December 2024, but the inspection was cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation in the country.

**OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

- 1.24 In February 2024, the Secretariat issued a report by the FFM on the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Al-Yarmouk, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 22 October 2017. The Secretariat issued a second report in June 2024 on the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Qalib al-Thawr, al-Salamiyah, on 9 August 2017, and in al-Balil, Souran, on 8 November 2017, in Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 1.25 The first report (S/2254/2024, dated 22 February 2024) concluded that the information obtained and analysed as a whole, in accordance with the mandate of the FFM to gather facts regarding incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, was not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the FFM to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incident that occurred in al-Yarmouk, in the Syrian Arab Republic, on 22 October 2017.
- 1.26 The second report (S/2295/2024, dated 11 June 2024) concluded that the information obtained and analysed as a whole, in accordance with the mandate of the FFM to gather facts relevant to the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, was not sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for the FFM to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred on 9 August 2017 in Qalib al-Thawr and 8 November 2017 in al-Balil, Hama Governorate, the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 1.27 The FFM has continued to work on allegations that have been assessed as credible. Since the Twenty-Eighth Session of the Conference, the FFM has carried out nine deployments to collect further information regarding allegations under review, on which States Parties were briefed on 29 February, 2 July, and 1 October 2024.
- 1.28 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2024 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat (S/2244/2024, dated 6 December 2024).

**Implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3**

- 1.29 The IIT continued its investigation into several incidents identified in Annex 2 to Note EC-91/S/3 (dated 28 June 2019) entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)”.
- 1.30 The IIT released its fourth report on 22 February 2024 (S/2255/2024), focusing on the use of sulfur mustard in the town of Marea, the Syrian Arab Republic on 1 September 2015. Based on all of the information it had obtained and analysed, the IIT concluded in the report that there were reasonable grounds to believe that on 1 September 2015, during sustained attacks aimed at capturing the town of Marea, units of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) used sulfur mustard, delivered using one or more artillery guns. In the aftermath of the incident, 55 casualties were treated by a field hospital, of which at least 11 individuals who came into contact with the delivered chemical substance experienced symptoms consistent with exposure to sulfur mustard. The Director-General briefed the Council on the report on 5 March 2024.
- 1.31 Throughout 2024, the IIT continued to be denied access to, and direct engagement with, representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as to relevant locations.

- 1.32 Pursuant to paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3 and the memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM) regarding the provision of access, storage, and handling of information and evidence, the IIT continued to preserve and share information with the IIIM.
- 1.33 IIT personnel continued to undertake sustained efforts to transfer knowledge and expertise to other units and offices of the Secretariat. This includes the enhancement of the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Secretariat in providing States Parties with technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, as decided in paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3.

#### **Activities related to the Syrian Arab Republic after 8 December 2024**

- 1.34 On 8 December 2024, prior to the collapse of his regime, the former President of the Syrian Arab Republic fled the country, leaving his Prime Minister to transfer power to new authorities. As a result, the Organisation is now in a position to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. The Secretariat continued to closely monitor the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, paying special attention to any matters related to chemical weapons, including the status of its chemical weapons-related sites.
- 1.35 Through Note Verbale No. NV/ODG-636/24 (dated 9 December 2024), the Secretariat reminded the Syrian Arab Republic of its continued obligations under the Convention and requested that it fulfil these obligations. Furthermore, the Secretariat requested once again that the Syrian Arab Republic declare all sites and activities as listed in Council decision EC-94/DEC.2. The Secretariat also requested updated information regarding the security and integrity of declared chemical weapons research, development, production, storage, and testing sites and locations, including any movements, changes, or incidents involving materials and/or documentation from these sites/locations, as well as updates on measures that were implemented to ensure compliance with the Convention under the conditions at that time.
- 1.36 On 9 December 2024, the Director-General requested, in accordance with Rule 12(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, that an extraordinary meeting of the Council be convened to address the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in relation to the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Subsequently, the Sixty-Sixth Meeting of the Council was held on 12 December 2024, during which the Director-General delivered a statement on the matter.
- 1.37 On 26 December 2024, the Director-General held telephone consultations with H.E. Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, which were aimed at facilitating a deployment of OPCW experts to the Syrian Arab Republic. During those consultations, the Director-General requested, inter alia, that the Syrian interim authorities secure chemical weapons-related locations and materials therein. He also requested the caretaker Minister to appoint a team of experts to receive and engage with the Secretariat experts. The Director-General also continued to consult with high-ranking officials of the United Nations on the matter.

### Technical assistance visit to Ukraine

- 1.38 The Secretariat received a request from Ukraine for technical assistance in relation to an incident reportedly involving a toxic chemical that took place on 20 September 2024, along the confrontation lines between opposing forces near the village of Illinka, in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Ukraine requested the Secretariat to visit Ukraine to provide a technical evaluation. The Director-General dispatched an OPCW TAV team to provide the requested assistance to Ukraine.
- 1.39 The TAV team deployed to Ukraine and collected related documentation and digital files as well as testimonies from first-hand witnesses, and also received three samples collected by Ukraine: a shell of a grenade, and two soil samples collected from a trench. The TAV team also examined the metadata of the digital files received and verified that the date, time, equipment, and location data were authentic and consistent with the documentation records provided by Ukraine, and that the chain of custody had been maintained. After the deployment, the OPCW Laboratory received the samples from the TAV team and prepared them for off-site analysis by two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General. This activity was carried out in strict compliance with OPCW procedures.
- 1.40 The results of the analyses of these samples conducted by two OPCW designated laboratories, separately and independently from one another, indicate that the grenade and soil samples collected from the trench contained the riot control agent 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, known as CS. The Secretariat published the full report relating to the TAV (S/2338/2024, dated 18 November 2024) upon request by Ukraine.

### Industry verification

- 1.41 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, importing, exporting, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals, as well as declarations related to OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2024.

**TABLE 2: DECLARABLE FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024**

Type of Facility	Declarable Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection <sup>10</sup>	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities <sup>11</sup>	States Parties with Facilities Subject to Inspection
Schedule 1	28	28	24	24
Schedule 2	457	229	37	24
Schedule 3	400	374	35	31
OCPF	4,617	4,441	80	80
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,502</b>	<b>5,072</b>	<b>80<sup>12</sup></b>	<b>80<sup>13</sup></b>

<sup>10</sup> Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.

<sup>11</sup> Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities (ADAAs) and annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs).

<sup>12</sup> Eighty States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

<sup>13</sup> Eighty States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

- 1.42 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 200 Article VI inspections in 2024 as envisaged in the Programme and Budget for 2024. The 200 inspections referred to above comprised 11 Schedule 1 facilities, 42 Schedule 2 plant sites, 10 Schedule 3 plant sites, and 137 OCPFs (respectively 39%, 18%, 3%, and 3% of the total of inspectable facilities). During the inspections no uncertainties were recorded. However, 11 inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention, and in 108 inspections it was recommended that further information be provided in declarations. In addition, three OCPF inspections were carried out at facilities that were found not to be inspectable as a result of declaration errors.

**TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS**

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year									
2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
241	241	241	241	241	82	80	160	196	200

- 1.43 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2024, the site selection was performed as described in the “Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites” (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.
- 1.44 In 2024, the Secretariat, supported by States Parties, continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of optimising resources. Accordingly, the number of sequential inspections in the 2024 inspection plan was increased as compared to 2023. The 54 sequential missions indicated in Table 4 below were carried out in 34 different countries, including 13 long industry missions to 10 different countries. Forty-two sequential missions were intra-country, with the remaining 12 consisting of inter-country missions.

**TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS**

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year									
2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
59	54	58	58	60	20	21	34	48	54

- 1.45 In 2024, the Secretariat continued the work of a cross-divisional team to perform a thorough review of inspection practices, inspection report templates, inspection tools, and inspection training to identify further options to optimise the conduct of inspections. For example, in 2024 the Secretariat improved the new electronic tool for inspections and revised inspection report templates (see paragraph 1.58 below).
- 1.46 In 2024, six inspections involving sampling and analysis activities were carried out. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5 below.

**TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES**

Number of Inspections Involving Sampling and Analysis									
2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
11	11	10	9	6	1	0	0	1	6

### **Declarations**

- 1.47 In 2024, 76 of the 102 States Parties (74.5%) that submitted ADPAs did so by the deadline set forth by the Convention. In the year under review, 96.3% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs updated, or partially updated, the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 99.5% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.

### **Transfers of scheduled chemicals**

- 1.48 Twenty-nine transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by 17 States Parties in their ADPAs for 2023. Twenty-eight of these transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties, and one transfer was notified and declared only by the receiving State Party.
- 1.49 ADPAs for 2023 indicated that 59 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 9,336 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 124 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 569,311 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.50 Seven States Parties declared the export of four Schedule 3 chemicals to three States not Party.

### **Transfer discrepancies**

- 1.51 In 2024, ADPAs for 2023 indicated a total of 1,613 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 807 transfers were declared with quantities above the declaration threshold, of which 567 involving 89 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.52 The Secretariat continued to follow up with the States Parties in this regard and to work closely with other stakeholders to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

### **Riot control agents**

- 1.53 At the end of the reporting period, 137 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 53 States Parties had declared that they did not possess such agents. One State Party had not yet provided an initial declaration, and two other States Parties had not provided detailed information on riot control agents in their initial declarations. Additional information on the possession of riot control agents is provided in Annex 4 to this report.

### **Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange System**

- 1.54 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to support and promote the use of the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS) and the Secure Information Exchange System (SIX) as a component of Article VI-related training activities. In addition, the Secretariat provided on-demand virtual training and consultations on EDIS and SIX to requesting States Parties.

- 1.55 In 2024, there was no new release of EDIS, as had been tentatively planned during the previous year. This was due to organisational prioritisation in combination with insufficient demand among States Parties for new features in the software.
- 1.56 By the end of the reporting period, 126 active users from 66 States Parties had registered to use SIX.

### **Analytics platform and business intelligence**

- 1.57 The Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, which includes a data warehouse software application (WhereScape) and a business intelligence software application (Qlik Sense). Qlik Sense will replace the older business intelligence software application (Cognos). Around 60% of the development work for Qlik Sense was completed before the project was paused due to organisational priorities. The project is scheduled to resume in 2025.

### **Electronic Inspections Tool**

- 1.58 The Electronic Inspections Tool (eINS) software application was upgraded in 2024 to further streamline the efficiency and quality of inspection reports. This tool is part of the cross-divisional Article VI optimisation project to improve work efficiencies in all aspects of the current verification process.

### **Verification Information System**

- 1.59 In 2024, the Secretariat continued the implementation of the Verification Information System-Industry modernisation project. Several core declaration modules were developed in 2024, including the Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and OCPF regimes. The software development is scheduled to continue for the whole of 2025. At the end of 2024, the project was estimated to be 40% complete and scheduled to be delivered at the end of 2026.

### **Informal consultations**

- 1.60 Three informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections (Industry Cluster consultations) were conducted in 2024. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of verification-related topics, including:
- (a) Schedule 2 inspections – plant site selection and risk assessment methodology;
  - (b) increase in notification days;
  - (c) implementation of the 2024 inspection plan;
  - (d) bio-mediated processes and highly active pharmaceutical ingredients;
  - (e) transfer discrepancies; and
  - (f) OCPF site selection performance.

### OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories

- 1.61 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that wish to be part of the OPCW network of analytical laboratories. During the reporting period, the Fifty-Fourth Official OPCW Proficiency Test for Environmental Analysis was completed, the Fifty-Fifth Test was conducted and completed, and the Fifty-Sixth Test began. Additionally, the Ninth Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test was completed. At the end of the reporting period, 30 laboratories from 25 States Parties had been designated for environmental analysis, and 18 laboratories from 14 States Parties had been designated for biomedical sample analysis. Annex 5 to this report shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2024.

### OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology

- 1.62 In 2024, the ChemTech Centre continued to be utilised for capacity building and training for experts from States Parties, Inspectorate training, laboratory exercises, proficiency testing, knowledge building and sharing, scientific research, and international cooperation and assistance programmes. With enhanced remote capacity-building and training capabilities, the ChemTech Centre has also generated cost efficiencies and facilitated improved online training experiences. An update on the Centre's use was provided in a Note entitled "Update on Programmes and Activities at the Centre for Chemistry and Technology" (S/2304/2024, dated 8 July 2024).

### OPCW Central Analytical Database

- 1.63 Table 6 below reflects the number of chemicals covered in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) for each technique for the last five years. Only the gas chromatography (retention index) and mass spectrometry data were used in on-site analysis.

**TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHEMICAL SPECIES IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE**

Technique	Status at the End of:				
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Infrared (IR)	775	794	805	816	827
Gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI))	4,543	4,588	4,596	4,609	4,624
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)	300	300	300	300	305
Mass spectrometry (MS)	4,647	4,673	4,682	4,697	4,711
Tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)	38	68	68	68	71
Gas chromatography high resolution mass spectrometry (GC-HRMS)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2

### **Reorganisation of the Inspectorate**

- 1.64 Following the completion of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and in response to rapid developments in science and technology, the Inspectorate Division continued in 2024 to transition into a more flexible and agile structure, while maintaining its unique body of international experts across a broad range of specialised fields. In 2024, the Inspectorate Division implemented the organisational structure approved by the Conference at its Twenty-Eighth Session, as outlined in the Programme and Budget for 2024–2025, to respond to current and new challenges.
- 1.65 Under the new structure, the Inspectorate Division centralised its major operational financial resources and responsibilities within the Programme Control and Monitoring Branch. All inspector posts have been consolidated under the Inspection Team Personnel subprogramme, which is divided into two units: the Industry and Technology Advancement Unit, focused on non-proliferation activities, and the Contingency and Chemical Demilitarisation Unit, focused on chemical demilitarisation and implementing the Inspectorate training programme. Additionally, the Operations and Technology Support Branch has assumed a broader role in operations and technology support, drawing upon synergies with the ChemTech Centre and managing projects for testing and validating existing and new technologies relevant to Secretariat activities.

### **Training provided by the Inspectorate Division**

- 1.66 In 2024, the Contingency and Chemical Demilitarisation Unit (CCD) of the Inspectorate Division coordinated or delivered 54 individual training courses that took place in the following countries: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Serbia, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The CCD, supported by other parts of the Secretariat, provided mandatory inspector refresher training as well as specialised courses in occupational health and safety, the OPCW confidentiality regime, ordnance training, explosive remnants of war, mobile laboratory deployment, and analytical chemist certification, among others.
- 1.67 The United States of America provided support in the delivery of one initial and one refresher course on hazardous waste operations and emergency response for a total of 33 Secretariat staff members.
- 1.68 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provided support through two different training activities: Command and Control for Deployed Missions and a Group W mock inspection. Additionally, the United Kingdom sponsored a diplomatic skills course, delivered at the OPCW Main Building, for 12 Secretariat staff members.
- 1.69 Further, one Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) course was sponsored and hosted by Germany. As a result, 12 Secretariat staff members whose jobs could require deployment to high-risk areas received training.
- 1.70 In 2024, three toxic chemicals training courses took place in Serbia (with portions at the ChemTech Centre) and in Slovakia, resulting in a total of 44 Secretariat staff members receiving their certification.

- 1.71 In September 2024, a group of 11 new inspectors (Group W) joined the OPCW. The CCD, together with other parts of the Secretariat, facilitated a 12-week mandatory initial training aimed at preparing them for their important role as inspectors.

### **Knowledge management**

- 1.72 In 2024, the Secretariat further enhanced its knowledge management policy framework, while continuing to implement the knowledge strategy aligned with the Organisation's strategic goals. This strategy aims to identify, develop, and retain expertise through embedded processes. Building on previous efforts, the Secretariat implemented new processes and improved existing ones, with a continued focus on key expertise in the Inspectorate and Verification Divisions. Additionally, the Secretariat expanded cross-unit training sessions, facilitated collaboration between organisational units, sustained regular inclusive knowledge-sharing events, and further refined its knowledge transfer methodology, enhancing the Organisation's ability to preserve and transfer critical expertise and core experiential knowledge.
- 1.73 The Verification Division continued its work to ensure that the OPCW remains the global repository of knowledge in the Division's core areas of expertise. The Chemical Demilitarisation Branch focused on preserving chemical weapons knowledge. From 10 to 12 September 2024, the Secretariat held a workshop on verification practices at CWPFs, attended by 16 outside experts. In October 2024, the Secretariat led a joint OPCW-United States of America field training to practice verification activities, which had not been conducted for over 10 years. In the same month, the Secretariat held a joint OPCW-United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland-United States destruction technology briefing to update the OPCW repository on chemical weapons destruction. Throughout the year, the Verification Division held five regular knowledge transfer sessions aimed at capturing critical business knowledge from staff members nearing separation from the Organisation. A major revision of the knowledge management site on the OPCW intranet was conducted to ensure that the information is up to date.
- 1.74 In 2024, the Inspectorate Division continued to advance its knowledge management initiatives to support sustainable operations. Significant efforts were undertaken to ensure that all departing Group Q inspectors, as well as the fifth cohort of rehired inspectors, participated in knowledge-transfer sessions. These sessions were essential for preserving core operational expertise and skills. The Inspectorate Division also continued to compile the outcomes of knowledge-sharing and retention events into a dedicated digital repository. This repository provides long-term storage, continuous access, and sustainable preservation of explicit expert knowledge and information. Furthermore, the Inspectorate Division continued the development of the action-tracking tool, an integral component of the Continuous Improvement Platform. This tool is designed to enhance the efficient implementation of preventive and corrective actions for identified deviations and issues occurring during missions.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 97 activities and programmes benefitting some 2,765 experts from across all regions, which included online, hybrid, and in-person activities. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement four standing programmes, namely the Fellowship Programme, the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Conference Support Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme.
- 2.2 The ChemTech Centre has been further leveraged to better address States Parties' needs in terms of training and exchange of expertise. Twenty-three capacity-building activities were conducted from and at the ChemTech Centre in 2024, benefitting participants from all regions.

### **National implementation and technical assistance**

- 2.3 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to strengthen States Parties' national capacities to fully and effectively implement the Convention. A total of 846 participants from all regions took part in 22 technical assistance activities which focused on enhancing institutional capacities to meet their obligations under the Convention.

### Legislative support

- 2.4 As at 31 December 2024, of the 193 States Parties to the Convention, 164 had reported the adoption of national implementing legislation, of which 128 had legislation covering all the initial measures. A total of 36 States Parties had reported legislation covering some of the initial measures. The remaining 29 States Parties had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation and/or submit the information to the Secretariat. Detailed information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.<sup>14</sup>
- 2.5 The Secretariat reviewed draft legislation for the implementation of the Convention submitted by five States Parties: Angola in February 2024, Timor-Leste in April 2024, Tuvalu in June 2024, Sao Tome and Principe in August 2024, and Seychelles in November 2024. The Secretariat also conducted a national legislative review forum with the National Authority of Sao Tome and Principe in September 2024. The Secretariat and State Party delegates jointly reviewed the scope of their national legislative frameworks on the Convention, and the Secretariat gave advice on legislative and regulatory approaches to its implementation.
- 2.6 The Secretariat, in collaboration with Portugal, conducted a workshop for members of the National Authorities and relevant government legislative experts from eight Portuguese-speaking States Parties from 27 to 29 February 2024. Nineteen participants examined the obstacles faced by the participating States Parties in implementing the Convention through national legislation and formulated follow-up actions to address them. The event featured contributions by entities such as the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.

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<sup>14</sup> Annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention in 2024: EC-107/DG.9 C-29/DG.8 (dated 26 August 2024); EC-107/DG.10 C-29/DG.9 (dated 26 August 2024); and EC-107/DG.11 C-29/DG.10 (dated 26 August 2024)

- 2.7 The Secretariat, in collaboration with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), organised a side event at the 148th IPU Assembly in Geneva on 26 March 2024 on the role of parliamentarians in fostering global peace and security through advancing national implementation of the Convention. The event included presentations and a panel discussion on the importance of national legislation to implement the Convention, focusing on the threat posed by non-State actors and on sustainable development. The event was attended by parliamentarians from various States Parties, as well as representatives from the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.
- 2.8 A subregional workshop on advancing implementing legislation for the Convention was held from 12 to 14 March 2024 in Suva, Fiji. The event brought together 10 participants from nine selected Pacific Islands States Parties and regional counterparts, including Australia and New Zealand, to share experiences, good practices, and challenges related to the development of legislation, as well as to discuss key messages to support its adoption at the national level and conduct practical advocacy training. The workshop built upon past subregional activities to further consolidate working relationships and encourage broader regional cooperation and engagement in implementation of the Convention.
- 2.9 A regional workshop on best practices in the development of a legislative and regulatory framework on chemical security was held from 10 to 12 April 2024 in Pretoria, South Africa. The workshop provided a forum for 20 participants from 12 States Parties to share experiences in developing chemical security legislation and to discuss the roles of regulatory authorities, relevant government agencies, and other stakeholders, including the chemical industry and distributors.
- 2.10 An expert meeting on the development of a compendium of best practices for a national legislative and regulatory framework on chemical security was held from 21 to 22 October 2024 at the OPCW Main Building and the ChemTech Centre. The meeting brought together selected chemical security experts to initiate work on the compendium, which is expected to be published or made available in late 2025. During this meeting, experts defined the scope and structure of the compendium and conducted an initial review of best practices in terms of their relevance and applicability.

#### Facilitating collaborations and good practices

- 2.11 Five regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention were held in May, June, and July 2024 for all five regional groups, including, for the first time, the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). These meetings provided a platform for States Parties to exchange views on national implementation of the Convention, including Articles VI, VII, X, and XI, share good practices and challenges, and identify capacity-building priorities. Discussions covered a range of issues, including chemical security legislation, prevention of illicit chemical transfers, transfer discrepancies, and enhancing coordination with national stakeholders. The meeting also served to strengthen regional cooperation and engagement with relevant international and regional organisations.
- 2.12 From 15 to 17 October 2024, the Secretariat held the Eleventh Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention in Doha, Qatar. At the meeting, 53 participants from 28 States Parties from

all regions shared their views, experiences, good practices, and challenges related to the implementation of the Convention among personnel from National Authorities and chemical industry representatives.

- 2.13 The Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention was held from 20 to 22 November 2024 at the OPCW Main Building. National Authorities were updated on highlights and achievements of capacity-development activities. Further, the Secretariat and States Parties discussed ways to renew commitments to strengthening cooperation and increasing engagement to implement the Convention. The meeting was attended by 192 participants from 134 States Parties from all regions.
- 2.14 Five visits were conducted under the Mentorship/Partnership Programme for National Authorities. Representatives of the National Authority of India visited Kenya from 3 to 7 June 2024, followed by a return visit by representatives of the National Authority of Kenya to India from 23 to 27 September 2024. Representatives of the National Authority of Malaysia visited Sri Lanka from 24 to 28 June 2024, with the return visit by Sri Lanka's National Authority to Malaysia taking place from 21 to 25 October 2024. Representatives of the National Authority of Lebanon also visited the United States of America from 22 to 26 July 2024.

#### Strengthening technical capacities

- 2.15 To support the timely and accurate submission of annual declarations under Article VI of the Convention, an online training course for National Authorities was conducted in February and March 2024. The course, which was attended by 60 participants from 26 States Parties, raised awareness of national implementation requirements and provided practical guidance on receiving and escorting OPCW inspections.
- 2.16 A subregional workshop on preventing illicit transfers of toxic chemicals was held from 18 to 21 March 2024 at the ChemTech Centre. The workshop provided 30 customs and law enforcement officials from eight States Parties in South and Southeast Asia with knowledge and skills on tools, practices, and resources to prevent and mitigate illegal transfers. The programme featured expert presentations and interventions, tabletop exercises, and demonstrations of relevant laboratory activities and equipment.
- 2.17 Two regional workshops were convened for States Parties on the identification and resolution of issues related to transfer discrepancies. The first was held from 24 to 25 April 2024 in Seoul, the Republic of Korea, for States Parties from East and Southeast Asia, and the second from 29 to 30 October 2024 in Madrid, Spain for States Parties from WEOG and key trading partners from the Eastern European Group. The workshops provided opportunities for participants to share information with peers and technical experts, including from the WCO. The programmes included presentations, case studies, panel discussions, and group discussions, fostering networks between National Authorities.
- 2.18 A peer-to-peer training for customs training institutions, co-organised with the WCO, was conducted from 21 to 23 May 2024 in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. The training strengthened the capacity of 50 participants from 16 French-speaking African States Parties to enforce the Convention's transfers regime for scheduled chemicals. The programme focused on adult training methodologies and fostered cooperation between National Authorities and customs administrations.

- 2.19 A training of trainers course for representatives of customs training institutions and National Authorities was held from 20 to 22 August 2024 in Santiago, Chile. The course equipped 29 participants from 10 States Parties of the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) with the knowledge, skills, and tools to integrate Convention-related transfer control training into national programmes. Contributions from the WCO and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States enriched the programme.
- 2.20 A conference on enforcing effective customs control of the trade in toxic chemicals in the Pacific region was conducted from 24 to 26 September 2024 in Port Vila, Vanuatu. The event strengthened awareness among Pacific Island States Parties' customs administrations and National Authorities of the importance of the Convention for preventing the illicit trade and transits of scheduled chemicals. The conference was attended by 28 participants from 16 States Parties, including 13 Pacific Island countries, along with representatives from the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the WCO, and the Oceania Customs Organisation.
- 2.21 A workshop for customs training institutions was held from 3 to 5 December 2024 in Luanda, Angola for Portuguese-speaking States Parties. The workshop highlighted the critical role of customs officers in regulating the import and export of scheduled chemicals and introduced innovative training methodologies used by customs academy instructors to enhance the ability of customs officers to identify and implement Convention-related provisions effectively. Thirty-nine participants from 10 States Parties attended.
- 2.22 A general training course on the Convention was held from 3 to 5 December 2024 in Lima, Peru, for the National Authorities and relevant stakeholders of States Parties from GRULAC. The course strengthened the skills of National Authority personnel to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.

### **Assistance and protection**

- 2.23 In 2024, the Secretariat conducted a total of 42 capacity-building activities in partnership with States Parties and partner training centres, benefitting 1,006 first responders across multiple regions. Of these, 28 events were held in person and 14 were delivered online.
- 2.24 The Secretariat fully implemented the assistance and protection training cycle, consisting of two in person and three online courses at regional and international levels. Courses were offered in English, French, and Spanish. The online components provided information on the implementation of Article X of the Convention, including the basic principles of protection against chemical weapons and response to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. This served as preparation for more intensive, hands-on training and scenario-based exercises. Seven regional assistance and protection training cycles were delivered in Africa, Asia, GRULAC, and among Portuguese- and French-speaking States Parties. Two international cycles were also conducted, including a specialised cycle for women first responders.

- 2.25 The international training cycle for women first responders, a first of-its-kind initiative, was a key activity in the area of assistance and protection in 2024. It highlighted the efforts of the OPCW to address gender-related challenges and needs in chemical emergency preparedness, and expanded opportunities for women in a traditionally male-dominated field. The Secretariat also continued to encourage applications from women for capacity-building training and to promote the involvement of women instructors in such activities, resulting in increased female participation.
- 2.26 Following a re-evaluation of the current assistance and protection training cycle, the Secretariat introduced the Integrated Advanced Course and Exercise Pilot Project. This new approach consists of an online and in-person training course that combines the current basic and advanced courses, together with a final exercise. The new mode maintains the training cycle's objective of enhancing preparedness and response capabilities, while avoiding duplication and optimising resources and budgets. First implemented in Ecuador, the pilot will be transferred to other regions in 2025 and run in parallel with the current training cycle of the Assistance and Protection Branch.
- 2.27 The Secretariat conducted 12 specialised training courses in 2024 to address specific protection needs of States Parties. Course topics included sampling, live agent training, investigation of incidents involving toxic chemicals, and emergency response involving toxic chemicals in unconventional environments. The Secretariat also relied on its Instructor Development and Exchange Programme to support the development and delivery of in-person training.
- 2.28 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to provide assistance to Ukraine, upon its request, in the field of assistance and protection. The Secretariat delivered three sampling courses on the investigation of chemical weapons use to 60 experts at the ChemTech Centre. The specific objective of these courses was to provide participants with the theoretical knowledge and practical skills needed to competently conduct an investigation of chemical weapons use. The training, which included practical exercises, addressed the handling of digital data and the chain of custody, and provided an introduction to environmental and biomedical sampling, and familiarisation with personal protective equipment (PPE) and detection equipment. Online courses on emergency response to incidents involving toxic chemicals were also offered to 47 first responders of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. The course content covered basic theoretical knowledge for all participants on the Convention, the OPCW, Article X, chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, PPE, devices for detection, identification, and monitoring, and decontamination and sampling.
- 2.29 In addition, the Secretariat conducted TAVs to deliver detection equipment and to provide training on its use, as well as technical advice. The equipment delivered consisted of 70 LCD 3.3 and 13 FirstDefender RM Raman spectrometers. These detectors were funded from contributions totalling EUR 1.4 million from States Parties to the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X.
- 2.30 Upon a request by Seychelles, the Secretariat conducted an assistance and protection mission in line with paragraph 5 of Article X of the Convention. The Secretariat provided technical advice and support to the Seychelles authorities on, inter alia, comprehensive implementing legislation; coordination among relevant national stakeholders; and the establishment of effective command channels for chemical incident response.

- 2.31 To support States Parties in building capacity to investigate incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals, the Secretariat conducted a basic course for French-speaking African States Parties in November 2024 in Côte d'Ivoire. The course provided practical training on the fundamentals of chemical warfare agents and their effects, protective equipment, detection and decontamination equipment and procedures, and basic sampling procedures. This hands-on approach aimed to give first responders the confidence and capability to deal with potential chemical emergencies.
- 2.32 Under the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Africa Programme), further progress was made with regard to establishing and strengthening national and regional capacity to respond to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals.
- 2.33 The Secretariat organised an online course, in collaboration with the Population Protection Institute of the Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic, from 26 to 27 April 2024 to assess the teaching skills and theoretical knowledge of East African Community (EAC) instructors on specific topics related to properties and symptoms of chemical agents. The event was conducted at the ChemTech Centre.
- 2.34 In addition, the Secretariat, in collaboration with the Government of Uganda, conducted the Seventh Operational Training Course on Chemical Emergency Response in December 2024 in Uganda, benefitting 35 participants from seven States Parties from the EAC region. The training equipped participants with the knowledge and skills to safely conduct critical emergency operations and support functions following an act of chemical terrorism or the release of toxic chemicals.
- 2.35 Progress in implementation of the Medical Action Plan, which provides assistance to States Parties on medical antidotes and treatments and advice on protective measures against chemical weapons, continued towards the standardisation and harmonisation of medical training. The Secretariat organised three medical training courses: a regional course for African States Parties in June 2024 in Morocco; an international course in October 2024 in China; and a regional course for GRULAC States Parties in November 2024 in Brazil. These courses also fostered the participation of experts who will coordinate future training, which will focus on sharing experiences and harmonising medical response-related content.
- 2.36 The Secretariat conducted a consultancy meeting at the ChemTech Centre from 27 to 29 August 2024 to develop a syllabus on medical aspects related to chemical weapons, as well as to draft an academic paper for publication. The meeting brought together six experts in chemical emergency response and medical education from Brazil, Chile, Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In 2024, the Secretariat also continued to work with an international group of experts to finalise a second guidebook for medical practitioners focusing on the long-term care of victims.
- 2.37 Broader participation in the funding of the activities within the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons was encouraged in accordance with the relevant decision of the Conference (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011). At the end of 2024, the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 107,733.

- 2.38 The Online Self-Assessment Tool (OSAT) continued to assist National Authorities in evaluating the risks posed by hazardous chemicals, auditing existing response capacities, and identifying necessary improvement measures, including those that may be supported by the Secretariat. The Secretariat engaged with States Parties that are also members of both the Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC) in South-Eastern Europe and EAC, by organising capacity-building workshops on the use of OSAT. Based on lessons learned and to advance to the next phase of utilising OSAT, the Secretariat has offered the tool to help States Parties develop robust national protection plans through a risk-based needs assessment, with the support of the Secretariat upon request.
- 2.39 With respect to the collection and submission of information required under paragraph 4 and paragraph 7 of Article X, efforts were made to enhance the use of the Protection and Assistance Databank (PAD) in 2024, with the purpose of ensuring secure and efficient access for States Parties.
- 2.40 The Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,655,294, with 48 States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X.

#### **International cooperation and technological development**

- 2.41 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and facilitate international cooperation to advance the peaceful uses of chemistry. The programmes under Article XI were offered in face-to-face, hybrid, and online formats, across the three thematic areas of integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge.
- 2.42 During the year under review, 33 capacity-building programmes and events covering the three thematic areas were carried out by the Secretariat for some 913 participants.
- 2.43 The review and evaluation workshop for the “Components of an Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article XI” (C-16/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2011) continued to serve as an overarching platform to facilitate discussion and the exchange of views among States Parties and relevant stakeholders to further the full implementation of Article XI of the Convention. The ninth edition of the workshop was organised in a hybrid format on 19 November 2024 with 60 participants from 42 States Parties. It reviewed ongoing capacity-building efforts under Article XI, as well as the impact of related programmes and activities, including deliberations on progress and gaps.
- 2.44 From 29 July to 26 September 2024, the Secretariat organised the twenty-fifth edition of the OPCW Associate Programme, featuring a training segment at the OPCW Main Building covering topics such as the verification regime, the role of National Authorities, and international cooperation and assistance; a study segment at the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the development of skills in the operation of chemical plants and chemical engineering theories in industry environments; and an industry segment for hands-on exposure and training in various industrial operations. A total of 29 participants representing 29 States Parties took part in this edition of the Programme. At the end of the reporting period, the Alumni Network of the Associate Programme comprised 603 members.

- 2.45 In the area of integrated chemicals management, the Secretariat organised a series of 16 global and regional capacity-building events on chemical safety and security, 10 of which were held in person in Argentina, Costa Rica, Italy, the Netherlands, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, the United States of America, and Zambia. These events included the Associate Programme, a series of global and regional seminars focusing on chemical safety and security management, and training and e-learning events to promote safety and security standards for chemical facilities and laboratories to minimise the risk of incidents.
- 2.46 During the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to support the national capacity building of States Parties in the chemical security management field by providing practical tools and guidelines. To this end, in October 2024, the Secretariat launched the Indicative Guidelines for Safe and Secure Transport of Hazardous Chemicals by Road. The guidelines are aimed at States Parties with limited resources or small and medium enterprises. From 27 February to 1 March 2024, the Secretariat also initiated a programme for the development of “Know Your Customer” guidelines for chemical distributors and manufacturers to ensure that hazardous chemicals are not distributed for illegitimate purposes by exercising due diligence in understanding their clients.
- 2.47 Within the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, 11 training courses on the analysis of Convention-related chemicals and on OPCW proficiency testing were held in 2024. These courses were organised by laboratories from Finland, India, Spain, South Africa, and at the ChemTech Centre. This included online training on basic analytical chemistry and specialised proficiency testing. Additionally, the Secretariat organised two training courses – one in Warsaw, Poland and another at the ChemTech Centre – to equip qualified analytical chemists from laboratories that support, or plan to support, customs services or offices with practical knowledge in the analysis of Convention-related chemicals. A basic analytical chemistry course to enhance the knowledge and practical skills of female specialists in the analysis of Convention-relevant chemicals was also organised from 9 to 11 July 2024 at the ChemTech Centre.
- 2.48 Under the Laboratory Twinning and Assistance Programme, two twinning projects continued in 2024: one between Algeria (assisted laboratory) and Germany (assisting laboratory), and one between South Africa (assisted laboratory) and the Netherlands (assisting laboratory). In 2024, a new twinning project was initiated between the Forensic Science Centre of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the United States of America and the National Laboratory of Scientific and Technical Police of Morocco. These projects aim to enhance the capacity of assisted laboratories to successfully complete the OPCW proficiency tests required for OPCW designation status.
- 2.49 The Secretariat continued to further enhance the capacity of laboratories in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean. The fifth phase of the “Project on Assessing and Enhancing the Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States: Towards OPCW Designation”, funded by a voluntary contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was successfully completed in March 2024. Project activities continued to focus on building the capacity of four selected analytical laboratories seeking OPCW designation from Brazil, Chile, Kenya, and Nigeria. In October 2024, the sixth phase of the project was launched, financially supported by the United Kingdom.

- 2.50 The Secretariat, with the support of Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA) and funding from Spain, made progress under the project for establishing a network of Spanish-speaking laboratories for the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention and improving the analytical competencies of the selected laboratories. After technical scoping and evaluation and consultations, five laboratories from Argentina, Guatemala, Peru (2), and Uruguay were selected to participate in the project.
- 2.51 Within the project on “Enhancing Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African Member States”, supported by a voluntary contribution from Germany, a range of activities were implemented, including training for customs laboratories from Africa on chemical weapons-related analysis and tailored action to assist one African laboratory seeking OPCW designation.
- 2.52 Under the Equipment Exchange Programme, in 2024 the Secretariat facilitated a donation from Germany to the University of Mwenge in the United Republic of Tanzania. This was followed by the training of 15 Tanzanian experts.
- 2.53 The Secretariat continued to raise awareness and advance scientific and technical information exchange among various stakeholder groups within the thematic area of chemical knowledge promotion. From 22 to 24 October 2024, the Secretariat and the Kingdom of Morocco co-organised the “Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention” in Rabat, Morocco. This event brought together experts in artificial intelligence (AI), chemistry, the chemical industry, and policy making to examine current developments in AI in the field of chemistry and its industrial application, and to assess potential threats and opportunities that AI may pose to the implementation of the Convention.
- 2.54 As part of the Women in Chemistry initiative, the Secretariat organised two events: the Symposium on Women in Chemistry, held from 22 to 23 May 2024 in Panama City, Panama, and the Basic Analytical Chemistry Course (BACC) for female chemists, held from 9 to 11 July 2024 at the ChemTech Centre. The Symposium, supported by a voluntary contribution from France, brought together experts, scientists, and researchers from across the globe to discuss and address the challenges faced by women in science, particularly in chemistry. The aim of the BACC was to enhance the knowledge and skills of female analytical chemists in the analysis of chemical weapons-related chemicals.
- 2.55 From 8 to 11 April 2024, the Secretariat organised the Education Training Programme on the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry for Youth in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in collaboration with the National Authority of Brazil and with financial support from the European Union. The training aimed to raise awareness and promote the peaceful use of chemistry among youth, especially young academics and researchers in chemistry, chemical engineering, and other chemical science-related fields.
- 2.56 Under the Fellowship Programme, the Secretariat facilitates the exchange of scientific and technical information between institutions, while supporting scientific research and strengthening institutions in the targeted countries through capacity building and facilitating international cooperation in science. Six fellowships were completed in 2024: one from Argentina (hosted in France), two from Cameroon (hosted in France and Italy); one from Sri Lanka (hosted in Sweden); one from the United Republic of Tanzania (hosted in Germany); and one from Uganda (hosted in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

- 2.57 Under the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Secretariat supports small-scale research projects in States Parties to help promote the development of scientific and technical knowledge in chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes relevant to the Convention. As at the end of 2024, the Secretariat continued to support 20 ongoing research projects.
- 2.58 Under the Conference Support Programme, the Secretariat provided sponsorship for participation in 11 international scientific events held in Argentina, Italy (2), Malaysia, Mauritius (online), Nigeria, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand (2), and Uruguay which accommodated 143 scientists.
- 2.59 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to attach importance to enhancing capacity-building needs assessments for the delivery of relevant and effective programmes in chemical safety and security management. To solicit enhanced feedback and streamline the subsequent information analysis, the Secretariat circulated a modified and updated survey questionnaire to better focus on States Parties' needs in capacity building as well as tools and guidelines in relevant areas. Responses were received from 51 States Parties and, following a fuller analysis, the findings were used to inform the ongoing programmes and activities.
- 2.60 The approach and techniques of programme review and lessons-learned were further institutionalised during the reporting period. In 2024, the Secretariat conducted a review of the Laboratory Twinning and Assistance Programme. The Programme has been operational since 2020, following the merger of two previous initiatives: the Laboratory Assistance Programme and the Laboratory Twinning Initiative. This combined programme maintains the fundamental principles and activities of its predecessors, while also expanding opportunities for participation and providing greater support to assisted laboratories. The lessons and findings have helped in informing and enhancing the planned delivery of courses in 2025 and beyond.

### **The Africa Programme**

- 2.61 In 2024, the implementation of the sixth phase of the Africa Programme (2023-2025) progressed, with 67 capacity-building events and support activities organised during the year by the Secretariat, benefitting some 750 participants from 44 African States Parties. These activities included 37 activities organised specifically for the Africa region.
- 2.62 The focus of activities ranged from enhancing national implementation of the Convention to improving controls over cross-border transfers of scheduled chemicals, to developing assistance and protection capabilities against chemical emergencies, to advancing chemical safety and security management, to upgrading laboratory competencies across the continent, and to promoting the development of knowledge of peaceful chemistry and its exchange.
- 2.63 In terms of advancing national implementation of the Convention, intensified efforts were deployed by the Secretariat in 2024 to assist Portuguese-speaking African States Parties develop and enhance their national legislations. Special focus was also given to assisting several individual States Parties, namely Angola, Kenya, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles.

- 2.64 Two new capacity-building initiatives were launched in 2024 specifically for African States Parties, namely a training cycle on the investigation of chemical emergencies for law enforcement agencies, and a training course on laboratory equipment maintenance.
- 2.65 A major achievement in 2024 was the attainment in April of OPCW designation status for the analysis of authentic environmental samples by the National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology of the Gendarmerie Nationale of Algeria (INCC/GN). The Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection of Germany (WIS) and the Finnish Institute for the Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), through established OPCW capacity-building support programmes, were key partners in this achievement. With the designation of INCC/GN, Africa now has a designated laboratory for the first time since 2006—a key objective of the sixth phase of the Africa Programme. OPCW designated laboratories are now present in each of the regional groups of the OPCW.
- 2.66 Activities conducted under the Africa Programme continued to be funded through the OPCW regular budget, with additional voluntary contributions used to further achieve the objectives of the Programme. In this connection, the Secretariat made significant progress in implementing the first batch of seven extrabudgetary projects under the Africa Programme. By the end of 2024, six of the seven projects had been delivered. Implementation of the remaining project “Strengthening mitigation and preparedness to respond to chemical incidents and attacks in French-speaking West African States Parties to the CWC” was progressing rapidly.
- 2.67 Building on this progress, the Secretariat developed a new set of extrabudgetary project proposals in 2024. Ten special projects, with a total estimated budget of nearly EUR 2.5 million, were designed. They address the three overarching areas of needs defined by African States Parties for the Africa Programme: strengthening control over transfers of toxic chemicals on the continent; boosting response capacities against chemical incidents and attacks, including by terrorists; and developing capacities of African laboratories, including for the analysis of biotoxins. As part of resource mobilisation efforts for these projects, the Secretariat organised an information session for all States Parties on 5 July 2024, during which the projects were presented and voluntary contributions called for. The Secretariat continues its efforts to secure the necessary funding and support for these projects.
- 2.68 Cooperation with a variety of partners continued throughout the year to organise activities and explore new synergies and initiatives within the Programme’s framework. The partners include relevant national, regional, and international organisations.
- 2.69 The African Union (AU) Commission for Political Affairs, Peace and Security has been kept abreast of developments under the Programme. Interactions with the Commission have been ongoing with a view to revitalising cooperation between the OPCW and the AU, building on the outcome of the 2023 visit to the OPCW by H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.
- 2.70 The Secretariat has continued to maintain and develop the OPCW Africa Network. The Network, which currently has over 1,250 members, including African chemistry professionals and other stakeholders, serves as a platform for networking, knowledge exchange, and professional opportunities related to the Convention and the peaceful uses of chemistry.

- 2.71 The Africa Programme Steering Committee continued to monitor and support Programme implementation in 2024. The Committee members for 2024 included Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Committee observers (donors to the Programme) included Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.
- 2.72 The Steering Committee, chaired by H.E. Ambassador Madeleine Liguemoh Ondoua of Cameroon, met in June and November 2024, and reviewed recent developments in the Programme and commended the progress and the results achieved.

### 3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

#### Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.1 The Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference took place from 25 to 29 November 2024, and was attended by representatives of 152 States Parties, a signatory State, one non-signatory State, and six international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. A total of 118 NGOs and three bodies representing the global chemical industry and scientific community also registered to attend.
- 3.2 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 27 November 2024.
- 3.3 The Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Session reviewed the status of implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, including: chemical disarmament; destruction-related issues; national implementation measures; assistance and protection; international cooperation; the activities of the ABEO; and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. States Parties discussed a report covering the activities carried out under the auspices of the Africa Programme, and considered progress made regarding the efforts of the OPCW to engage with the chemical industry and the scientific community.
- 3.4 The following decisions were among those adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Session:<sup>15</sup>
- (a) Participation of the OPCW in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund (C-29/DEC.9, dated 25 November 2024);
  - (b) Amendments to the Financial Regulations and Rules of the OPCW (C-29/DEC.10, dated 25 November 2024);
  - (c) Revised Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2025” (C-29/DEC.11, dated 25 November 2024);
  - (d) Appointment of the External Auditor (C-29/DEC.6, dated 25 November 2024); and
  - (e) Rehiring of Inspectors (C-29/DEC.8, dated 25 November 2024).

#### Activities of the Executive Council

- 3.5 In 2024, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
- 3.6 The Chairperson of the Council, the Director-General, and other representatives of the Council, conducted a visit to the Mudanjiang excavation and recovery sites, Heilongjiang Province, and to the Haerbaling destruction facility, Jilin Province, China, from 18 to 22 September 2024 (EC-107/2, dated 3 October 2024, and EC-108/3, dated 27 February 2025).

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<sup>15</sup> Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.

3.7 The Council also:

- (a) reviewed progress in decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
- (b) discussed the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
- (c) reviewed the work of the DAT;
- (d) discussed two reports of the FFM (S/2254/2024, dated 22 February 2024, and S/2295/2024, dated 11 June 2024);
- (e) reviewed progress in the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 and received one report of the IIT (S/2255/2024, dated 22 February 2024);
- (f) approved an arrangement and an agreed detailed plan for verification between the OPCW and a State Party;
- (g) adopted two decisions on lists of newly validated data on scheduled chemicals (EC-105/DEC.1, dated 5 March 2024; and EC-107/DEC.1, dated 8 October 2024); two decisions on lists of newly validated data on non-scheduled chemicals relevant to the Convention (EC-105/DEC.2, dated 5 March 2024; and EC-107/DEC.2, dated 8 October 2024) for inclusion in the OCAD; and a decision on lists of approved data recommended for removal from the OCAD (EC-107/DEC.3, dated 8 October 2024);
- (h) considered the work done in the context of the Africa Programme;
- (i) considered the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) for 2023 (EC-106/DG.6 C-29/DG.3, dated 24 April 2024);
- (j) adopted a decision entitled “Implementation of the Action Plan on Geographical Representation” (EC-105/DEC.3, dated 7 March 2024);
- (k) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters; and
- (l) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Session.

**Activities of subsidiary bodies**

- 3.8 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (the Confidentiality Commission) held its Twenty-Sixth Meeting from 15 to 17 May 2024 (CC-26/1, dated 17 May 2024).
- 3.9 The ABAF held its Fifty-Sixth Session from 4 to 6 June 2024 (ABAF-56/1, dated 6 June 2024) and its Fifty-Seventh Session from 23 to 25 July 2024 (ABAF-57/1, dated 25 July 2024).
- 3.10 The SAB held its Thirty-Eighth Session from 27 to 31 May 2024 (SAB-38/1, dated 31 May 2024).

- 3.11 The ABEO held its Sixteenth Session from 16 to 18 April 2024 (ABEO-16/1, dated 18 April 2024) and its Seventeenth Session from 11 to 13 June 2024 (ABEO-17/1, dated 13 June 2024).
- 3.12 The Acting Chairperson of the Council, H.E. Ambassador Salima Abdelhak of Algeria, reported to the Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Session on the status of the work of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.

**Activities of the Secretariat to improve the support to the policy-making organs**

- 3.13 To improve the support to the policy-making organs, the Secretariat:
- (a) further upgraded the OPCW external server, Catalyst, to facilitate access to national statements related to particular sessions; and
  - (b) introduced a new conference registration portal, “iMeet”, which is designed to facilitate attendance registration, speakers list registration, and statement submission, as well as to provide practical information on sessions and meetings of the Council and the Conference; and
  - (c) continued to apply the informal consultations process as a procedure to consider non-contentious agenda items in pre-session mode, as well as a best practice tool that boosts the efficient and timely management of Conference and Council sessions.

## 4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### Universality

- 4.1 In 2024, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2024. The Secretariat maintained its practice of inviting representatives of States not Party and the signatory State to participate in selected OPCW activities, including the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference. During the reporting period, the Secretariat also made use of various opportunities to engage with representatives of States not Party, including in The Hague and in the margins of international conferences and meetings.
- 4.3 With respect to the signatory State, the Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of Israel in the Netherlands throughout the year. A delegation of Israel attended the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference, and the Ambassador of Israel delivered a statement at the Conference.
- 4.4 The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of South Sudan to the Benelux Countries and the European Union. In June 2024, a representative of South Sudan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Juba participated as an observer in the Twenty-Second Meeting of National Authorities from African States Parties, held in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The Ambassador of South Sudan attended the Briefing for Delegations based outside The Hague, held on 13 November 2024 in Brussels, Belgium. A delegation from South Sudan also attended the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference.
- 4.5 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with representatives of States not Party, the signatory State, senior officials of States Parties, and in his interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

### External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.6 Throughout 2024, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to meet with high-level officials of States Parties from all regional groups, as well as senior officials of other international organisations, hosting 20 such visits at the OPCW Main Building.
- 4.7 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as to enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.
- 4.8 The Director-General met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands to discuss matters pertaining to the implementation of the Agreement between the Organisation and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters of the OPCW, signed at The Hague on 22 May 1997.

### Visits and briefings by the Director-General and Deputy Director-General

- 4.9 During the year the Director-General visited Belgium, China, France, Germany, Morocco, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. During these visits he met with high-level government officials, including ministers and vice-ministers. The Director-General also addressed diverse audiences, including representatives of the scientific community, government agencies, and the chemical industry.
- 4.10 The Director-General further addressed a number of events throughout the year, including the Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction, held in Berlin, Germany; the Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Convention in Rabat, Morocco; and the European Union Non-proliferation and Disarmament Conference 2024.
- 4.11 In 2024, the Deputy Director-General accompanied the Director-General on his visits to Belgium and Morocco.

### **Protocol and privileges and immunities support**

- 4.12 The External Relations Division continued to provide protocol services to senior management and other members of the Secretariat. Additionally, the Division continued to administer the privileges and immunities of the Organisation and its staff under the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. In all, 27 Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2024.

### **OPCW–The Hague Award**

- 4.13 In 2024, the recipients of the OPCW–The Hague Award were Algeria’s National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology of the National Gendarmerie (NICC/NG), and the Indian Chemical Council.

### **Other activities**

- 4.14 The Twenty-Fourth Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel was convened on 13 September 2024. A total of 116 delegates registered to attend. The Workshop provided comprehensive briefings on various aspects of the implementation of the Convention and the organisational operation of the OPCW.
- 4.15 On 20 and 21 September 2024, the OPCW hosted 25 fellows of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme for a two-day programme at the OPCW Main Building. The programme included briefings by experts from the Secretariat and equipment demonstrations. This was the twenty-fifth edition of the programme to visit the OPCW.
- 4.16 On 3 November 2024, the Director-General gave a briefing to Permanent Representatives based outside The Hague. The briefing was attended by Permanent Representatives and other diplomatic personnel based in Brussels, Belgium. The delegates were from 23 States Parties.

## **Public affairs and media profile**

### Public outreach

- 4.17 The OPCW participated in The Hague International Open Day on 22 September 2024. Due to construction at the OPCW Main Building, the Secretariat represented the OPCW at the ‘Humanity Hub’ in The Hague, where it hosted two interactive presentations for public visitors on the Convention and the work of the OPCW.
- 4.18 During the reporting period, the Secretariat organised 84 outreach events through the OPCW Group Visits Programme, reaching a total of 2,197 participants. In response to the increased visiting demands, the Friday Visits Programme was launched in 2024 as a new initiative to host multiple groups simultaneously. The programme received an overwhelming welcome from public audiences.
- 4.19 In 2024, OPCW completed the translation of six OPCW Basics videos into Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish. The videos are available on the OPCW website for streaming and download, as well as on the OPCW YouTube channel, and can be used freely by OPCW stakeholders across the globe as outreach tools.

### Civil society outreach

- 4.20 Following on from the Fifth Review Conference, the States Parties conducted a year-long process of informal open-ended consultations on the topics related to civil society engagement, culminating in a report presented by the co-facilitators, Costa Rica and Germany, at the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference. The informal consultations carried out a stocktaking of past and current practices of engagement with civil society, followed by discussions on possible options to facilitate and broaden this engagement. Respective recommendations, including improving the process of accreditation of NGOs to the sessions of the Conference, were set out in its final report.

### *T.M.C. Asser Institute*

- 4.21 As a traditional joint project with the OPCW, the fourteenth edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute’s Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction took place from 30 September to 4 October 2024. A total of 36 early- and mid-career professionals from 26 States Parties participated, increasing their knowledge of the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The Deputy Director-General addressed the programme participants. The OPCW, with financial support from the European Union, awarded scholarships for the programme to two female participants, one from Poland and one from Ukraine.

### *Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference of the States Parties*

- 4.22 A total of 118 civil society organisations received approval to participate in the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference. Participating civil society organisations held side events and delivered 14 statements in the plenary on topics relevant to the Convention. Thanks to support from the European Union, the OPCW was able to provide financial support to two participants of civil society from countries with developing economies or economies in transition.

Digital platforms

- 4.23 The Secretariat manages the Organisation’s website ‘opcw.org’, as well as several social media channels. In 2024, the Secretariat’s digital audiences continued to increase according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Overall, the OPCW social media platforms experienced a combined growth rate of 8% in 2024.

**TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH**

<b>Social Media</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>Change 2023/2024</b>
Facebook followers	22,087	23,083	4.5%
X followers	39,055	39,483	1%
YouTube followers	2,942	3,387	15.1%
LinkedIn followers	33,579	39,546	17.8%

- 4.24 Changes in corporate policies at ‘X’ in 2024 continued to reshape user behaviour and platform dynamics. As a result, overall user activity on X declined, reflecting broader industry trends rather than a shift in the engagement strategy of the OPCW for this channel.
- 4.25 The Secretariat’s social media strategy ensures that posts and campaigns are designed to increase awareness and to enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention.
- 4.26 In 2024, the OPCW social media platforms highlighted key milestones, including the call for nominations for the OPCW-The Hague Award, and extensive coverage of the Conference, keeping stakeholders informed on major decisions. The Organisation also marked important international observances, such as the International Day of Women and Girls in Science, and the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare, using dedicated campaigns to raise awareness. Through these initiatives, the OPCW reinforced its commitment to transparency, engagement, and global outreach.

## **5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION**

### **Administrative and budgetary matters**

- 5.1 In 2024, the Secretariat implemented the first year of the 2024-2025 Programme and Budget, following historically high inflationary pressures during 2022 and 2023, primarily with regard to extraordinary in-year increases in utility and staff remuneration costs. While the Organisation successfully mitigated the impact of these inflationary pressures during the 2022-2023 biennium, such temporary measures were not sustainable over the longer term. The 2024–2025 Biennium Programme and Budget, approved by the Conference at its Twenty-Eighth Session (C-28/DEC.9, dated 29 November 2023), included an increase to adjust for over a decade of lost purchasing power due to inflation. This allowed the Secretariat to place its operations on a more sustainable financial footing, particularly by rebasing actual staffing costs with adjustments for inflation.
- 5.2 Additionally, in 2024 the Organisation prepared a revision of the Programme and Budget for 2025 to address the impact of bringing the OPCW Provident Fund accounts under direct Secretariat management following the discontinuance of pension management services by the external service provider, the pending physical security requirements of the OPCW Main Building, and replenishment of the special funds used for major capital replacement.
- 5.3 Throughout 2024, the Administration Division continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation’s cash situation, providing monthly updates to States Parties on the financial position, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. The collection rate for 2024 assessed contributions remained strong reaching 94.6%. In addition, the Organisation recovered EUR 3.3 million in assessed contributions in arrears, equivalent to 46% of the outstanding assessed contributions as at 31 December 2023.
- 5.4 The 2023 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in April 2024 (EC-107/DG.12 C-29/DG.11, dated 27 August 2024). Both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2023 Financial Statements of the OPCW included a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting key financial trends and issues of importance to the Organisation.
- 5.5 In September 2024, the Administration Division successfully assumed direct management of the OPCW Provident Fund, following a decision by the Organisation’s service provider to divest itself of its pension and provident fund management services. In parallel, the Division took all necessary steps to prepare the OPCW for joining the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF) from 1 January 2025.
- 5.6 The General Support Services and Facilities Management Sections continued to play a crucial role in supporting daily operations of the OPCW by providing a wide range of essential services, including building maintenance and management; facilities support services; cafeteria operations; cleaning and waste management; transportation and fleet management; shipments and removal of household goods; travel facilitation; visa and travel documentation services; conference and meeting infrastructure support; audio-visual support; asset and property management; office and other supplies, insurances; procurement administration; mail and courier services; as well as supplier and contract management in general.

- 5.7 In close cooperation with the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS), the entrance area of the OPCW Headquarters Main Building was upgraded, significantly improving the security of the premises. Furthermore, the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system of the server rooms was upgraded, providing improved performance and sustainability.
- 5.8 Continuous efforts were made to reduce energy consumption in the OPCW Headquarters Main Building, including the installation of energy-saving light bulbs wherever feasible.
- 5.9 The Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 19.1 million in 2024. This amount was achieved through 314 contracts or purchase orders amounting to EUR 16.6 million, and 820 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low-value procurements), totalling EUR 2.5 million.
- 5.10 Throughout 2024, the Human Resources Branch (HRB) focused on strengthening workforce development, integrity, inclusivity, and employer attractiveness by launching and completing a variety of initiatives. To reinforce OPCW hiring practices, the Secretariat, through the HRB, joined the United Nations ClearCheck programme, which is a United Nations system-wide initiative aimed at preventing the hiring of individuals with substantiated allegations of sexual misconduct. In tandem, the HRB expanded its roster of external investigators to ensure timely action as well as rigorous, impartial handling of formal complaints. In support of efforts to ensure that our workforce is composed of nationals from as many States Parties as possible, the HRB participated in seven talent outreach events in regions with fewer nationals in the Secretariat workforce.
- 5.11 The work of the Information Services Branch (ISB) in 2024 was focused on the rollout of additional and timely major improvements to many systems used both by staff members and external stakeholders. The improvements were varied, but all were connected to the core IT strategy focused on systems that are secure, resilient, and agile.
- 5.12 The biggest IT infrastructure achievement in 2024 was the rollout of “Citadel”, the next generation on-premise network of the OPCW. Representing one of the largest shifts in critical data management within the Organisation, the transition to Citadel was completed on schedule in December 2024 without disruption to business. A key area of focus in 2024 was the replacement of the OPCW telecommunications system with a modern, flexible solution designed to support a mobile workforce. This involved a change of supplier of internet connectivity, a new mobile telephony contract, and migration to a new hybrid telephone system. Lastly, the ISB also continued its focus on data and analytics by migrating to the new Power BI platform. This system, along with a new data architecture, is the foundation for expanded capabilities in data analysis and reporting.

### **Internal oversight**

- 5.13 In 2024, the OIO continued to implement its Strategic Master Plan for 2020 to 2025,<sup>16</sup> which had been approved by the Director-General in 2020 after due consideration by the ABAF. The Master Plan establishes the strategic objectives of the OIO, which are focused on three key pillars/drivers—people, processes, and technology—to enable the OIO to add value to the Organisation and to keep its services fit for purpose.
- 5.14 The OIO conducted several audits and evaluations in 2024, including: Audit of Contract Management; Audit of the use of Direct Purchase Orders for procurement; Audit of Education Grant and Travel; and Evaluation of Risk Management.
- 5.15 In accordance with the requirements of OPCW Financial Rule 12.2.02 and paragraph 2.7 of the OIO Charter, the OIO investigates reported allegations of potential violations of the OPCW Financial Regulations and Rules and directives issued thereunder, and the relevant Staff Regulations and Rules and directives; alleged waste, fraud, and mismanagement of OPCW resources; and where required, alleged misconduct or wrongdoing by OPCW staff, non-staff personnel, and third parties. The results of these fact-finding activities are transmitted to the Director-General, together with supporting evidence, to guide OPCW Management in deciding on administrative, disciplinary, or other actions to be taken, as appropriate.
- 5.16 In 2024, the OIO closed one investigation on alleged unsatisfactory conduct. Additionally, one new allegation of breaches of the OPCW Financial Rules and Regulations was reported during the year. A pre-assessment was conducted, and an investigation was commenced during the year.
- 5.17 On 9 December 2024, the new OPCW Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Policy was approved. The purpose of the policy is to provide clear guidance for preventing fraud and corruption within the OPCW and to establish robust controls to effectively mitigate these risks. Additionally, the investigation function hosted the third Global Compliance Week and the second edition of Fraud Awareness Week at the Secretariat. Activities included a compliance competition, a webinar on fraud prevention, a series of podcasts, and concluded with an awards ceremony to recognise staff participation in anti-fraud initiatives.
- 5.18 The fraud and corruption awareness e-learning course was made mandatory for OPCW personnel with the aim of further strengthening internal controls and promoting ethical practices within the Secretariat. It covers the latest tools and approaches for identifying and mitigating fraudulent activity, drawing on practical case studies and best practices in anti-fraud strategies. As at 31 December 2024, over 80% of staff had successfully completed the training.
- 5.19 The OIO managed the Quality Management System (QMS) by performing four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and conducted management reviews of accredited areas. These activities enabled the OPCW to maintain certification in the accredited processes. As a result of the four audits, core areas of activity subject to accreditation have been audited. These audits

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<sup>16</sup> The Strategic Master Plan originally covered the period 2020 to 2024, but was extended until 2025.

have resulted in four findings aimed at further improving the QMS. All of the findings are subject to a dedicated follow-up exercise in line with accredited standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

- 5.20 The Dutch accreditation body, the Raad voor Accreditatie (RvA), carried out a full assessment against ISO/IEC 17025:2017 and ISO/IEC 17043:2010 on 3 and 4 April 2024 at the ChemTech Centre (ref. L338/PT11-C05.2). A minor non-conformity was identified. It was noted that the cross-reference lists in Annexes 1 and 2 of document QDOC/LAB/QM did not accurately correspond to the OIO quality documents for certain clauses of ISO/IEC 17025. As of the reporting date, the auditee had addressed this issue by reviewing and updating the cross-reference table in the LAB Quality Manual. The revised Quality Manual (QDOC/LAB/QM Issue 7 Version 0) was issued on 10 July 2024. The RvA reviewed this remedial action and deemed it sufficient, closing the non-conformity. The next RvA assessment is scheduled for September 2025.
- 5.21 The QMS Internal Auditor course took place from 29 to 31 October 2024, with 12 Secretariat staff members completing it. The course focused on the basic understanding of ISO/IEC Standard 17043:2023, as well as the requirements of ISO 9001:2015 and ISO/IEC 17025:2017. Part of the course was devoted to guidelines for auditing quality systems and qualification criteria for auditors, with reference to ISO 19011:2018. The course meets the requirements of the International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA).
- 5.22 During the reporting period, the OIO continued to conduct its audits in conformity with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors–United States of America. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for Evaluation were also observed.
- 5.23 During the reporting period, OIO staff continued to provide advice through their participation as observers at meetings of various committees, such as the Committee on Contracts, the Investment Committee, the IT Strategy Advisory Committee, the IT Steering Committee, the Risk Management Committee, the Data Protection Committee, the Business Continuity Steering Group, the Verification IT Application Steering Committee, and the QMS Technical Committee, in addition to providing advice to the Diversity and Inclusion Network and Gender Focal Points volunteers.
- 5.24 In 2024, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in its audit and evaluation reports, assessing the actions taken by management in response. The cumulative implementation rate of the audit and evaluation recommendations issued over the past five years was 66.4%. The outcomes of follow-up exercises were reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the annual summary report of the OIO. To facilitate timely follow-up of recommendations, the OIO used a SharePoint-based “Audit Tracker” tool and an “Audilytics” dashboard for reporting purposes. The implementation of the audit and evaluation recommendations of the OIO contributed to enhancing compliance with existing regulations and procedures, further strengthening internal controls and improving resources allocation and the effectiveness of programmes and policies.

- 5.25 In 2024, the OIO organised virtual training on risk management for Secretariat staff. This included one advanced risk management training session for directors, branch heads, risk owners, and other staff that support risk management activities (attended by 43 participants) on “Navigating the risks of Artificial Intelligence”. During the year, the OIO launched a new e-learning training course on the Risk Management Framework in accordance with Administrative Directive AD/ADM/33/Rev.1 (dated 29 December 2021). This training module has been undertaken by 116 staff, including directors and branch heads. Accordingly, from 2022 to 2024, the OIO has provided risk management training to a total of 351 participants. This training has helped to raise awareness of the importance of embedding risk management into the Secretariat’s operations and to improve the understanding of the Risk Management Framework and methodology. The OIO staff also participated in a United Nation Representatives of Internal Audit Services-organised workshop held in June 2024 on “Common approaches and methodologies for ERM audit and maturity assessment”.
- 5.26 In 2024, the OIO continued to promote initiatives to make the best use of available IT tools to improve its internal processes and methodologies. The OIO made progress in the full use of the IDEA data analytics software to facilitate the analysis of data for audit purposes and with the objective of implementing continuous auditing. This objective has been set in the OIO Strategy for 2020 to 2025.

#### **Legal affairs**

- 5.27 In 2024, the Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO) provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.28 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the rules of procedure of the policy-making organs; negotiation of international agreements, including agreements on privileges and immunities, voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements, inter alia, with designated laboratories and with national and international agencies on the conduct of training and other activities; cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations; administrative policies and procedures, including the formulation and interpretation of the OPCW Staff Regulations and interim Staff Rules and other administrative issuances, as well as procurement practices, policies, and procedures; financial questions, including those concerning commercial contracts for the procurement of goods and services, also in relation to the OPCW Main Building and the ChemTech Centre. The LAO further represented the OPCW before administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial bodies, including the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation. In addition, the LAO provided legal support in the process of the admission of the OPCW to membership in the UNJSPF. The LAO has continued serving in the function of Personal Data Protection Officer and acts as the focal point for internal and external questions and requests in relation to the Secretariat processing of personal data.
- 5.29 The Secretariat registered 51 international agreements in 2024 and 11 amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8 to this report).

## **Strategy and policy**

### Follow-up process to the Fifth Review Conference

- 5.30 The Office of Strategy and Policy provided advice related to the follow-up process to the Fifth Review Conference, focusing on a set of topics where a general convergence of views was observed during the Conference. These topics included the contribution of the Convention to global anti-terrorism efforts, geographical distribution and tenure flexibility, and industry regime adaptation.

### Countering chemical terrorism

- 5.31 In 2024, the OEWG-T remained the primary platform for States Parties to interact with international experts and exchange views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. In 2024, the Secretariat supported the convening of three OEWG-T meetings.
- 5.32 The focus of discussions in the OEWG-T in 2024 was on the activities of international and regional organisations to prevent and counter chemical terrorism, the importance of capacity building in addressing the evolving threat landscape of chemical terrorism, cooperation with other international organisations and stakeholders, monitoring and assessment mechanisms for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) threats, and follow-up activities for the OEWG-T tabletop exercise held in 2023. The meetings of the OEWG-T were held on 26 February, 11 July, and 10 October 2024. All were chaired by H.E. Ambassador Vusimuzi Philemon Madonsela of South Africa.
- 5.33 As follow-up to the November 2023 tabletop exercise, in 2024 the OEWG-T developed an Action Plan to enhance the prevention, response to, and investigation of chemical terrorism incidents. The plan focused on capacity building, continuous threat assessment, engagement with technological advancements, international collaboration, and information sharing. At the July 2024 OEWG-T meeting, participants endorsed the plan. By October 2024, the implementation of the Action Plan was underway, with a focus on capacity-building activities, policy exercises, and partnerships.
- 5.34 In 2024, the OPCW continued to actively participate in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it became a signatory in 2018. Under the Compact's auspices, the Organisation acts as a Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, which is chaired by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The Working Group met four times on a quarterly basis in 2024 to coordinate efforts, share novel analysis and research, and seek the expert support and engagement of its members, as well as receive briefings from regional and other organisations.
- 5.35 The Secretariat and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) continued to collaborate in strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and to offer practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control. In 2024, the Secretariat contributed to regional and national workshops organised by the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee, UNODC, and UNODA in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, where it highlighted the relevant obligations under the Convention.

### Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.36 The OPCW continued engagement with the global chemical industry, a key stakeholder in the implementation of the Convention. Throughout the reporting period, the Secretariat facilitated dialogue between National Authorities and the chemical industry, and also held regular consultations with the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) and the International Chemical Trade Association (ICTA). During the reporting period, the sixteenth meeting of the Chemical Industry Coordination Group took place. Participants discussed issues such as current trends and challenges in the global chemical industry, and exchanged information on capacity-development activities, focusing on cybersecurity and the promotion of best practices in the area of chemical safety and security.
- 5.37 In 2024, representatives of ICCA and ICTA participated in a number of the Secretariat's activities. The Director-General submitted a Note entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" to the Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Session (C-29/DG.15, dated 14 November 2024), which provided a detailed account of OPCW engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The Note covers activities related to verification, education and outreach, national implementation of the Convention, and chemical safety and security.

### Education and outreach

- 5.38 The ABEO held two in-person sessions in 2024, from 16 to 18 April and from 11 to 13 June. In April 2024, the ABEO Chairperson participated in the education and training programme for youth on the peaceful uses of chemistry, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Furthermore, on 27 November 2024, the ABEO Chairperson and Professor Lijun Shang, Director of the Biological Security Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, co-hosted a joint side event in the margins of the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference. The event focused on progress in chemical and biological security education, and was attended by representatives of States Parties, the chemical industry, academic institutions, and NGOs. In June 2024, the ABEO delivered a briefing to the States Parties to update them on its activities and future priorities. During the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference, the ABEO Chairperson delivered a statement on the Board's work and future priorities.
- 5.39 The ABEO conducted multiple activities in 2024 related to education and raising awareness about the OPCW and the Convention. The Board continued to provide advice on academic resources and the development of partnerships with academia. It also worked on a core syllabus, including links to educational resources, for educators wishing to start a course on the Convention and the OPCW. In addition, the ABEO updated its Strategic Plan to align its priorities with the strategic goals of the OPCW.
- 5.40 A call for nominations to the ABEO was issued in January 2024 to replace members concluding their second term of office at the end of the year S/2239/2024\* (dated 19 January 2024). A Note by the Director-General on the membership of the Board was submitted to the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference (C-29/DG.14, dated 8 November 2024).

## **Confidentiality and security**

- 5.41 During 2024, the OCS continued its efforts to improve the level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, assets, and information based on the United Nations minimum security standards and international best practice. The OCS continued to use a data-driven and risk-based approach aligned with the organisational risk appetite.
- 5.42 After the OPCW Main Building intrusion on 3 December 2021, the OCS completed a comprehensive security risk assessment which outlined all required security measures to increase security at the OPCW Main Building to lower the risks to an acceptable level, and to meet the United Nations minimum standards. In 2024, the security upgrade of the entrance lobby of the OPCW Main Building was completed, with a secure compartment featuring new turnstiles, doors, and floor-to-ceiling glass panels. Additional and gradual hardening of the Main Building access points will continue in 2025.
- 5.43 The remaining physical security requirements to ensure full compliance with United Nations minimum security standards will need an investment of EUR 6 million. These will include upgrades to the Front Guard House and main gates, as well as replacement of the perimeter fence and intrusion detection capability. The revised Programme and Budget for 2025 includes the reallocation of EUR 3 million from the 2022 Cash Surplus to the Special Fund for Cybersecurity, Business Continuity, and Physical Infrastructure Security to finance the upgrades to the Front Guard House and the Main Gates.
- 5.44 The Secretariat remains in contact with the Host Country regarding the EUR 3 million for the replacement of the perimeter fence and intrusion detection capability. While a EUR 1 million contribution has been agreed, the Secretariat will continue discussions on the remaining funding. In parallel, the Secretariat has started the process of designing security solutions based on available funding and will decide on solutions in 2025 once greater clarity on funding, design options, and costs have been obtained.
- 5.45 Following the provision of additional budgetary resources at the end of 2023, the procurement of equipment to improve the resistance levels of the OPCW Main Building access points was completed in 2024. Additionally, the synchronisation of physical security management systems at the Main Building and the ChemTech Centre was also completed, ensuring greater resilience and readiness in case of serious incidents at either location.
- 5.46 In 2024, the OPCW continued to address challenges in managing the protection of confidential and sensitive information within existing resources. To strengthen the Organisation's cybersecurity posture, the network is being continuously monitored to detect and respond to potential threats. In line with established best practices, detection rules were regularly enhanced and refined in 2024 to address emerging risks, ensuring the highest level of protection for our critical assets and sensitive information.
- 5.47 As part of the Organisation's ongoing efforts to enhance cybersecurity and safeguard critical assets, a Privileged Access Governance tool was implemented in 2024. The tool strengthens access controls by ensuring that privileged accounts are managed, monitored and governed in accordance with the need-to-know principle.

- 5.48 The OCS continued to observe and track a high volume of cyberattacks (phishing and malware). Consistent with trends in 2023, attacks in 2024 demonstrated a high degree of sophistication and specific targeting of OPCW staff. In addition to maintaining staff awareness and vigilance, the OCS continued to monitor and investigate these attacks and to ensure that system monitoring tools remained optimised.
- 5.49 In 2024, the number of incidents involving errors in the handling of confidential information by States Parties decreased from 25 to 10. This reduction followed training delivered by the OCS at regional meetings of the National Authorities in 2024. The OCS also continued to provide ongoing training on physical security, information security, and confidentiality to Secretariat staff and third-party suppliers. In addition to the routine training programme, the OCS also delivered additional training to all staff on the new Information Classification Policy, which came into effect in 2024. The main purpose of the policy is to improve the security and protection of unclassified information routinely processed across the Secretariat.
- 5.50 As part of ongoing efforts to strengthen business continuity, the OCS facilitated further meetings of both the Business Continuity Steering Group and Working Group in 2024 in its capacity as Secretary. Many division- and branch-specific business continuity plans were completed. However, the embedding of business continuity into routine practices is an ongoing process that requires a designated business continuity resource within the Secretariat. In 2024, the OCS also supported the annual meeting of the Confidentiality Commission, during which members debated the continuity of work of the Commission under extraordinary circumstances.

### **Health and safety**

- 5.51 All health and safety incidents reported in 2024 were of a minor nature, with no serious injuries or work-related illnesses reported. The process of encouraging near-miss reporting via an electronic platform has resulted in greater staff engagement in proactive reporting. Migration to an electronic medical management system experienced administrative delays and will be implemented in 2025.
- 5.52 The annual Health and Safety Committee meeting reviewed progress and set focus areas for the coming year. The 2024 annual workplace inspection showed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace. Most issues highlighted in the previous year's workplace inspection report had been resolved satisfactorily.
- 5.53 No radiation safety-related issues, excessive noise level issues, or poor air quality issues were reported by staff over the year.
- 5.54 The staff of the Health and Safety Branch continued to participate in professional development programmes in 2024.

## 6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

### The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

- 6.1 The SAB met for its Thirty-Eighth Session from 27 to 31 May 2024, and the report of the session was issued as SAB-38/1 (dated 31 May 2024). In addition to discussing SAB-related business, the Board received seven briefings from external speakers on topics including persistent nerve agents; innovation in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) defence; machine learning; unmanned aerial vehicles; metal-organic frameworks; and laboratory automation. The Board also received updates and briefings from various Secretariat staff members to enrich its scientific discussions. At the conclusion of the session, the SAB offered a number of recommendations for the Director-General's consideration, including the establishment of a new temporary working group (TWG) on AI. The response of the Director-General to the report of the Thirty-Eighth Session was issued as EC-106/DG.19 (dated 4 July 2024), in which he indicated that a new TWG on AI would be established and that he would work with the SAB Chairperson and others involved to determine the next steps.
- 6.2 The TWG on Chemical Forensics began its two-year mandate on 1 January 2024 and held three meetings during the year. These meetings took place from 25 to 26 March, 3 to 5 June, and 25 to 27 September 2024, and reports were issued after each meeting (SAB-38/WP.1, dated 15 May 2024; SAB-39/WP.1, dated 21 August 2024; SAB-39/WP.2, dated 16 January 2025; and SAB-39/WP.2/Corr.1, dated 27 January 2025).
- 6.3 The SAB continued its collaboration and engagement across scientific communities throughout 2024. Members of the Board chaired, attended, and presented at conferences; maintained their leadership of professional chemistry societies; and continued to partner with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and to issue publications in scientific literature. SAB involvement in such activities ensures that the Secretariat stays abreast of developments in chemistry, maintains visibility and credibility among scientists, promotes responsible and ethical scientific practices, and supports education and outreach. At the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference, the Chairperson of the SAB delivered an update on the activities of the Board and highlighted the relevance of developments in AI.

### Emerging technologies

- 6.4 During 2024, emerging technologies—particularly AI—attracted increasing attention from both States Parties and the Secretariat. On 22 and 23 April 2024, the Director-General convened a two-day meeting at the OPCW Main Building and the ChemTech Centre to explore with external experts the potential implications of AI for the Convention and the work of the OPCW. The Secretariat issued a Note on the outcomes of the meeting to all States Parties (S/2289/2024, dated 23 May 2024).
- 6.5 On 28 June 2024, the Director-General delivered the keynote address at the “Artificial Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction” conference in Berlin, Germany, organised by the German Federal Foreign Office. In his remarks, the Director-General called for an ongoing, continuous discussion to ensure that AI enhances rather than undermines international arms control.

- 6.6 In June 2024, with funding from the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Secretariat launched the “AI Research Challenge”, inviting researchers to propose innovative ways in which AI could benefit the implementation of the Convention and the work of the Organisation (S/2301/2024, dated 4 July 2024). A total of 22 proposals were submitted: 15 from WEOG, five from the Asian Group, one from the Eastern European Group, and one from GRULAC. Four proof-of-concept ideas were subsequently selected for funding and will explore different and complementary applications of AI relevant to the work of the OPCW. These four research projects will be carried out in 2025.
- 6.7 Recognising the growing significance of developments in AI, as well as emerging technologies more broadly, the Council at its 106th Session in July 2024 decided to include an item on emerging technologies on the agenda of all future regular sessions.
- 6.8 Building on this momentum, from 22 to 24 October 2024, the OPCW and the Kingdom of Morocco co-organised the “Global Conference on the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Advancing the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention” (the Global Conference) in Rabat, Morocco, which included the participation of 57 experts from all regions. Following the Global Conference, the Secretariat issued a Note to update States Parties on the key outcomes, as well as details on the Secretariat’s other AI-related activities (S/2360/2025, dated 29 January 2025).

### **Scientific engagement**

- 6.9 The Secretariat’s engagement with global scientific communities continued in 2024. Secretariat staff continued to serve on IUPAC committees.
- 6.10 In 2024, the Secretariat maintained a visible presence among technical communities, participating in a wide range of events, including the Artificial Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference (June), Accelerate Conference (August), American Chemical Society Fall Meeting (August), Spiez Convergence Workshop (September), and the Automated Synthesis Forum (November). The Secretariat also delivered presentations at the CBRNE Research and Innovation Conference (March), Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (May), Ninth EuChemS Chemistry Congress (July), 27th IUPAC International Conference on Chemistry Education (July), United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM) workshop (September), and the 2024 Chemical and Biological Defense Science and Technology Conference (December). In addition, the Science Policy Adviser and Science Policy Officer published an article in the peer-reviewed journal *Nature Reviews Chemistry* on the important role the SAB plays in ensuring that the OPCW is fully prepared to address future challenges.<sup>17</sup>
- 6.11 The Secretariat also remained engaged with international organisation partners, participating in scientific and technical discussions with IUPAC, INTERPOL, the CTBTO, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the World Health Organization, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit.

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Clapham, S., and P. J. Hotchkiss. “Robust Scientific Advisory Mechanisms Future-Proof Disarmament Treaties.” *Nature Reviews Chemistry* 8, no. 4 (March 21, 2024): 231–33. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41570-024-00594-2>.

- 6.12 Scientific briefings were also delivered at the T.M.C. Asser Institute's Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (October 2024), the OPCW's Twenty-Fourth Annual Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel (September 2024), the Eleventh Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities (October 2024), and the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of National Authorities (November 2024).
- 6.13 In 2024, the Secretariat continued to support States Parties in enhancing their understanding of scientific developments relevant to the Convention and organised two Science for Diplomats events. These events bridge science and diplomacy by explaining complex topics, highlighting emerging technologies, and fostering dialogue among diplomats, scientists, and OPCW experts. The first event, held during the 106th Session of the Council,<sup>18</sup> focused on chemical forensics. It outlined the composition and objectives of the TWG on Chemical Forensics, as well as the key questions that the Director-General has posed to the Group. During the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Conference, a Science for Diplomats side event was held to augment the delegates' understanding of AI.<sup>19</sup> It provided an introduction to the basic principles of AI, highlighted its relevant applications in the chemical sciences, and outlined the OPCW approach to AI to date. It was co-presented by Secretariat staff and the Chairperson of the SAB, with support from members of both the SAB and the TWG on Chemical Forensics.

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<sup>18</sup> For more information, see: <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2024/03/Science%20for%20Diplomats%20Presentation%20-%20Chem-ecting%20the%20dots-the%20world%20of%20chemcial%20forensics.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> For more information, see: <https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/science-for-diplomats/Atoms%20and%20Algorithms.pdf>.

## Annex 1

**STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024<sup>20</sup>**

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06

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For each State Party listed, the date in the "Signature" column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the "Deposit" column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, "[a]" means "deposit of instrument of accession", "[A]" means "deposit of instrument of acceptance", and "[d]" means "deposit of instrument of succession".

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry into Force
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry into Force
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry into Force
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
133.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
134.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
135.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
136.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
137.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
138.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
139.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
140.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
141.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
142.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
143.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
144.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
145.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
146.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
147.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
148.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
149.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
150.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
151.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
152.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
153.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
154.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
155.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
156.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
157.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
158.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97
159.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
160.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13
161.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
162.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry into Force
163.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
164.	State of Palestine		17-05-18	16-06-18
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Türkiye	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

**Annex 2**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES  
IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2024**

<b>Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party</b>	
United States of America	Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF)* Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System (CTF/MAPS)* Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)*

\* No destruction took place at the facility in 2024.

## Annex 3

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN<sup>21</sup>  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024**

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed <sup>22</sup>
<b>Category 1</b>		
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	15,047.041
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,586.722
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD, HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	17,439.877
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and Lewisite (including HD/L mixture in dichloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.876
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.174
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.863	3.863
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
<b>Total Category 1:</b>	<b>70,493.640</b>	<b>70,493.640</b>
<b>Category 2</b>		
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorus trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356

<sup>21</sup> Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

<sup>22</sup> Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>22</sup></b>
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorus pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorus oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
<b>Total Category 2:</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>72,304.343</b>	<b>72,304.343</b>

**Annex 4**

**NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED  
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT,  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024<sup>23</sup>**

<b>Name of Riot Control Agent</b>	<b>Number of States Parties That Had Declared Possession</b>
CS	119
CN	64
OC	26
PAVA	13
Capsaicin	16
CR	14
Other types	12

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 137

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<sup>23</sup> The Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) Registry Numbers for riot control agents listed in this table are as follows:

CS: 2698-41-1;  
CN: 532-27-4;  
OC: 8023-77-6;  
PAVA: 2444-46-4;  
Capsaicin: 404-86-4; and  
CR: 257-07-8.

Other types include mixtures of chemicals mentioned in the table or older types of riot control agents.

## Annex 5

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024  
(ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Algeria	National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology of the National Gendarmerie (NICC/NG)	4 Apr 2024
2.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	25 Mar 2021
3.	Belgium	Defensielaboratoria – Laboratoires de la Défense (DLD)	12 May 2004
4.	Brazil	Laboratório de Análises Químicas, Centro Tecnológico do Exército (CTEx)	31 Aug 2021
5.	China	Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
6.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
7.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	29 Mar 2017
8.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département Analyse Chimique	29 Jun 1999
9.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection	29 Jun 1999
10.	India	VERTOX Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
11.	India	Centre for Analysis of Chemical Toxins – Indian Institute of Chemical Technology	4 Apr 2023
12.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defense Chemical Research Laboratory	3 Aug 2011
13.	Japan	Chemical School, Japan Ground Self- Defence Force	9 Aug 2024
14.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Safety and Security	17 Nov 1998
15.	Norway	Laboratory for the Analysis of Chemical Threat Agents, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)	25 Mar 2021
16.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defense Science Technology Organization	18 Apr 2018
17.	Poland	Chemical Laboratory of CBRN Area Control Centre,	4 Apr 2024
18.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory, 5th Directorate 3rd R&D Institute, Agency for Defense Development	3 Aug 2011
19.	Republic of Korea	CBRN Defense Research Institute ROK Defense Command	15 Aug 2022

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
20.	Romania	Research and Innovation Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis Laboratory	18 Apr 2018
21.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre	4 Aug 2000
22.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, "State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology"	15 Apr 2015
23.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
24.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa	8 Sept 2004
25.	Sweden	Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI	17 Nov 1998
26.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998
27.	Türkiye	Chemical Warfare Agents Diagnosis and Verification Laboratory (NPHRL)	9 Aug 2024
28.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	29 Jun 1999
29.	United States of America	DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center Forensic Analytical Laboratory	17 Nov 1998
30.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024  
(BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département Analyse Chimique	1 Aug 2016

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Biomedical Verification Division Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defense Chemical Research Laboratory	31 Aug 2021
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Safety and Security	1 Aug 2016
10.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory, 5th Directorate 3rd R&D Institute, Agency for Defense Development	31 Aug 2021
11.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
12.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
13.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
14.	Sweden	Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI	1 Aug 2016
15.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	1 Aug 2016
16.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017
17.	United States of America	DEVCOM, Chemical Biological Center Forensic Analytical Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
18.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016

Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2024<sup>24</sup>

STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME AND SUBPROGRAMME  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2024

Funding Programme	Final Appropriation	Total Expenditure	Balance of Appropriations
1	2	3	4 (2-3)
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>			
1. Verification Programme	10,517,880	10,013,487	504,393
2. Inspections Programme	22,306,072	19,034,663	3,271,409
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>32,823,952</b>	<b>29,048,150</b>	<b>3,775,802</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	7,818,833	7,477,899	340,934
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	5,855,952	5,797,784	58,168
5. External Relations Programme	2,472,041	2,467,072	4,969
6. Executive Management Programme	12,028,273	11,509,084	519,189
7. Administration Programme	18,690,392	16,929,425	1,760,967
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>46,865,491</b>	<b>44,181,264</b>	<b>2,684,227</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>79,689,443</b>	<b>73,229,414</b>	<b>6,460,029</b>

**BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024**

<b>Fund</b>	<b>Balance</b>	
	<b>As at 31 December 2024<sup>25</sup></b>	<b>As at 31 December 2023</b>
General Fund	11,638,865	9,163,941
Working Capital Fund	8,146,819	8,143,668
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,651,924	1,605,423
OPCW special accounts	4,573,151	3,979,606
OPCW trust funds	28,054,012	22,762,763
<b>Total</b>	<b>54,064,771</b>	<b>45,655,401</b>

<sup>25</sup> The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances owing to timing differences.

Annex 7

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2024

Fund Balances

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds, Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2024	2024 Income	Refunds/ Transfers during 2024	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure during 2024	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2024
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	8,139,941	253,285	(253,285)	-	-	8,139,941
Special funds	4,121,451	97,686	5,380,603	-	248,845	9,350,895
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,589,074	61,285	-	-	-	1,650,359
Trust funds	15,194,267	14,154,724	(130,752)	-	8,360,016	20,858,223

Syria Trust Fund Balances

Syria Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2024	2024 Income	Refunds/ Transfers during 2024	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure during 2024	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2024
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons	196,563	10,322	-	-	-	206,885
Trust Fund for Syria Missions	293,219	6,847,687	-	-	1,646,646	5,494,260

Annex 8

**INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT  
FROM 1 JANUARY 2024 TO 31 DECEMBER 2024**

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 781	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (TBT)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Azerbaijan	13-12-2023 13-12-2023	13-12-2023
IAR 782	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (TBT)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Azerbaijan	13-12-2023 13-12-2023	13-12-2023
IAR 783	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Regional Seminars (Seoul Workshop)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	22-01-2024 22-01-2024	22-01-2024
IAR 784	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Analysis Laboratory, Technological Center of the Army (CTEx), Brazil, regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat CTEx, Brazil	08-12-2023 29-01-2024	29-01-2024
IAR 785	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden	OPCW Technical Secretariat FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden	30-01-2024	30-01-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
	concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 9th Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test			
IAR 786	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Spiez Laboratory, NBC Defence Establishment, Switzerland concerning Sample Preparation for the 55th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Spiez Laboratory, NBC Defence Establishment, Switzerland	29-01-2024 08-02-2024	08-02-2024
IAR 787	Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the European Union	OPCW European Union	20-02-2024 19-02-2024	20-02-2024
IAR 788	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between Japan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Japan	05-03-2024 04-03-2024	05-03-2024
IAR 789	Memorandum of Understanding between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United States Department of State concerning the provision of Junior Professional Officers	OPCW Technical Secretariat United States Department of State	04-03-2024 05-03-2024	05-03-2024
IAR 790	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Verification Laboratory Defence Medical & Environmental Research Institute, DSO National Laboratories, Singapore, concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 55 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat DSO National Laboratories, Singapore	12-04-2024 18-04-2024	18-04-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 791	Grant Award Agreement between the United States Department of State and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat United States Department of State	24-04-2024 15-04-2024	24-04-2024
IAR 792	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the State of Qatar and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Regional Seminar (TAB)	OPCW Qatar	17-05-2024 16-05-2024	17-05-2024
IAR 793	Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Department of Commerce and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of source code licence on the electronic declaration information system (EDIS)	OPCW Technical Secretariat United States Department of Commerce	14-05-2024 03-06-2024	03-06-2024
IAR 794	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Czech Republic	10-06-2024 10-06-2024	10-06-2024
IAR 795	Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Training of Personnel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Training and Testing Center of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske, Kostol'any, the Slovak Republic (17 June 2024 – 28 June 2024)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic	16-05-2024 09-05-2024	11-06-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 796	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government Offices of Sweden (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs) and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden	20-06-2024 24-05-2024	20-06-2024
IAR 797	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the State of Qatar and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (AI Conference in Morocco)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Qatar	20-06-2024 20-06-2024	20-06-2024
IAR 798	Grant Award Contract between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the United States of America and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding OPCW Forensic and Attribution Capabilities Developments	OPCW Technical Secretariat Defense Threat Reduction Agency, United States of America	01-07-2024 20-06-2024	01-07-2024
IAR 799	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency	18-06-2024 28-06-2024	28-06-2024
IAR 800	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X and the Trust Fund for OPCW Events	OPCW Technical Secretariat France	01-07-2024 01-07-2024	01-07-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 801	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (AI Conference in Morocco)	OPCW Republic of Korea	12-07-2024 12-07-2024	12-07-2024
IAR 802	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (AI Conference in Morocco)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Germany	12-07-2024 12-07-2024	12-07-2024
IAR 803	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, DSTL, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland concerning Sample Preparation for the 56 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat DSTL, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland	01-07-2024 16-07-2024	16-07-2024
IAR 804	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland acting through the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (FCDO)	26-07-2024 29-07-2024	29-07-2024
IAR 805	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland acting through the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (FCDO)	26-07-2024 29-07-2024	29-07-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 806	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland acting through the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (FCDO)	26-07-2024 29-07-2024	29-07-2024
IAR 807	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland acting through the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training (Designated Laboratories)	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (FCDO)	26-07-2024 29-07-2024	29-07-2024
IAR 808	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI concerning Sample Preparation for First Trial OPCW Biotoxins Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI	28-08-2024 15-08-2024	28-08-2024
IAR 809	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Principality of Andorra and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat Andorra	28-08-2024 29-08-2024	29-08-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 810	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Analysis Laboratory, Technological Center of the Army (CTEx), Brazil concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 56th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat  CTEx, Brazil	12-08-2024  29-08-2024	29-08-2024
IAR 811	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the State of Qatar and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Regional Seminar (TAB)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  Qatar	02-09-2024  28-08-2024	02-09-2024
IAR 812	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation regarding the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland	10-09-2024  10-09-2024	10-09-2024
IAR 813	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland	10-09-2024  10-09-2024	10-09-2024
IAR 814	Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Training of Personnel of the OPCW at the Training and Testing Centre of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske (14 October 2024 – 25 October 2024)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  The Slovak Republic	11-09-2024  04-09-2024	21-09-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 815	European Union Contribution Agreement CFSP/2024/13 with the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat European Union	07-10-2024 27-09-2024	07-10-2024
IAR 816	Arrangement between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany governing on-site inspections at the Gesellschaft zur Entsorgung von Chemischen Kampfstoffen und Rüstungsaltslasten mbH (GEKA mbH), Munster, Federal Republic of Germany	OPCW Germany	07-10-2024 07-10-2024	07-10-2024
IAR 817	Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Global Conference: The Role of the Artificial Intelligence in Advance the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Rabat, Morocco (22 – 24 October 2024)	OPCW Technical Secretariat Morocco	17-10-2024 17-10-2024	17-10-2024
IAR 818	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), Finland concerning Sample Preparation for the 57th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), Finland	08-10-2024 22-10-2024	22-10-2024
IAR 819	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Implementation of Article VII	OPCW Technical Secretariat France	15-11-2024 15-11-2024	15-11-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 820	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat France	15-11-2024 15-11-2024	15-11-2024
IAR 821	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of His Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat Monaco	02-12-2024 02-12-2024	02-12-2024
IAR 822	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of His Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Monaco	02-12-2024 02-12-2024	02-12-2024
IAR 823	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Germany	03-12-2024 03-12-2024	03-12-2024
IAR 824	Exchange of Letters between the Republic of India and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance	OPCW Technical Secretariat India	03-12-2024 03-12-2024	03-12-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 825	Voluntary Contribution Arrangement between the Government of The Netherlands and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat The Netherlands	10-12-2024 10-12-2024	10-12-2024
IAR 826	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Norway	13-12-2024 16-12-2024	16-12-2024
IAR 827	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Germany	17-12-2024 17-12-2024	17-12-2024
IAR 828	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Lithuania	17-12-2024 17-10-2024	17-12-2024
IAR 829	Voluntary Contribution Arrangement between the Government of the Netherlands and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat The Netherlands	19-12-2024 18-12-2024	19-12-2024
IAR 830	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Scientific Advisory Board	OPCW Technical Secretariat Mexico	19-12-2024 05-12-2024	19-12-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 831	Exchange of Letters between the United Mexican States and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Voluntary Fund for Assistance	OPCW Technical Secretariat Mexico	18-12-2024 05-12-2024	18-12-2024
IAR 758(a)	Amendment to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding a contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (FCDO)	25-01-2024 26-01-2024	26-01-2024
IAR 710(e)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding to support the OPCW, Annex 05 "Regional Assistance and Protection Training for the East Africa Community"	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence) OPCW	19-03-2024	19-03-2024
IAR 710(f)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding to support the OPCW, and Annex 06 "Chemical Weapons Convention Regional Training for 8 Caribbean Region States"	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence) OPCW	19-03-2024	19-03-2024

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 710(g)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding support to the OPCW, Annex 07 “Chemical Weapons Convention Diplomatic Skills Training for OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) Personnel”	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence)  OPCW	23-05-2024  24-05-2024	24-05-2024
IAR 710(g)(i)	Amendment 1 to Annex 07: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding support to the OPCW	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence)  OPCW	08-07-2024  10-07-2024	10-07-2024
IAR 710(h)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding support to the OPCW, Annex 08 “Chemical Weapons Convention Command and Control Training for Deployed Missions for OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) Personnel”	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence)  OPCW	23-05-2024  24-05-2024	24-05-2024
IAR 710(i)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the provision of funding support to the OPCW, Annex 09 “Regional Assistance and Protection Training for the East Africa Community”	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Ministry of Defence)  OPCW	25-11-2024  27-11-2024	27-11-2024

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2024</b>				
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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry into Force</b>
IAR 689(v)	Amendment Twenty-Two to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	26-06-2024 27-06-2024	27-06-2024
IAR 689(w)	Amendment Twenty-Three to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	18-12-2024 19-12-2024	19-12-2024
IAR 381(w)	Amendment No.22 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services Syria	19-06-2024 24-06-2024 02-07-2024	02-07-2024
IAR 427(g)	Amendment 7 to the Administrative Arrangement between the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat France -MFA	01-07-2024 01-07-2024	01-07-2024

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