Point 6 (e) Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use.

Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 106th session of the Executive Council

Mr Chairperson,
Director-General,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is extremely important for our delegation to participate in today's discussion on the threat of chemical weapons usage.

The global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, which includes a strong norm against the use of chemical weapons, has been a critical component of international security and stability. However, this framework is facing significant challenges from certain states, particularly Russia. To understand the current situation, it's important to consider both the historical context and recent developments.

Since the beginning of the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the enemy, along with the use of conventional means of fire, has been significantly increased the use of chemical weapons and chemical riot control agents against the Ukrainian Defense Forces as a means of warfare in violation of the Convention.

According to the evidence obtained, the Russian Federation relies heavily on the use of chemical agents during hostilities. In combination with other types of weapons, these chemical agents constrain the actions of Ukrainian units during offensive operations, and allow the occupiers to force the fighters of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine to leave occupied positions or shelters and come under attack from conventional weapons. At the same time, an important factor is also the psychological impact on the personnel as a result of the use of chemical agents.

In the period from 15.02.2023 to 24.06.2024, 3201 cases of the enemy's use of ammunition containing hazardous chemicals cases were recorded and documented, in particular, from 25.05 to 24.06, 639 cases were recorded, the share of gas grenades of the K-51 and RG-V0 types accounted for 31%. In the course of the pre-trial investigation their verification is carried out through investigative actions and expert research.

There were recorded 1945 cases of servicemen visiting medical institutions with symptoms of chemical exposure of varying severity were recorded and two fatalities from acute poisoning by an unknown chemical substance.

Most of the munitions (82%) used were hand gas grenades of the type K-51 and RG-VO types (31% in June 2024), which are riot control agents and are prohibited for use
as means of warfare (Article 1, paragraph 5, CWC). The intensity of such use is constantly increasing, due to the lack of international response to the Russian Federation's violations of international law and the general increase in offensive efforts by the enemy military command.

Another reason to be vigilant is that the Russian occupation forces have begun to use so-called imitators of chemical warfare agents. Fragments of the UB-105 training munition were found on the front lines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donetsk oblast of Ukraine. At the same time, it is possible that the UB-105 chemical munitions used by the aggressor state may contain other toxic chemicals, as their design provides for possible equipping with various substances and formulations (see addendum).

During pre-trial investigations, the competent authorities of Ukraine established that all components of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine did not have K-51, RG-VO gas grenades and any other types of RCAs in service and did not use them as a means of warfare in repelling the armed aggression of the Russian Federation.

The Ukrainian authorities are actively compiling evidence related to violations of the Convention, with updates on the investigation to be shared with the Technical Secretariat and the OPCW States Parties in due course. While Russia consistently breaches the Convention, Ukraine is diligently gathering crucial proof of chemical weapon use by Russian terrorists. Our commitment to the Convention remains steadfast, expressing deep concern over Russia’s use of chemical weapons on Ukrainian soil. We adhere strictly to the Convention’s provisions.

We condemn Russia’s support for the Syrian regime and the confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians, the FSB’s attack on the Skripal’s in Salisbury which led to the death of Dawn Sturgess in 2018, cyber-attacks against the OPCW, and the poisoning of Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny in 2020. This pattern of behaviour demonstrates categorically that the Russian state has utter contempt for the CWC and the crucial principles it upholds.

I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat for his readiness to coordinate the process in providing technical assistance to Ukraine, especially in the field of chemical safety and security in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The recent ratification of the Ad hoc Agreement between Ukraine and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Privileges and Immunities for Technical Assistance Visits has given both sides a legitimate basis for discussing practical aspects of cooperation.

As a result of expert discussions, we were able to successfully conduct the first TAV in Ukraine just ahead of the EC session. The purpose of this event was to provide Ukrainian specialists with equipment and training to strengthen their capabilities in counteracting the response to possible chemical threat. We are also in constant contact with the Secretariat to discuss the scope of next visits in the near future.

We were also able to conduct trainings at the Chem Tech Centre for the Ukrainian experts designated by the National Authority of Ukraine on sampling for investigation of chemical weapons use.

The Secretariat has also continued its activities under the Convention related to assistance and protection, upon Ukraine’s request. It has provided several online training courses to Ukrainian specialists. More such activities are scheduled throughout the year.
Thus, on behalf of Ukraine, I express my sincere gratitude to Director-General Fernando Arias, the staff of the Secretariat, as well as to the States Parties for their voluntary contributions to the Article 10 Trust fund.

I would like to reassure the Executive Council that Ukraine is committed to further deepening relevant cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian experts in countering the threat of chemical weapons use by the Russian Federation.

Let me express my appreciation to all the statements of support to Ukraine from the OPCW Member States. We are very grateful for the strong international support.

I kindly request you to study the attached information provided by Ukrainian authorities and consider this statement as an official document of the 106th Session of the Executive council and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you for your attention.
Report by the Main Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine on the Use of RCAs by Russia in Ukraine

The Main Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine is conducting a pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings, which investigates the use of means of warfare prohibited by international law, namely the use of riot control agents by the armed forces and military formations of the Russian Federation during hostilities against the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine in violation of paragraph 5 of Art. I of the CWC, as well as investigating possible facts of the use by the aggressor state of chemical warfare agents, toxic and other hazardous substances, in particular those included in Schedules 1, 2, 3 of the Convention.

To date, information has been received on 2,345 cases of possible use of chemicals by the armed forces of the Russian Federation as a means of warfare against the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine. In the course of the pre-trial investigation their verification is carried out through investigative actions and expert research.

According to the conclusions of forensic experts and information collected during the investigation, after 24.02.2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation during hostilities against the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine as a means of warfare, that is, for military purposes, actively use chemicals that can quickly cause irritation of the senses or physical irritation of the senses or physical disorders that disappear in a short period of time after the end of exposure, including the substance CS (other names 2-chlorobenzene malononitrile, dinitrile of orthochlorobenzalmonic acid, P-65, "Lilac"), molecular formula C10H5ClN2, according to the classification of the of the generally recognized foreign organization "Chemical Abstracts Service" (hereinafter - CAS) has the registration number 2698-41-1 (hereinafter referred to as CS substance) and CN substance (other names chloroacetophenone or 2-chloro-1-phenylethanone, Litin, Or lith, P-14, substance no.34, "Bird cherry"), molecular formula C8H7ClO, which according to the classification of the generally recognized foreign organization CAS has the registration number 532-27-4 (hereinafter referred to as CN substance).

According to the international toxicological classification, substance CS and substance CN classification, they are classified as irritant poisons lachrymators, i.e. tearful poisonous substances that mainly irritate the eyes and have an irritating effect on the respiratory tract, as well as chemical agents used to counteract mass riots (commonly referred to as riot control agents). Common symptoms of the use of these chemicals are damage to the mucous membranes and respiratory tract, as well as damage to the esophagus (in the case of high concentration of the substance and its swallowing), which is manifested by sore throat, cough, choking, red eyes and lacrimation, nausea and vomiting. In some cases, information was received about the appearance of fatigue and discomfort in the lungs for a long time after the lesion. The means of delivery of CS and CN agents are usually the following military pyrotechnics - K-51 gas hand grenade, equipped with a pyrotechnic mixture containing CS substance and RG-VO gas grenade, which is equipped with a pyrotechnic mixture containing either CS or CN substance.

During the pre-trial investigation, it was established that all components of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine had no military pyrotechnics – gas K-51 hand grenade and RG-VO gas grenade were not in service and were not used as a means of warfare in the course of repulsing the Russian armed aggression.

Within the framework of the criminal proceedings, 94 people were identified from among of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who witnessed the use of chemicals by the armed or suffered damage from such use of chemicals by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, of whom 16 were recognized as victims and 26 were interrogated as witnesses; about 57 means of delivery of chemicals, their fragments, as well as samples of clothing, water, and soil with traces of the substance used. All these objects were sent for expert examination (a total of 32 examinations were scheduled); 25 expert opinions were received, including on the ownership of the seized items of application to the K-51 and RG-VO grenades, which are equipped with the relevant chemical irritant chemicals. All interrogated persons testified to the widespread use of gas grenades with tear gas substances by Russian armed groups by dropping them from UAVs, and less often - directly by hand during combat operations.
According to the evidence obtained, the use of chemical agents by the Russian Federation during hostilities is of great importance, since in combination with other types of weapons, it constrains the actions of Ukrainian units during offensive operations, and also allows the occupiers to force the fighters of the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine to leave occupied positions or shelters and come under attack from conventional weapons. At the same time, an important factor is also the psychological impact on the personnel as a result of the use of chemical agents.

In addition, video and photos posted by the aggressor state's accomplices on social media and on official Russian propaganda media resources. Among other things, during the pre-trial investigation, the most resonant facts of the use of chemical weapons by the armed forces of the Russian Federation are:

1. On 10.03.2023, at the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine between the settlements of Severne and Vodiane, Donetsk region, against the military of the 501st separate battalion of the 36th separate marine brigade, a K-51 aerosol grenade was used (chemical substance CS - 2-chlorobenzalmononitrile), resulting in the injury of 8 servicemen, one of whom died of asphyxiation.

2. On 08.02.2023, the enemy threw aerial grenades at the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Marinka, Donetsk region, the enemy dropped aerosol grenades K-51, as a result of which the defenders were forced to leave the shelter and came under attack by enemy rocket artillery.

3. On 29.03.2023, as well as at the end of March 2023, near the settlement of Spirne, Donetsk region, the occupiers from the 88th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army Corps of the North-Eastern District and the 123rd separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russian armed forces, used against the Ukrainian Defense Forces K-51 and RG-VO grenades, injuring 3 of our soldiers.

4. On 20.12.2023, during the offensive, the aggressor used K-51 and RG-VO grenades, which injured 4 servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who were holding defense at positions near the village of Spirne, Donetsk region. In addition, the investigation is looking into 3 possible facts of another irritant chemical agent usage, chloropicrin, which is listed in Schedule 3 of the Convention as a toxic chemical.
Report by the Command of the Support Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the use of RCAs by Russia in Ukraine

Information on the use of chemical weapons and/or chemical riot control agents against the Ukrainian Defense Forces as a means of warfare in violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter - CWC).

Since the beginning of the full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the enemy, along with the use of conventional means of fire, has been using special munitions equipped with hazardous chemicals (hereinafter - CW).

For reference:

In the period from 15.02.2023 to 24.06.2024, the following cases were recorded and documented 3201 cases of the enemy’s use of ammunition containing hazardous chemicals (hereinafter - CW), in particular, from 25.05 to 24.06, 639 cases were recorded, the share of gas grenades of the K-51 and RG-V0 types accounted for 31%.

A total of 1945 cases of servicemen visiting medical institutions with symptoms of chemical exposure of varying severity were recorded, and two fatalities from acute poisoning by an unknown chemical substance were also recorded (sailor Hasanov Marat Elkhanogly, 10.03.2023, soldier Polyakov Mykola Vyacheslavovych, 09.06.2024).

Most of the munitions (82%) used were hand gas grenades of the K-51 and RG-V0 types (31% in June 2024), which are riot control agents and are prohibited for use as means of warfare (Article 1, paragraph 5, CWC). The intensity of such use is constantly increasing, due to the lack of international response to the Russian Federation's violations of international law and the general increase in offensive efforts by the enemy military command.
Report by the Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine on the use of RCAs by Russia in Ukraine

The Counterintelligence Department of the Security Service of Ukraine is aware of the information regarding the publication by a number of Russian propaganda information resources of a video by A. Filatov on the use by the occupation forces of the Russian Federation of aerosol grenades containing chemicals classified as chemical riot control agents, and the facts are currently the subject of a pre-trial investigation by the investigators of the Security Service of Ukraine. There is also an increase in the number of cases of the use of toxic chemicals, in particular chloropicrin (trichloronitromethane or "PS agent"), which is classified as a chemical weapon under the Convention (Schedule 3A.04) and is prohibited for use under any circumstances.

According to available information, the Russian occupation forces have begun using so-called chemical warfare agent imitators, in particular, fragments of the UB-105 training munition (Russian: учебный боеприпас, photo attached) were found on the front lines in Donetsk region. The UB-105 is part of the UKOV-1 training kit, which is designed to simulate the use of chemical warfare agents (photo attached). The UKOV-1 consists of two 9-barrel throwing units, a control panel, two control lines and 54 UB-105 training munitions.

These training munitions can be equipped with "training" formulation URFOV-2 (Russian: учебная рецептура органических веществ), which is a mixture of chemicals, including tributyl phosphate, triethanolamine and products of their decomposition and interaction. According to preliminary information, the effect of this mixture on the human body is somewhat similar to the effect of the use of chemical riot control agents (irritation of the respiratory tract, difficulty breathing, tearing breathing, lacrimation, etc.). It is worth emphasizing that triethanolamine, according (3A.04 of Schedule 3 of the CWC) belongs to toxic chemicals that are precursors to chemical weapons. At present, due to the high intensity of hostilities, it has not been possible to obtain samples of the relevant substances, however, it is possible that UB-105 chemical munitions used by the enemy may contain other toxic chemicals, as their design provides for the possibility of equipping with various substances and formulations.
Report by the National Police of Ukraine on the use of RCAs by Russia in Ukraine

Investigative units of the National Police of Ukraine are conducting pre-trial investigation in 11 criminal proceedings initiated under Article 438 (Violation of the Laws and Customs of War) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine on the facts of the use of military personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation of chemical weapons on the contact line.

As of today, in 10 criminal proceedings, pre-trial investigation in which the pre-trial investigation is being carried out by the Investigation Department of the Main Directorate of the National Police in Donetsk region, 38 victims among the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the AFU) who were injured as a result of the shelling of combat positions by Russian occupation forces received chemical poisoning with an unidentified substance.

In 1 criminal proceeding, the pre-trial investigation in which is being carried out by the Investigation Department of the Main Directorate of the National Police in the Kharkiv region, it was established that during the shelling of combat positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the armed forces of the Russian Federation used chemical weapons, the type of which and the number of possible victims are being established in a procedural manner.

The pre-trial investigation in these criminal proceedings is ongoing, the necessary investigative (detective) and procedural actions are being taken to full, comprehensive and impartial investigation of the circumstances of the criminal offense that may have been committed in the context of an armed conflict.

Due to the fact that Article 387 (Disclosure of data on operational and and pre-trial investigation data) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine establishes criminal liability for the disclosure of pre-trial investigation data, to provide more detailed information on the progress of the pre-trial investigation in the mentioned criminal proceedings is impossible.

According to the state institutions "Territorial Medical Association of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Zaporizhzhia, Sumy and Khmelnytskyi regions, the following patients were treated for poisoning with unknown chemical agents: Sumy region 5 patients, Zaporizhzhia region 29 patients, Khmelnytskyi region 1 patient.

According to the testimonies provided by the victims, after the "dumping" of explosives and its subsequent detonation, a pale green substance was released into the air, which filled the free niches of dugouts / fortifications / trenches, and was heavier than air.

The exposure caused the following clinical symptoms: dizziness, headache, suffocation, dry hacking cough, irritation of the mucous membranes, severe generalized weakness, sleep disturbance, and most noted mild hyperthermia within 3 days after the event. Patients with poisoning by unknown chemical agents were admitted to the health care facilities 3-5 days after the attack.

The National Guard of Ukraine (hereinafter - NGU) systematically records the use of chemical weapons by the Russian Federation against the NGU units along the entire line of combat operations, but a special concentration of chemical munitions is observed in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Thus, in 2023, 113 cases of use of the above-mentioned type of weapon, and in the first half of 2024 - 978 cases were recorded. The mostly used grenades are Soviet K-51 long-range gas hand grenades, RGR irritant hand grenades, which are equipped with the poisonous substance CS or chloropicrin, and RG-VO chemical hand grenades, which are equipped with the poisonous substance CN (chloroacetophenone), which are used by dropping them from unmanned aerial vehicles.

In total, 83 servicemen of the NGU have sought medical care in the combat zone with signs of chemical exposure from 2022 to the present. No fatalities were recorded.

In the period from 01.01.2023 to 25.06.2024, the use of ammunition loaded with hazardous chemicals by the Russian Federation against units of the National Guard of Ukraine was recorded in accordance with the table below.
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**Total, 2023**: 113

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**Total, 2024**: 978