



**Permanent Representation
of Ukraine to the OPCW**

English only

Point 7 (e) Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use.

**Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 105th session of the Executive
Council**

Mr Chairperson,

Director-General,

Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is extremely important for our delegation to participate in today's discussion on the threat of chemical weapons usage.

Every day, Ukraine is exposed to information, psychological and other types of threats from the Russian Federation.

The enemy understands that modern warfare is not limited to land, sea, air and space. Modern warfare is also waged in the information space.

It's evident that information warfare and disinformation play significant roles in modern conflicts. Recognizing the manipulation of narratives is vital for countering these threats and maintaining the accuracy of information.

Russian head of the Russian terrorist CBRN troops, I. Kirillov has alleged that Ukraine is using substances prohibited by the Convention on the front line. A range of Russian telegram channels and pro-Kremlin media are spreading information about facts of violations of the Convention by Ukraine and the United States.

In fact, Kirillov's words have nothing to do with reality. Their purpose is to produce an information environment that supports a future Russian chemical weapon false flag operation on the territory of Ukraine. Russian propaganda is also trying to discredit not only Ukraine's law enforcement agencies, but also its partner states.

This allegation is a continuation of the disinformation campaign about the "use of chemical weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces" and is intended first of all for the domestic audience of the Russian Federation.

Such statements are the Kremlin's largest information and psychological special operation tools in an attempt to "open eyes to the truth", which is allegedly being carefully concealed from the international community.

This Russian narrative is well known in New York, Vienna and The Hague.

And while the Russian state increases the volume of propaganda, it is my country and our valiant soldiers on the frontline that are victims to gross Russian breaches of the CWC on a daily basis. My country is in grave peril because the Russian Federation consistently and egregiously violates the rules of war and continues to deploy weapons prohibited by the CWC against Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Russian armed forces are rapidly increasing the volume and geographical scope of the use of toxic chemicals, in breach of the CWC, against the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine as a means of warfare. We have recorded 346 individual toxic chemical incidents in 2024 so far – equivalent to 6 Russian breaches of the CWC per day. The use of chemical weapons is seen by the enemy as a means of gaining tactical advantages and demoralising the Ukrainian Defense Forces. The purpose of the use is to poison the military personnel of the Defence Forces of Ukraine and push them out from hardened positions before destroying them with artillery strikes and infantry assaults. The munitions are used in combat zones, which makes it more challenging to carry out detailed analysis or sampling due to the intensity of the fighting. Russian troops as much as possible are trying to conceal the use of riot control agents. After international media reported on Russian military sources confirming the use of riot control agent filled RG-VO grenades, we have provided crucial details outlining the specific nature of the Russian threat in a separate addendum.

The Main Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine is conducting a pre-trial investigation in the criminal proceedings on the grounds of committing a crime stipulated by Part 1 Art. 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which investigates the circumstances of the use of prohibited by international law means of warfare, namely the use of riot control agents by the armed forces and military formations of the Russian Federation during hostilities in violation of the requirements of para. 5 of Article 1 of the Convention, and also investigates possible facts of the enemy's use of chemical warfare agents, toxic and other dangerous substances, in particular those included in Schedules 1, 2, 3 of the Convention.

As of March 01, 2024, information on 1060 cases of the use of chemicals by the Russian Federation is investigated, as of which 72 facts have been verified due to active hostilities.

According to the conclusion of the Chief of the Chemical and Biological Defence Troops of the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the means of delivery of munitions equipped with hazardous chemical agents are UAVs (74%), artillery (13%), grenade launchers (1%) and other (12%). The types of ammunition that are armed with hazardous substances are K-51 (71%), gas (17%), VOG (11%) and liquid (1%). Most of the munitions were used during the daytime (93%), and at night (7%).

As of February 2024, 946 cases of medical care for Ukrainian servicemen with poisoning by an unknown substance that occurred in the areas of hostilities were registered in Ukrainian healthcare facilities.

Ukraine believes that every documented case of the soldiers of the Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine seeking medical assistance is evidence of a systematic and gross violation of the provisions of the Convention by the aggressor state.

Each State Party has committed not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare as stated under Article 1 of the Convention.

Ukrainian authorities are actively compiling evidence related to violations of the Convention, with updates on the investigation to be shared with the Technical Secretariat and States Parties in due course. While Russia consistently breaches the Convention, Ukraine is diligently gathering crucial proof of chemical weapon use by Russian terrorists. Our commitment to the Convention remains steadfast, expressing deep concern over Russia's use of chemical weapons on Ukrainian soil. We adhere strictly to the Convention's provisions.

In addition, we condemn Russia's support for the Syrian regime and the confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians, the FSB's attack on the Skripal's in Salisbury which led to the death of Dawn Sturgess in 2018, cyber-attacks on the OPCW, and the poisoning of Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny in 2020. This pattern of behaviour demonstrates categorically that the Russian state has utter contempt for the CWC and the crucial principles it upholds.

I would like to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to States Parties and the Technical Secretariat for their readiness to provide technical assistance to Ukraine, especially in the field of chemical safety and security in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The Secretariat has continued its activities under the Convention related to assistance and protection, upon Ukraine's request. It has provided several training courses to Ukrainian specialists, including training in the investigation of incidents involving chemicals. More such activities are scheduled throughout the year.

I would like to reassure the Executive Council that Ukraine is committed to further deepening relevant cooperation and strengthening the capabilities of Ukrainian experts in countering the threat of chemical weapons use by the Russian Federation. In this regard, the ratification of the Ad hoc Agreement between Ukraine and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on Privileges and Immunities for Technical Assistance Visits is expected in the near future. The relevant draft Law of Ukraine has been already submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for consideration, and after its adoption, it will become the legal basis to facilitate in-country OPCW technical assistance.


Let me express my appreciation to all the statements of support to Ukraine from OPCW Member States. We are very grateful for the strong international support.

I kindly request you to consider this statement as an official document of the 105th Session of the Executive council and post it on the OPCW external server and public website.

Thank you for your attention.

*Addendum to the Statement of the
delegation of Ukraine (105-th session of the EC)*

Use of ammunition containing toxic chemicals by the Russian Federation



Special gas grenade K-51 (Video screenshots from Russian propaganda channel «Russia Today»)

According to the chemical and explosive technical expertise, the special gas grenade K-51 is designed to create gas in the form of smoke, which is capable of affecting the respiratory tract, causing shortness of breath and coughing, which leads to a negative psychological and demoralizing effect, as a result of which servicemen become completely incapacitated for a long time (up to 30 minutes). In the remnants of special K-51 gas grenades provided for the study experts found the presence of a special chemical substance (toxic irritant) - CS and 3-chlorobenzaldehyde (a degradation product of CS).

The K-51 grenade is a development of the Soviet period, which is mentioned in official documents in the "Conclusion of the Commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on the Investigation of the Events that took place in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989" (attached), as a "K-51 product" containing the poisonous chemical agent CS.

According to this document, which is currently available on the website of the Gorbachev Foundation (link https://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/file/komissiya_po_tbilisi.pdf), non-service "K-51" or "CS" products were used on 09.04.1989 to suppress rallies by the 4th Motorised Rifle Regiment of the Separate Motorised Rifle Division of Special Purpose of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Moscow region, currently - the Dzerzhinsky Separate Operational Division of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (in/4 N°3111).

In addition, the relevant document until 2023 was posted on the website of the Anatoly Sobchak Foundation at <https://www.sobchak.org/rus/docs/zakluchenie.html>, and is currently available through the web archive The Wayback Machine. At the same time, no information about the manufacturer and developer of the "K-51 product" is contained in the currently available documents.

On the website "Invisible Weapons" (link <https://nonkill.info/irritant/cs.shtml>), in an article on the chemical CS, under the description of special-purpose munitions for law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation, there is an image of a grenade visually similar to K-51 and the inscription "GNPP Basalt".


The link "Army Special Forces of the Russian Federation" states that the Russian army is armed with a full range of non-lethal chemical agents, from hand grenades to 500 kg cluster bombs. The main producer of these types of weapons is FSUE "Basalt" (currently "JSC "Basalt" ODNR 1127747209501, TIN 7719830028, address: 32, Velyaminovskaya St., Moscow, Russian Federation, main activity: "production of weapons and ammunition").

In addition, it was found that a video entitled "Unboxing of an army box of special hand grenades K-51 and an overview of the grenade itself" (link

<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qxo6PbHn0Tk>). In particular, during the review of the video, at 3 min 37 sec and 3 min 44 sec, the "Packing list N°51" dated 03.06.1994 signed by an official of the military unit 42734 ("Head of the storage warrant officer I.P. Fedoseev") is shown, describing the product name "Izdeliya K-51".

According to the data available in open sources, the Russian military unit N° 42734 was located at the following address: Russian Federation, Saratov region, Volsk, village Shikhany-4, i.e. at the location of the Central Military Chemical Proving Ground of the Russian Federation, where chemical weapons were developed and tested. It is also known that between 3 and 4 thousand tonnes of irritant chemicals (CS and chloroacetophenone (CN) were stored on the territory of the said Russian military unit.

It can be concluded that as of 1994, chemical riot control agents, namely the K-51 aerosol grenade called "Izdeliye K-51", were in service with the Russian Armed Forces. Also, some units of the national Guard of the Russian Federation had these weapons. Moreover, in 2009, the Department of Mobilisation Training for Healthcare and Disaster Medicine of the Volgograd State Medical University of the Federal Agency for Healthcare and Social Development published a "Study Guide on Toxicology and Medical Protection" (available at https://www.volgmed.ru/uploads/files/2011-11/7784-uchebnoe_posobie_po_toksikologii_i_dedicinskoj_zachshite_osnovy_toksikologii_toksichnyh_himicheskikh_vecshestv.pdf) as a training material for students, which states the following: "Currently, irritant agents are in service with the Russian armed forces and law enforcement agencies".



RG-VO grenade

The following comprehensive forensic examinations have been ordered following the detection and seizure of RG-VO grenades forensic explosive examinations and examination of materials, substances and products, which was entrusted to the experts of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Special Equipment and Forensic Expertise of the Security Service of Ukraine. At present, the examinations are ongoing.

*Chloroacetophenone (CN) chemical warfare agent substance from the group of lacrimators substances. A colourless crystalline substance with a bird cherry smell.

Boiling point 245 °C, melting point 59 °C. Highly toxic, very poisonous. Toxic dose that incapacitating for 10-15 min - 0.08 mg-min/l, lethal - 11 mg-min/l

In December 2023, cases of the use of new RG-VO aerosol grenades by the Russian occupation forces on the contact line in Donetsk region were documented (according to preliminary information, they contain the chemical chlorobenzalmonodinitrile or CS (CAS registration number 2698-41-1, an irritant toxic substance that belongs to chemical riot control agents). There is currently no official information on the manufacturers of RG-VO grenades.

However, the bodies of RG-VO grenades bear the marking "862-3-23", which can be deciphered as follows: "862" - manufacturer, "3" - quarter (month) of production, "23" - year of production".

According to the information available in open sources, during the Soviet era, the code "862" belonged to the enterprise "Plant No. 862 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition" (other names: "NII-862 PCA" and "mailbox A-1928"), which currently operates under the name "Joint Stock Company "Federal Scientific and Production Center "Research Institute of Applied Chemistry" (abbreviated as "JSC FSPC "RI Applied Chemistry"), address: Russian Federation, Moscow region, mos. Sergiev Posad, 3 Akademika Silina St., ODNR 1115042005638, TIN 5042120394), founder - JSC Spetskhimiya (Moscow).

For reference: "JSC "Research Institute of Applied Chemistry" is a leading developer and manufacturer of military pyrotechnics, including signalling, lighting, targeting, camouflage (smoke bombs and grenades) and aerosol, and has developed pyrotechnic solid propellants for Shkval torpedoes and Kub air defence missiles, thermobaric charges for Shmel-2 and Priz flamethrowers and heavy flamethrower systems Buratino and Solntsepek. The company's specialists were involved in the development of the Iskander tactical missile system, Bulava and Yars ballistic missiles, and the corresponding pyroautomatic means are widely used in Topol-M and S-300 systems.

For the first time, the so-called Russian "military commander", Russian citizen Vladimir Romanov (Russian: Романов Владимир Nikolayevich, born 07.03.1986), who published the relevant information on 09.12.2023 in his Telegram channel "Romanov Light" ([link t.me/romanov_92](https://t.me/romanov_92)).

Thus, the first use of RG-VO grenades by the Russian occupation forces coincides with the year of their production, namely 2023. Accordingly, there are grounds to believe that this munition was developed and manufactured by the Research Institute of Applied Chemistry specifically for use by Russian military formations during Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine.

It is shown that in March 2023, the Director General of JSC "Research Institute of Applied Chemistry" was recognised as a citizen of the Russian Federation, Artem Kostiantinovich Muranov (Russian: Муранов Артем Константинович), born on 28.09.1979, who documented his own understanding of the possibility of using non-lethal chemical agents in international military conflicts. In particular, in the dissertation of Muranov A.K. on obtaining the scientific degree of candidate of legal sciences: "Administrative-legal regime of non-lethal weapons: problems of formation and implementation", in paragraph 9 of the conclusions it is stated as follows: "It is advisable to make changes in the sources of public international law, containing norms that restrict or prohibit certain types of weapons. The amendments should be aimed at establishing the possibility of using in international armed conflicts non-lethal weapons, which are currently prohibited for use, but are more humane than traditional means of armament".

This clearly demonstrates the attitude of representatives of the Russian Federation to international non-proliferation agreements and international law in general. Such judgements look especially cynical against the background of the Russian propaganda media's publication of information on the tactics of the occupation forces' use of the relevant chemical munitions, which consists in "smoking out" Ukrainian soldiers from defensive structures for their further destruction by artillery and small arms fire.

**RGR grenade**

60 mm hand-held gas grenade, CS equipment, range - up to 200 m

"JSC 'Research Institute of Applied Chemistry' is also a manufacturer of RGR aerosol grenades, which were also used by the occupiers against the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine. The official website of the Kazakh enterprise LLP NPO Applied Chemistry - Kazakhstan (link https://niph.kz/index.php?route-product/product&product_id=86) contains information on an irritant grenade, where the manufacturer is listed as "JSC FIC NII Applied Chemistry".

In addition, on 13.08.2013, a video entitled "RGR" was posted on the YouTube video hosting on the channel "FISCH NII Applied Chemistry" (<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ukfBT1LP8-o>) with the description "Irritant hand grenade - RGR. The grenade is designed to suppress the mental and volitional stability of offenders during special operations and in the suppression of mass disorders".

On the Internet, the official website of the Russian state special exporting company Rosoboronexport (link https://roe.ru/pdfs/pdf_425.pdf) contains information about the

RGR hand-held irritant grenade containing the irritant CS.

It was established that the bodies of the RGR grenades bear the designations of the manufacturer, namely the aforementioned digital index "862". According to the Russian information resource "Kompanium", "JSC 'Research Institute of Applied Chemistry' supplied "Grenades" and "Other Ammunition" to the "Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia", "Federal Security Forces of Russia", military units of the Russian Guard" and other military formations of the Russian Federation as part of the execution of state defence orders.



40 mm gas grenade «VGM 93.200»

Equipment - CS

Range - up to 200 meters

Maximum volume

of an enclosed space

up to 300 cubic meters




Hand-held gas grenade

High irritant hand grenade (DROFA-PM)

Equipment - CS

Range - not less than 200 meters.



Improvised explosive devices equipped with ammonia, chloropicrin and other irritant agents.

In general, all of the above confirms that chemical riot control agents, namely K-51, RGR and RG-VO grenades produced by Russian enterprises, were supplied to Russian military formations and are actively used by the troops of the aggressor state on the battlefield.