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**DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,  
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION IN 2022**



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## INTRODUCTION

1. In 2022, progress continued to be made in addressing the use of chemical weapons, destroying the remaining declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, implementing and enhancing industry verification, delivering international cooperation and assistance, addressing the challenges posed by chemical terrorism, and broadening and sustaining the OPCW's education and outreach efforts.
2. In the process of the destruction of declared chemical weapons in 2022, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") verified the destruction of 371.310 metric tonnes (MT) of Category 1 chemical weapons.
3. Between entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and 31 December 2022, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of 70,135.346 MT<sup>1</sup> of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, representing 99.49% of the total amount of declared agent. The United States of America, the remaining possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed, continued to work towards the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpiles in 2023.
4. China and Japan continued to cooperate bilaterally in relation to the destruction, excavation, and recovery of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. While in-person inspections regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) continued to be suspended in 2022 because of COVID-19-related restrictions, a remote inspection was conducted at the Haerbaling ACW storage and destruction facilities. The Secretariat, in consultation with relevant States Parties, conducted five inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCW).
5. The OPCW carried out 160 inspections of industrial facilities in 2022. While that is twice the number of those conducted in 2021, the continued reduction in the number of Article VI inspections, compared to pre-pandemic levels, was a result of the remaining challenges posed by COVID-19.
6. Work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of chemical weapons in that country. The Secretariat's efforts focused largely on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018), including the operation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established pursuant to that decision, as well as on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continued its activities in 2022, guided by the relevant decisions of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and subsequently submitted declarations, continued throughout 2022.

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<sup>1</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex").

7. Significant progress was made in the project to build the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre) within the planned timeline and budget. Major construction works were completed in December 2022.
8. In 2022, the Secretariat continued to conduct capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 97 activities and programmes for 3,075 experts from all regional groups.
9. Preparations for the Fifth Review Conference<sup>2</sup> began, with the Open-Ended Working Group for the Preparation of the Fifth Review Conference (OEWG-RC) holding 11 meetings between 7 June and 13 December 2022.
10. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the OPCW's contribution to global counterterrorism efforts. The Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) examined regional approaches to countering chemical terrorism, as well as relevant points for consideration in advance of the Fifth Review Conference. Several capacity-building initiatives focused on areas relevant to countering chemical terrorism, such as legislation and chemical security.
11. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates.
12. Public interest in the work of the OPCW remained strong. The OPCW's social media platforms experienced an average growth rate of 13.5% in 2022. In-person visits resumed, while the Secretariat also continued to employ digital outreach tools.
13. In 2022, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party during the course of the year.

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<sup>2</sup> Review Conference = Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

## 1. VERIFICATION

- 1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2022 is provided in Table 1 below. The OPCW conducted 208 inspections in 2022, of which 23% were related to chemical weapons. Operations connected with non-routine missions accounted for a further 892 inspector days in 2022.

**TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2022**

Type of Facility	Number of Inspections	Number of Facilities or Sites Inspected	Number of Inspector Days
<b>Chemical Weapons-Related Inspections</b>			
CWDF <sup>3</sup>	36	4 <sup>4</sup>	4,069
CWSF <sup>5</sup>	4	2	120
CWPF <sup>6</sup>	1	1	21
OCW	5	5	49
ACW <sup>7</sup>	2	2	25
Non-routine missions	N/A		892
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5,176</b>
<b>Article VI Inspections</b>			
Schedule 1	11	11	229
Schedule 2	49	49	917
Schedule 3	6	6	62
OCPF <sup>8</sup>	94	94	861
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>2,069</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>7,245</b>

- 1.2 As at 31 December 2022, eight States Parties (a State Party,<sup>9</sup> Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared a combined total of 72,304.343 MT<sup>10</sup> of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons, as well as 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3 to this report.
- 1.3 Progress continued with respect to OCW. States Parties that declared possession of OCW continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner.

<sup>3</sup> CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

<sup>4</sup> All facilities are in the United States of America.

<sup>5</sup> CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

<sup>6</sup> CWPF = chemical weapons production facility.

<sup>7</sup> This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

<sup>8</sup> OCPF = other chemical production facility.

<sup>9</sup> As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as “a State Party”.

<sup>10</sup> This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

- 1.4 China and Japan continued to cooperate in the field of ACW and their destruction, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2022, China and Japan continued to cooperate on implementing the “Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2016 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China”, submitted to the Council at its Eighty-Fourth Session (EC-84/NAT.6, dated 2 March 2017). In addition, China and Japan jointly submitted to the Council at its 101st Session a destruction plan for beyond 2022 (EC-101/NAT.4\*, dated 30 September 2022), which contains updated information on destruction facilities and time frames for destruction.

### **Chemical weapons destruction**

- 1.5 During the reporting period, four CWDFs located in the United States of America were involved in the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons<sup>11</sup> (see Annex 2). Through a combination of the continuous presence of inspectors, the use of monitoring and dedicated recording equipment, as well as the review of relevant documentation, the Secretariat in 2022 verified the destruction of 371.310 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons.
- 1.6 Between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2022, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of: 70,135.346 MT,<sup>12</sup> or 99.49% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons; 1,810.703 MT, or 100% of declared Category 2 chemical weapons; and 417,833 items, or 100% of declared Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3 to this report.
- 1.7 As at 31 December 2022, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of a total of 27,411.538 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by the United States of America, or 98.71% of its declared stockpile. All of the United States’ Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons had previously been verified as destroyed.
- 1.8 The Secretariat verified the destruction of removed energetics components from the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) at the non-contiguous Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) site at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, the destruction of hydrolysate from the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) at the non-contiguous Veolia treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) at Port Arthur, Texas, and the destruction of the rocket motors at the BGCAPP non-contiguous Anniston SDC site. In addition, two sites of the Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF) were engaged in the test destruction of the rocket motors received from the BGCAPP. Furthermore, the United States of America declared two additional non-contiguous sites to the BGCAPP, the SDC 2000 and SDC 1200, to accelerate the destruction activities of the plant.

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<sup>11</sup> Not counting OCW or ACW (see Annex 2).

<sup>12</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex.



- 1.9 In its detailed annual plan for destruction of chemical weapons for 2023, the United States of America informed the Secretariat that a total of 313.645 MT<sup>13</sup> of Category 1 chemical agent is planned to be destroyed. This will conclude the destruction of all the stockpiled chemical weapons declared by this State Party.
- 1.10 In addition to those noted above, the United States of America made the following submissions in 2022:
- (a) BGCAPP detailed facility information (DFI) Addendum #1, Volume 2, Revision 1, regarding the destruction of hydrolysate at the Veolia TSDF;
  - (b) amendments to the chemical weapon initial declaration (update #73);
  - (c) annual report on the destruction of chemical weapons from 1 January to 31 December 2021;
  - (d) BGCAPP DFI Addendum #3, Volume 1, Revision 1, regarding the changes in the rocket motor and end cap destruction process at the Anniston SDC;
  - (e) amendments to the chemical weapon initial declaration (update #74);
  - (f) amendments to the chemical weapon initial declaration (update #75);
  - (g) PDTDF DFI Addendum #6, describing the testing and destruction of partially deformed rocket motors and shipping and firing tube end caps at the PDTDF non-contiguous Blue Grass Army Depot Controlled Detonation Chamber (BGAD CDC);
  - (h) amendments to the chemical weapon initial declaration (update #76);
  - (i) amendments to the chemical weapon initial declaration (update #77);
  - (j) BGCAPP DFI Addendum #4, Volume 1, declaring the SDC 2000 and SDC 1200 as the non-contiguous parts of the BGCAPP for the destruction of M55 rockets, separately declared M56 warheads, and their component wastes;
  - (k) BGCAPP DFI Addendum #4, Volume 2, describing the technical details for the BGCAPP SDC 2000 and SDC 1200;
  - (l) PCAPP DFI, Volume 1, Revision 1, describing the changes at the PCAPP main plant introduced to facilitate the destruction of mortars;
  - (m) modifications to the Facility Agreement and the Agreed Detailed Plan for Verification for the PCAPP;
  - (n) BGCAPP DFI, Volume 1, Revision 3, describing the changes at the main plant for processing problematic rockets and warheads; and
  - (o) a letter with proposals to conduct the 2022 annual recovered chemical weapons destruction review from 23 to 27 January 2023 at the Washington Dulles Point of Entry.

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<sup>13</sup> The rounding rules have been applied to this quantity.

- 1.11 The Secretariat conducted a visit to the BGCAPP non-contiguous SDCs in November 2022 to familiarise itself with the rocket, rocket warhead, and chemical weapon waste component destruction process. As a result, modifications and amendments to the facility agreement and the detailed plan for verification were agreed upon between the Secretariat and the United States of America and approved by the Council at its 102nd Session (EC-102/DEC.3 and EC-102/DEC.4, both dated 15 March 2023).
- 1.12 With regard to recovered chemical weapons, the Secretariat conducted an inspection from 23 to 25 January 2023 to review the documents related to the destruction of four items at the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. The review also covered the destruction of chemical weapons component wastes at the PDTDF at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and at the BGAD CDC, Kentucky.

#### **Chemical weapons storage facilities**

- 1.13 In 2022, the Secretariat conducted four inspections at two CWSFs in the United States of America. The two CWSFs remained subject to systematic verification.

#### **Chemical weapons production facilities**

- 1.14 By 31 December 2022, all 97 CWPFs declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (74 had been certified as destroyed and 23 as converted).
- 1.15 One inspection was conducted at a former CWPF in the Russian Federation in 2022.

#### **Abandoned chemical weapons**

- 1.16 Since entry into force of the Convention, three States Parties have reported ACW on their territory. One State Party, Japan, reported ACW on the territory of another State Party, China.
- 1.17 The Secretariat continued to engage, in virtual format, with Japan and China on ACW. A remote inspection was conducted at Haerbaling ACW storage and destruction facilities. The Secretariat confirmed that the new construction projects at the Haerbaling ACW destruction facility had been completed in 2022, with Japan now operating the destruction equipment on site.
- 1.18 As at 31 December 2022, 97,539 items had been declared as ACW to the Secretariat. Of these, 65,903 items of ACW had been reported as destroyed.

#### **Old chemical weapons**

- 1.19 As at 31 December 2022, 19 States Parties had declared 152,095 items of OCW produced either before 1925, or between 1925 and 1946. Approximately 77% of these were reported as destroyed. In 2022, the Secretariat conducted five OCW inspections in Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

### **Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use**

- 1.20 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2022. The Secretariat focused its training on improving preparedness for IAUs, more specifically methodology and execution of reconnaissance, documentation, and sampling procedures in field environments. In addition, one table-top exercise/workshop was held. A total of 53 inspectors participated in these events.

### **OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

- 1.21 In January 2022, the Secretariat issued two reports by the FFM on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 1.22 The first report (S/2017/2022\*, dated 24 January 2022) reported on two allegations of use in Marea, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 and 3 September 2015. The report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that scheduled chemicals of the family of mustard agents were used in Marea on 1 September 2015, resulting in injuries to more than 50 persons. While information was found regarding a similar incident two days later, on 3 September, the results of analysis of all available data obtained did not allow the FFM to establish whether or not chemicals were used as a weapon in this incident.
- 1.23 The second report (S/2020/2022, dated 31 January 2022) concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a chlorine cylinder was used as a chemical weapon in the town of Kafr Zeita, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 October 2016, causing 20 persons to suffer from suffocation and breathing difficulties.
- 1.24 The FFM is currently working on allegations that have been assessed as credible. Since the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference, the FFM had carried out three deployments to collect further information regarding allegations under review, on which States Parties were briefed on 23 February, 28 June, and 28 September 2022.
- 1.25 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2022 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat (S/2124/2023, dated 20 January 2023).

### **Declaration Assessment Team**

- 1.26 In 2022, the Secretariat continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Convention, paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 (dated 27 September 2013), paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4 (dated 23 March 2016), paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2 (dated 9 July 2020). The shortcomings noted in the declarations are raised with the Syrian National Authority as outstanding issues until the Secretariat receives sufficient information to consider these issues as resolved.

- 1.27 As a result of the declaration-related consultations between the Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority since 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic had, by the end of 2022, submitted a total of 17 amendments to its initial declaration. These amendments contained previously undeclared elements, including: one additional CWPF; four additional chemical weapons research and development facilities; activities involving five previously undeclared chemical warfare agents; a substantial amount of previously undeclared chemical munitions; and other supplementary information about all of the segments of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
- 1.28 Since 2014, the Secretariat has raised and reported a total of 24 outstanding issues, of which four have been resolved. The last issue was opened by the Secretariat in April 2021 following insufficient explanations provided by the Syrian National Authority on the presence of a chemical warfare agent in the large-volume storage containers at the CWPF declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons. In the reporting period, the Syrian National Authority did not provide further clarifications on this matter.
- 1.29 The substance of the remaining 20 issues involves large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical agents and chemical munitions. Additionally, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of the declaration-related measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.
- 1.30 The last, namely the twenty-fourth, round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in February 2021 in Damascus. Between April 2021 and May 2022, the Secretariat's efforts to organise the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority remained unsuccessful, inter alia, because of the Syrian Arab Republic's refusal to issue a visa to the DAT's lead technical expert.
- 1.31 In May 2022, the Secretariat proposed to address the declaration-related issues through exchange of correspondence, and in September 2022 the Secretariat provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019 that could assist in resolving the currently 20 outstanding issues. Despite the Syrian Arab Republic's agreement to this proposal, as of 31 December 2022, the Syrian National Authority had not submitted any declarations or documents requested by the Secretariat.
- 1.32 In light of the above, and since none of the requested declarations or documents had been provided, in December 2022, the Secretariat proposed, with the agreement of the Syrian Arab Republic, to deploy a reduced team comprised of several members of the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct Limited In-Country Activities (LICA) in early 2023. These LICA would not include technical discussions between experts.
- 1.33 The Director-General continued to report all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions through his Notes circulated to the Council at its Ninety-Ninth, 100th, and 101st Sessions.<sup>14</sup> In the last Note issued in 2022 (EC-101/HP/DG.2), the Director-General concluded that "the Secretariat assesses that

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<sup>14</sup> EC-99/HP/DG.1 (dated 2 March 2022); EC-100/HP/DG.1 (dated 29 June 2022); and EC-101/HP/DG.2 (dated 28 September 2022).

the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 (dated 27 September 2013), EC-94/DEC.2 (dated 9 July 2020), Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018) and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013)".

### **Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre**

- 1.34 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities "on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings".
- 1.35 The Secretariat had planned to conduct two rounds of inspections at the SSRC in 2022. The ninth round of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC was conducted in September 2022. For operational reasons, the Secretariat postponed the round of inspections scheduled to take place in December 2022.
- 1.36 With regard to the Schedule 2.B.04 chemical detected during the third round of inspections in November 2018 at the Barzah facility of the SSRC, the Secretariat has engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic mostly through the exchange of notes verbales. As previously reported, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.

### **Implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3**

- 1.37 The IIT continued its investigation into several incidents identified in Annex 2 to Note EC-91/S/3 (dated 28 June 2019) entitled "Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)".
- 1.38 The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic did not engage with the IIT, despite:
  - (a) various requests addressed to them by the Secretariat;
  - (b) the obligation by the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the Secretariat under paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Convention; and
  - (c) the obligation incumbent on the Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), to cooperate fully with the OPCW by providing personnel designated by the OPCW with immediate and unfettered access to any and all sites and individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate.
- 1.39 The IIT continued to request to meet with key representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, at their convenience and at a location of their choosing, to discuss the IIT's work, the provision of any relevant information, and access to locations that the Syrian authorities may be able to facilitate.

- 1.40 Pursuant to paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3 and the memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM) regarding the provision of access, storage, and handling of information and evidence, the IIT continued preparations for further transfers to the IIIM, in follow-up to the first transfer which took place in October and November 2020.
- 1.41 IIT personnel further worked with other units and offices to enhance the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Secretariat in providing States Parties with technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, as decided in paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3.

### Industry verification

- 1.42 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, import, export, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention’s Annex on Chemicals, as well as declarations related to OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2022.

**TABLE 2: DECLARABLE FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022**

Type of Facility	Declarable Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection <sup>15</sup>	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities <sup>16</sup>	States Parties with Facilities Subject to Inspection
Schedule 1	28	28	24	24
Schedule 2	442	209	34	24
Schedule 3	358	339	32	32
OCPF	4,507	4,335	81	80
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,335</b>	<b>4,911</b>	<b>82<sup>17</sup></b>	<b>82<sup>18</sup></b>

- 1.43 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 160 Article VI inspections in 2022. This reduced number, compared to the planned 180 inspections, was a result of the remaining restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. These 160 inspections comprised 11 Schedule 1 facilities, 49 Schedule 2 plant sites, 6 Schedule 3 plant sites, and 94 OCPFs (respectively 39%, 23%, 2%, and 2% of the total of inspectable facilities). No uncertainties were recorded. Eleven inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention, and 103 inspections recommended further information to be provided in declarations. In addition, two inspections were carried out at plant sites that were found during those inspections not to be inspectable because of declaration errors.

<sup>15</sup> Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.

<sup>16</sup> Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities (ADAAs) and annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs).

<sup>17</sup> Eighty-two States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

<sup>18</sup> Eighty-two States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

**TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS**

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year								
2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
241	241	241	241	241	241	82	80	160

- 1.44 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2022, the site selection was performed as described in the “Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites” (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.
- 1.45 In 2022, the Secretariat, supported by States Parties, continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of saving resources. The percentage of inspections that were part of a sequential mission increased significantly from 26% in 2021 to 46% in 2022. The 34 sequential missions shown in Table 4 below were carried out in 16 different countries, including 18 long industry missions to eight different countries. Thirty-two sequential missions were intra-country, with the remaining two consisting of long inter-country missions. The 2022 annual inspection plan has not been completed in full, owing to constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Those constraints resulted in delayed resumption of industry missions, long quarantine periods as well as limited availability of flights. Twenty inspections planned by the Secretariat were not conducted in 2022.

**TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS**

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year								
2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
51	59	54	58	58	60	20	21	34

- 1.46 In 2022, the Secretariat continued the work of a cross-divisional team to perform a thorough review of inspection practices, inspection report templates, inspection tools, and inspection training to identify further options to optimise the conduct of inspections. The status of this work was reported to States Parties during the Annual Meeting of National Authorities in November 2022. Report templates for OCPF, Schedule 3, and Schedule 2 inspections were finalised at the end of 2022 and were planned to be field tested in the first half of 2023.
- 1.47 In 2022, sampling and analysis activities during Article VI inspections were suspended because of challenges related to COVID-19. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5 below.

**TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES**

Number of Inspections Completed with Sampling and Analysis by Year								
2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
9	11	11	10	9	6	1	0	0

### **Declarations**

- 1.48 In 2022, 67 of the 82 States Parties (82.5%) that submitted ADPAs did so by the deadline imposed by the Convention. In the year under review, 72.5% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs fully updated the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 95% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing full, annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.

### **Transfers of scheduled chemicals**

- 1.49 Twenty-three transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by 11 States Parties in their ADPAs for 2021. Nineteen of these transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties, and three transfers were notified by both but declared by only one State Party.
- 1.50 ADPAs for 2021 indicated that 51 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 6,467 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 124 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 413,133 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.51 Eleven States Parties declared the export of six Schedule 3 chemicals to three States not Party.

### **Transfer discrepancies**

- 1.52 In 2022, ADPAs for 2021 indicated a total of 1,625 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 831 transfers were declared with quantities above the declaration threshold, of which 618 involving 94 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.53 The Secretariat continued to follow up with the States Parties in this regard and to work closely with other stakeholders to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

### **Riot control agents**

- 1.54 At the end of the reporting period, 137 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 53 States Parties had declared that they did not possess such agents. One State Party had not yet provided an initial declaration, and two other States Parties had not provided detailed information on riot control agents in their initial declarations. Additional information on the possession of riot control agents is provided in Annex 4 to this report.

### **Update of OPCW declaration resources**

- 1.55 In 2022, the Secretariat published an updated version of the Handbook on Chemicals, the “Most Traded Scheduled Chemicals” brochure, the OPCW Online Scheduled Chemicals Database, and the Declarations Handbook.



### **Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange System**

- 1.56 In 2022, the Secretariat identified areas of improvements to the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS) software application and documentation. This information was gathered mainly during trainings and consultations with States Parties. These changes will be added to the next EDIS release scheduled for 2023. By the end of the reporting period, 117 active users from 62 States Parties had registered to use the Secure Information Exchange (SIX) system.
- 1.57 In 2022, the Secretariat provided EDIS training as a component of various Article VI-related training activities. In addition, the Secretariat provided on-demand virtual training and consultations on EDIS and SIX to requesting States Parties.

### **Analytics platform and business intelligence**

- 1.58 The Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, which includes a data warehouse software application (WhereScape) and a business intelligence software application (Qlik Sense). Qlik Sense will replace the older business intelligence software application (Cognos).

### **Electronic Inspections Tool**

- 1.59 The Electronic Inspections Tool (eINS) software application was released to inspectors in 2022 to streamline and digitise the inspection process. This tool is part of the cross-divisional Article VI optimisation project to improve work efficiencies in all aspects of the current verification process.

### **Verification Information System**

- 1.60 In 2022, the Secretariat continued the execution of the Verification Information System-Industry (VIS-I) modernisation project. The focus was on the design of new architecture, the creation of a comprehensive list of tasks to be carried out as part of the modernisation process, and the finalisation of the project plan for related software development activities.

### **Informal consultations**

- 1.61 Four informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections (Industry Cluster consultations) were conducted in 2022. Meetings were held in a hybrid format. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of verification-related topics, including:
- (a) Schedule 2 inspections – current backlog and the future;
  - (b) progress against the 2022 inspection plan;
  - (c) chemicals transfers – development of a prototype based on distributed ledger technology (DLT);
  - (d) Article VI and related training opportunities; and
  - (e) performance of the methodology for the selection of OCPF plant sites for inspection in 2021.

### **OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories**

- 1.62 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that wish to be a part of the OPCW's network of analytical laboratories. During the reporting period, the Fiftieth Official OPCW Proficiency Test for Environmental Analysis was completed, the Fifty-First Test was conducted and completed, and the Fifty-Second Test began. Additionally, the Seventh Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test was conducted. At the end of the reporting period, 25 laboratories from 21 States Parties had been designated for environmental analysis, and 20 laboratories from 14 States Parties had been designated for biomedical sample analysis. Annex 5 to this report shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2022.
- 1.63 A confidence-building exercise for the analysis of biologically derived toxins was finished at the beginning of 2022, and a seventh exercise began in November 2022. These exercises were specifically targeted at the analysis of the protein toxin ricin and/or the biological toxin saxitoxin.

### **Project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology**

- 1.64 In 2022, significant progress was made in the project to build the ChemTech Centre. Despite impacts from global inflation and challenges with supply chains, the project remained within budget. Major construction works were completed in December 2022 and no change is expected to the overall planning timelines. The inauguration ceremony of the ChemTech Centre would be held on 12 May 2023 as announced in Note S/2119/2022 (dated 14 December 2022) entitled "Centre for Chemistry and Technology: Inauguration Ceremony – 12 May 2023." As of the end of 2022, a total of EUR 34.25 million had been raised for the Centre from 54 countries, the European Union, and other donors.
- 1.65 Regular updates on project progress were provided in Notes S/2026/2022 (dated 17 February 2022), S/2072/2022 (dated 24 June 2022), and S/2112/2022 (dated 17 November 2022), all entitled "Progress in the Project to Upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology". Briefings were provided to States Parties on multiple occasions. The Secretariat has continued with other project-related communication and outreach activities. These include the updating of the ChemTech Centre webpage on the OPCW website, the display at OPCW Headquarters of the donor wall and a physical model of the ChemTech Centre, and the production and sharing on the ChemTech Centre webpage of a construction progress video.

### **OPCW Central Analytical Database**

- 1.66 Table 6 below reflects the number of chemicals covered in the OPCW Central Analytical Database for each technique for the last five years. Only the gas chromatography (retention index) and mass spectrometry data were used in on-site analysis.

**TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHEMICAL SPECIES IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE**

<b>Status at the Beginning of:</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>
Infrared (IR)	756	775	775	794	805
Gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI))	4,439	4,482	4,543	4,588	4,596
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)	298	299	300	300	300
Mass spectrometry (MS)	4,566	4,602	4,647	4,673	4,682
Tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)	N/A	N/A	38	68	68

### **Training provided by the Inspectorate Division**

- 1.67 In 2022, the Capacity-Building and Contingency-Planning Cell (CBCP) of the Inspectorate Division coordinated or delivered 53 individual training courses which took place in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The CBCP, supported by other parts of the Secretariat, continued to provide mandatory inspector refresher trainings as well as specialised courses in occupational health and safety, the OPCW confidentiality regime, ordnance training, explosive remnants of war, mobile laboratory deployment, and analytical chemist certification, among others.
- 1.68 The United States of America provided support in the delivery of one initial and five refresher hazardous waste operations and emergency response courses to a total of 117 Secretariat staff members.
- 1.69 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland sponsored a diplomatic skills course delivered at the OPCW Headquarters for 13 Secretariat staff members.
- 1.70 Further, one Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) course was sponsored and hosted by Germany. As a result, 15 Secretariat staff members whose jobs could require deployment to high-risk areas received training.
- 1.71 In 2022, three toxic chemicals training courses took place, two in Serbia, and one in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, respectively. A total of 73 Secretariat staff members received their certification, with five inspectors becoming qualified toxic chemical training instructors in the process.
- 1.72 In September 2022, a group of 13 new inspectors (Group U) joined the OPCW. The CBCP, together with other parts of the Secretariat, facilitated a 12-week mandatory initial training aimed at preparing them for their important role as inspectors. On 9 December 2022, the OPCW held a graduation ceremony at OPCW Headquarters, during which the Director-General awarded the certificates of training completion to the inspectors from Group U and welcomed them officially to the team.

### **Knowledge management**

- 1.73 In 2022, the Secretariat further strengthened its knowledge management policy framework with a knowledge strategy aligned with the Organisation's strategic goals and based on continuous knowledge management, which aims to identify, develop, and retain expertise and knowledge in the Organisation through a set of continuous processes. The Secretariat implemented new and improved existing processes as part of this strategy, with priority given to specific expertise in the Inspectorate and Verification Divisions.
- 1.74 Throughout 2022, the Verification Division consolidated its network of knowledge champions across the Division and fine-tuned the process of knowledge transfer activities, especially for staff members who were separating from the Organisation. The Verification Division also actively used SharePoint-based knowledge repositories, such as VERCOM, which captures noteworthy communications exchanged between the States Parties and the Division in the context of the declaration process. In light of the expected conclusion of chemical weapons stockpile destruction programmes, the Verification Division also worked to preserve relevant knowledge, which included an analysis of historic chemical weapons destruction data.
- 1.75 In 2022, the Inspectorate Division continued to implement knowledge management to enable sustainable operations. Among others, this ensures continuity of operations and retention of knowledge, skills, and expertise towards and beyond the completion of destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Implementation and development continued for a number of tailored activities and processes, such as mentoring, knowledge transfer sessions, knowledge sharing presentations, as well as digital tools to assist in capturing and preserving lessons learned from inspections. These processes focus on skills and expertise relevant to missions and deployment, and support the Inspectorate in improving the quality and sustainability of its operations.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2022, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 97 activities and programmes benefitting a total of 3,075 experts from across all regions.
- 2.2 These activities included online, hybrid, and in-person activities. Beginning in late March 2022, the Secretariat gradually resumed in-person capacity-building activities because of the improving pandemic situation and the relaxation of restrictions on international travel.

### **National implementation and technical assistance**

- 2.3 In 2022, the Secretariat continued to strengthen States Parties' national capacities to fully and effectively implement the Convention. More than 950 participants from all regions took part in 23 technical assistance activities which focused on enhancing institutional capacities to meet their obligations under the Convention.
- 2.4 As of 31 December 2022, 158 of 193 States Parties had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures. A total of 122 States Parties had reported on the adoption of comprehensive legislation covering all required initial measures, while 36 had reported on the adoption of implementing legislation covering some of the required initial measures. The remaining 35 States Parties had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation. Detailed information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.<sup>19</sup>
- 2.5 The Secretariat conducted three national legislative review forums in 2022, with the National Authorities of Malawi (30 May), the Niger (14 July), and Kenya (20 October). During these forums, the Secretariat reviewed jointly with State Party delegates the scope of their national legislative frameworks on the Convention and discussed various legislative and regulatory approaches to its implementation.
- 2.6 Three training courses on declarations and inspections obligations under Article VI of the Convention were held in 2022. These include two online courses, from 7 to 25 February and from 25 April to 11 May, respectively, and one in-person training for States Parties of the Latin American and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC) in Quito, Ecuador from 4 to 7 October. These courses equipped participants with the knowledge and skills required to submit accurate and timely annual declarations under Article VI of the Convention, and also provided delegates with practical guidance to facilitate the process of receiving and escorting OPCW inspections. A total of 77 participants from 34 States Parties attended the online courses in February and April/May, respectively, while 44 participants from 14 States Parties took part in the training in Quito.

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<sup>19</sup> Annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention in 2022: EC-101/DG.13\* C-27/DG.9 (dated 9 September 2022) and Add.1 (dated 3 October 2022); EC-101/DG.16 C-27/DG.12 (dated 15 September 2022); and EC-101/DG.14 C-27/DG.10 (dated 12 September 2022).

- 2.7 From 19 to 21 September 2022, the Secretariat held at OPCW Headquarters a pilot forum on verification issues for States Parties with Schedule 2 plant sites. A total of 27 delegates from 17 States Parties attended the forum.
- 2.8 In 2022, the Secretariat conducted two regional workshops on best practices in the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks on chemical security: for States Parties in Asia from 27 to 29 July 2022 in Bangkok, Thailand; and for States Parties of GRULAC from 27 to 29 September 2022 in San Salvador, El Salvador. The workshop for Asian States Parties was attended by 47 participants from 11 States Parties and the workshop for GRULAC States Parties was attended by 44 participants from 14 States Parties.
- 2.9 Two regional training courses were held on the basics of the Convention for personnel of National Authorities and relevant stakeholders: for States Parties in Africa from 23 to 25 August in Lomé, Togo; and for Asian States Parties from 11 to 14 October 2022 in Putrajaya, Malaysia. A total of 36 participants from 20 States Parties attended the training in Africa while 36 participants from 25 States Parties attended the training in Asia.
- 2.10 The Secretariat, in cooperation with the World Customs Organization, held an online training course on the enforcement of the Convention's transfers regime for scheduled chemicals from 16 to 18 May 2022, and conducted a train-the-trainers course for representatives of customs training institutions from 6 to 9 September 2022 at OPCW Headquarters. The online course was attended by 58 participants from 34 States Parties, while 49 participants from 18 States Parties attended the train-the-trainers course.
- 2.11 Four regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties were held in May and June 2022. During the meetings, National Authorities provided updates on issues concerning national implementation of the Convention, discussed challenges, and shared lessons learned. Representatives also engaged with the Secretariat on a range of issues relating to strengthening national capacities under Articles VI, VII, X, and XI of the Convention, and were briefed on the Secretariat's technical assistance and capacity-building agenda. Meetings were held for the Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean regions.
- 2.12 A global stakeholders forum on the adoption of national implementing legislation was held from 13 to 15 September 2022 at the OPCW Headquarters. The forum enhanced the understanding of national stakeholders on comprehensive implementing legislation and helped to support road maps for their adoption. Thirty-one delegates from 10 States Parties participated in the forum.
- 2.13 The Secretariat organised from 17 to 20 October 2022 in Brisbane, Australia, a subregional forum on national implementation in the Pacific Island States. The forum revitalised the Secretariat's engagement with the subregion by bringing together 11 Pacific Island States Parties and key regional counterparts to promote regional cooperation through the sharing of experiences, challenges, and good practices. A total of 45 delegates from 19 States Parties participated.

- 2.14 From 18 to 20 October 2022, the Secretariat held the Ninth Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention in Doha, Qatar. Participants discussed, inter alia, capacity-building needs and ways to enhance cooperation between National Authorities and chemical industry to address transportation security risks. In all, 70 participants from 26 States Parties attended the meeting.
- 2.15 From 16 to 18 November in Dakar, Senegal, the Secretariat held a regional workshop for French-speaking African States Parties on the role of national implementing legislation in addressing threats arising from non-State actors. A total of 51 delegates from 14 States Parties attended the workshop, along with representatives from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).
- 2.16 The Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties was held from 22 to 25 November 2022 at OPCW Headquarters in The Hague. National Authorities shared experiences, knowledge, and good practices related to the implementation of the Convention and the enhancement of chemical security. The annual meeting attracted 137 participants from 102 States Parties representing all regional groups.

#### **Assistance and protection**

- 2.17 In 2022, 71 States Parties made annual submissions pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X regarding their national protective programmes against the use of chemical weapons.
- 2.18 The situation in Ukraine increased the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. In this regard, the Secretariat provided assistance and protection to Ukraine, upon its request, as provided for under Article X. Capacity-building courses were delivered, both online and in person, for first responders to be better prepared against the threat of chemical weapons use, and in case of incidents involving chemical industrial facilities.
- 2.19 The Secretariat was also engaged in providing first responders in Ukraine with the necessary equipment for chemical detection, together with training activities and capacity-building courses providing instruction on the use of such equipment. The Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X, to which States Parties contributed, was used to finance the costs of these procurements. At the end of 2022, around EUR 1 million had been committed for this purpose.
- 2.20 The Secretariat continued to promote the use of a user-friendly online tool facilitating the collection and submission of information required under paragraph 4 of Article X. This online tool has been incorporated in the updated version of the Protection and Assistance Databank (PAD). The PAD is accessible to States Parties through the external server known as “Catalyst”.
- 2.21 The core components of the capacity-building activities run by the Secretariat under Article X are based on a three-component training cycle that comprises a basic, advanced, and exercise course. In the second quarter of 2022, face-to-face activities resumed and were combined with online activities, as well as some in a hybrid format. In 2022, 37 capacity-building events took place, benefitting 1,316 first responders from all regions.

- 2.22 Throughout 2022 the Secretariat conducted a series of online basic training courses for States Parties in all regional groups, covering theoretical and practical material related to chemical emergency response. The work done in 2021 and during the first quarter of 2022 allowed participants to move easily from online activities to face-to-face training after acquiring a solid base of theoretical knowledge.
- 2.23 The Secretariat offered a range of nine tailored specialised training courses and three train-the-trainers courses to suit the protective needs of States Parties across all regional groups. The Secretariat also relied on its Instructor Development and Exchange Programme to support the development and delivery of online training. This programme involves the international exchange of expertise and the fostering of best practices to enhance States Parties' response capabilities at the national, subregional, and regional levels. It also continued to bolster the OPCW's readiness to respond to requests for assistance.
- 2.24 In 2022, the Secretariat conducted four assistance and protection training cycles for States Parties in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean respectively, as well as two international and subregional cycles. These training cycles are an important means to strengthen the capacity of States Parties to respond to chemical incidents involving toxic chemicals. The return of face-to-face activities also made it possible to complete some training cycle programmes that had been paused because of the pandemic. The training cycles were supported by Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Pakistan, Panama, and the Republic of Korea.
- 2.25 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Secretariat offered several online capacity-building activities supported by Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Spain, and Uruguay. A first modular online course on emergency response incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals as well as a basic course on response to chemical incidents were offered. Specialised courses and chemical emergency response trainings supported by Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador were also delivered.
- 2.26 To support nurses in Panama in responding to chemical incidents, the Secretariat offered an online pilot project based on a basic course on assistance and protection. The project was supported by the Government of Spain (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence Military School and the Gómez Ulla Military Hospital), the Ministry of Health of Panama, the University of Panama, and the Meritorious Fire Department of the Republic of Panama. This activity aimed to widen the participation of female front-line responders, especially nurses, in chemical emergencies.
- 2.27 In response to a request for assistance in preparation for the FIFA World Cup 2022, the OPCW assisted first responders from Qatar in gaining skills in handling chemical emergencies during the national workshop on chemical emergency protection and response during major sports events, held from 21 to 25 August 2022 in Doha.
- 2.28 Under the fifth phase of the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Africa Programme"), further progress was made with regard to establishing and strengthening national and regional capacity to respond to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. In 2022, the Secretariat delivered 23 capacity-building activities that benefited 461 participants from 39 African States Parties. These events included 13 activities organised specifically for the Africa region.



- 2.29 To make the best use of regional and subregional capacities and expertise in Africa, the Secretariat continued to work with the regional economic communities to coordinate the delivery of capacity-building support for States Parties in each subregion. Capacity-building activities continued to follow the training cycle approach, in addition to specialised activities focusing on specific needs, such as developing hospital preparedness for chemical emergencies and conducting sampling and analysis in highly contaminated environments following a chemical attack or incident.
- 2.30 The implementation of Article X in the framework of the Africa Programme in 2022 also included the launch, as a pilot project in Africa, of the Online Self-Assessment Tool (OSAT), with the technical and financial support of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The OSAT is aimed at helping States Parties, initially those in the Southern African Development Community, to assess chemical safety and security risks from hazardous chemicals, audit existing response capacities, and identify necessary improvement measures, including those that the OPCW could help build. Following the completion of the design phase, the implementation phase was launched with the financial support of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The OSAT is expected to contribute to the further development of national programmes for protective purposes in Africa, and is being exported as a tool to other regions.
- 2.31 Efforts within the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons continued to support the network's objectives. Furthermore, broader participation in the funding of its activities, in accordance with the relevant decision of the Conference (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011), was encouraged in support of future projects. In 2022, the Secretariat continued to work with an international group of experts to draft a second guidebook for medical practitioners focusing on the long-term care of victims, which is in the final stage of drafting and is expected to be published in 2023.
- 2.32 The balance of the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 130,593. The Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,572,974, with 47 States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X.

### **International cooperation and technological development**

- 2.33 In 2022, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and facilitate international cooperation to advance the peaceful uses of chemistry. The programmes under Article XI were offered online in the three thematic areas of integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge.
- 2.34 During the year under review, 34 capacity-building programmes and events covering the three thematic areas were carried out by the Secretariat for 747 participants. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement four standing programmes, namely the Fellowship Programme, the Programme for the Support of Research Projects, the Conference Support Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme.
- 2.35 The seventh edition of the Review and Evaluation Workshop of the Components of an Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article XI (C-16/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2011) was organised in a hybrid format on 14 November 2022. A total of 44 participants from 25 States Parties representing National Authorities, Permanent

Representations, and relevant stakeholders participated in this workshop, whose aim was to facilitate discussion and the exchange of views among States Parties and relevant stakeholders to further the full implementation of Article XI of the Convention. The workshop featured discussion on ongoing capacity-building efforts under Article XI, as well as the impact of related programmes and activities, including deliberations on progress and gaps. The Secretariat also briefed participants on its efforts to strengthen programmes and interventions in all thematic areas, including on the results review study of the Fellowship Programme.

- 2.36 The Secretariat organised from 28 July to 8 September the twenty-third edition of the OPCW Associate Programme, which aims at supporting national implementation of the Convention, with a particular focus on building industry-related skills and knowledge. The course included a training segment at OPCW Headquarters covering topics such as the verification regime, the inspection process, the role of National Authorities, and international cooperation and assistance, as well as a studying segment at the University of Surrey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, during which the participants developed skills on the operation of chemical plants and chemical engineering theories in simulated industry environments. In all, there were 27 participants representing 27 States Parties. At the end of the reporting period, the Associate Programme Alumni Network comprised 487 alumni from 121 States Parties.
- 2.37 In the area of integrated chemicals management, the Secretariat organised a series of 13 global and regional capacity-building events on chemical safety and security, 11 of which were held in person in Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Germany (two), Italy, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Peru, the Republic of Korea, and Zimbabwe. These events included an Executive Programme on Integrated Chemicals Management from 11 to 14 October, jointly organised with the Prime Minister's Office of Mauritius and co-funded by the European Union. The programme aimed at raising awareness and building capacity on integrated chemicals management and peaceful uses of chemistry among the senior and middle management of industry, laboratories, and government institutions. Seventeen participants from 11 States Parties took part in this programme.
- 2.38 The second phase of the Chemical Safety and Security Tools Development Programme, focused on developing indicative guidelines for the transportation of hazardous chemicals by road, was launched with a workshop in Wuppertal, Germany from 4 to 6 April 2022. Experts discussed the practices regarding the transportation of hazardous chemicals in respective countries and regions and brainstormed ways to develop indicative guidelines to benefit States Parties and the chemical industry.
- 2.39 Within the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, nine training courses on the analysis of Convention-related chemicals and on OPCW proficiency testing were held in 2022, organised by laboratories from Finland, India, Spain, South Africa, and by the OPCW Laboratory in Rijswijk. In addition, to equip qualified analytical chemists from laboratories that support, or plan to support, customs services or offices in acquiring further experience and practical knowledge on the analysis of chemicals, the Secretariat organised an analytical skills development course for analytical chemists supporting customs services in States Parties in Africa. This was held at the Institute of Industrial Organic Chemistry in Warsaw, Poland and attended by 20 chemists from 16 States Parties. The course was funded through a voluntary contribution from the United States of America within the framework of the Africa Programme.

- 2.40 To further enhance the capacity of laboratories in Africa and in Latin America and the Caribbean, the third phase of the “Project on Assessing and Enhancing the Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States: Towards OPCW Designation” was completed on 31 March 2022. The project, funded from a voluntary contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was renewed in September 2022 until 31 March 2023. Project activities continue to focus on building the capacity of six analytical laboratories in two African and two GRULAC Member States.
- 2.41 Under the Equipment Exchange Programme, the Secretariat obtained from a German commercial laboratory two laboratory devices, namely an Agilent Flame Photometric Detector and a Dionex ASE 350 Accelerated Solvent Extractor for samples, which were donated in December to the National Authority of Uganda.
- 2.42 Throughout the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to focus on promoting chemical knowledge. In this connection, it launched the Education and Training Programme on Peaceful Uses of Chemistry for Youth, with the support of the European Union. The first edition of the training was held online on 7 April 2022, and the second edition took place in person in Kenitra, Morocco, from 31 October to 4 November 2022, in collaboration with the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, the Moroccan Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation, and the National School of Chemistry. The training aimed at raising awareness of participating youth on the Convention, education and ethical issues for chemists, multiple uses of chemicals, and the importance of chemical safety and security management in ensuring the peaceful uses of chemicals, among others, and was attended by 17 participants from 10 States Parties.
- 2.43 From 9 to 10 November 2022, the Secretariat, in cooperation with UNICRI, organised a Symposium on Women in Chemistry in Turin, Italy. The symposium highlighted the contribution of women to peaceful uses of chemistry and raised awareness of the opportunities for capacity and knowledge development for women in chemistry. During the symposium, a “Compendium of Best Practices on the Engagement and Advancement of Women in Chemical Safety and Security” was launched. The compendium, jointly produced by the OPCW and UNICRI with funding from the European Union, identifies best practices in recruiting, training, and promoting women in chemistry, and serves as a guide for policymakers and practitioners in the field of chemistry on gender inclusivity.
- 2.44 Under the Fellowship Programme, the Secretariat continues to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information between fellows and institutions, while at the same time strengthening the institutions in the targeted countries through capacity building. A total of 12 fellowships were completed in 2022, as follows: one from Argentina (hosted in the Netherlands), two from Cameroon (hosted in Germany), one from Cuba (hosted in Italy), one from Cuba (hosted in Mexico), one from Nigeria (hosted in South Africa), one from Nigeria (hosted in United States of America), one from Serbia (hosted in Finland), one from Uganda (hosted in Germany), one from Uganda (hosted in South Africa), one from Uganda (hosted in Finland), and one from Uruguay (hosted in the Netherlands). Two fellowships that began in 2022 are to be completed in 2023, one from Ukraine (hosted in Poland) and one from Serbia (hosted in Hungary).

- 2.45 Under the Programme for the Support of Research Projects, the Secretariat continued to extend its support to small-scale research projects in States Parties to help promote the development of scientific and technical knowledge in chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes relevant to the Convention. As at the end of 2022, the Secretariat continued to support 26 ongoing research projects.
- 2.46 Furthermore, the continued importance of enhancing capacity-building needs assessments for the delivery of pertinent and effective programmes was underscored in 2022. In this context, the Secretariat invited States Parties, on a voluntary basis, to submit assessments of their specific needs in chemical safety and security management, as well as information on existing tools, guidance, and best practices in chemical management in their respective countries.
- 2.47 The programme review and lessons-learned approach and techniques were further institutionalised during the reporting period. The assessment of programme effectiveness was based on structured feedback from a wide variety of stakeholders, including participants, relevant institutions, and National Authorities of States Parties. During the reporting period, the Secretariat successfully concluded a review of the Fellowship Programme in order to draw on lessons learned for future programme improvements.

### **The Africa Programme**

- 2.48 The implementation of the fifth phase of the Africa Programme continued to progress in 2022. Throughout the year, the Secretariat significantly intensified the delivery of its targeted activities while addressing the phase's eight objectives.
- 2.49 In terms of capacity building and provision of technical assistance, which constitute the backbone of the Programme, a total of 57 relevant activities were delivered by the Secretariat in 2022, including 26 activities specifically for the Africa region.
- 2.50 These activities accommodated 935 African participants from 47 States Parties in Africa.<sup>20</sup> Activity areas included: improving national implementation of the Convention; enhancing the effectiveness of National Authorities; improving controls over cross-border transfers of scheduled chemicals; developing assistance and protection capabilities against chemical incidents and attacks; providing education on chemical safety and security management; and upgrading laboratory competencies.
- 2.51 In addition to capacity-building and technical assistance activities, in 2022 the Secretariat continued to provide sponsorship for nine fellowships and four research projects for African scientists. Eight additional African research projects were co-funded with the International Foundation for Science. Under the Conference Support Programme, the Secretariat also provided sponsorship to three international

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Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

scientific events held in Italy and Mauritius in 2022, accommodating 130 scientists from Africa. Under the Equipment Exchange Programme, as mentioned in the previous section, the transfer of two items of laboratory equipment between a commercial laboratory in Germany and the National Authority of Uganda was facilitated in December 2022.

- 2.52 The Africa Programme has continued to be funded essentially through the OPCW regular budget. The Secretariat has also continued to seek additional resources through voluntary contributions with a view to further expanding the Programme's depth, reach, and impact. Activities under the Africa Programme in 2022 received in-kind and financial support from Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. In-kind support was also provided by States Parties co-organising activities under the Programme.
- 2.53 Two special extrabudgetary projects were implemented in 2022 under the Africa Programme, namely the specialised analytical chemistry course for laboratories supporting customs services in States Parties in Africa (Warsaw, Poland, 10 to 14 October 2022) and the general training course for Africa on the Convention and national obligations for personnel of National Authorities and other national stakeholders (Lomé, Togo, 23 to 25 August 2022).
- 2.54 The Secretariat continued its outreach and cooperation with a variety of stakeholders to organise activities under the Africa Programme and to explore new synergies and initiatives. This included further development of the OPCW Africa Network.
- 2.55 In relation to Africa Programme governance, the Africa Programme Steering Committee held its fifth and sixth meetings online on 24 June and 15 November 2022, under the chairpersonship of Cameroon. The Committee continued to monitor progress and to provide support, advice, and guidance to the Secretariat.
- 2.56 In parallel to the continued implementation of the fifth phase of the Africa Programme, the Secretariat began preparations for a sixth phase. From March to May 2022, the Secretariat conducted a needs assessment survey among the African States Parties to update needs and priorities. The feedback received on the survey was analysed and thoroughly discussed with African States Parties during the Twentieth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Africa, held online from 31 May to 2 June 2022. A subsequent series of consultations held by the Secretariat from September to November with the Permanent Representations of the African States Parties determined the approach and planning to be followed in order to achieve the objectives of the sixth phase. The resulting concept was endorsed by the African States Parties during the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of National Authorities held in The Hague in November 2022. Throughout the process, the Programme Steering Committee has been kept updated on the details and progress of the consultations.

### 3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

#### Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.1 The Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference took place from 28 November to 1 December 2022. The work of the session was adapted to the operational restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference was attended by representatives of 139 States Parties, a signatory State, an observer State, and eight international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. A total of 119 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and three bodies representing the global chemical industry and scientific community also registered to attend. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security of the United States of America, and Dr Reza Najafi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, delivered statements as high-level speakers. Hon Phil Twyford, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, Mr Eivind Vad Petersson, State Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and Baroness Annabel Goldie, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, submitted video statements to the Conference as high-level speakers.
- 3.2 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 30 November 2022.
- 3.3 The Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session reviewed the status of implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, including: chemical disarmament; destruction-related issues; national implementation measures; assistance and protection; international cooperation; the activities of the ABEO; and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. States Parties discussed a report covering the activities carried out under the auspices of the Africa Programme, and also considered progress made regarding the OPCW's efforts to engage with the chemical industry and the scientific community. For the first time, the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session approved a revised mid-biennium Programme and Budget (C-27/DEC.11, dated 29 November 2022).
- 3.4 The Chairperson of the OEWG-RC, Ambassador Lauri Kuusing of Estonia, reported to the Conference on its activities (C-27/WP.1, dated 30 November 2022). The Fifth Review Conference would be held from 15 to 19 May 2023.
- 3.5 The following decisions were among those adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session:<sup>21</sup>
- (a) Scale of Assessments for 2023 (C-27/DEC.5, dated 28 November 2022);
  - (b) Extension of the Special Fund for OPCW Special Missions (C-27/DEC.7, dated 28 November 2022);
  - (c) Write-Offs of Irrecoverable Accounts Receivable and of Losses of Assets (C-27/DEC.8, dated 28 November 2022); and
  - (d) Revised Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2023 (C-27/DEC.11).

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<sup>21</sup> Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.

### **Activities of the Executive Council**

- 3.6 In 2022, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
- 3.7 The Council also:
- (a) reviewed progress in and adopted a number of decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
  - (b) reviewed the work of the DAT;
  - (c) reviewed progress in the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3;
  - (d) approved facility agreements and modifications or amendments to facility agreements between the OPCW and States Parties;
  - (e) considered the work done in the context of the Africa Programme;
  - (f) considered the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight for 2021 (EC-100/DG.3 C-27/DG.2, dated 11 April 2022);
  - (g) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters; and
  - (h) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session.

### **Activities of subsidiary bodies**

- 3.8 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter “the Confidentiality Commission”) held its Twenty-Fourth Meeting from 7 to 9 September 2022 (CC-24/1, dated 9 September 2022).
- 3.9 The ABAF held its Fifty-Second Session from 7 to 9 June 2022 (ABAF-52/1, dated 9 June 2022) and its Fifty-Third Session from 26 to 28 July 2022 (ABAF-53/1, dated 28 July 2022).
- 3.10 The SAB held its Thirty-Fourth Session from 15 to 17 March 2022 (SAB-34/1, dated 17 March 2022), its Thirty-Fifth Session from 13 to 16 June 2022 (SAB-35/1, dated 16 June 2022), and its Thirty-Sixth Session from 26 to 29 September 2022 (SAB-36/1\*, dated 29 September 2022). The SAB Temporary Working Group on the Analysis of Biotoxins held its fourth meeting on 29 and 31 March 2022 (SAB-36/WP.1, dated 29 July 2022), its fifth meeting from 21 to 23 June 2022 (SAB-36/WP.2, dated 17 November 2022), and its sixth meeting from 18 to 20 October 2022 (SAB-37/WP.1, dated 17 April 2023).
- 3.11 The ABEO held its Twelfth Session from 8 to 10 February 2022 (ABEO-12/1, dated 10 February 2022) and its Thirteenth Session from 19 to 21 July 2022 (ABEO-13/1, dated 21 July 2022).
- 3.12 The Committee on Relations with the Host Country held its Nineteenth Meeting on 7 April 2022 (EC-100/HCC/1 C-27/HCC/1, dated 13 May 2022). The Chairperson of the Council, Ambassador Ziad M.D. Al Atiyah, reported to the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session on the status of its work.

## 4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### Universality

- 4.1 In 2022, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2022. Although the COVID-19 pandemic had a continued impact on universality activities, the Secretariat maintained its practice of inviting representatives of States not Party and the signatory State to participate in selected OPCW activities, virtually or in-person as conditions allowed, including the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference.
- 4.3 Six delegates of Israel registered to participate in the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference. The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of Israel in the Netherlands throughout the year.
- 4.4 The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of South Sudan to the Benelux Countries and the European Union. Two delegates of South Sudan registered to participate in the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference. Two South Sudanese delegates also participated in the briefing for non-Hague-based Permanent Representations held in Brussels, Belgium, in November, where they met with the Director-General.
- 4.5 During the reporting period, the Secretariat also optimised various opportunities to reach out to and maintain contact with representatives of States not Party and the signatory State, including in The Hague and in the margins of international conferences and meetings.
- 4.6 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with representatives of States not Party, the signatory State, senior officials of States Parties, and in his interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

### External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.7 As set out below, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to meet with high-level officials of States Parties at the OPCW Headquarters.
- 4.8 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as to enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.

### High-level visits to the OPCW Headquarters

- 4.9 In 2022, the Director-General hosted 17 high-level visitors at the OPCW Headquarters, namely: Mr Marc Shaw, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance of the United States of America; Dr Geoffrey Shaw,



Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office; H.E. Dr Rogelio Mayta Mayta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Plurinational State of Bolivia; Senator Stefania Pucciarelli, Undersecretary for Defence of Italy; Mr Atsushi Kaifu, Director-General of Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; H.E. Mr Lejeune Mbella Mbella, Minister of External Relations of Cameroon; Ms Outi Hyvärinen, Director of the Unit for Arms Control of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland; H.E. Ms Maria Ubach, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Andorra; Mr Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chairman of the Parliament of Ukraine; H.E. Dr Reza Najafi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran; Mr Kingston Reif, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States of America; H.E. Mr Claudio Javier Rozencwaig, Undersecretary for Foreign Policy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina; Mr Stephen Lillie, Director for Defense and International Security at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; H.E. Mr Jan Lipavský, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic; H.E. Ms Dominique Hasler, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Liechtenstein; Mr Marko Štucin, State Secretary for European Affairs, International Law and the Protection of Interests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia; and H.E. Mr Mario Adolfo Búcaro Flores, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala.

- 4.10 To advance relations with the Host Country, the Director-General met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands: Ms Dominique Kuhling, the Director of Protocol and Host Country Affairs; H.E. Thijs van der Plas, Director-General of Political Affairs; and H.E. Mr Paul van den IJssel, Ambassador for International Organisations.
- 4.11 In July 2022 the Deputy Director-General, H.E. Ms Odette Melono, received H.E. Mr Pekka Haavisto, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland.

#### Visits and briefings by the Director-General and Deputy Director-General

- 4.12 During the course of the year the Director-General visited Australia, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.
- 4.13 In April, the Director-General visited Germany and met with H.E. Ms Annalena Baerbock, the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Ms Susanne Baumann, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and other high-ranking officials of the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Federal Chancellor's Office. In May, the Director-General travelled to Warsaw, Poland where he met with H.E. Mr Zbigniew Rau, the Foreign Minister of Poland, and Mr Grzegorz Piechowiak, the Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Technology of Poland. In June, the Director-General paid an official visit to Washington, D.C., the United States of America, and met with H.E. Ms Bonnie Jenkins, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ms Mallory Stewart, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, and other government officials of the United States. In September, the Director-General travelled to Switzerland to visit the Spiez Laboratory and met with senior Swiss officials, including the State Secretary for Economic Affairs, H.E. Ms Helene Budliger Artieda. In October, the Director-General

visited London, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, where he met with H.E. the Rt Hon Mr James Cleverly MP, the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (FCDO). The Director-General also met with H.E. Baroness Goldie, the Minister of State at the Ministry of Defence, and H.E. Mr Leo Docherty, the Minister of State at the FCDO. Also in October, the Director-General visited Australia and met with the Hon. Mr Tim Watts MP, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Hon. Mr Matt Thistlethwaite MP, the Assistant Minister for Defence. In November, the Director-General went to Brussels, Belgium and gave a briefing to Permanent Representatives based outside The Hague. This activity is part of the Secretariat's efforts to keep non-resident Permanent Representations apprised of developments within the Organisation, in advance of the regular sessions of the Conference.

- 4.14 The Director-General further addressed a number of international conferences and other events, including: the launch of the Competence Network CBWNet in Berlin, Germany on 29 April; the Spiez Convergence Workshop on Scientific and Technological Developments with a Potential Impact on Arms Control Issues in Spiez, Switzerland on 12 September; the Wilton Park meeting on "Securing Effective Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention" in Sussex, the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 12 October; and the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, on 20 October.
- 4.15 The Deputy Director-General visited El Salvador in September. In addition to a series of high-level meetings, the Deputy Director-General participated in the launch of a workshop on national implementation of the Convention in Latin American and Caribbean States Parties, and delivered a lecture at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of El Salvador.

#### **Protocol and privileges and immunities support**

- 4.16 The External Relations Division continued to provide protocol services to senior management and other members of the Secretariat. Additionally, the Division continued to administer the privileges and immunities of the Organisation and its staff under the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. In all, 31 Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2022.

#### **OPCW – The Hague Award**

- 4.17 The Special Risks Brigade of the Federal Police of Argentina, the Population Protection Institute of the Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition were awarded the OPCW–The Hague Award for 2022.

#### **Other activities**

- 4.18 To mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention, the OPCW held a commemorative event on 20 May 2022 entitled "The OPCW at 25 Seminar". A total of 111 participants attended the event, which took place in the Ieper Room at OPCW Headquarters.

- 4.19 The Twenty-Second Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel was convened virtually on 15 September 2022. A total of 122 delegates registered to attend.
- 4.20 On 22 and 23 September 2022, the OPCW hosted 24 fellows of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Fellowship Programme for a day of briefings by experts from the Secretariat and a tour of the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store in Rijswijk. This was the twenty-third edition of the programme.

### **Public affairs and media profile**

#### OPCW website

- 4.21 The OPCW website was visited by approximately 409,000 users in 2022, a 12.8% decrease from 2021.

#### Public outreach

- 4.22 The OPCW participated in The Hague International Open Day (16 October 2022) by hosting over 600 participants for an “OPCW at 25 years” presentation, an inspector demonstration, a tour of the memorial garden, an interactive activity about dual-use chemicals, and presentations about OPCW internship opportunities.
- 4.23 The OPCW Group Visits Programme resumed in-person visits in 2022, with 53 groups hosted throughout the year. The OPCW conducted 74 public outreach events in 2022, of which over 75% were held in-person. Through these events, the OPCW had direct interaction with over 3,000 participants.

#### T.M.C. Asser Institute

- 4.24 The thirteenth edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute’s Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction took place from 19 to 23 September. A total of 26 early- and mid-career professionals from 25 States Parties participated in this fully online version of the course, increasing their knowledge about the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The Director-General addressed the participants of the programme. The OPCW, with financial support from the European Union, awarded four scholarships for the Programme to representatives of NGOs from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

#### Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 4.25 A total of 119 civil society organisations represented by 366 individuals received approval to participate in the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference. Owing to COVID-19 restrictions, in-person attendance by civil society representatives was limited. Accredited civil society participants were invited to submit pre-recorded video statements, which were organised thematically by the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition, shared on the OPCW website, and played in the Conference venue.

- 4.26 The Secretariat provided a live webcast of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference, which attracted 3,918 views.

Social media growth

- 4.27 The Secretariat's digital communications capacity continued to increase significantly according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Each social media post and campaign is designed to increase awareness and to enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention. Overall, the OPCW's social media platforms experienced a combined growth rate of 13.5%.

**TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH**

<b>Social Media</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>Change 2021/2022</b>
Facebook followers	19,606	20,936	6.7%
Twitter followers	35,580	37,882	6.5%
YouTube followers	2,101	2,582	22.9%
LinkedIn followers	22,486	29,157	29.7%

## **5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION**

### **Administrative and budgetary matters**

- 5.1 In decision C-24/DEC.11 (dated 28 November 2019), the Conference decided that the first biennial programme and budget would be for the 2022 to 2023 biennium. Preparations made by the Secretariat for this included amended OPCW Financial Regulations and Rules effective 1 January 2021 (C-25/DEC.6, dated 30 November 2020), development of detailed and integrated templates and costing sheets to support biennial budget formulation for programme managers, and also the development of internal structures to further entrench major capital investment planning and the integration of major capital funding. The biennial Programme and Budget was approved by the Conference in December 2021 in decision C-26/DEC.11 (dated 1 December 2021). In 2022, the Organisation promulgated an administrative directive on the Programme and Budget cycle to provide further guidance for the preparation and implementation of the biennial Programme and Budget. Additionally, in 2022 the Organisation successfully implemented the 2022 Programme and Budget and prepared a revision of the 2023 Programme and Budget.
- 5.2 The Administration Division continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation's cash situation throughout 2022, apprising States Parties of the financial position on a monthly basis, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. In 2022, there was a higher-than-normal proportion of payments for assessed contributions and arrears occurring in the last month of the year, which required the Organisation to transfer EUR 5 million from the Working Capital Fund to cover operational needs in the last quarter of the year.
- 5.3 The 2021 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in July 2022 (EC-101/DG.5 C-27/DG.5, dated 25 August 2022); both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2021 Financial Statements of the OPCW continued to include a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting key trends and issues of financial importance to the Organisation.
- 5.4 The General Support Services Section provided a wide range of services, including building maintenance and management, facility support services, transportation and fleet management, shipments and removal of household goods, travel facilitation, visa and travel documentation services, conference and meeting infrastructure support, asset and property management, supplies, insurances, procurement administration, and mail and courier services, during a very dynamic and challenging period of high inflationary pressures and a higher level of travel operations.
- 5.5 Electricity consumption at the Headquarters was significantly reduced via the installation of energy-saving light bulbs wherever feasible. The replacement of older light bulbs with energy-savings bulbs will continue in 2023 but will increasingly require the replacement of outdated fixtures as a pre-requisite to using the modern bulbs.

- 5.6 Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 18.2 million in 2022. This amount was reached through 228 contracts or purchase orders raised centrally by the Procurement Section for a total value of EUR 15 million, 38 purchase orders through catalogue ordering for a total volume of EUR 0.8 million, and 686 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low-value procurements), for a total value of EUR 2.4 million.
- 5.7 In 2022, flexible working arrangements, informed by the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic, were introduced formally to manage people, time, space, resources, and workloads in a more adaptable, agile, and effective manner. Through the introduction of the Administrative Directive on Flexible Working Arrangements, the OPCW provides staff members whose positions do not require them to always work at OPCW premises with the possibility of working remotely, from The Netherlands, for up to two days a week. The Human Resources Branch developed and delivered a range of interventions to support staff members in their return to the office. In 2022, the Secretariat continued to proactively source the best candidates for positions under recruitment and to position the Organisation as a preferred place to work. This included improving the style and content of vacancy notices and organising webinars to reach new candidates and help applicants improve the quality of their applications.
- 5.8 The Secretariat continued to offer staff members and supervisors training and coaching in providing and receiving ongoing performance-related feedback, to strengthen the OPCW's performance management. Training to develop coaching skills for current and prospective supervisors was also organised. The Secretariat continued to enhance its approach to the onboarding of new staff in 2022. During the reporting period, it also continued to support States Parties' deliberations regarding the possible adaptation of the tenure policy, including through contributing workforce and data analysis, presentations, and research to support informal consultations.
- 5.9 The Secretariat continued to implement the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme in 2022. There are currently three JPOs at the Secretariat.
- 5.10 In 2022, Secretariat sustained its activities to promote and foster well-being in the workplace by providing professional support services for personnel, managers, and teams. The Secretariat augmented its efforts to build resilience and occupational health by delivering tailored interventions at different levels, mindful of the needs of a diverse and multicultural workforce.
- 5.11 The work of the Information Services Branch in 2022 was focused on rolling out additional and timely major improvements to many systems used both by staff and external stakeholders. The improvements were varied, but all were connected to the core IT strategy focused on systems that are secure, resilient, and agile.
- 5.12 The stabilisation, refinement, and optimisation of the updated enterprise resource planning (ERP) platform was a major area of focus in 2022. After successfully supporting the first year-end financial closure of the system, various ERP efficiency enhancements were implemented to better automate the year-end financial closure process. The agility and flexibility of the system was evidenced by the ability to quickly configure and roll out new functionality to support hybrid work and other key initiatives. A major project

was undertaken in 2022 to improve asset management and to ensure proper inventory of assets. This was accomplished via a shift to an improved asset system and new devices to ensure that stock inventory at the ChemTech Centre as well as corporate assets are effectively managed. Looking beyond systems used by staff directly, major improvements were made to systems used for external connections and collaboration.

- 5.13 Because of the relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions, it became simpler and easier to meet in person in 2022, both for internal and external meetings. However, robust hybrid meeting support remained a priority, and support was expanded to additional meeting and training spaces, along with the enabling of hybrid meetings in the Ooms and Ieper Rooms at Headquarters.
- 5.14 Other important developments included a move to a new network infrastructure using modern, next generation technology to better protect data and personnel from persistent cybersecurity threats, as well as to prepare for future activities, including the establishment of a new IT infrastructure at the ChemTech Centre.
- 5.15 As stated in Section 1 above, the Knowledge Management Section continued to coordinate activities related to the identification, development, and retention of knowledge at the OPCW, pursuing efforts to strengthen a knowledge-sharing culture, coordinating a Knowledge Management Champions network, and guiding staff to implement continuous knowledge management processes. The Section also continued to manage the archives, the Correspondence Management System, and the OPCW Library. The Senior Knowledge Management Advisor reported to States Parties through presentations, including at briefings related to knowledge management and its aspects related to the tenure policy. Knowledge management practices and goals were defined through the issuing of a new knowledge management strategy.

### **Internal oversight**

- 5.16 In 2022, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) continued to implement its Strategic Master Plan for 2020–2024. The Master Plan establishes the strategic objectives of the OIO, which are focused on three key pillars—people, processes, and technology—to enable the OIO to add value to the Organisation and to keep its services fit for purpose.
- 5.17 The OIO conducted the following audits and evaluations in 2022: Audit of the Use of Credit Cards; Control Self-assessment for the Statement of Internal Control (advisory); Spot Check of Payments Made to a Vendor; Audit of the ERP System–Hire-to-Separate Cycle; Audit of the Recruitment and Promotion of Inspectors; and Evaluation of Gender and Diversity in the Inspectorate, International Cooperation and Assistance, and Verification Divisions (the evaluation was conducted in 2022 and the final report will be issued in 2023).
- 5.18 In accordance with the requirements of OPCW Financial Rule 12.2.02 and paragraph 2.7 of the OIO Charter, the OIO investigates reported allegations of potential violations of the OPCW Financial Regulations, Rules and Directives issued thereunder, as well as relevant Staff Regulations, Rules, and Directives. Between July 2021 and year-end 2022, the OIO provided investigation oversight to the Secretariat by assessing allegations of potential misconduct. Since commencement of its investigation activities, the OIO investigation function has managed nine cases consisting of five reported allegations in the second half of 2021, and four reported allegations in 2022. In addition to case management, the investigations function actively contributed to the revision of the

OPCW Code of Conduct for Staff Members (AD/PER/1/Rev.1, dated 20 May 2022) and to the OPCW Uniform Guidelines for Conducting Internal Investigations (AD/ADM/26), which is still under finalisation.

- 5.19 To manage the Quality Management System (QMS) of the OPCW, the OIO performed four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and conducted management reviews of accredited areas. These enabled the OPCW to maintain certification in the accredited processes. In 2022, no external audit (surveillance assessment) was conducted by the Dutch Accreditation Council, the Raad voor Accreditatie (RvA). The next RvA assessment will be conducted in 2023. In 2022, the OIO organised one training course for Secretariat staff aimed at improving their professional skills and knowledge of the QMS and related standards. The course was conducted in person at OPCW Headquarters. An additional 12 staff members are now certified and fully competent to support QMS improvements.
- 5.20 During the period under review, the OIO continued to conduct its audits in conformity with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors–United States of America. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for Evaluation were also observed.
- 5.21 In 2022, the OIO received several requests for advice and comments concerning, among other issues, the revision of administrative directives, the improvement of internal controls, risk management (with a special focus on fraud risk), quality aspects, and IT governance.
- 5.22 Further, the OIO participated as an observer in meetings of the Committee on Contracts, the Property Survey Board, the IT Strategy Advisory Committee, the IT Steering Committee, the ERP Advisory Board, the Risk Management Committee, the COVID-19 Task Force, the ChemTech Centre Project Board, and the Investment Committee.
- 5.23 In 2022, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in its audit and evaluation reports, in order to assess the actions taken by Management in implementation of the audit recommendations. The outcome of the follow-up exercises was reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the OIO’s annual summary report. To facilitate the timely follow-up of recommendations, the OIO utilised an online SharePoint-based “Audit Tracker” tool and an “Audilytics” dashboard for reporting thereon. The implementation of the OIO’s audit and evaluation recommendations contributed to enhancing compliance with existing regulations and procedures, to further strengthening internal controls, and to improving the allocation of resources and the effectiveness of programmes and policies.
- 5.24 In addition, in 2022 the OIO also proposed amendments to Financial Regulation 12.4 and Financial Rules 12.3.04, 12.3.05, and 12.4.01. These were considered by the ABAF at its Fifty-Second Session in June 2022. The amendments to the Financial Rules were approved by the Council at its 101st Session (EC-101/DEC.1, dated 4 October 2022) and the amendments to the Financial Regulations were approved by the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session (C-27/DEC.10, dated 28 November 2022). These amendments will serve to align the Financial Regulations and Rules related to the finalisation and issuance of audit, inspection, and evaluation reports with international best practices in the United Nations system organisations.



## **Legal affairs**

- 5.25 In 2022, the Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO) provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.26 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the rules of procedure of the policy-making organs; negotiation of international agreements, including agreements on privileges and immunities, voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements, inter alia with designated laboratories and national and international agencies on the conduct of trainings and other activities; cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations; administrative policies and procedures, including the formulation and interpretation of the OPCW Staff Regulations and interim Staff Rules and other administrative issuances, as well as procurement practices, policies, and procedures; and financial questions, including those concerning commercial contracts for the procurement of goods and services, also in relation to the Headquarters of the Organisation and the ChemTech Centre. The LAO further represented the OPCW before administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial bodies, including the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization. In addition, the LAO assumed the function of Personal Data Protection Officer, serving as the focal point for internal and external questions and requests in relation to the Secretariat processing of personal data.
- 5.27 The Secretariat registered 43 international agreements in 2022 and 25 amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8 to this report).

## **Strategy and policy**

### Preparations for the Fifth Review Conference

- 5.28 The OEWG-RC met at regular intervals between 7 June and 13 December 2022, and considered a range of issues related to the operation of the Convention. The meetings featured, inter alia, presentations by the Secretariat, representatives of civil society and chemical industry associations, as well as consideration of national positions and working papers. The OEWG-RC would resume its work in 2023.

### Countering chemical terrorism

- 5.29 In 2022, the OEWG-T remained the primary platform for States Parties to interact with international experts and exchange views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. The focus of discussions in 2022 was on regional approaches to coordination on chemical terrorism and on providing input to the preparatory process for the Fifth Review Conference, including through a survey on priorities conducted among States Parties. Three meetings of the OEWG-T were held in 2022: on 22 February, 27 June, and 30 September. All were chaired by H.E. Ambassador Vusimuzi Philemon Madonsela of South Africa.
- 5.30 During a meeting of the OEWG-RC on 15 November 2022, the Chairperson of the OEWG-T and the Secretariat gave presentations on the responses to the survey referred to above and on suggestions for the consideration of countering chemical terrorism in the preparatory process for the Fifth Review Conference.

- 5.31 In 2022, the OPCW continued to actively participate in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it became a signatory in 2018. Under the Compact's auspices, the Organisation acts as a Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, which is chaired by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). In this framework, work began under the third phase of a project to enhance interagency interoperability and public communications in the event of a chemical or biological attack, jointly developed by the OPCW along with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, UNICRI, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit.
- 5.32 The Secretariat and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to collaborate in strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and to offer practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.

#### Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.33 The OPCW and the chemical industry continued efforts to strengthen their cooperation in accordance with the relevant recommendations of the Third Review Conference. During the reporting period, the twelfth and thirteenth meetings of the Chemical Industry Coordination Group took place. Participants discussed issues such as current trends and challenges in the global chemical industry, and exchanged information on capacity-development activities, focusing on promotion of best practices in the area of chemical safety and security.
- 5.34 In 2022, representatives of the International Council of Chemical Associations and the International Chemical Trade Association participated in a number of Secretariat activities. The Director-General submitted a Note to the Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" (C-27/DG.14, dated 20 October 2022), which provided a detailed account of the OPCW's engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The Note covers activities related to verification, education and outreach, national implementation of the Convention, and chemical safety and security.

#### Education and outreach

- 5.35 The composition of the ABEO was partially renewed in 2022, following the completion of two terms of office on the Board by some members. As a result of an adapted call for nominations inviting States Parties to nominate two candidates if one of the two were a female expert, the current Board serving from 2022 to 2024 is composed of seven female experts of the total 15 Board members. The composition of the Board respects geographical diversity and its membership encompasses several areas of expertise, including e-learning and blended learning methodologies, chemistry, science communication, and international law, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Director-General submitted the report on the operation of the ABEO from 2019 to 2021 to the Council at its Ninety-Ninth Session (EC-99/DG.10, dated 17 February 2022). The ABEO conducted multiple activities in 2022 related to education and raising awareness about the OPCW and the Convention. It continued to provide its advice on the

development of e-learning resources and on the translation and dissemination of several educational resources, while taking into account diverse target audiences. Board members raised awareness of the Convention and The Hague Ethical Guidelines at a number of conferences and workshops. They also raised awareness of the various professional opportunities at the OPCW for young and mid-career professionals. The Chairperson of the ABEO in 2022, Mr Shahab Ud Din, participated in the sixth meeting of the OEWG-RC on 18 October 2022 to provide an overview of the work of the Board.

- 5.36 The ABEO continued to work to foster engagement with disarmament initiatives, especially those involving youth. In addition, the Board advised the Secretariat to strengthen partnerships with universities and academic institutions worldwide.

### **Confidentiality and security**

- 5.37 In the period under review, the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) continued its efforts to ensure and improve the level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, assets, and information based on the United Nations minimum security standards and international best practice. The OCS continued to use a data-driven and risk-based approach aligned with the organisational risk appetite.
- 5.38 After the intrusion of the OPCW Headquarters building on 3 December 2021,<sup>22</sup> the OCS implemented immediate additional security measures and conducted an in-depth vulnerability assessment of the OPCW Headquarters building and recommended a series of measures to reduce the security risks to the staff and delegates of the OPCW, its Headquarters building, its information, and other assets. The findings and recommendations of the security risk assessment were confirmed by an assessment later conducted by the Host Country's security services. The OCS continued to engage with the Host Country to further increase security around the Headquarters building. New security entrance gates were installed at the underground garage of the OPCW Headquarters building. The procurement stage for the upgrading of the physical security of the security-critical areas in the OPCW Headquarters building were finalised and the construction and installation was scheduled for the second quarter of 2023. Preparations to significantly improve the security of the reception area of the Headquarters building were made and the procurement phase was to be finalised in the first quarter of 2023, after which the works would proceed. The remaining improvements will continue as funding becomes available.
- 5.39 Over 100 demonstrations took place in the direct vicinity of the OPCW Headquarters building in 2022, with a peak of twice-weekly demonstrations between May and July and daily demonstrations between August and the end of 2022. The Secretariat remained in permanent contact with the relevant Host Country authorities and continued to request adequate security support. The high number of demonstrations stretched resources for safeguarding the control and authority of OPCW Headquarters. It had a significant impact on the OCS staffing and budget and resulted in considerable costs for overtime for security staff.
- 5.40 In 2022, the average weekly number of cyberattacks (phishing and malware) increased to over 160, and the average number of monthly probes and attacks against OPCW

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<sup>22</sup> See Note S/2009/2021\* (dated 6 December 2021).

Internet services increased to around 30,000, driven from over 2,000 separate global servers. The OCS finalised the implementation of various projects related to cybersecurity resilience, and identified and initiated new and follow-up projects to continue to assess, prevent, and respond to the ongoing and fast evolving cyberthreats and related risks.

- 5.41 In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, the OCS increased, and in some cases restarted, the delivery of staff training and awareness sessions on security and confidentiality, physical security services, and support for major events. With a continuing focus on empowering staff with the skills necessary to protect their activities from a cybersecurity perspective, the overall resilience of the OPCW was improved. In total, the OCS conducted over 50 training and awareness sessions, including certification training for OCS staff, security and fire safety inductions, confidentiality training, and user awareness sessions.
- 5.42 The OCS supported the annual meeting of the OPCW Confidentiality Commission, supported ad hoc classified briefings, and coordinated security for OPCW missions, frequently in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The OCS conducted 21 investigations related to cyberevents, security incidents, and potential breaches of confidentiality in 2022.
- 5.43 In 2022, significant progress was made in increasing organisational resilience by embedding business continuity into routine practices and by implementing a business continuity management system. The OCS drafted the new Business Continuity Policy and facilitated the related strategic Business Continuity Plan, Business Impact Analysis, and Crisis Management Framework. Divisional and branch business continuity representatives were appointed and trained to coordinate their respective divisional-level analyses and plans. The Business Continuity Steering Group and Working Group were established and held their first meetings at the end of 2022. A designated business continuity tool, providing a platform to support, document, and structure business continuity-related plans and documentation, was procured and implemented.

### **Health and safety**

- 5.44 Reported health and safety incidents in 2022 were of a minor nature. The Health and Safety Branch (HSB) initiated a process of increasing near-miss reporting through an electronic platform. There was an increase in mission preparation following the easing of COVID-related restrictions.
- 5.45 The annual workplace inspection in 2022 showed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace. Most issues highlighted in the 2021 report were at various stages of resolution.
- 5.46 No radiation safety-related issues, excessive noise level issues, or poor air quality issues were reported by staff over the year.
- 5.47 HSB staff continued to participate in professional development programmes in 2022.

## 6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

### The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

- 6.1 Owing to continued COVID-19 restrictions, the first SAB meeting of 2022 was held virtually, with the other two in hybrid format. Despite this, the Board continued to perform its duties in providing scientific advice to the Director-General, meeting three times. In addition, the SAB continued its work supporting the Temporary Working Group on the Analysis of Biotoxins.
- 6.2 In March 2022, the Board met for its Thirty-Fourth Session (report issued as SAB-34/1), which it used to plan its upcoming work, hear scientific research presentations from external experts, and receive updates from Secretariat staff. The Director-General's response to the report of the SAB's Thirty-Fourth Session was issued as EC-100/DG.9 (dated 14 June 2022).
- 6.3 The SAB met for its Thirty-Fifth Session in June 2022 (report issued as SAB-35/1). In addition to discussing SAB-related business, the Board heard from several external experts on topics including standards-free approaches for identifying unknown chemicals, approaches to supporting the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, and the importance of scientific advice. The Director-General's response to the report of the SAB's Thirty-Fifth Session was issued as EC-101/DG.21 (dated 19 September 2022).
- 6.4 The SAB met for its Thirty-Sixth Session in September 2022 (report issued as SAB-36/1\*). The focus of the session was the finalisation of the Board's report to the Fifth Review Conference. In addition, the Board took a guided tour of the ChemTech Centre. The Board also heard from a number of Secretariat staff as well as from several external speakers on topics such as chemical profiling approaches to chemical warfare agents, studies on chemical weapons dumped at sea, and the use of insects as chemical samplers. Several Board members also spoke about their own research and provided updates on recent activities of interest to the SAB. The Director-General's response to the report of the SAB's Thirty-Sixth Session was issued as EC-102/DG.13 (dated 16 February 2023).
- 6.5 The work of the Temporary Working Group on the Analysis of Biotoxins continued throughout 2022. The Group met once virtually and twice in person in 2022, with meeting reports issued after each meeting (SAB-36/WP.1; SAB-36/WP.2; and SAB-37/WP.1).
- 6.6 The SAB's collaboration and engagement across scientific communities continued throughout 2022. Although some activities continued in virtual or hybrid format, SAB members chaired, attended, and presented at conferences, continued with their leadership of professional chemistry societies, and continued to partner with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and to issue publications in scientific literature. SAB involvement in such activities ensures that the Secretariat stays abreast of developments in chemistry, maintains visibility and credibility among scientists, promotes responsible and ethical scientific practices, and supports education and outreach activities.

### **Engagement with the scientific community**

- 6.7 The Secretariat's engagement with global scientific communities continued in 2022. Several Secretariat staff members continued to serve on IUPAC committees.
- 6.8 The Secretariat continued to maintain a visible presence among technical communities in 2022, participating in the 2022 Global Congress on Chemical Security Emerging Threats (October 2022), and delivering presentations at: the International Conference CBRNE Research & Innovation (May 2022); the Virtual Conference on Chemistry and its Applications (August 2022); the Spiez Convergence and the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM) conference workshops (September 2022); the Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (September 2022); the 14th International Meeting on Cholinesterases and the 8th International Conference on Paraoxonases (September 2022); Malta X – Frontiers of Science: Innovation, Research, and Education in the Middle East, A Bridge to Peace (November 2022); and the 7th International CBRN Safety and Security Conference (virtual, December 2022). In addition, several Secretariat staff, in partnership with an SAB member, published an article in peer-reviewed scientific literature.<sup>23</sup>
- 6.9 The Secretariat also continued to manage its Plant Biomarker Challenge initiative in 2022. This initiative, backed by the European Union, has funded six research projects that describe a method or system by which a specific type of vegetation could act as an indicator of exposure to chemicals that are toxic to humans and/or animals. As vegetation is always present in areas of human habitation, plants are well suited as potential sentinel species. The teams will continue their research in 2023, while two teams were selected to take part in a further phase of the initiative, which will be implemented in 2023.
- 6.10 The Secretariat remained engaged with international organisation partners, participating in scientific and technical discussions, including with IUPAC, INTERPOL, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. In addition, scientific briefings were delivered at the Asser Institute's Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (September 2022) and at the OPCW's Twenty-Second Annual Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel.

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Palermo G., Kovarik Z., Hotchkiss P. J., "Newly scheduled carbamate compounds: A synopsis of their properties and development, and considerations for the scientific community". *Toxicology*, Volume 480, October 2022, 153322.

**Annex 1**

**STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022<sup>24</sup>**

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06

<sup>24</sup>

For each State Party listed, the date in the “Signature” column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the “Deposit” column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, “[a]” means “deposit of instrument of accession”, “[A]” means “deposit of instrument of acceptance”, and “[d]” means “deposit of instrument of succession”.

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97



	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
133.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
134.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
135.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
136.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
137.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
138.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
139.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
140.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
141.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
142.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
143.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
144.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
145.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
146.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
147.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
148.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
149.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
150.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
151.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
152.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
153.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
154.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
155.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
156.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
157.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
158.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97
159.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
160.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13
161.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
162.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
163.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
164.	State of Palestine		17-05-18	16-06-18
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Türkiye	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

**Annex 2**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES  
IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2022**

<b>Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party</b>	
United States of America	Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF) Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System (CTF/MAPS)* Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)**

\* Eleven rocket motors previously removed from the chemical weapons at the BGCAPP were destroyed at the facility in 2022 for test purposes.

\*\* The facility remained in service in 2022, but no destruction operations took place.

Annex 3

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN<sup>25</sup>  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022**

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>26</sup></b>
<b>Category 1</b>		
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	14,882.156
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,586.722
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD, HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	17,246.471
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and lewisite (including HD/L mixture in dichloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.875
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.173
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.863	3.862
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
<b>Total Category 1:</b>	<b>70,493.640</b>	<b>70,135.346</b>
<b>Category 2</b>		
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorous trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655

<sup>25</sup> Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

<sup>26</sup> Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>26</sup></b>
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorous pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorous oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
<b>Total Category 2:</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>72,304.343</b>	<b>71,946.049</b>

**Annex 4**

**NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED  
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT,  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022<sup>27</sup>**

<b>Name of Riot Control Agent</b>	<b>Number of States Parties That Had Declared Possession</b>
CS	118
CN	62
OC	25
PAVA	13
Capsaicin	15
CR	14
Other types	13

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 137

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<sup>27</sup>

The Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) nomenclature for riot control agents listed in this chart is as follows:

CS: CAS number 2698-41-1;  
CN: CAS number 532-27-4;  
OC: CAS number 8023-77-6;  
PAVA: CAS number 2444-46-4;  
Capsaicin: CAS number 404-86-4; and  
CR: CAS number 257-07-8.

Other types include mixtures of chemicals mentioned in the table or older types of riot control agents.

**Annex 5**

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022**

**(ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	25 Mar 2021
2.	Belgium	Defensielaboratoria – Laboratoires de la Défense (DLD)	12 May 2004
3.	Brazil	Laboratório de Análises Químicas, Centro Tecnológico do Exército (CTEx)	31 Aug 2021
4.	China	Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
5.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
6.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	29 Mar 2017
7.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département Analyse Chimique	29 Jun 1999
8.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection	29 Jun 1999
9.	India	VERTOX Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
10.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defence Chemical Research Laboratory	3 Aug 2011
11.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Safety and Security	17 Nov 1998
12.	Norway	Laboratory for the Analysis of Chemical Threat Agents, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)	25 Mar 2021
13.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defense Science Technology Organization	18 Apr 2018
14.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CBR Directorate, Agency for Defense Development	3 Aug 2011
15.	Republic of Korea	CBRN Defense Research Institute ROK Defense Command	15 Aug 2022
16.	Romania	Research and Innovation Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis Laboratory	18 Apr 2018
17.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre	4 Aug 2000
18.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, “State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology”	15 Apr 2015
19.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
20.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa	8 Sept 2004
21.	Sweden	Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI	17 Nov 1998
22.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998



23.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	29 Jun 1999
24.	United States of America	DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center Forensic Analytical Laboratory	17 Nov 1998
25.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022**

**(BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département Analyse Chimique	1 Aug 2016
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Biomedical Verification Division Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defense Chemical Research Laboratory	31 Aug 2021
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Safety and Security	1 Aug 2016
10.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CBR Directorate, Agency for Defense Development	31 Aug 2021
11.	Republic of Korea	CBRN Defense Research Institute ROK Defense Command	2 Dec 2020
12.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
13.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
14.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
15.	Sweden	Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI	1 Aug 2016
16.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	1 Aug 2016
17.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017
18.	United States of America	DEVCOM, Chemical Biological Center Forensic Analytical Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
19.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
20.	United States of America	U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense	19 Aug 2019

Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2022<sup>28</sup>

STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME AND SUBPROGRAMME  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2022

Funding Programme	Final Appropriation	Total Expenditure	Balance of Appropriations
1	2	3	4 (2-3)
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>			
1. Verification Programme	9,837,560	8,554,405	1,283,155
2. Inspections Programme	20,471,957	20,370,723	101,234
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>30,309,517</b>	<b>28,925,128</b>	<b>1,384,389</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	7,582,275	6,954,62	627,65
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	5,292,617	5,289,277	3,340
5. External Relations Programme	2,151,352	2,084,904	66,448
6. Executive Management Programme	10,036,796	9,983,708	53,088
7. Administration Programme	15,083,006	15,074,44	8,564
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>40,146,046</b>	<b>39,386,954</b>	<b>759,092</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>70,455,563</b>	<b>68,312,082</b>	<b>2,143,481</b>

**BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022**

	<b>Balance</b>	
	<b>As at 31 December 2022<sup>29</sup></b>	<b>As at 31 December 2021</b>
General Fund	13,154,346	3,483,950
Working Capital Fund	3,133,878	8,133,388
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,582,950	1,567,950
OPCW special accounts	3,160,988	3,719,261
OPCW trust funds	26,730,576	41,367,945
<b>Total</b>	<b>47,767,738</b>	<b>58,272,495</b>

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<sup>29</sup> The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances owing to timing differences.

Annex 7

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2022

Fund Balances

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds, Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2022	2022 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2022*	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2022	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2022
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	8,143,173	-	-	-	-	8,143,173
Special funds	3,425,135	-	958,134	-	601,203	3,782,066
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,572,974	-	-	-	-	1,567,974
Trust funds	18,136,363	14,604,446	(186,664)	-	18,079,376	14,475,207

Syria Trust Fund Balances

Syria Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2022	2022 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2021	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2022	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2022
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Syria trust fund for the destruction of chemical weapons	191,988	-	-	-	-	191,988
Trust Fund for Syria Missions	3,999,511	3,513,029	-	-	6,553,026	959,514

Annex 8

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT  
FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2022

International Agreements Registered in 2022				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Parties	Date of:	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 689	Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	25-09-14 25-09-14	25-09-14
IAR 690	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, Spain concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 51st Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, Spain	28-01-22 16-02-22	16-02-22
IAR 691	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute, DSO National Laboratories, Singapore concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 7th Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat DSO, Singapore	04-03-22 22-02-22	04-03-22
IAR 692	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	14-03-22 14-03-22	14-03-22

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2022</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of:</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 693	Grant Arrangement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as Represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning Strengthening the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention (Project CWD-2021-0002)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  Canada	14-03-22  20-03-22	20-03-22
IAR 694	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Australian Department of Defence as represented by Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia concerning Sample Preparation for the 51st Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat  DSTG, Australia	14-02-22  18-03-22	18-03-22
IAR 695	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the United States of America and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X (May 2022 Workshop on Chemical Security for Nigeria)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  United States of America	31-03-22  24-03-22	31-03-22
IAR 696	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the United States of America and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X (provision of assistance and protection to Ukraine in the event of use or threat of use of chemical weapons)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  United States of America	31-03-22  24-03-22	31-03-22
IAR 697	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Defense Chemical Research Laboratory (DCRL), the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat  Islamic Republic of Iran	11-03-22  09-04-22	09-04-22

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2022</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of:</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 698	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Belgium regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat Minister of Defence, Kingdom of Belgium	04-04-22 25-04-22	25-04-22
IAR 699	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	14-04-22 14-04-22	14-04-22
IAR 700	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Sweden OPCW Technical Secretariat	06-04-22 02-05-22	02-05-22
IAR 701	Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Training of Personnel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Training and Testing Center of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske Kostol'any, the Slovak Republic, 20 – 24 June 2022	Slovak Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	23-05-22 30-05-22	15-06-22

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2022</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of:</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 702	Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Training of Personnel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Training and Testing Center of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske Kostol'any, the Slovak Republic, 14 – 25 June 2021	Slovak Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	20-05-21 04-06-21	10-06-21
IAR 703	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Republic of Lithuania OPCW Technical Secretariat	03-06-22 03-06-22	03-06-22
IAR 704	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Australia OPCW Technical Secretariat	08-06-22 08-06-22	08-06-22
IAR 705	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	New Zealand OPCW Technical Secretariat	17-06-22 17-06-22	17-06-22
IAR 706	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the Provision of Voluntary Contributions to the OPCW for its Work Overseeing the Global Endeavours to Permanently and Verifiably Eliminate Chemical Weapons	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland OPCW Technical Secretariat	30-06-22 30-06-22	30-06-22



<b>International Agreements Registered in 2022</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of:</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 707	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Slovak Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	07-07-22 07-07-22	07-07-22
IAR 708	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	New Zealand OPCW Technical Secretariat	17-06-22 17-06-22	17-06-22
IAR 709	Contract between the Minister of Foreign Affairs as represented by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	MFA Ireland, represented by the Department of Foreign Affairs OPCW	30-06-22 20-07-22 25-07-22	25-07-22
IAR 710	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the Provision of Funding Support to the OPCW	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence OPCW	15-08-22 24-08-22	24-08-22
IAR 711	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Germany Concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 8th Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology, Germany OPCW	22-08-22 07-09-22	07-09-22

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2022</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of:</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 712	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Republic of Chile OPCW	02-09-22 02-09-22	02-09-22
IAR 713	Technical Agreement and Secrecy Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, United States of America OPCW Technical Secretariat	05-07-22 07-09-22	07-09-22
IAR 714	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons towards the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Czech Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	26-09-22 26-09-22	26-09-22
IAR 715	Technical Agreement Between the Kingdom of Sweden/FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning the Conduct of Training	Swedish Defence Research Agency OPCW Technical Secretariat	28-09-22 28-09-22	28-09-22
IAR 716	Research Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Swedish Defence Research Agency regarding the Use of Cell Lines	Swedish Defence Research Agency OPCW Technical Secretariat	03-10-22 16-09-22	03-10-22
IAR 717	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the State of Qatar and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Regional Seminars	Qatar OPCW Technical Secretariat	06-10-22 07-10-22	07-10-22

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 718	Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning the Training of Personnel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Training and Testing Center of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske Kostol'any, the Slovak Republic	Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic OPCW Technical Secretariat	30-09-22 05-10-22	05-10-22
IAR 719	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Department of Defence of Australia as Represented by the Defence Science and Technology Group, Australia concerning Preparation of the Samples for the 8th Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	Department of Defence of Australia OPCW Technical Secretariat	21-10-22 21-10-22	21-10-22
IAR 720	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	Kingdom of Spain OPCW Technical Secretariat	28-10-22 28-10-22	28-10-22
IAR 721	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of San Marino and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	San Marino OPCW Technical Secretariat	11-11-22 23-11-22	23-11-22
IAR 722	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of His Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Monaco OPCW Technical Secretariat	16-11-22 16-11-22	16-11-22

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 723	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Principality of Andorra and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons and the Trust Fund for Training	Principality of Andorra OPCW Technical Secretariat	24-11-22 24-11-22	24-11-22
IAR 724	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland OPCW Technical Secretariat	24-11-22 24-11-22	24-11-22
IAR 725	Non-Disclosure Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and DSO National Laboratories	DSO National Laboratories OPCW Technical Secretariat	01-04-20 01-05-20	01-05-20
IAR 726	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	Republic of Cameroon OPCW Technical Secretariat	09-12-22 09-12-22	09-12-22
IAR 727	Voluntary Contribution Agreement: Arrangement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to support the OPCW Conference of States Parties 2022–2024 and the OPCW Review Conference, 2023	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands OPCW Technical Secretariat	12-12-22 13-12-22	13-12-22

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 728	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Italy and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	Republic of Italy OPCW Technical Secretariat	14-12-22 14-12-22	14-12-22
IAR 729	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Federal Republic of Germany OPCW Technical Secretariat	13-12-22 13-12-22	13-12-22
IAR 730	License Agreement for the use of cell lines between the Robert Koch Institute and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	Robert Koch Institute OPCW Technical Secretariat	16-12-21 01-12-21	16-12-21
IAR 731	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the National Institute of Aerospace Technology "Esteban Terradas" (INTA) regarding the Off-Site Analysis of Samples	National Institute of Aerospace Technology "Esteban Terradas" (INTA) / (LA VEMA) Spain OPCW Technical Secretariat	07-12-22 21-11-22	07-12-22

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 381(s)	Amendment No. 19 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	06-05-22 12-05-22 12-05-22	12-05-22
IAR 427(e)	Amendment 5 to the Administrative Arrangement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat France-MFA	14-04-22 14-04-22	14-04-22
IAR 587(a)	Amendment to the Arrangement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concerning Voluntary Contribution to the OPCW Trust Fund for Syria	OPCW Technical Secretariat Netherlands MFA	11-03-22 04-03-22	Not specified
IAR 637(a)	Amendment to the Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	02-11-22 02-11-22	02-11-22
IAR 689(a)	Amendment One to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	11-11-14 17-11-14	17-11-14

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			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 689(b)	Amendment Two to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	02-06-15 04-06-15	04-06-15
IAR 689(c)	Amendment Three to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	02-10-15 22-10-15	22-10-15
IAR 689(d)	Amendment Four to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	13-11-15 19-11-15	19-11-15
IAR 689(e)	Amendment Five to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	29-04-16 13-05-16	13-05-16
IAR 689(f)	Amendment Six to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	08-11-16 14-11-16	14-11-16

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IAR 689(g)	Amendment Seven to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	08-05-17 15-05-17	15-05-17
IAR 689(h)	Amendment Eight to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	12-12-17 24-12-17	24-12-17
IAR 689(i)	Amendment Nine to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	20-04-18 18-04-18	20-04-18
IAR 689(j)	Amendment Ten to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	26-09-18 26-09-19	26-09-19
IAR 689(k)	Amendment Eleven to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	26-03-19 26-03-19	26-03-19



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IAR 689(l)	Amendment Twelve to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	18-12-19 22-12-19	22-12-19
IAR 689(m)	Amendment Thirteen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	31-03-20 30-03-20	31-03-20
IAR 689(n)	Amendment Fourteen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	30-09-20 29-09-20	30-09-20
IAR 689(o)	Amendment Fifteen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	31-03-21 16-03-21	31-03-21
IAR 689(p)	Amendment Sixteen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	27-09-21 16-09-21	27-09-21

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IAR 689(q)	Amendment Seventeen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	17-12-21 27-12-21	27-12-21
IAR 689(r)	Amendment Eighteen to the Contribution Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with respect to the provision of services for the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)	24-06-22 28-06-22	28-06-22
IAR 706(a)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annex A-01 "Assessing and Enhancing Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States: Towards OPCW Designation"	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland OPCW Technical Secretariat	15-11-22 15-11-22	15-11-22
IAR 706(b)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annex A-02 "Support to OPCW Syria Missions"	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland OPCW Technical Secretariat	06-12-22 13-12-22	13-12-22
IAR 710(a)	Amendment: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annex A-01 "Inspector Verification Training for OPCW Inspectors, training of other relevant OPCW Personnel, and Regional Training for the Caribbean Region"	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Ministry of Defence OPCW	15-08-22 24-08-22	24-08-22