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**Conference of the States Parties**

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**REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION  
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING  
AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION IN 2021**





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## INTRODUCTION

1. Despite the ongoing restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, progress continued to be made in addressing the use of chemical weapons, destroying the remaining declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, implementing and enhancing industry verification, delivering international cooperation and assistance, addressing the challenges posed by chemical terrorism, and broadening and sustaining the OPCW's education and outreach efforts.
2. In the process of the destruction of declared chemical weapons in 2021, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") verified the destruction of 433.976 metric tonnes (MT) of Category 1 chemical weapons.
3. Between entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and 31 December 2021, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of 69,764.036 MT<sup>1</sup> of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, representing 98.97% of the total amount of declared agent. The remaining possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed, the United States of America, continued to work towards its target date of 30 September 2023 for the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpiles.
4. China and Japan have continued to cooperate bilaterally in relation to the destruction, excavation, and recovery of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. Because of COVID-19-related restrictions, all inspections regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) continued to be suspended in 2021. While destruction operations at all sites had been suspended in 2020, such operations at the Haerbaling facility resumed in May 2021. The Secretariat, in consultation with relevant States Parties, conducted seven inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCW), while ensuring the health and safety of inspectors and State Party site personnel.
5. The OPCW carried out 80 inspections of industrial facilities in 2021. The continued reduction in the number of Article VI inspections resulted from the significant challenges posed by pandemic-related restrictions. Sampling and analysis activities were not carried out during any Article VI inspections in 2021.
6. The Secretariat released the second version of the Electronic Declaration Information System (EDIS).
7. Work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of chemical weapons in that country. The Secretariat's efforts focused largely on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018), including the operation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established pursuant to that decision, as well as on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Fifth Session (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continued its activities in 2021, guided by the relevant decisions of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") and resolutions of the

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<sup>1</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex").

United Nations Security Council. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at resolving outstanding issues identified in relation to the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and related submissions, continued throughout 2021.

8. Significant progress was made in the project to build the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre) within the planned timeline and budget. In 2021, an irrevocable construction permit was granted, construction-related tenders were completed, and building activities on site commenced.
9. In 2021, the Secretariat continued to implement capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 83 activities and programmes for 4,162 experts from 156 States Parties across all regional groups.
10. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the OPCW's contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. The Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism examined capacity-building activities in support of chemical security, the strengthening of States Parties' legislative and regulatory frameworks for countering chemical terrorism, and cooperation with international organisations. Several capacity-building initiatives focused on areas relevant to countering chemical terrorism, such as legislation and chemical security.
11. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates.
12. Public interest in the work of the OPCW remained strong. The OPCW's social media platforms experienced an average growth rate of 10% in 2021, while the OPCW website was visited by approximately 469,000 users, a 22% increase from 2020. Although in-person visits remained suspended, the Secretariat continued to adapt by employing digital outreach tools.
13. In 2021, the number of States Parties to the Convention remained at 193. Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party during the course of the year.

## 1. VERIFICATION

- 1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2021 is provided in Table 1 below. The OPCW conducted 120 inspections in 2021, of which 33% were related to chemical weapons. Operations connected with non-routine missions accounted for a further 1,366 inspector days in 2021.

**TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2021**

Type of Facility	Number of Inspections	Number of Facilities or Sites Inspected	Number of Inspector Days
<b>Chemical Weapons-Related Inspections</b>			
CWDF <sup>2</sup>	29	3 <sup>3</sup>	4,064
CWSF <sup>4</sup>	4	2	78
CWPF <sup>5</sup>	0	0	0
OCW	7	7	70
ACW <sup>6</sup>	0	0	0
Non-routine missions	n/a		1,366
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5,578</b>
<b>Article VI Inspections</b>			
Schedule 1	13	13	276
Schedule 2	22	22	363
Schedule 3	7	7	64
OCPF <sup>7</sup>	38	38	357
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>1,060</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>6,638</b>

- 1.2 As at 31 December 2021, eight States Parties (a State Party,<sup>8</sup> Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared a combined total of 72,304.343 MT<sup>9</sup> of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons, as well as 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3 to this report.

<sup>2</sup> CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

<sup>3</sup> All in the United States of America.

<sup>4</sup> CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

<sup>5</sup> CWPF = chemical weapons production facility.

<sup>6</sup> This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

<sup>7</sup> OCPF = other chemical production facility.

<sup>8</sup> As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as “a State Party”.

<sup>9</sup> This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

- 1.3 Progress continued with respect to OCW and ACW. States Parties that declared possession of OCW continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner. China and Japan continued to cooperate in the field of ACW and their destruction, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2021, China and Japan continued to cooperate on implementing the “Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2016 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China”, submitted to the Council at its Eighty-Fourth Session (EC-84/NAT.6, dated 2 March 2017), which contains updated information on destruction facilities and time frames for destruction.

### **Chemical weapons destruction**

- 1.4 During the reporting period, four CWDFs located in the United States of America were involved in the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons<sup>10</sup> (see Annex 2). Through a combination of the continuous presence of inspectors, the use of monitoring and dedicated recording equipment, as well as the review of relevant documentation, the Secretariat in 2021 verified the destruction of 433.976 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons.
- 1.5 One of the four CWDFs referred to above—the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Static Detonation Chamber (SDC)—completed the destruction of projectiles and containers filled with mustard (H) in September 2021 and was closed as a separate CWDF. A total of 82.269 MT of H has been destroyed at this CWDF. The facility will be converted in order to become a non-contiguous part of the BGCAPP.
- 1.6 As Annex 3 shows, between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2021, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of 69,764.036 MT,<sup>11</sup> or 98.97% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons; 1,810.703 MT, or 100% of declared Category 2 chemical weapons; and 417,833 items, or 100% of declared Category 3 chemical weapons.
- 1.7 In 2021, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 433.976 MT of chemical weapons in the United States of America, the only remaining possessor State Party with declared Category 1 chemical weapons. As at 31 December 2021, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of a total of 27,040.228 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by the United States of America, or 97.37% of its declared stockpile. All of the United States’ Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons had previously been verified as destroyed.
- 1.8 The Secretariat verified the destruction of removed energetics components from the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) at the non-contiguous SDC site at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and the destruction of hydrolysate from the BGCAPP at the non-contiguous Veolia treatment, storage, and disposal facility (TSDF) at Port Arthur, Texas. The BGCAPP also started the shipment of the rocket motors removed during the destruction of rockets to the Anniston SDC.

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<sup>10</sup> Not counting OCW or ACW (see Annex 2).

<sup>11</sup> This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex.



- 1.9 In its detailed annual plan for destruction of chemical weapons for 2022, the United States of America informed the Secretariat that a total of 510.230 MT<sup>12</sup> of Category 1 chemical agent is planned to be destroyed.
- 1.10 In addition to those noted above, the United States of America made the following submissions in 2021:
- (a) a revision to BGCAPP detailed facility information (DFI), updating the technical information for the rocket destruction process at the BGCAPP;
  - (b) Addendum 1 to BGCAPP DFI, adding technical information for the destruction of hydrolysate at the Veolia TSDF;
  - (c) amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification (ADPV) of the destruction of chemical weapons at the BGCAPP;
  - (d) amendments to the facility agreements (FA) for the BGCAPP;
  - (e) a technical supplement for the destruction of nine recovered chemical weapons at the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF) Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) in Arkansas;
  - (f) Addendum 2 to BGCAPP DFI, adding technical information for the destruction of end caps at the Veolia TSDF;
  - (g) Addendum 3 to BGCAPP DFI, adding technical information for the destruction of rocket motors at the Anniston SDC;
  - (h) a revision to BGCAPP DFI and a DFI supplement, updating the technical information for the BGCAPP;
  - (i) a technical supplement for the destruction of two recovered chemical weapons at RCWDF Dover Air Force Base (DAFB);
  - (j) amendments to the ADPV for the BGCAPP;
  - (k) amendments to the FA for the BGCAPP;
  - (l) a letter concerning the completion of destruction operations at the BGCAPP SDC and the closure of the facility;
  - (m) a revision to Addendum 1 to BGCAPP DFI, updating technical information for the Veolia TSDF; and
  - (n) a letter with proposals to conduct the 2021 annual recovered chemical weapons destruction review from 24 to 28 January 2022 at the Washington Dulles Point of Entry (POE).

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<sup>12</sup> The rounding rules have been applied to this quantity.

- 1.11 The Secretariat conducted a visit to the BGCAPP main plant in April 2021 to familiarise itself with the modified rocket destruction process. The BGCAPP FA and ADPV were amended accordingly and approved by the Council at its Ninety-Seventh Session. Upon receipt of addenda to the BGCAPP DFI in August 2021, which cover the destruction of rocket motors at Anniston SDC and the destruction of end caps at Veolia TSDF, the BGCAPP FA and ADPV were amended again and approved by the Council at its Ninety-Eighth Session. In addition, the Secretariat conducted a familiarisation visit to the mustard agent sampling facility of the BGCAPP SDC prior to the sampling and analysis operation in May 2021.
- 1.12 With regard to the recovered chemical weapons, the Secretariat conducted an inspection on 14 February 2021 to review the documents related to the destruction of nine items at the RCWDF PBA and two items at the RCWDF DAFB in 2021. Based on the review of destruction documentation, including video recordings made available by the inspected State Party, the Secretariat confirmed the destruction of the aforementioned items.

### **Chemical weapons storage facilities**

- 1.13 In 2021, the Secretariat conducted four inspections at two CWSFs in the United States of America. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, two of the four inspections were conducted by the inspection teams deployed at the collocated CWDFs. The two CWSFs remained subject to systematic verification.

### **Chemical weapons production facilities**

- 1.14 By 31 December 2021, all 97 CWPFs declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (74 had been certified as destroyed and 23 as converted).
- 1.15 No inspections were conducted at any former CWPFs in 2021 owing either to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic or to local security situations.

### **Abandoned chemical weapons**

- 1.16 Since entry into force of the Convention, three States Parties have reported ACW on their territory. One State Party, Japan, reported ACW on the territory of another State Party, China. In May 2021, all ACW destruction operations and related activities, such as excavations and recoveries, resumed at the Haerbaling site in China.
- 1.17 The Secretariat continued to engage, in virtual format, with Japan and China on ACW. The Secretariat was informed that construction projects at the Haerbaling ACW destruction facility had proceeded smoothly in 2021, with Japan starting to install the destruction equipment on site.
- 1.18 As at 31 December 2021, 89,838 items had been declared as ACW to the Secretariat. Of these, 60,035 items of ACW had been reported as destroyed.

### **Old chemical weapons**

- 1.19 As at 31 December 2021, 19 States Parties had declared over 150,500 items of OCW produced either before 1925, or between 1925 and 1946. Approximately 76% of these were reported as destroyed. In 2021, the Secretariat conducted seven OCW inspections in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

### **Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use**

- 1.20 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2021. The Secretariat focused on improving its preparedness for CIs. The Secretariat conducted two remote workshops on this topic with a total of 93 participants, including 75 inspectors.

### **OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria**

- 1.21 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2021 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat (S/2014/2021, dated 30 December 2021).
- 1.22 Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the FFM deployed several times in 2021 to gather relevant facts. The FFM also continued the analysis of all information obtained from the Syrian Arab Republic, other States Parties, and relevant stakeholders. The Secretariat has maintained its readiness for further deployments with due consideration for applicable COVID-19 restrictions and the prevailing security situation.
- 1.23 Pursuant to Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 with regard to “instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report”, the FFM has continued to periodically hand material over to the IIT.
- 1.24 Following the finalisation in July 2020 of the pilot transfer of FFM material to the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM), and pursuant to paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3 as well as the memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the IIIM regarding the provision of access, storage, and handling of information and evidence, the FFM has continued preparations for further transfers to the IIIM.

### **Declaration Assessment Team**

- 1.25 In 2021, the Secretariat continued its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in order to clarify all identified gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies noted in its initial declaration and related submissions. The shortcomings noted in the declarations are raised with the Syrian National Authority as outstanding issues until the Secretariat receives sufficient information to consider these issues as resolved.

- 1.26 As a result of the declaration-related consultations between the Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority, the Syrian Arab Republic had, by the end of 2021, submitted a total of 17 amendments to its initial declaration. These amendments contained previously undeclared elements, including: one additional CWPF; four additional chemical weapons research and development facilities; activities involving five previously undeclared chemical warfare agents; a substantial amount of previously undeclared chemical munitions; and other supplementary information about all the segments of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
- 1.27 Since 2014 the Secretariat has raised and reported a total of 24 outstanding issues, of which four have been resolved. The last issue was opened by the Secretariat in April 2021 following insufficient explanations provided by the Syrian National Authority on the presence of a chemical warfare agent in the large-volume storage containers at the CWPF declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used for the production of chemical weapons. In the reporting period, the Syrian National Authority did not provide further clarifications on this matter.
- 1.28 The substance of the remaining 20 issues involves large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical agents and chemical munitions. Additionally, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of the declaration-related measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2 (dated 9 July 2020).
- 1.29 The last, namely the twenty-fourth, round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in February 2021 in Damascus. The twenty-fifth round of consultations, which had tentatively been planned for May 2021 in Damascus, did not take place during the reporting period despite extensive efforts by the Secretariat. The delays in this deployment were initially (April to August 2021) caused by the absence of a response from the Syrian Arab Republic and later (September 2021 onwards) by the repeated refusals of the Syrian Arab Republic to issue entry visas to one DAT expert. To mitigate these visa refusals, the Secretariat additionally attempted, unsuccessfully, to convene a limited meeting with Syrian experts in The Hague in late October 2021. Since then, through exchange of correspondence, the Secretariat continued its engagement with the Syrian National Authority regarding the next DAT deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 1.30 The Director-General continued to report all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions through his Notes circulated to the Council at its Ninety-Sixth, Ninety-Seventh, and Ninety-Eighth Sessions.<sup>13</sup> In the last Note issued in 2021 (EC-98/DG.28), the Director-General concluded that “the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 (dated 27 September 2013), EC-94/DEC.2, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013)”.

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<sup>13</sup> EC-96/HP/DG.1 (dated 5 March 2021); EC-97/HP/DG.1 (dated 30 June 2021); and EC-98/HP/DG.2 and EC-98/DG.28 (both dated 30 September 2021).

### **Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre**

- 1.31 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities “on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings”.
- 1.32 The Secretariat had planned to conduct two rounds of inspections at the SSRC in 2021. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the delays caused to the DAT deployment seriously affected the planning and conduct of these inspections. The Secretariat conducted one round of inspections (i.e., the eighth round) at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC in December 2021. The results of this round of inspections will be reported in due time.
- 1.33 With regard to the Schedule 2.B.04 chemical detected during the third round of inspections in November 2018 at the Barzah facility of the SSRC, the Secretariat has engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic mostly through exchange of notes verbales. As previously reported, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.

### **Implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3**

- 1.34 On 12 April 2021, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled “Second Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use’, Saraqib (Syrian Arab Republic) – 4 February 2018” (S/1943/2021, dated 12 April 2021).
- 1.35 In the report, the IIT concluded that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that at approximately 21:22 on 4 February 2018, during ongoing attacks against Saraqib, a military helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force under the control of the Tiger Forces hit eastern Saraqib by dropping at least one cylinder. The cylinder ruptured and released a toxic gas, chlorine, which dispersed over a large area affecting 12 named individuals”.
- 1.36 The conclusions of this report are based on the combination, consistency, and corroboration of the obtained information, after a careful assessment of its probative value through a widely shared methodology in compliance with best practices of international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry. In its investigations, the IIT adhered to applicable OPCW procedures, including with respect to chain of custody, supplemented as appropriate.
- 1.37 The report was provided to the Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General for their consideration.
- 1.38 The IIT continues its investigation into several other incidents identified in Annex 2 to Note EC-91/S/3 (dated 28 June 2019) entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)”.

- 1.39 The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic did not engage with the IIT, despite:
- (a) various requests addressed to them by the Secretariat;
  - (b) the obligation by the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the Secretariat under paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Convention; and
  - (c) the obligation incumbent on the Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), to cooperate fully with the OPCW by providing personnel designated by the OPCW with immediate and unfettered access to any and all sites and individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate.
- 1.40 The IIT has continued to request to meet with key representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, at their convenience and at a location of their choosing, to discuss the IIT's work, the provision of any relevant information, and access to locations that the Syrian authorities may be able to facilitate.
- 1.41 Pursuant to paragraph 12 of C-SS-4/DEC.3 and the memorandum of understanding between the OPCW and the IIM regarding the provision of access, storage, and handling of information and evidence, the IIT has continued preparations for further transfers to the IIM, in follow-up to the first transfer which took place in October and November 2020.
- 1.42 IIT personnel further worked with other units and offices to enhance the forensic and investigative capabilities of the Secretariat in providing States Parties with technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, as decided in paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3.

### **Industry verification**

- 1.43 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, import, export, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals, as well as declarations related to OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2021.

**TABLE 2: DECLARED FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021**

Type of Facility	Declared Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection <sup>14</sup>	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities <sup>15</sup>	States Parties with Facilities Subject to Inspection
Schedule 1	28	28	24	24
Schedule 2	459	209	35	25
Schedule 3	365	337	32	32
OCPF	4,551	4,392	80	79
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,403</b>	<b>4,966</b>	<b>83<sup>16</sup></b>	<b>80<sup>17</sup></b>

1.44 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 80 Article VI inspections in 2021. This reduced number, compared to the planned 241 inspections, was a result of the restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. These 80 inspections comprised 13 Schedule 1 facilities, 22 Schedule 2 plant sites, 7 Schedule 3 plant sites, and 38 OCPFs (respectively 46%, 11%, 2%, and 1% of the total of inspectable facilities). No uncertainties were recorded. Ten inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention, and 47 inspections recommended further information to be provided in declarations. In addition, three inspections were carried out at plant sites that were found during those inspections not to be inspectable, and one not declarable, because of declaration errors.

**TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS**

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year								
2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
229	241	241	241	241	241	241	82	80

1.45 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2021, the site selection was performed as described in the “Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites” (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.

1.46 In 2021, the Secretariat continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of saving resources. Although the overall number of inspections and sequential inspections was reduced in 2021, the percentage of inspections that were part of a sequential mission remained consistent with 2020 at approximately 26%. Because of travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was not possible to carry out any inter-country sequential inspections in 2021. All 21 pairs of intra-country sequential inspections shown in Table 4 below were carried out in 14 different countries, including long industry missions to four different countries.

<sup>14</sup> Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.

<sup>15</sup> Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities (ADAAs) and annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs).

<sup>16</sup> Eighty-three States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

<sup>17</sup> Eighty States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

**TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS**

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year								
2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
57	51	59	54	58	58	60	20	21

- 1.47 In 2021, the Secretariat continued the work of a cross-divisional team to perform a thorough review of inspection practices, inspection report templates, inspection tools, and inspection training to identify further options to optimise the conduct of inspections. The status of this work was reported to States Parties through the Industry Cluster in July 2021. Report templates for OCPF, Schedule 3, and Schedule 2 inspections were finalised at the end of 2021 and were planned to be field tested in the first half of 2022. The cross-divisional team will continue to report the results of this work to States Parties.
- 1.48 In 2021, sampling and analysis activities during Article VI inspections were suspended. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5 below.

**TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES**

Number of Inspections Completed with Sampling and Analysis by Year								
2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
8	9	11	11	10	9	6	1	0

**Declarations**

- 1.49 In 2021, 66 of the 88 States Parties (75%) that submitted ADPAs did so by the deadline imposed by the Convention. In the year under review, 96.3% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs fully updated the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 99.99% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing full, annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.

**Transfers of scheduled chemicals**

- 1.50 Nineteen transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by 11 States Parties in their ADPAs for 2020. Fifteen of these transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties, and four were notified by both but declared by only one State Party.
- 1.51 ADPAs for 2020 indicated that 59 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 12,212 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 120 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 433,258 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.52 Ten States Parties declared the export of four Schedule 3 chemicals to three States not Party.



### **Transfer discrepancies**

- 1.53 In 2021, ADPAs for 2020 indicated a total of 1,574 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 823 transfers were declared with quantities above the declaration threshold, of which 613 involving 94 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.54 The Secretariat continued to follow up with the States Parties in this regard and to work closely with other stakeholders to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

### **Cooperation with the World Customs Organization**

- 1.55 The Secretariat continued its cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO) on the basis of the Harmonized System (HS) Project for the identification by customs authorities of the Convention's most traded scheduled chemicals.

### **Update of OPCW declaration resources**

- 1.56 In 2021, the Secretariat worked on revisions to the Handbook on Chemicals, the "Most Traded Scheduled Chemicals" brochure, and the Declarations Handbook.

### **Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange System**

- 1.57 In September 2021, the Secretariat released the second version of EDIS, the electronic declarations platform. This version introduced declarations and reports for OCW. In December 2021, a minor EDIS patch (version 2.1) was released and included general system improvements.
- 1.58 In 2021, the Secretariat renewed its public encryption key and two-factor authentication mechanism for all Secure Information Exchange System (SIX) users. By the end of the reporting period, 117 users from 61 States Parties had registered to use the system.
- 1.59 In 2021, the Secretariat provided EDIS training as a component of various Article VI-related training activities. In addition, the Secretariat provided on-demand virtual training and consultations on EDIS and SIX to requesting States Parties.

### **Analytics platform and business intelligence**

- 1.60 The Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, which includes a data warehouse, consolidation of verification process data, and a business intelligence tool (Qlik Sense).

### **Electronic inspections tool**

- 1.61 In 2021, the Secretariat continued the development of an electronic inspections tool. Subject to consultations with States Parties, this will allow inspectors to improve the efficiency of the implementation of Article VI verification.

### **Verification Information System**

- 1.62 In 2021, the Secretariat completed the architectural design of the Verification Information System.

### **Riot control agents**

- 1.63 At the end of the reporting period, 137 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 53 States Parties had declared that they did not possess such agents. One State Party had not yet provided an initial declaration, and two other States Parties had not provided detailed information on riot control agents in their initial declarations. Additional information on the possession of riot control agents is provided in Annex 4 to this report.

### **Informal consultations**

- 1.64 Three informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections (Industry Cluster consultations) were conducted in 2021. Owing to COVID-19-related restrictions, meetings were held virtually. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of verification-related topics, including:
- (a) summary of industry verification in 2020;
  - (b) performance of the methodology for the selection of OCPF plant sites for inspection in 2020;
  - (c) Schedule 2 inspections;
  - (d) guidance for States Parties on Article VI declarations obligations and inspections following entry into force of changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals;
  - (e) enhancing Article VI implementation;
  - (f) preparations to resume Article VI inspections;
  - (g) resumption of Article VI inspections; and
  - (h) update of the Declarations Handbook (version 3).

### **OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories**

- 1.65 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that wish to be a part of the OPCW's network of analytical laboratories. During the reporting period, the Forty-Eighth Official OPCW Proficiency Test for Environmental Analysis was completed, the Forty-Ninth test was conducted and completed, and the Fiftieth test began. Additionally, the Sixth Official Proficiency Test for Biomedical Sample Analysis was conducted. At the end of the reporting period, 24 laboratories from 19 States Parties had been designated for environmental analysis, with one laboratory temporarily suspended. Twenty laboratories from 14 States Parties had been designated for biomedical sample analysis, with one laboratory temporarily suspended. Annex 5 to this report shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2021.
- 1.66 A confidence-building exercise for the analysis of biologically derived toxins was finished at the beginning of 2021, and a sixth exercise began in December 2021. These exercises were specifically targeted at the analysis of the protein toxin ricin. The biological toxin saxitoxin was included in the third, fourth, and fifth exercises.



### **Training provided by the Inspectorate Division**

- 1.70 In 2021, the Capacity-Building and Contingency-Planning Cell (CBCP) of the Inspectorate Division coordinated or delivered 44 individual training courses. As a result of the ongoing COVID-19-related restrictions, 41% of all courses took place virtually and the rest were conducted in the following countries: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The CBCP continued to provide mandatory inspector refresher courses as well as specialised courses directed at newly promoted inspection team leaders. In addition, a range of mandatory courses based on inspector speciality were organised, including in occupational safety and health, tactical combat casualty care, ordnance training, explosive remnants of war, and analytical chemist certification.
- 1.71 The United States of America provided support in the delivery of four refresher and one initial hazardous waste operations and emergency response (HAZWOPER) courses to a total of 79 Secretariat staff members.
- 1.72 Further, three Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) courses were sponsored and hosted by Germany. As a result, 38 Secretariat staff members whose job could require deployment to high-risk areas were trained. In addition, two Inspectorate staff received SSAFE trainer qualification training in Turin, Italy.
- 1.73 In 2021, three toxic chemicals training (TCT) courses took place in Serbia, Slovakia, and Sweden, respectively. Thirty-three Secretariat staff members received their certification, with nine inspectors becoming qualified TCT trainers in the process.
- 1.74 In September 2021, a group of 10 new inspectors (Group T) joined the OPCW. The CBCP facilitated a 12-week mandatory initial training aimed at preparing them for their important role as inspectors. On 17 December 2021, the OPCW held a virtual graduation ceremony during which the Director-General awarded the certificates of training completion to the inspectors from Group T and welcomed them officially to the team.

### **Knowledge management**

- 1.75 In 2021, the Secretariat further strengthened its knowledge management policy framework with a new knowledge strategy aligned with the Organisation's strategic goals and based on continuous knowledge management, which aims to identify, develop, and retain expertise and knowledge in the Organisation through a set of continuous processes. The Secretariat implemented new and improved existing processes as part of this strategy, with priority given to specific expertise in the Inspectorate and Verification Divisions. Specialised training on knowledge transfer methodology provided 25 focal points across the Secretariat, as well as inspectors, with necessary skills to ensure knowledge retention. Management of explicit knowledge was further strengthened through improvements to digital tools such as the OPCW Intranet (OrgNet), the Correspondence Management System, and the OPCW Library.
- 1.76 Throughout 2021, the Verification Division consolidated its network of knowledge champions across the Division, fine-tuned the process of core knowledge identification, and developed collaborative working areas. The Division continued its knowledge transfer activities with staff members who were separating from the Organisation. Furthermore, the Division worked to preserve relevant knowledge following the

expected conclusion of chemical weapons stockpile destruction programmes. In addition, it began work on an international chemical weapons-related knowledge retention workshop which is expected to take place in 2022, and also undertook analysis of historic chemical weapons destruction data, which it added to the repository of knowledge.

- 1.77 In 2021, the Inspectorate Division continued its efforts towards the implementation of an integrated portfolio of knowledge management tools and initiatives. This included enhancing the Continuous Improvement Platform (a tool structuring the capture and sharing of knowledge derived from inspection missions) and piloting two initiatives, namely, knowledge transfer sessions and a mentoring programme. Knowledge transfer sessions contribute to the preservation of specific areas of core knowledge, while the mentoring programme allows the direct sharing of knowledge between staff, with special attention given to supporting the integration of more recently arrived staff and to accelerating their learning in relevant topics. Regular knowledge sharing events continued to take place, contributing to a high level of consistency and quality of on-site verification-related activities.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2021, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 83 activities and programmes, all delivered online owing to COVID-19-related restrictions. A total of 4,162 experts from 156 States Parties across all regions took part.
- 2.2 Throughout the year, while maintaining readiness to resume face-to-face activities as soon as permitted, the Secretariat continued to enhance its tools and methodologies for online learning, which will contribute in the longer term to strengthening the overall effectiveness and efficiency of its capacity-building support as a complement to the traditional in-person format.
- 2.3 The implementation of the fifth phase (2020-2022) of the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Africa Programme") continued to progress apace. During the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to address the eight objectives of the Programme concurrently. In terms of capacity building, which constitutes the backbone of the Programme, over 1,000 participants from 40 African States Parties benefitted from 52 training events, including 26 training activities organised specifically for the Africa region.

### **National implementation and technical assistance**

- 2.4 In 2021, the Secretariat continued to provide capacity-building support to States Parties in their efforts towards full and effective national implementation of the Convention. Support for the National Authorities and stakeholders focused on building their institutional capacity to meet State Party obligations under the Convention. More than 900 participants took part in 18 capacity-building and technical assistance activities related to national implementation of the Convention.
- 2.5 As of 31 December 2021, 158 of 193 States Parties had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures. A total of 118 States Parties had reported the adoption of comprehensive legislation covering all required initial measures, while 40 had reported on the adoption of implementing legislation covering some of the required initial measures. The remaining 35 States Parties had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation. Detailed information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.<sup>18</sup>
- 2.6 The Secretariat conducted two national legislative review forums in 2021, with the National Authority of Mauritania on 23 February 2021 and the National Authority of Togo on 3 June 2021. During the forums, the Secretariat worked collaboratively with State Party delegates to review the scope of the participating States Parties' national legislative frameworks on the Convention and discussed various legislative and regulatory approaches to its implementation.

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<sup>18</sup> Annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention in 2021: EC-98/DG.13 C-26/DG.11; EC-98/DG.11 C-26/DG.9; and EC-98/DG.12 C-26/DG.10 (all dated 14 September 2021).

- 2.7 Two training courses on declarations and inspections obligations under Article VI of the Convention were held in 2021: in English from 1 March to 15 April, and in Arabic (for States Parties from the Middle East and North Africa) from 13 to 30 September. Through these courses, participants were provided with an opportunity to enhance their knowledge of Article VI obligations as well as a chance to share experiences and best practices on Article VI-related issues. States Parties were also assisted in the practical fulfilment of Article VI obligations and the management of contemporary security challenges in that context. Fifty-two participants from 29 States Parties representing all regions completed the March course. Thirty participants from 10 States Parties in the Asia and Africa regions completed the September course.
- 2.8 In 2021, the Secretariat conducted three training courses on legislative and regulatory issues on chemical security: from 19 to 22 April 2021 for English-speaking States Parties in Africa; from 16 to 21 October for French-speaking States Parties in Africa; and from 8 to 14 December for States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean. The courses aimed to enhance the capacities of participants to analyse their national legislative and regulatory frameworks on chemical security and to identify gaps and potential means to address them. Participants completed specific training modules, shared information on their national legal frameworks on chemical security, and attended an interactive online session. Forty-nine participants from 12 African States Parties attended the April course. Forty participants from 12 African States Parties attended the October course. Fifty-six participants from 23 States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean attended the December course.
- 2.9 A general training course on the Convention for personnel of National Authorities and relevant stakeholders was conducted from 19 to 22 April 2021. The course provided an opportunity for participants to increase their knowledge on issues related to national implementing legislation, national protective programmes, the annual submission of Article VI declarations, and receiving and escorting inspections. Sixty-seven participants from 41 States Parties representing all regions completed the course.
- 2.10 The Secretariat, in cooperation with the WCO, held two online training courses on the enforcement of the Convention's scheduled chemicals transfer regime, from 25 to 27 May and from 8 to 10 December 2021. The intensive courses aimed to equip frontline customs officers with the skills and knowledge required to effectively monitor the cross-border movement of toxic chemicals, while also underscoring the role of the Convention in supporting global, regional, and national security. Sixty-one participants from 40 States Parties representing all regions completed the May course. Thirty-nine participants from 17 African States Parties completed the December course.
- 2.11 Four regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties were held in June 2021. The virtual sessions provided participants with the opportunity to engage with other National Authorities in their respective regions to address specific aspects of national implementation and to promote networking and collaboration between States Parties. Meetings were held for the Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and Caribbean regions.

- 2.12 On 21 September and 12 October 2021, the Secretariat, in cooperation with the WCO, conducted two online lessons-learned workshops on customs training integration for States Parties in the Asia and Latin America and Caribbean regions. Discussions focused on challenges and good practices related to the incorporation of Convention-related modules into national customs training curricula. Thirty representatives from 13 States Parties in Asia took part in the September event. Twenty-four participants from 10 States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean took part in the October event.
- 2.13 On 12 and 13 October 2021, the Secretariat held the Eighth Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention. The meeting promoted cooperation between National Authorities and the chemical industry by providing a platform for representatives to share experiences, challenges, and good practices on the implementation of the Convention. Participants also discussed issues related to regulatory compliance and exchanged information on approaches to chemical industry outreach. A total of 113 representatives from States Parties attended the meeting.
- 2.14 From 23 to 26 November 2021, the Secretariat held the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of National Authorities. During the meeting, the Secretariat updated participants on policy-related issues, as well as on its activities in the implementation of the verification regime, and highlighted the most important developments within its capacity-building programmes. National Authorities shared experiences, knowledge, and good practices related to the implementation of the Convention. Specifically, participants exchanged views on the OPCW's capacity-building support related to the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks for chemical security, chemical security management, and strengthening response capacities against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. The meeting was attended by 200 participants from 102 States Parties.

### **Assistance and protection**

- 2.15 In 2021, 78 States Parties made annual submissions pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X regarding their national protective programmes against the use of chemical weapons.
- 2.16 The Secretariat continued to promote the use of a user-friendly online tool facilitating the collection and submission of information required under paragraph 4 of Article X. This online tool has been incorporated in the updated version of the Protection and Assistance Databank (PAD). The PAD is accessible to States Parties through the external server known as "Catalyst".
- 2.17 The core components of the capacity-building activities run by the Secretariat under Article X are based on a three-component training cycle that comprises a basic, advanced, and exercise course. In 2021, training cycles continued to be disrupted by COVID-19 restrictions, and instead a broader range of online activities were arranged, covering core theoretical components and promoting an exchange of knowledge and experience among stakeholders. In 2021, 35 capacity-building events took place, in which a record 2,102 first responders from all regions took part.
- 2.18 Throughout 2021 the Secretariat conducted a series of online basic training courses for States Parties in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, covering theoretical material related to chemical emergency response. These activities allow the participating first responders to move rapidly to practical face-to-face training once circumstances permit. Eight such courses were held in English, French,



Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish, with technical support provided by relevant institutions in Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Malaysia, Peru, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Uruguay.

- 2.19 The Secretariat offered a range of 20 tailored specialised training courses and one train-the-trainers course to suit the protective needs of States Parties in all OPCW regional groups. The Secretariat also relied on its Instructor Development and Exchange Programme to support the development and delivery of online training. This Programme involves the international exchange of expertise and the fostering of best practices to enhance States Parties' response capabilities, both nationally, subregionally, and regionally. It will also continue to improve the OPCW's readiness to respond to a request for assistance. The success of this Programme allowed the Secretariat to quickly leverage suitable and qualified instructors to support the range of online programmes developed over the course of 2021.
- 2.20 The basic trainings for States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean, supported by Costa Rica, were augmented with seven online courses covering decontamination techniques, detection and sampling, the Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER), and the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), with the support of the Governments of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Spain.
- 2.21 In Eastern Europe, a specialised training on WISER and ERG was held. Furthermore, building on the basic training courses held at the end of 2020, a series of five training courses conducted in cooperation with the Belarus-based International Rescuers Training Centre (IRT Centre) were designed and delivered as a new online training programme for Russian-speaking first responders. As a complementary learning tool supporting an eventual return to in-person training, this digital offering included several specialised modules on personal protection, reconnaissance, sampling, and decontamination to be studied over six months, designed to strengthen national preparedness to respond to accidents and incidents involving chemical weapons or toxic industrial chemicals.
- 2.22 Within the fifth phase of the Africa Programme, further progress was made with regard to establishing and strengthening national and regional capacity to respond to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals. To make the best use of regional and subregional capacities and expertise, the Secretariat continued to work with the regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa to coordinate the delivery of capacity-building outputs for States Parties in each region.
- 2.23 With the support of Algeria, Argentina, and the Czech Republic, the Secretariat delivered six new online specialised training courses designed to introduce first responders to WISER and ERG, decontamination techniques, and sampling.
- 2.24 In order to support the development or improvement of national protection programmes, the Secretariat completed the first phase of a pilot assistance and protection needs assessment project with the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This phase of the project included the development of an online self-assessment tool that participating States Parties will use to assess their current framework, which aims to help an expert team organised by the Secretariat to assess the needs of the country and assist with the drafting of a plan of action to address those identified needs. Once the Secretariat has proven the concept with this pilot, it plans to offer this support to States Parties in other regions. Currently, this project benefits from the support of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

- 2.25 In response to a request for assistance in preparation for the Africa Cup of Nations 2021, the Secretariat conducted two online capacity-building activities. As a first step, a webinar aimed at sharing experience on preparing for a response to possible chemical incidents during a major public event was organised between States Parties that had held such events in the past and those that would do so in the near future. This activity was followed by a targeted training in initial operational response for Cameroon, as a host nation of the Africa Cup of Nations 2021. The Secretariat also started building its technical capacities to address similar requests for assistance in the future.
- 2.26 In order to widen participation in OPCW capacity-building activities, which is important for the full and effective implementation of Article X, the Secretariat launched a new initiative to address practical issues for women in chemical incident first responder roles by organising an international platform for sharing experience from female first responders from all regions. This event was followed by a targeted regional online basic course on assistance and protection in chemical emergencies for female armed forces personnel, organised in cooperation with the Inter-American Defense Board for OPCW Member States that are also members of the Organization of American States.
- 2.27 The Secretariat convened a meeting of training centres from the Latin America and Caribbean region to discuss assistance and protection training strategies and other Article X issues. The meeting allowed participating training institutions to share best practices regarding the continuation of training during the pandemic, reviewing progress in developing a new virtual course as a prerequisite to the face-to-face training cycle. The participants agreed to set up a working group to develop standard content for the basic and advanced course, as well as the new virtual course.
- 2.28 Efforts within the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons continued to support the network's objectives. Furthermore, broader participation in the funding of its activities, in accordance with the relevant decision of the Conference (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011), was encouraged in support of future projects. In addition, from the beginning of 2021, the Secretariat started to work with an international group of experts to draft a second guidebook for medical practitioners focusing on the long-term care of victims, which is in the last stage of drafting and is expected to be published in 2022.
- 2.29 The balance of the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 135,596. The Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,567,950, with 47 States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X.

### **International cooperation and technological development**

- 2.30 In 2021, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and facilitate international cooperation to advance the peaceful uses of chemistry. The programmes under Article XI were offered online in the three thematic areas of integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge.
- 2.31 During the year under review, 29 capacity-building programmes and events covering integrated chemicals management (including chemical safety and security management), enhancement of laboratory capabilities (analytical skills development courses), and chemical knowledge promotion were carried out by the Secretariat for over 1,000

participants. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement four standing programmes, namely the Fellowship Programme, the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Conference Support Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme. In 2021, the Secretariat also organised the annual workshop on the implementation of Article XI.

- 2.32 The sixth edition of the Review and Evaluation Workshop of the Components of an Agreed Framework for the Full Implementation of Article XI (C-16/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2011) was organised online on 11 November 2021. A total of 79 participants from 48 States Parties representing National Authorities, Permanent Representations, and relevant stakeholders participated in this workshop, whose aim was to facilitate discussion and the exchange of views among States Parties and relevant stakeholders to further the full implementation of Article XI of the Convention. The workshop featured discussion on ongoing capacity-building efforts under Article XI, as well as the impact of related programmes and activities, including deliberations on progress and gaps. The Secretariat also briefed participants on its efforts to strengthen programmes and interventions in all thematic areas.
- 2.33 Over the reporting period the Secretariat continued to focus on promoting chemical knowledge. In this connection, it organised the “Online Forum on the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry: New Norms on OPCW Capacity-Building Programmes After the COVID-19 Pandemic” for African States Parties on 1 April 2021. The forum aimed to create a platform for States Parties to share lessons learned and best practices related to capacity building, particularly in the area of chemical safety and security management. The forum was attended by 37 experts from 13 States Parties representing governmental agencies, chemical industries, academia, and laboratories. Representatives from the University of Wuppertal, Germany, also shared their experience.
- 2.34 Within the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, nine training courses on the analysis of Convention-related chemicals and on OPCW proficiency testing were held in 2021. These online training courses were organised by laboratories from Finland and Spain and by the OPCW Laboratory in Rijswijk.
- 2.35 To further enhance the capacity of laboratories in Africa and in the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), the second phase of the “Project on Assessing and Enhancing the Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States: Towards OPCW Designation” was completed on 31 March 2021. The project, funded from a voluntary contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was renewed in August 2021 until 31 March 2022, with the Secretariat and the United Kingdom Government having signed a further memorandum of understanding. The activities within the project continue to focus on building the capacity of the six remaining analytical laboratories in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean that were among the seven that had been identified as recipients of support under the first phase of the project.
- 2.36 A workshop under the project referred to above was held online on 8 April 2021. The workshop summarised the progress made in the project and brought participants together to discuss the way forward in the third phase (2021–2022). It was attended by 21 participants from the following eight States Parties: Brazil, Chile, Finland, Germany, Kenya, Nigeria, Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

- 2.37 The Secretariat organised two parallel online laboratory skills enhancement courses in collaboration with the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention from 23 to 27 August 2021. The two courses covered liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry and laboratory quality management, and benefitted nine participants from eight States Parties.
- 2.38 Under the Equipment Exchange Programme, the Secretariat obtained gas chromatography-mass spectrometry equipment from a German laboratory and donated it to the National Authority of the Sudan.
- 2.39 In promoting chemical knowledge and exchange, the Secretariat has continued to provide support for scientists to participate in events related to the peaceful uses of chemistry. Two events (one online and one hybrid) were supported by the Secretariat under the Conference Support Programme. In total, 160 participants were sponsored to attend the two events.
- 2.40 Under the Fellowship Programme, the Secretariat continues to facilitate the exchange of scientific and technical information between fellows and institutions, while at the same time strengthening the institutions in the targeted countries through capacity building. Nine fellows were selected for sponsorship under the Fellowship Programme. Two fellowships, one from Jordan (hosted in France) and one from Zimbabwe (hosted in Switzerland), were completed during the reporting period. In addition, seven fellowships commenced during the reporting period and will be completed in 2022. The fellows include one from Argentina (hosted in the Netherlands), one from Cameroon (hosted in Germany), one from Cuba (hosted in Italy), one from Nigeria (hosted in South Africa), one from Serbia (hosted in Finland), and two from Uganda (hosted in Finland and Germany).
- 2.41 Under the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Secretariat continued to extend its support to small-scale research projects in States Parties to help promote the development of scientific and technical knowledge in chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful purposes relevant to the Convention. The Secretariat also continued supporting 27 ongoing research projects funded by the OPCW.
- 2.42 Furthermore, the continued importance of enhancing capacity-building needs assessments for the delivery of pertinent and effective programmes was underscored in 2021. In this context, the Secretariat invited States Parties, on a voluntary basis, to submit assessments of their specific needs in chemical safety and security management, as well as information on existing tools, guidance, and best practices in chemical management in their respective countries.
- 2.43 The programme review and lessons-learned approach and techniques were further institutionalised during the reporting period. The assessment of programme effectiveness was based on structured feedback from a wide variety of stakeholders, including participants, relevant institutions, and National Authorities of States Parties. During the reporting period, the Secretariat successfully concluded a review of the Women in Chemistry initiative in order to draw on lessons learned for future improvement of the initiative.

## **The Africa Programme**

- 2.44 Addressing the specific needs of the Africa region in relation to the Convention continued to be a strong priority for the Secretariat in 2021. Throughout the year, the Secretariat continued implementing the fifth phase of the Africa Programme, addressing concurrently the eight objectives assigned thereto. In terms of capacity building, which constitutes the backbone of the Programme, the Secretariat delivered 52 training events benefiting over 1,000 participants from 40 African States Parties. These activities, organised online because of COVID-19-related restrictions, included 26 training activities conducted specifically for the Africa region.
- 2.45 Capacity-building activities included the provision of online training in various Programme areas, including fostering national implementation of the Convention, enhancing National Authorities' effectiveness, improving control over cross-border transfers of scheduled chemicals, streamlining assistance and protection capabilities against chemical threats and incidents, educating on chemical safety and security management, developing laboratory competencies, and promoting knowledge of peaceful uses of chemistry and its exchange on the continent.
- 2.46 To deliver these activities and to ensure targets are met in line with Programme guidelines, the Secretariat closely coordinated with various partners, donors, as well as States Parties in Africa.
- 2.47 In addition, as part of the promotion of knowledge of peaceful uses of chemistry in Africa, the Secretariat sponsored 12 African research projects (including eight projects co-funded with the International Foundation for Science), as well as the participation of 137 African scientists in two major international scientific events. Moreover, the Secretariat granted five fellowships for the benefit of African chemical scientists and funded a transfer of laboratory equipment from Germany to the Sudan.
- 2.48 The Africa Programme has continued to be funded essentially through the OPCW regular budget. In parallel, the Secretariat continued in 2021 its efforts to further maximise the Programme's impact and outreach by mobilising additional voluntary resources for the special projects designed within the framework of the Programme, to complement the regular budget resources. As a result, by the end of 2021 five of these special projects had received full funding through extrabudgetary resources.
- 2.49 In 2021, the Africa Programme received voluntary contributions in particular from the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union. In-kind support was also provided by African States Parties and other States Parties outside Africa.
- 2.50 The Secretariat continued to implement specific initiatives in 2021 to enhance the Africa Programme's visibility and stakeholder engagement. These initiatives included the maintenance and further development of the online OPCW Africa Network and the publication of the second OPCW Africa Bulletin.

2.51 In relation to Africa Programme governance, the Africa Programme Steering Committee continued to meet as planned in 2021 to monitor progress and to provide support, advice, and guidance to the Secretariat in regard to Programme implementation.<sup>19</sup> Donors to the Programme also continued to participate in the Committee as observers.<sup>20</sup> Two Committee meetings, under the chairpersonship of Kenya, were held on 25 June and 15 November 2021.

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<sup>19</sup> Members of the Steering Committee of the Africa Programme in 2021: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya (Chair), Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and the Sudan.

<sup>20</sup> Observers of the Steering Committee of the Africa Programme in 2021: the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

### 3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

#### Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

##### Part II of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.1 Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference was split into two parts: Part I (held from 30 November to 1 December 2020)<sup>21</sup> and Part II (held from 20 to 22 April 2021).
- 3.2 The following decisions were adopted by the Conference during Part II of its Twenty-Fifth Session:
- (a) Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic (C-25/DEC.9);
  - (b) Appointment of the External Auditor of the OPCW (C-25/DEC.10, dated 21 April 2021); and
  - (c) Extension of the Special Fund for OPCW Special Missions (C-25/DEC.8, dated 20 April 2021).
- 3.3 The Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference took place from 29 November to 3 December 2021. As with the Twenty-Fifth Session, the work of the Twenty-Sixth Session was adapted to the operational restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference was attended by representatives of 152 States Parties, a signatory State, and eight international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. A total of 76 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and three bodies representing the global chemical industry and scientific community also registered to attend. Baroness Annabel Goldie, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security of the United States of America, submitted video statements to the Conference as high-level speakers.
- 3.4 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 30 November 2021.
- 3.5 The Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session reviewed the status of implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, including chemical disarmament, destruction-related issues, national implementation measures, assistance and protection, international cooperation, the activities of the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. States Parties discussed a report covering the activities carried out under the auspices of the Africa Programme, and also considered progress made regarding the OPCW's efforts to engage with the chemical industry and the scientific community. For the first time, the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session approved a biennial Programme and Budget.

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<sup>21</sup> See C-26/3 (dated 1 December 2021) for more details on the activities of the Conference during Part I of its Twenty-Fifth Session.

- 3.6 States Parties approved the renewal of appointment of Ambassador Fernando Arias as the Director-General of the Secretariat, for one further term of four years (C-26/DEC.9, dated 30 November 2021).
- 3.7 The Conference recommended that the Council at its next session establish an open-ended working group to begin, in cooperation with the Secretariat, preparations for the Fifth Review Conference,<sup>22</sup> which will be convened in accordance with paragraph 22 of Article VIII of the Convention. Furthermore, the Conference decided that its Fifth Review Conference would be held from 15 to 19 May 2023.
- 3.8 The following decisions were among those adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session:<sup>23</sup>
- (a) Understanding Regarding the Aerosolised Use of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes (C-26/DEC.10, dated 1 December 2021);
  - (b) Scale of Assessments for 2022 (C-26/DEC.8, dated 30 November 2021);
  - (c) Cash Deficit for 2019 (C-26/DEC.4, dated 29 November 2021);
  - (d) Submission of the 2021 OPCW Financial Statements to the External Auditor (C-26/DEC.5, dated 29 November 2021);
  - (e) Extension of the Special Fund for OPCW Special Missions (C-26/DEC.6, dated 29 November 2021);
  - (f) Write-Offs of Irrecoverable Accounts Receivable and of Losses of Assets (C-26/DEC.7, dated 29 November 2021); and
  - (g) Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2022–2023 (C-26/DEC.11, dated 1 December 2021).

#### **Activities of the Executive Council**

- 3.9 In 2021, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
- 3.10 The Council also:
- (a) reviewed progress in and adopted a number of decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
  - (b) reviewed the work of the DAT;

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<sup>22</sup> Review Conference = Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

<sup>23</sup> Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.



- (c) considered a summary update of FFM activities (S/1922/2020, dated 21 December 2020);
- (d) reviewed progress in the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3;
- (e) approved facility agreements and modifications or amendments to facility agreements between the OPCW and States Parties;
- (f) considered the work done in the context of the Africa Programme;
- (g) considered the annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) for 2020 (EC-97/DG.6 C-26/DG.2, dated 17 May 2021);
- (h) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters; and
- (i) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session.

#### **Activities of subsidiary bodies**

- 3.11 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter “the Confidentiality Commission”) held its Twenty-Third Meeting from 13 to 15 October 2021 (CC-23/1, dated 15 October 2021).
- 3.12 The ABAF held its Fiftieth Session from 1 to 4 June 2021 (ABAF-50/1, dated 4 June 2021).
- 3.13 The SAB held its Thirty-First Session on 3 and 4 March 2021 (SAB-31/1, dated 4 March 2021), its Thirty-Second Session from 15 to 17 June 2021 (SAB-32/1, dated 17 June 2021), and its Thirty-Third Session from 15 to 18 November 2021 (SAB-33/1, dated 18 November 2021).
- 3.14 The ABEO held its Tenth Session on 9 and 10 February 2021 (ABEO-10/1, dated 10 February 2021) and its Eleventh Session on 26 and 27 July 2021 (ABEO-11/1\*, dated 27 July 2021).
- 3.15 The Chairperson of the Council, Ambassador Abdelouahab Bellouki of Morocco, reported to the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session on the status of the work of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.

## 4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

### Universality

- 4.1 In 2021, the number of OPCW Member States remained at 193. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2021. Although the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic presented challenges for the Secretariat's universality activities, the Secretariat maintained its practice of inviting representatives of States not Party and the signatory State to participate in selected OPCW activities, virtually or in-person as conditions allowed, including Part II of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference and the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference.
- 4.3 Six delegates of Israel registered to participate virtually in Part II of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference, and five delegates of Israel registered for the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference. The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of Israel in the Netherlands throughout the year.
- 4.4 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with representatives of States not Party, the signatory State, senior officials of States Parties, and in his interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

### External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.5 As set out below, the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to meet with high-level officials of States Parties at the OPCW Headquarters, while in compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. In addition, the Director-General conducted one official visit to Spain in July 2021.
- 4.6 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as to enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.

### High-Level visits to the OPCW Headquarters

- 4.7 In 2021, the Director-General hosted a number of high-level visitors at the OPCW Headquarters, including H.E. Mr Félix Ulloa, the Vice-President of El Salvador; H.E. Ms Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia; H.E. Dr Kahtan Al-Janabi, Deputy Minister for Legal and Multilateral Affairs of Iraq; H.E. Mr Marcin Przydacz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland; H.E. Mr Christian Guillermet-Fernández, Vice-Minister of Multilateral Affairs of Costa Rica; and Mr Jonatan Vseviov, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia.
- 4.8 To advance relations with the Host Country, on 31 March the Director-General met with Ms Dominique Kuhlning, the Director of Protocol and Host Country Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

### Visits and virtual briefings by the Director-General

- 4.9 In July 2021, the Director-General paid an official visit to Madrid, Spain, where he had an audience with H.M. King Felipe VI, followed by meetings with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation.
- 4.10 The Director-General met online with a number of high-level officials, including H.E. Mr Simon Coveney, T.D., Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence of Ireland; the Honourable Phil Twyford, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand; and H.E. Mr Abdulla bin Faisal bin Jabur Al Doseri, Assistant Foreign Minister of Bahrain.
- 4.11 On 3 June 2021, the Director-General gave a virtual briefing to the United Nations Security Council in an open session. On 27 September, the Director-General delivered the keynote address at the opening of the OPCW and Asser Institute's Twelfth Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, held in virtual format. On 2 November, the Director-General gave a virtual address to the Twenty-Third Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference organised by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- 4.12 On 12 November, the Director-General gave a virtual briefing to Permanent Representatives based outside The Hague. This activity is part of the Secretariat's efforts to keep non-resident Permanent Representations apprised of developments within the Organisation, in advance of the regular sessions of the Conference.
- 4.13 The Deputy Director-General, H.E. Ms Odette Melono, addressed a visit by the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme on 24 September at the OPCW Headquarters.

### **Protocol and privileges and immunities support**

- 4.14 The External Relations Division continued to provide protocol services to senior management and other members of the Secretariat. Additionally, the division continued to administer the privileges and immunities of the Organisation and its staff under the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. In all, 34 Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2021.

### **Other activities**

- 4.15 The Twenty-First Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel was convened virtually on 17 September 2021. A total of 119 delegates registered to attend.
- 4.16 On 24 September 2021, the OPCW hosted 19 fellows of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Fellowship Programme for a day of briefings by experts from the Secretariat.

## **Public affairs and media profile**

### OPCW Basics video

- 4.17 In 2021, the OPCW added two new science-focused videos to the OPCW Basics video series first produced in 2020. The new videos, “What is a dual-use chemical?” and “What are scheduled chemicals?”, are featured on the OPCW website and social media channels, with subtitles available in all six OPCW official languages. Principally created for the general public, the series also enhances the Secretariat’s education and outreach activities, trainings and workshops, and onboarding of staff. An additional video on the ChemTech Centre describes how the OPCW uses science and technology to uphold the Convention. This was shared with States Parties during the first pillar ceremony, as well as on the website and social media.

### OPCW website

- 4.18 Increased interest in the work of the OPCW in 2021 led to a sizeable increase in the number of visitors to the OPCW website. The website was visited by approximately 469,000 users in 2021, a 22% increase over 2020.

### Public outreach

- 4.19 The OPCW participated in The Hague International Open Day (19 September 2021) by hosting six groups of visitors for presentations about the mission and work of the OPCW, held on the OPCW premises but outside the Headquarters building, and in compliance with COVID-19-related measures.
- 4.20 Following a successful pilot in 2020, the OPCW officially launched its virtual group visits in February 2021 and hosted groups from nearly all regions. The OPCW conducted 54 public outreach events in 2021, of which 80% were held virtually. Through these events, the OPCW had direct interaction with 769 participants.

### T.M.C. Asser Institute

- 4.21 The twelfth edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute’s Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction took place from 27 September to 1 October. Forty-eight early- and mid-career professionals from 27 States Parties participated in this fully online version of the course, increasing their knowledge about the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. The Director-General addressed the participants of the programme virtually. The OPCW, with financial support from the European Union, awarded 12 scholarships to representatives of NGOs from Argentina, Egypt, France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, and the United States of America.

### Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties – Part II

- 4.22 As mentioned above, owing to COVID-19 restrictions, the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference was split into two parts. Part I was held in November 2020 and Part II was held in April 2021. A total of 73 civil society organisations represented by 227 individuals received approval to participate in the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference. Though attendance in person was not possible, approved NGO participants were instead invited to submit written or video statements that were made available via the OPCW website.

- 4.23 The Secretariat provided a live webcast of Part II of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference, which attracted 7,846 viewers.

Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 4.24 A total of 79 civil society organisations represented by 223 individuals received approval to participate in the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference. Owing to COVID-19 restrictions, in-person attendance by civil society representatives was limited. Accredited civil society participants were invited to submit pre-recorded video statements, which were organised thematically by the Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition, shared on the OPCW website, and played in the Conference venue.
- 4.25 The Secretariat provided a live webcast of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference, which attracted 9,498 views.

Social media growth

- 4.26 The Secretariat's digital communications capacity continued to increase significantly according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Each social media post and campaign is designed to increase awareness and to enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention. Overall, the OPCW's social media platforms experienced a combined growth rate of 10%.

**TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH**

<b>Social Media</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>Change 2020/2021</b>
Facebook followers	19,067	19,606	3%
Twitter followers	34,218	35,580	4%
YouTube followers	1,636	2,101	28%
LinkedIn followers	17,611	22,486	28%

## 5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

### Administrative and budgetary matters

- 5.1 In decision C-24/DEC.11 (dated 28 November 2019), the Conference decided that the first biennial programme and budget would be in the 2022 to 2023 biennium. Preparations made by the Secretariat for this included amended OPCW Financial Regulations and Rules effective 1 January 2021 (C-25/DEC.6, dated 30 November 2020), development of detailed and integrated templates and costing sheets to support biennial budget formulation for programme managers, and also the development of internal structures to further entrench major capital investment planning and the integration of major capital funding. The biennial Programme and Budget was approved by the Conference in December 2021 in decision C-26/DEC.11.
- 5.2 The Administration Division continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation's cash situation throughout 2021, apprising States Parties of the financial position on a monthly basis, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. In 2021 there was a higher-than-normal proportion of payments for assessed contributions and arrears occurring in the later part of the year, which contributed to cash flow volatility during the year. The Working Capital Fund was replenished during the period with funds that had previously been accessed to address liquidity constraints.
- 5.3 The 2020 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in July 2021 (EC-98/DG.7 C-26/DG.6, dated 30 August 2021); both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2020 Financial Statements of the OPCW continued to include a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting for the financial year key trends and issues of importance for the readers of the Financial Statements, including States Parties.
- 5.4 Strengthening and further integrating internal control monitoring to support the Director-General's Statement of Internal Control continued in 2021, building upon the progress made in 2020, as noted by the External Auditor.
- 5.5 The General Support Services maintained uninterrupted availability of the full range of support services for the Secretariat, despite COVID-19-related restrictions, including travel facilitation, transportation and fleet maintenance, visa and travel documentation services, building maintenance and management, conference and meeting infrastructure support, asset and property management, supplies and inventory, facility support services, and mail and courier services.
- 5.6 Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 33.1 million in 2021.<sup>24</sup> This amount was reached through 216 contracts or purchase orders raised centrally by the Procurement Section for a total value of EUR 30.5 million, 32 purchase orders through catalogue ordering for a total value of EUR 1.2 million, and 624 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low-value procurements), for a total value of EUR 1.4 million.

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<sup>24</sup>

The significantly higher volume of procurement in 2021 compared to previous years is attributable to contracting for the construction of the ChemTech Centre. As the new enterprise resource planning (ERP) system enables more detailed reporting, it is now possible to exclude obligations for international agreements from the procurement statistics. In 2021, there were 126 such transactions with a volume of EUR 3 million. In previous years, such transactions were included.

- 5.7 Significant work was undertaken in 2021 by the Human Resources Branch in the context of the pandemic to support staff and ensure business continuity. The Secretariat developed and delivered a range of interventions to help staff continue to adhere to the requirement for working from home, including in the areas of staff well-being and engagement. Learning and development activities continued to be delivered remotely. Work continued to move a number of critical organisational processes, such as recruitment, staff administration, and training and development, to the new System of Record ERP solution during the period under review.
- 5.8 In 2021, the Secretariat continued to proactively source the best candidates for positions under recruitment and to position the Organisation as an appealing place to work. This included improving the style and content of vacancy notices and developing a webinar to help applicants improve the quality of their applications. To meet urgent staffing needs, the Secretariat actively pursued loan agreements with entities of the United Nations system, with two concluded in 2021 and a third remaining in force. This modality provides a valuable source of short-term staff to fill crucial gaps while corresponding fixed-term posts are under recruitment.
- 5.9 The Secretariat continued to enhance its approach to the onboarding of new staff in 2021, including through the use of a mobile phone application. Work also continued on implementing a revised approach to performance management, focusing on continuous feedback between staff and managers, and obtaining feedback from key stakeholders. Training to develop coaching skills for current and prospective supervisors was also organised.
- 5.10 The Secretariat continued in 2021 to support States Parties in the possible adaptation of the tenure policy, including through contributing workforce and data analysis, presentations, and research to support informal consultations.
- 5.11 The Secretariat continued to participate in the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme in 2021. There are currently three JPOs at the Secretariat. Work began to explore further placements for 2022.
- 5.12 Building on the Director-General's commitment as an International Gender Champion, the Secretariat undertook a gender and diversity audit in 2020. The audit resulted in several recommendations on policy and operational improvements, which the Secretariat either implemented or was in the process of implementing in 2021. In addition, significant investment was made in delivering training on diversity and inclusion.
- 5.13 The work of the Information Services Branch in 2021 focused on delivering significant improvements to the Secretariat's digital capabilities. More IT system improvements were launched than in any other year since the OPCW's establishment. These improvements were aimed towards the three strategic objectives of security, agility, and resilience.
- 5.14 On 1 January 2021, the Secretariat conducted a successful switchover to a new ERP system, a major milestone. The platform was supported and refined over the course of the year with improvements made to payroll, procurement, budgeting, and reporting functions. Beyond this system, the Organisation made major enhancements to the "modern workplace" landscape of collaboration tools, including a full, modern replacement of the document management and archiving system.

- 5.15 Looking beyond systems used by staff directly, major improvements were made to systems used for external connections and collaboration. In 2021, an in-room conferencing system with online capabilities to allow for hybrid meetings spanning all six OPCW official languages was fully integrated. In addition, the former Extranet was replaced with the modern Catalyst platform.
- 5.16 In 2021, the Secretariat also improved its ability to effectively secure internal networks and devices. New tools for managing laptops and mobile devices were launched along with a new network infrastructure that powers a secure Wi-Fi network for hybrid work. Legacy desktop hardware was decommissioned and disposed of, and hardware to support hybrid and flexible working arrangements was installed.
- 5.17 In order to effectively manage the many projects and system roll-outs, improvements were made to relevant governance frameworks, with an updated IT Steering Committee launched, and a new IT strategy approved by the IT Strategic Advisory Committee in June 2021.
- 5.18 As stated in Section 1 above, the Knowledge Management Section continued to coordinate activities related to the identification, development, and retention of knowledge at the OPCW, pursuing efforts to strengthen a knowledge-sharing culture, coordinating a knowledge management champions network, and guiding staff to implement continuous knowledge management processes. It also continued to manage the archives, the Correspondence Management System, and the OPCW Library. The Knowledge Management Advisor reported to States Parties through presentations, including at briefings related to knowledge management and its aspects pertinent to the tenure policy. Knowledge management practices and goals were defined through the issuing of a new knowledge management strategy.

### **Internal oversight**

- 5.19 In 2021, the OIO carried out its risk-based work plan prepared in line with its Strategic Master Plan (SMP) for 2020–2024. In accordance with the SMP and in keeping with the principles of agile auditing, the OIO modified its work plan in 2021, in view of disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, the OIO conducted the following audits/evaluations in 2021: Management of Sick Leave; Staff Performance Management; Evaluation of OPCW Committees: the Investment Committee; IT Project Management; and ERP System – General Controls and Procure-to-Pay Module. The OIO also supported the Management in updating the code of conduct and related guidelines.
- 5.20 To manage the Quality Management System (QMS) of the OPCW, the OIO performed four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and conducted management reviews of accredited areas. These enabled the OPCW to maintain certification in the accredited processes. In 2021, the Dutch Accreditation Council, the *Raad voor Accreditatie* (RvA), conducted a remote audit (surveillance assessment) of the accredited processes. No non-conformities were observed. As a result of the audit, the OPCW Laboratory continues to be recognised as fully compliant with the latest International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards ISO 17025:2017 and ISO 17043:2010.



- 5.21 During the period under review, the OIO continued to conduct its audits in conformity with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors–United States of America. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for Evaluation were also observed.
- 5.22 In 2021, the OIO continued to provide advice concerning, inter alia, the revision of administrative directives, the improvement of internal controls, risk management (with a special focus on fraud risk), and quality management. In view of the risks associated with the implementation of the ERP project, the OIO set up an advisory team to support and advise business process owners on best practices relating to key risks and controls associated with processes in the ERP system. Following a request from the Procurement Section and the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS), the OIO consulted with the relevant parties and provided them with advisory notes.
- 5.23 Further, the OIO participated as an observer in meetings of the Committee on Contracts, the Property Survey Board, the IT Strategy Advisory Committee, the IT Steering Committee, the ERP Advisory Board, the Risk Management Committee, the COVID-19 Task Force, the ChemTech Centre Project Board, and the Investment Committee.
- 5.24 In 2021, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of the implementation of recommendations contained in its audit and evaluation reports, in order to assess the actions taken by the Management in implementation of the audit recommendations. The outcome of the follow-up exercises was reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the OIO’s annual summary report. To facilitate the timely follow-up of recommendations, the OIO utilised an online SharePoint-based “Audit Tracker” tool and an “Audilytics” dashboard for reporting thereon. The implementation of the OIO’s audit and evaluation recommendations contributed to enhancing compliance with existing regulations and procedures, to further strengthening internal controls, and to improving the allocation of resources and the effectiveness of programmes and policies.

### **Legal affairs**

- 5.25 In 2021, the Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO) provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.26 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the rules of procedure of the policy-making organs; negotiation of international agreements, including agreements on privileges and immunities, voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements, inter alia with designated laboratories and national and international agencies on the conduct of trainings and other activities; cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations; administrative policies and procedures, including the formulation and interpretation of the OPCW Staff Regulations and interim Staff Rules and other administrative issuances, as well as procurement practices, policies, and procedures; and financial questions, including those concerning commercial contracts for the procurement of goods and services, also in relation to the Headquarters of the Organisation and the new ChemTech Centre. The LAO further represented the OPCW before administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial bodies, including the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization.
- 5.27 The Secretariat registered 50 international agreements in 2021 and 10 amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8 to this report).

## **Strategy and policy**

### Countering chemical terrorism

- 5.28 In 2021, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (OEWG-T) remained the primary platform for States Parties to interact with international experts and exchange views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. The focus of discussions throughout 2021 was on the Secretariat's capacity-building activities in support of chemical security, the strengthening of States Parties' legislative and regulatory frameworks for countering chemical terrorism, and on cooperation with international organisations. Three meetings of the OEWG-T were held in 2021, on 8 March, 5 July, and 4 October, respectively. All were held in an online format and chaired by H.E. Ambassador Vusimuzi Philemon Madonsela of South Africa.
- 5.29 In 2021, the OPCW continued to actively participate in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it became a signatory in 2018. Under the Compact's auspices, the Organisation acts as a Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, which is chaired by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). In this framework, the third phase of a project to enhance interagency interoperability and public communications in the event of a chemical or biological attack, jointly developed by the OPCW along with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, was launched in 2021.
- 5.30 The Secretariat and the Expert Group of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) continued to collaborate in strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and to offer practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.

### Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.31 The OPCW and the chemical industry continued efforts to strengthen their cooperation in accordance with the relevant recommendations of the Third Review Conference. During the reporting period, the tenth and eleventh meetings of the Chemical Industry Coordination Group took place. Owing to COVID-19-related restrictions, both meetings were held remotely. Participants discussed issues such as the impact of the pandemic and current trends and challenges in the global chemical industry, and continued to exchange information on capacity building, in particular in the area of chemical safety and security.
- 5.32 In 2021, representatives of the International Council of Chemical Associations and the International Chemical Trade Association participated in a number of Secretariat activities. The Director-General submitted a Note to the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" (C-26/DG.15, dated 5 November 2021) which provided a detailed account of the OPCW's engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The Note covers activities related to verification, education and outreach, national implementation of the Convention, and chemical safety and security.

### Education and outreach

- 5.33 Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, members of the ABEO conducted multiple activities in 2021 related to education and raising awareness about the Convention and the OPCW, both individually and as a group. Their work continued to focus on e-learning, active learning, and the creation and translation of new education and outreach materials. At its Tenth Session, the Board adopted its strategic plan,<sup>25</sup> which sets the priorities of work for the Board and aligns them with OPCW priorities, taking into account different target audiences.
- 5.34 The ABEO temporary working group (TWG) on e-learning held its second meeting virtually on 28 April 2021 and prepared its final report,<sup>26</sup> which was endorsed by the ABEO in summer 2021. The final report of the TWG contains guidelines on the development and maintenance of online courses and recommends, among others, the creation of an e-learning committee, a working group or unit to centralise the e-learning strategy, and the development of a content pack for universities to raise awareness of the OPCW and its mission.
- 5.35 ABEO members participated in the Nineteenth Regional Meeting of National Authorities in Africa (held virtually in June 2021), in the Twenty-Second Regional Meeting of National Authorities in Latin America and the Caribbean (held online in June 2021), in the Eighth Annual Meeting of Representatives of Chemical Industry and National Authorities of States Parties (held online in October 2021), and in the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of National Authorities (held online in November 2021).
- 5.36 The Board held its Eleventh Session on 26 and 27 July 2021, through an online platform. At the session, the Board endorsed a proposal on the creation of an ABEO alumni network open to former ABEO members who could continue to volunteer their expertise and knowledge to the Secretariat at no cost.

### **Confidentiality and security**

- 5.37 In the period under review, the OCS continued its efforts to ensure a persistent and appropriate level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, assets, and information, using a risk management-based approach aligned with the risk appetite of the Organisation and with international best practice.
- 5.38 On 3 December 2021, over 40 individuals intruded into the OPCW Headquarters building.<sup>27</sup> This incident had no impact on the OPCW's confidentiality posture and resulted in minor physical damage to the building. The OCS implemented immediate additional security measures, conducted an in-depth vulnerability assessment, and proposed security mitigation measures to upgrade the Headquarters environment to meet the requisite security standards. Funding and delivery on this plan will be the focus of the OCS in 2022. Further to the Secretariat's request, the authorities of the Host Country increased mobile police surveillance around the Headquarters building but did not consider it necessary to place a static police post in its vicinity. The Host Country security services were to carry out a vulnerability assessment in 2022.

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<sup>25</sup> Annex 2 to ABEO-10/1.

<sup>26</sup> Annex to EC-98/DG.17 C-26/DG.13 (dated 16 September 2021).

<sup>27</sup> See Note S/2009/2021\* (dated 6 December 2021).

- 5.39 In response to a weekly average of over 100 cyberattacks (phishing and malware) and 5,000 attacks and probes against OPCW Internet services, the OCS implemented a series of projects related to cybersecurity resilience. In addition, the OCS provided key input to the development of a business continuity policy and plan, as well as to a crisis management framework to withstand discontinuities in OPCW business functions. Additional systems and software to improve cybersecurity-related threat and vulnerability detection were also put in place.
- 5.40 The OCS continued to provide training and awareness to personnel on security and confidentiality, physical security services, and support for major events. With a continued focus on empowering staff with the skills necessary to protect their activities from a cybersecurity perspective, the overall defence of the OPCW more generally was improved. To achieve this, and despite COVID-19-related limitations, the OCS conducted over 30 training and awareness sessions, including security and fire safety inductions, confidentiality trainings, and user awareness sessions.
- 5.41 The OCS supported the annual meeting of the OPCW Confidentiality Commission, supported ad hoc classified briefings, and coordinated security for OPCW missions, frequently in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. The OCS conducted over 25 investigations related to cyberevents, security incidents, and potential breaches of confidentiality in 2021.

#### **Health and safety**

- 5.42 There were no significant health and safety incidents in 2021. Incident reporting trends continued to be significantly lower owing to fewer in-person activities and missions. The Health and Safety Branch (HSB) continued to assist other branches in delivering inputs for routine work and training, as well as for regular and high-risk inspection missions. The HSB continued to support non-routine operations from a risk assessment and mitigation point of view.
- 5.43 The annual workplace inspection in 2021 showed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace. Most issues highlighted in the 2020 report were resolved, with some longer-term issues in progress towards resolution.
- 5.44 No radiation safety-related issues, excessive noise level issues, or poor air quality issues were reported or identified in the course of the year.
- 5.45 HSB staff continued to participate in professional development programmes in 2021.

## 6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

### The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

- 6.1 Owing to COVID-19 restrictions, all SAB meetings were held virtually in 2021. Despite this, the Board continued to perform its duties in providing scientific advice to the Director-General, the Secretariat, and States Parties, meeting three times. In addition, the SAB began work on a new TWG on the analysis of biotoxins, after it had been established by the Director-General in January 2021. The TWG also met virtually three times.
- 6.2 In March 2021, the Board met for its Thirty-First Session (SAB-31/1), which it used to plan its upcoming work. Time was spent preparing for the newly established TWG on the analysis of biotoxins and on discussing potential upcoming SAB-driven topical workshops. The SAB also received updates from Secretariat staff. The Director-General's response to the report of its Thirty-First Session was issued in May 2021 (EC-97/DG.5, dated 18 May 2021).
- 6.3 The SAB met for its Thirty-Second Session in June 2021 (SAB-32/1). In addition to discussing SAB-related business, the Board heard from several external experts on topics ranging from new detection methods for the identification of organophosphates to the use of artificial intelligence to predict hazard properties and synthesis routes for different chemicals. The Director-General's response to the report of its Thirty-Second Session was issued in September 2021 (EC-98/DG.21, dated 22 September 2021).
- 6.4 The SAB met for its Thirty-Third Session in November 2021 (SAB-33/1). This session was largely dedicated to discussing ideas for scientific activities that could be held at the ChemTech Centre, discussing progress made on the Board's report on developments in science and technology for the Fifth Review Conference, and receiving an update on the SAB's TWG on the analysis of biotoxins. In addition, the Board heard from several Secretariat staff members on relevant OPCW activities and received technical presentations from two external speakers on the detection of chlorine biomarkers in plants and on assessing risk in the chemical industry. The Director-General's response to the report of its Thirty-Third Session was issued in March 2022 (EC-99/DG.16, dated 2 March 2022).
- 6.5 The work of the TWG on the analysis of biotoxins began in January 2021. The TWG met virtually three times, with meeting reports issued after each meeting (SAB-32/WP.1, dated 6 May 2021; SAB-33/WP.1, dated 15 October 2021; and SAB-33/WP.2, dated 14 February 2022).
- 6.6 The SAB's collaboration and engagement across scientific communities continued throughout 2021 despite limitations caused by the pandemic. Although all activities continued in virtual format, SAB members attended, presented at, and chaired conferences, continued with their leadership of professional chemistry societies, and continued to partner with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and to issue publications in scientific literature. The SAB published

a scientific article in the peer-reviewed journal *Toxicology*.<sup>28</sup> SAB involvement in such activities ensures that the Secretariat stays abreast of developments in chemistry, maintains visibility and credibility among scientists, promotes responsible and ethical scientific practices, and supports education and outreach activities.

### **Engagement with the scientific community**

- 6.7 The Secretariat's engagement with global scientific communities continued in 2021. Several Secretariat staff members continued to serve on IUPAC committees, and the IUPAC President submitted a statement to the Conference at its Twenty-Sixth Session. Secretariat staff and SAB members also participated in the IUPAC World Chemistry Congress in August.
- 6.8 The Secretariat continued to maintain a visible presence among technical communities in 2021, participating in the Science and Technology Conference of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) (virtual, June–July 2021); delivering presentations at the Virtual Conference on Chemistry and its Applications, organised by the University of Mauritius (August 2021); participating in the Spiez Convergence conference (virtual, September 2021); and presenting at the Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (virtual, November 2021).
- 6.9 The Secretariat also continued to manage its Plant Biomarker Challenge initiative in 2021. This initiative, backed by the European Union, has funded six research projects that describe a method or system by which a specific type of vegetation could act as an indicator of exposure to chemicals that are toxic to humans and/or animals. As vegetation is always present in areas of human habitation, plants are well suited as potential sentinel species. The teams will continue their research into 2022.

### **Activities at the science-security interface**

- 6.10 The Secretariat remained engaged with international organisation partners, participating in scientific and technical discussions, including with INTERPOL, the CTBTO, and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. In addition, scientific briefings were delivered at the Asser Institute's Twelfth Annual Training Programme on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (virtual, September 2021) and at the OPCW's Twenty-First Annual Induction Workshop for Diplomatic Personnel.

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28

Advice on assistance and protection provided by the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: Part 3. On medical care and treatment of injuries from sulfur mustard. *Toxicology*, Volume 463, November 2021, 152967.

Annex 1

**STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021<sup>29</sup>**

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04

<sup>29</sup>

For each State Party listed, the date in the "Signature" column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the "Deposit" column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, "[a]" means "deposit of instrument of accession", "[A]" means "deposit of instrument of acceptance", and "[d]" means "deposit of instrument of succession".

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97



	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Palestine (State of)		17-05-18	16-06-18
133.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
134.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
135.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
136.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
137.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
138.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
139.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
140.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
141.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
142.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
143.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
144.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
145.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
146.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
147.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
148.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
149.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
150.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
151.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
152.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
153.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
154.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
155.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
156.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
157.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
158.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
159.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97
160.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
161.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13
162.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
163.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97
164.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Türkiye	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

**Annex 2**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES  
IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2021**

<b>Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party</b>	
United States of America	Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant Static Detonation Chamber (BGCAPP-SDC)* Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF) Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System (CTF/MAPS)** Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)**

\* The facility finished the destruction operations and was closed in September 2021. The facility will be converted to a non-contiguous part of the BGCAPP.

\*\* The facility remained in service in 2021, but no destruction operations took place.

Annex 3

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN<sup>30</sup>  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021**

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed <sup>31</sup>
<b>Category 1</b>		
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	14,796.102
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,546.997
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD, HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	17,000.943
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and lewisite (including HD/L mixture in dichloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.875
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.173
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.863	3.860
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
<b>Total Category 1:</b>	<b>70,493.640</b>	<b>69,764.036</b>
<b>Category 2</b>		
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorous trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356

<sup>30</sup> Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

<sup>31</sup> Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

<b>Common Name of Chemical</b>	<b>Number of MT Declared</b>	<b>Number of MT Destroyed<sup>31</sup></b>
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorous pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorous oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
<b>Total Category 2:</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>	<b>1,810.703</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>72,304.343</b>	<b>71,574.739</b>

**Annex 4**

**NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED  
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT,  
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021<sup>32</sup>**

<b>Name of Riot Control Agent</b>	<b>Number of States Parties That Had Declared Possession</b>
CS	119
CN	63
OC	25
PAVA	13
Capsaicin	15
CR	14
Other types	13

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 137

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<sup>32</sup> The Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) nomenclature for riot control agents listed in this chart is as follows:

CS: CAS number 2698-41-1;  
CN: CAS number 532-27-4;  
OC: CAS number 8023-77-6;  
PAVA: CAS number 2444-46-4;  
Capsaicin: CAS number 404-86-4; and  
CR: CAS number 257-07-8.

Other types include mixtures of chemicals mentioned in the table or older types of riot control agents.

**Annex 5**

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021  
(ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)**

	<b>State Party</b>	<b>Laboratory Name</b>	<b>Date of Designation</b>
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG)	25 Mar 2021
2.	Belgium	Belgian Defence Laboratories (DLD)	12 May 2004
3.	Brazil	Laboratório de Análises Químicas, Centro Tecnológico do Exército (CTEx)	31 Aug 2021
4.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
5.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
6.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	2 Sept 2015
7.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques*	29 Jun 1999
8.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection	29 Jun 1999
9.	India	Vertox Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
10.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defence Chemical Research Laboratory (DCRL)	3 Aug 2011
11.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	17 Nov 1998
12.	Norway	Laboratory for Analysis of Chemical Threat Agents, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)	25 Mar 2021
13.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defence Science Technology Organisation	18 Apr 2018
14.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CB Department, Agency for Defence Development	3 Aug 2011
15.	Romania	Research and Innovation Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis Laboratory	15 Apr 2018
16.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	4 Aug 2000
17.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, "State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology"*	15 Apr 2015
18.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
19.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa*	16 Aug 2004
20.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	17 Nov 1998
21.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998



22.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	29 Jun 1999
23.	United States of America	U.S. Army, Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM Chemical Biological Center) – Forensic Analytical Laboratory	17 Nov 1998
24.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

\* This laboratory remained suspended at the end of the reporting period because of its performance in a recent OPCW proficiency test. This laboratory will not be considered for receipt of samples taken for off-site analysis until it performs satisfactorily in a future OPCW proficiency test.

## LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021

### (BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	1 Aug 2016
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Vertex Biochemistry Division Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defense Chemical Research Laboratory (DCRL)	31 Aug 2021
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	1 Aug 2016
10.	Republic of Korea	CBRN Research Center, Republic of Korea CBRN Command	2 Oct 2020
11.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory, CBR Directorate, Agency for Defense Development	31 Aug 2021
12.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
13.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
14.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
15.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	1 Aug 2016
16.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	1 Aug 2016

17.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017
18.	United States of America	Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center	1 Aug 2016
19.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
20.	United States of America	US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense*	26 Jul 2019

\* This laboratory remained suspended at the end of the reporting period because of its performance in a recent OPCW proficiency test. This laboratory will not be considered for receipt of samples taken for off-site analysis until it performs satisfactorily in a future OPCW proficiency test.

## Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2021<sup>33</sup>STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME AND SUBPROGRAMME  
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2021

Funding Programme	Final Appropriation	Total Expenditure	Balance of Appropriations
1	2	3	4 (2-3)
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>			
1. Verification Programme	9,480,614	8,646,424	834,190
2. Inspections Programme	20,865,521	19,409,053	1,456,469
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>30,346,135</b>	<b>28,055,477</b>	<b>2,290,658</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	7,424,537	4,114,257	3,310,280
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	4,904,093	4,815,323	88,770
5. External Relations Programme	2,093,349	2,077,649	15,700
6. Executive Management Programme	9,845,328	9,579,955	265,373
7. Administration Programme	14,787,847	14,774,681	13,166
<b>TOTAL CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>39,055,154</b>	<b>35,361,866</b>	<b>3,693,289</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>69,401,289</b>	<b>63,417,343</b>	<b>5,983,947</b>

**BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021**

Fund	Balance	
	As at 31 December 2021 <sup>34</sup>	As at 31 December 2020
General Fund	3,483,950	13,094,708
Working Capital Fund	8,133,388	633,388
Special ERP Fund	0	917,021
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,567,950	1,567,950
OPCW special accounts	3,719,261	1,883,705
OPCW trust funds	41,359,927	32,779,871
<b>Total</b>	<b>58,264,476</b>	<b>50,876,643</b>

<sup>34</sup> The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances owing to timing differences.

Annex 7

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2021

Fund Balances

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds, Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2021	2021 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2021	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2021	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2021
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	8,143,173	-	-	-	-	8,143,173
Special funds	4,580,297	-	-	-	892,895	3,687,402
Voluntary fund for assistance (Article X)	1,567,974	5,000	-	-	-	1,572,974
Trust funds	24,865,726	17,328,057	-	-	27,832,011	14,361,772

Syria Trust Fund Balances

Syria Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2021	2021 Income	Refunds/ Transfers During 2021	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2021	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2021
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Syria trust fund for the destruction of chemical weapons	155,236	-	-	-	123,251	31,985
Trust Fund for Syria Missions	8,491,540	1,446,004	-	-	5,943,260	3,994,284

Annex 8

**INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT  
FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2021**

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 639	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, “Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology” Federal Unitary Enterprise (RIHOPHE), Federal Medical Biological Agency, Russian Federation concerning Sample Preparation for the 6 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat  RIHOPHE, Russian Federation	11-02-2021  28-02-2021	28-02-2021
IAR 640	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories concerning Sample Preparations for the 49 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat  DSO National Laboratories, Singapore	20-12-2020  01-03-2021	01-03-2021
IAR 641	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of the Military Research Centre, Federal State Budget Establishment “27 Scientific Centre” of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Regarding the off-site analysis of samples.	OPCW Technical Secretariat  27 Scientific Centre of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation	21-12-2020  21-01-2021	21-01-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 642	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), Finland regarding the off-site analysis of samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat  Finnish Institute for Verification of Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	27-01-2021  04-02-2021	04-02-2021
IAR 643	European Union Contribution Agreement CFSP/2021/34/OPCW CYBER	OPCW Technical Secretariat  European Union	23-08-2021  13-08-2021	23-08-2021
IAR 644	Memorandum of Understanding between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW Technical Secretariat  United Kingdom	26-08-2021  26-08-2021	26-08-2021
IAR 645	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  UNFPA	26-02-2021  Not specified	26-02-2021
IAR 646	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat  France	31-03-2021  31-03-2021	31-03-2021
IAR 647	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat  Japan	22-05-2020  20-04-2020	22-05-2020

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 648	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom	07-07-2020 07-07-2020	07-07-2020
IAR 649	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Finland-MFA	10-07-2020 10-07-2020	10-07-2020
IAR 650	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland, as represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Finland-MFA	10-07-2020 10-07-2020	10-07-2020
IAR 651	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Romania	13-07-2020 13-07-2020	13-07-2020
IAR 652	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Royal Thai Government and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Thailand	22-07-2020 22-07-2020	22-07-2020



<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 653	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Sweden-MFA	31-07-2020 07-07-2020	31-07-2020
IAR 654	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom	18-08-2020 15-08-2020	18-08-2020
IAR 655	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom	19-08-2020 19-08-2020	19-08-2020
IAR 656	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom	19-08-2020 12-08-2020	19-08-2020
IAR 657	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom	19-08-2020 19-08-2020	19-08-2020
IAR 658	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of his Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Monaco	24-09-2020 24-09-2020	24-09-2020

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 659	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Sweden-MFA	27-10-2020 10-10-2020	27-10-2020
IAR 660	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Finnish Institute for the Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), Finland concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 49th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat VERIFIN, Finland	11-03-2021 11-03-2021	11-03-2021
IAR 661	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Philippines	09-04-2021 09-04-2021	09-04-2021
IAR 662	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat New Zealand	05-05-2021 05-05-2021	05-05-2021
IAR 663	Contract between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, as represented by the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding a voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Ireland-MFA	07-06-2021 07-06-2021	07-06-2021
IAR 664	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of	OPCW Technical Secretariat France-MFA	25-07-2021 25-06-2021	25-07-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
	Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity			
IAR 665	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding a voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW United Kingdom	26-08-2021 26-08-2021	26-08-2021
IAR 666	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Czech Republic	20-09-2021 20-09-2021	20-09-2021
IAR 667	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Principality of Andorra and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Andorra	05-10-2021 05-10-2021	05-10-2021
IAR 668	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Principality of Andorra and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Andorra	05-10-2021 05-10-2021	05-10-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 669	Technical Agreement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Minister of Defence of the French Republic concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 50 <sup>th</sup> Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat France, Minister of Defence	01-10-2021 13-10-2021	13-10-2021
IAR 670	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X and the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article VII	OPCW Technical Secretariat France-MFA	14-10-2021 14-10-2021	14-10-2021
IAR 671	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, represented by the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding a voluntary contribution to the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW United Kingdom	27-10-2021	27-10-2021
IAR 672	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Sweden-MFA	31-10-2021 21-06-2021	31-10-2021
IAR 673	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Saudi Arabia	18-11-2021 18-11-2021	18-11-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 674	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Czech Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Implementation of Article X	OPCW Technical Secretariat Czech Republic	23-11-2021 23-11-2021	23-11-2021
IAR 675	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of India and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat India	24-11-2021 24-11-2021	24-11-2021
IAR 676	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Panama and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Panama	02-12-2021 26-11-2021	02-12-2021
IAR 677	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat Slovakia	26-11-2021 26-11-2021	26-11-2021
IAR 678	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Slovakia	26-11-2021 26-11-2021	26-11-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 679	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat Germany	01-12-2021 01-12-2021	01-12-2021
IAR 680	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for the Scientific Advisory Board	OPCW Technical Secretariat Russian Federation	01-12-2021 01-12-2021	01-12-2021
IAR 681	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Government of his Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Monaco	02-12-2021 23-11-2021	02-12-2021
IAR 682	Technical Arrangement between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories, Singapore regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat DSO, Singapore	15-12-2021 10-11-2021	15-12-2021
IAR 683	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Denmark	20-12-2021 20-12-2021	20-12-2021
IAR 684	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW Technical Secretariat Denmark	20-12-2021 20-12-2021	20-12-2021

<b>International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 685	Voluntary Contribution Agreement between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat Denmark	20-12-2021 20-12-2021	20-12-2021
IAR 686	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat STL	24-08-2021 25-08-2021	25-08-2021
IAR 687	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat UNFPA	26-08-2020 26-08-2020	31-08-2020
IAR 688	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat ICC	12-08-2020 25-08-2020	25-08-2020

<b>Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 645(a)	Letter of Extension of Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  UNFPA	30-07-2021  Not specified	30-07-2021
IAR 645(b)	Letter of Extension of Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat  UNFPA	10-11-2021  10-11-2021	10-11-2021
IAR 381(p)	Amendment No.16 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW  United Nations Office for Project Services  Syrian Arab Republic	03-03-2021  16-03-2021	16-03-2021
IAR 381(q)	Amendment No.17 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW  United Nations Office for Project Services  Syrian Arab Republic	30-08-2021  01-09-2021	07-09-2021
IAR 381(r)	Amendment No.18 to the Agreement between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW  United Nations Office for Project Services  Syrian Arab Republic	07-09-2021  26-11-2021  30-11-2021  14-12-2021	14-12-2021



<b>Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2021</b>				
<b>OPCW Registration Number</b>	<b>Subject of Agreement/Instrument</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Date of</b>	
			<b>Signature</b>	<b>Entry Into Force</b>
IAR 427(d)	Amendment 4 to the Administrative Arrangement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat France-MFA	07-05-2021 07-04-2021	07-05-2021
IAR 428(a)	Amendment to the Agreement between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the French Republic regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW France	18-01-2021 17-12-2020	18-01-2021
IAR 428(b)	Amendment to the Agreement between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the French Republic regarding the Off-site Analysis of Samples	OPCW France	22-09-2021 06-09-2021	22-09-2021
IAR 687(a)	Letter of Extension of Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat UNFPA	26-02-2021 Not specified	26-02-2021
IAR 688(a)	Letter of Extension of Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	OPCW Technical Secretariat ICC	11-06-2021 Not specified	11-06-2021

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