RUSSIAN FEDERATION

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE OPCW AT THE TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES

We would like to respond to those who continue to engage in unfounded speculation in their own political interests on the subject of the alleged attempt to poison Mr Navalny with a chemical weapon, thus exacerbating the situation in this regard.

First of all, problems need to be addressed not with the Russian Federation, but with other countries: Germany, France, and Sweden. For nearly eight months, we have not been able to pry from them the critical information requested by Russian law enforcement bodies back in August 2020. In spite of their obligations under the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Government of Germany is actively working against the investigative process being conducted in Russia on this incident, thus hindering the establishment of the truth within the framework of Russian legislation. The aforementioned countries are breaching the provisions of Articles VII and IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention, under which States Parties are obligated to provide legal assistance and resolve all issues that may emerge via dialogue and consultations.

Second, it is absurd to associate the poisonous substance referred to in the West as “novichok” exclusively with the USSR and Russia. The detection and identification by laboratories in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Sweden of highly toxic substances from the “novichok” family bears witness to the fact that they have long been familiar to a wide range of NATO countries. Some of them, the United States for example, regularly publish data from research of the properties of this class of synthesised chemicals, in addition to the patents issued for the application thereof. It is altogether likely that the aim to continue these developments without any control—and without informing the Organisation—is behind the unwillingness of the States where laboratories conducted analyses to make public, within the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the formula of these substances in the interests of updating the Schedules of Chemicals in the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention.

Third: We are disappointed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has still not provided the Russian Federation with technical assistance in accordance with paragraph 38(e), Article VIII of the Convention. The parameters set out by the Russian side for such collaboration would help clarify the main question: where, how, and under what circumstances did the chemicals detected outside of Russia appear in the biomaterials of the Russian blogger—the chemicals that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Sweden, as well as the Secretariat, unreservedly designated as belonging to the group of “novichok” toxic substances.
The only condition presented by our side was that we would conduct this work jointly with Organisation experts.

Fourth: we see the demands made by the Federal Republic of Germany and certain other countries—which began in early September 2020 and which continue to date—for Russia to “cooperate” with the investigation under the aegis of the OPCW into the so-called poisoning of Mr Navalny as undermining the fundamental principles of the Convention and an attempt to use the authority of an international organisation as if it were a prosecutor’s office; basically, if we are to call things by their real name: a platform for interfering in the domestic affairs of a State Party to the Convention.

It is time now to stop with this clearly protracted, senseless disinformation campaign. It is clearly unsuccessful.

We request that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Conference and published on the external server and the Organisation’s website.