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**DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION,
STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR
DESTRUCTION IN 2019**

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INTRODUCTION

1. The OPCW continued to work under sustained international attention throughout 2019, particularly in relation to its efforts to respond to the use of chemical weapons. At the same time, progress continued to be made in destroying the remaining declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, implementing and enhancing industry verification, expanding international cooperation and assistance, addressing the challenge posed by chemical terrorism, and broadening and sustaining the OPCW's education and outreach efforts.
2. In the process of destruction of declared chemical weapons in 2019, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") verified the destruction of 612.090 metric tonnes (MT) of Category 1 chemical weapons. Between entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and 31 December 2019, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 68,737.917 MT¹ of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, representing 97.51% of the declared total amount. The single remaining possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed, the United States of America, continued to work towards its target date of September 2023 for the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stocks. Progress was also recorded in the destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. During the year, the Secretariat conducted 12 inspections regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) and eight inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCWs).
3. The OPCW again carried out 241 inspections of industrial facilities in 2019. Sampling and analysis activities were carried out during six of those inspections, five of which were Schedule 2 inspections and one of which was an inspection of an other chemical production facility (OCPF). The Secretariat continued the development of the next version of the electronic declaration tool for National Authorities (EDNA), the electronic declaration information system (EDIS).
4. Work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in that country. The Secretariat's efforts in that regard focused in large measure on implementation of the decision adopted by the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") at its Fourth Special Session (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018), including the operation of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established pursuant to that decision. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continued its activities in 2019, guided by the relevant decisions of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at resolving outstanding issues identified in relation to the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and related submissions, continued throughout 2019.

¹ This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex").

5. 2019 also saw the activation for the first time of the procedure prescribed in Article XV of the Convention for the amendment of its Annex on Chemicals. Following incidents involving a toxic chemical displaying the properties of a nerve agent in Salisbury and Amesbury, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in 2018, two proposals were adopted by the Conference in 2019 to amend Schedule 1 of the Annex (C-24/DEC.4 and C-24/DEC.5, both dated 27 November 2019).
6. In 2019, the Secretariat continued to implement capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 90 activities and programmes for 2,476 participants from around the world.
7. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the OPCW's contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. The Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism explored a number of areas in which the OPCW could advance this contribution, and further capacity-building initiatives focused on areas relevant to countering chemical terrorism, such as legislation and chemical security.
8. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates.
9. Public interest in the work of the OPCW saw a further increase during 2019, with the OPCW's social media platforms experiencing an average growth rate of 15%, and with a 28% rise in the number of visitors to the OPCW Headquarters compared to 2018. Seventy-seven visiting groups consisting of a total of 2,180 individuals visited the OPCW Headquarters throughout the year, receiving briefings and presentations on the OPCW's work. In addition, the International Open Day on 24 September attracted a record 1,150 visitors to the OPCW Headquarters and reached a further 150,000 people through its related social media outreach.

1. VERIFICATION

- 1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2019 is provided in Table 1. The OPCW conducted 301 inspections in 2019, of which 20% were related to chemical weapons. Operations connected with the Syrian Arab Republic accounted for a further 706 inspector days in 2019.

TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2019

Type of Facility	Number of Inspections	Number of Facilities or Sites Inspected	Number of Inspector Days
Chemical weapons-related inspections			
CWDF ²	30	3 ³	3,435
CWSF ⁴	3	3	100
CWPF ⁵	7 ⁵	7	46
OCW	8	7	87
ACW ⁶	12	8	224
Syrian Arab Republic ⁷	n/a		706
Subtotal	60	28	4,598
Article VI inspections			
Schedule 1	11	11	189
Schedule 2	42	42	749
Schedule 3	19	19	188
OCPF	169	169	1,501
Subtotal	241	241	2,627
Total	301	269	7,225

- 1.2 As at 31 December 2019, eight States Parties (a State Party,⁸ Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared 72,304.339 MT⁹ of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons and 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3.
- 1.3 Progress continued with respect to OCWs and ACWs. States Parties that declared possession of OCWs continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner. China and Japan continued to cooperate in the field of ACWs and their

² CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

³ Three in the United States of America.

⁴ CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

⁵ This includes visits to the five underground structures of chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

⁶ This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

⁷ Given the continuous nature of OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, it is not possible to quantify the precise number of missions undertaken there as is the case for other States Parties.

⁸ As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as “a State Party”.

⁹ This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

destruction, in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2019, China and Japan continued to carry out the “Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2016 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China”, submitted to the Council at its Eighty-Fourth Session (EC-84/NAT.6, dated 2 March 2017), which contains updated information on destruction facilities and time frames for destruction.

Chemical weapons destruction

- 1.4 During the reporting period, three CWDFs located in the United States of America were involved in the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons¹⁰ (see Annex 2). Through a combination of the continuous presence of inspectors, the use of monitoring and dedicated recording equipment, as well as the review of relevant documentation, the Secretariat in 2019 verified the destruction of 612.090 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons.
- 1.5 As Annex 3 shows, between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2019, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 68,737.917 MT,¹¹ or 97.51% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons; 1,810.703 MT, or 100% of declared Category 2 chemical weapons; and 417,833 items, or 100% of declared Category 3 chemical weapons.
- 1.6 At the end of the reporting period, the United States of America was the only possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed. In 2019, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 612.090 MT of chemical weapons in the United States of America. Up until the end of 2019, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of a total of 26,014.109 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by the United States of America, or 93.68% of the declared stockpile. All of the United States’ Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons had previously been destroyed.
- 1.7 In addition, parallel to the destruction operations, the Secretariat verified the destruction of removed energetics components at the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant’s (PCAPP) non-contiguous Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) site at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and the destruction of hydrolysate at the PCAPP’s non-contiguous Veolia treatment, storage and disposal facility at Port Arthur, Texas.
- 1.8 In 2019, the United States of America submitted two amendments to its initial declaration, thereby adjusting its chemical weapons inventory on recovered agent originating from OCWs. The United States of America has continued to submit reports on the progress achieved towards the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, pursuant to the Conference’s decision C-16/DEC.11 (dated 1 December 2011). In addition, the United States of America made the following submissions in 2019:

¹⁰ Not counting OCWs or ACWs, or the CWDF under systemisation in the United States of America (Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) (see Annex 2)).

¹¹ This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex.

- (a) the final facility agreement for the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Pilot Plant (BGCAPP);
- (b) the final agreed detailed plan for verification for the BGCAPP;
- (c) a detailed facility information (DFI) technical supplement for the destruction of six chemical weapons at the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Pine Bluff Arsenal (RCWDF PBA);
- (d) a DFI technical supplement for the destruction of one chemical munition at the RCWDF Dover Air Force Base;
- (e) modifications to the facility agreement and agreed detailed plan for verification for the BGCAPP;
- (f) modifications to the facility agreement and agreed detailed plan for verification for the PCAPP;
- (g) the annual report for destruction of chemical weapons from 1 January to 31 December 2019; and
- (h) the declaration of the completion of destruction operations at the PCAPP Explosive Destruction System (PCAPP EDS).

1.9 The Secretariat conducted an initial visit to the BGCAPP main plant in Richmond, Kentucky, from 28 to 31 January 2019 and finalised the facility agreement and the agreed detailed plan for verification. Two final engineering reviews were conducted in 2019: at the BGCAPP SDC from 1 to 3 April, and at the BGCAPP from 8 to 11 July.

1.10 In early January 2020, the Secretariat conducted an inspection to review documents related to the destruction of five items recovered and destroyed at the RCWDF PBA, at the RCWDF Anniston Army Depot (RCWDF ANAD), and at the BGCAPP. Based on the review of destruction documentation, including video recordings, made available by the United States, the inspection team confirmed the destruction of 21.960 kg of unknown agent contained in one 4.2 inch mortar cartridge (on 29 and 30 April 2019) and four 15 cm Traktor rockets (from 7 to 10 May 2019).

Chemical weapons storage facilities

1.11 In 2019, the Secretariat conducted three inspections at two CWSFs in the United States of America. At the end of the review period, two CWSFs remained subject to systematic verification.

Chemical weapons production facilities

1.12 By 31 December 2019, all 97 CWPFS declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (74 had been certified as destroyed and 23 had been certified as converted).

- 1.13 In 2019, the Secretariat conducted seven inspections or visits in relation to seven former CWPFs in two States Parties.
- 1.14 In the Russian Federation, the Secretariat carried out two inspections at converted CWPFs in March 2019. In the Syrian Arab Republic, in November 2019 the Secretariat inspected the five underground structures of CWPFs that had been destroyed previously.

Abandoned chemical weapons

- 1.15 Between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2019, three States Parties had reported ACWs on their territory. One State Party, Japan, had reported ACWs on the territory of another State Party, China. In 2019, the Secretariat conducted 12 ACW inspections in China.
- 1.16 The Secretariat conducted an initial visit to the Harbin ACW mobile destruction facility in China in April 2019, to become familiar with the deployment location and destruction technology used at this site. Destruction operations officially started on 7 May 2019.
- 1.17 In 2019, the Haerbaling ACW destruction facility continued to destroy ACWs recovered at the Haerbaling excavation and recovery area, as well as those items currently stored at the Haerbaling ACW trust warehouses.
- 1.18 As at 31 December 2019, over 83,600 items had been declared as ACWs to the Secretariat. Of these, 57,701 ACWs had been destroyed.

Old chemical weapons

- 1.19 Until 31 December 2019, 18 States Parties had declared over 145,000 OCWs produced either before 1925, or between 1925 and 1946. In 2019, the Secretariat conducted eight OCW inspections: in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands (two inspections), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention

- 1.20 Following incidents involving a toxic chemical displaying the properties of a nerve agent in Salisbury and Amesbury, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in 2018, and as a result of the fact that the toxic chemical involved was not listed in the Convention's schedules, two proposals pursuant to Article XV of the Convention were made in 2018 (as outlined in S/1682/2018, dated 25 October 2018 and S/1697/2018, dated 7 December 2018 and Corr.1, dated 21 January 2019) to introduce additional chemical families to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
- 1.21 The Council met on 14 January 2019 and on 25 February 2019 to consider each proposal respectively. At its Twenty-Fourth Session, the Conference adopted two decisions, each based on one of the proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention (C-24/DEC.4 and C-24/DEC.5, both dated 27 November 2019). The Director-General subsequently notified all States Parties,

through a note verbale dated 7 December 2019, of the adopted changes to Schedule 1. The Secretariat then circulated a Note entitled “Consolidated Text of Adopted Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention” (S/1820/2019, dated 23 December 2019), and a Note entitled “Guidance for States Parties on Article VI Declaration Obligations and Inspections Following Entry Into Force of Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention” (S/1821/2019, dated 31 December 2019).¹² Pursuant to subparagraph 5(g) of Article XV of the Convention, changes to the Annex on Chemicals enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of the Director-General’s notification of those changes. In this case, the changes will enter into force on 7 June 2020.

Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use

- 1.22 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2019. Nevertheless, in 2019 the Secretariat focused on improving its preparedness for CIs. The Capacity-Building and Contingency Planning Cell of the Inspectorate Division conducted a table-top exercise for participants from various divisions, including the Inspectorate, Verification, Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO), and the Office of Strategy and Policy, supported by representatives from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

- 1.23 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2019 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat (S/1798/2019, dated 3 October 2019).
- 1.24 The FFM issued, in 2019, one report determining whether chemicals had been used as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, regarding an IAU of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma on 7 April 2018 (S/1731/2019, dated 1 March 2019).
- 1.25 During 2019 the FFM carried out multiple deployments to gather further information and conduct interviews regarding certain reported incidents of chemical weapons use: several incidents in Aleppo, including one on 24 November 2018; two incidents in Khirbat Masasinah on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017; one incident in Qalib Al-Thawr, Al-Salamiyah on 9 August 2017; one incident in Al-Balil, Suran on 8 November 2017; one incident in Yarmouk, Damascus on 22 October 2017; and one incident in Kabanah on 19 May 2019. The Secretariat is currently analysing the information collected with regard to these and other incidents and will report to the Council on the results of the analysis in due course.

Scientific Studies and Research Centre, Syrian Arab Republic

- 1.26 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016), the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities “on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings”.

¹² This document was revised in 2020 (S/1821/2019/Rev.1, dated 14 January 2020 and Add.1, dated 20 May 2020).

- 1.27 The Secretariat conducted the fifth and sixth rounds of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah SSRC facilities from 5 to 13 July and from 6 to 11 November 2019, respectively. During both inspections, samples were taken for analysis at OPCW designated laboratories. The Secretariat was waiting for results of the analysis at the end of 2019.

Declaration Assessment Team

- 1.28 In 2019, the Secretariat continued its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in order to resolve outstanding issues pertaining to its initial declaration and related submissions. As at 31 December 2019, the DAT had conducted a total of 22 rounds of consultations.
- 1.29 During the reporting period, the DAT conducted three rounds of consultations in order to clarify the outstanding issues noted in the initial declaration and subsequent submissions of the Syrian Arab Republic.
- 1.30 At the request of the Council (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), the Director-General reported all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions in three Notes¹³ circulated to the Council at its Ninetieth, Ninety-First, and Ninety-Second Sessions. In the last Note issued in 2019, the Director-General concluded, as in previous Notes on the matter, that “the Secretariat cannot confirm that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a declaration that can be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).”

Implementation of C-SS-4/DEC.3

- 1.31 In 2018, the Conference at its Fourth Special Session adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use” (C-SS-4/DEC.3). The decision called on the Secretariat to, inter alia, put in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Furthermore, it enabled the Director-General to provide technical expertise, if requested, to a State Party investigating possible chemical weapons use on its territory.
- 1.32 The Director-General decided to establish the IIT pursuant to paragraph 10 of the decision. Member States were informed of this decision in March 2019 (EC-90/DG.14, dated 7 March 2019). The IIT is responsible for identifying the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report.

¹³ EC-90/HP/DG.1, dated 4 March 2019; EC-91/HP/DG.2; dated 1 July 2019; and EC-92/HP/DG.2, dated 27 September 2019.

- 1.33 In April 2019, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, H.E. Dr Faisal Mekdad, sent a letter to the Director-General that reiterated the Syrian Arab Republic's refusal to recognise decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 and its refusal, as a consequence, to cooperate with the IIT in the course of its investigations.
- 1.34 Prior to the Ninety-First Session of the Council, the Secretariat circulated a Note entitled "Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018)" (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019). On 3 October 2019, the Secretariat circulated another Note with the same title, reporting on the work of the IIT (EC-92/S/8, dated 3 October 2019).
- 1.35 In 2019, the process of recruitment to the IIT was concluded and the team became fully operational. The IIT established contact with OPCW Member States and other international, regional, and local actors in order to gather information and conduct investigations and analysis. The IIT also developed and implemented a system to establish the focus of its investigation, thus formulating a preliminary list of nine incidents it would focus on. It further prepared and began implementing its investigation plan. In particular, the team gathered and assessed information provided to it and began carrying out interviews with victims and other witnesses of the incidents and with experts in the various subjects relevant to the investigation, and evaluating open-source material. The IIT further developed internal work practices relating to information management, investigations, evidence collection, documentation, and chain of custody. The IIT also informed States Parties that it welcomed their inputs, and would rely on their cooperation pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VII of the Convention, in particular through the provision of relevant information and access to relevant places and persons.
- 1.36 During 2019, voluntary contributions and pledges to support the IIT's work were received from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the European Union.
- 1.37 Pursuant to paragraph 18 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat continued to develop options for further assistance to States Parties to help prevent the chemical weapons threat posed by non-State actors, and to aid States Parties' contingency planning in the event of a chemical weapons attack. The Secretariat is building on existing activities in this regard, including with respect to preparedness, prevention, and response, taking into consideration, inter alia, the decision of the Council entitled "Addressing the Threat Posed by the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors" (EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017). In particular, during 2019, the Secretariat organised a second pilot workshop to raise awareness among stakeholders of how national legislation for implementation of the Convention can contribute to addressing non-State actor threats involving toxic chemicals, and a pilot technical workshop on the sharing of best practices in the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks for chemical security.

- 1.38 Pursuant to paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Director-General, if requested by a State Party investigating possible chemical weapons use on its territory, can provide technical expertise to identify those who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors, or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons. The Secretariat intends to achieve this objective, primarily, by implementing a series of capacity-building measures to expand the existing skills of relevant Secretariat staff and by recruiting new staff with skills and expertise that may be applicable to activities under paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3. In this regard, in 2019, during the recruitment of new inspectors for the conduct of routine missions and related routine tasks, consideration was given to identifying candidates with relevant experience and expertise in chemical forensics and explosive ordnance forensics.
- 1.39 In 2019, the Director-General submitted three reports to the Council entitled “Progress in the Implementation of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 on Addressing the Threat of Chemical Weapons Use” (EC-90/DG.14, dated 7 March 2019; EC-91/DG.20, dated 1 July 2019; EC-92/DG.26, dated 27 September 2019 and Corr.1, dated 4 October 2019).

Technical assistance to a State Party

- 1.40 In 2019, a State Party requested the Secretariat to conduct a technical assistance visit in accordance with subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Convention, with a view to assisting the State Party in the evaluation of a chemical allegedly used within its territory. To this end, an OPCW team was deployed to the State Party in October 2019. The findings are under review.

Industry verification

- 1.41 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, import, export, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention’s Annex on Chemicals, as well as declarations related to OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2019.

TABLE 2: DECLARED FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019

Type of Facility	Declared Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection ¹⁴	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities ¹⁵	States Parties With Facilities Subject to Inspection
Schedule 1	26	26	23	23
Schedule 2	492	212	35	23
Schedule 3	410	353	35	33
OCPF	4,419	4,262	81	80
Total	5,347	4,853	81¹⁶	80¹⁷

¹⁴ Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.
¹⁵ Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities, and annual declarations on past activities.
¹⁶ Eighty-one States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

- 1.42 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 241 Article VI inspections in 2019. These comprised 11 Schedule 1 facilities, 42 Schedule 2 plant sites, 19 Schedule 3 plant sites, and 169 OCPFs (respectively 42%, 20%, 5%, and 4% of the total of inspectable facilities). No uncertainties were recorded. Twenty inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention (up from 13 in 2018), and 166 inspections recommended further information to be provided in declarations (up from 89 in 2018). In addition, three inspections were carried out at plant sites that were found during those inspections not to be inspectable, because of declaration errors (the same as for 2018).

TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year								
2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
209	219	229	241	241	241	241	241	241

- 1.43 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2019, the site selection was performed as described in the “Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites” (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.
- 1.44 In 2019, the Secretariat continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of saving resources. Fifteen of the 17 States Parties that received four or more industry inspections in 2019 advised the Secretariat that they concurred with the use of sequential inspections on their territory. With the continuation of inter-country sequential inspections in 2019, nine of the 60 pairs of sequential inspections shown in Table 4 were carried out in two different countries.

TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year								
2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
47	48	57	51	59	54	58	58	60

- 1.45 In 2019, the Secretariat continued its efforts to further improve the verification system by using updated reporting templates for inspections to reduce the reporting burden, further improve the consistency of data reported, optimise post-inspection periods, and reduce the time spent on inspection report review, as reported by the Secretariat in its Note S/1419/2016 (dated 13 September 2016). The Secretariat formed a cross-divisional team to perform a thorough review of inspection practices, inspection report templates, inspection tools, and inspection training to identify further optimisation options. The results of this work will be reported to States Parties through the Industry Cluster.

¹⁷ Eighty States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

- 1.46 In 2019, sampling and analysis activities were conducted during six Article VI inspections, five of which were Schedule 2 inspections and one of which was an OCPF inspection. In the case of the OCPF, the inspection, including sampling and analysis, was successfully completed within the 24-hour time limit prescribed by the Convention. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES

Number of Inspections Completed with Sampling and Analysis by Year								
2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
8	9	8	9	11	11	10	9	6

Declarations

- 1.47 In 2019, 84 of the 92 States Parties (91%) that submitted annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs) did so by the deadline imposed by the Convention. In the year under review, 88.9% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs fully updated the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 99.47% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing full, annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.
- 1.48 In addition, in 2019, further efforts were made to assist the remaining State Party that had yet to submit its initial declarations under Articles III and VI of the Convention.

Transfers of scheduled chemicals

- 1.49 Six transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by five States Parties in their ADPAs for 2018. All six transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties.
- 1.50 ADPAs for 2018 indicated that 66 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 10,735 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 122 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 605,316 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.51 Six States Parties declared the export of three Schedule 3 chemicals to three States not Party.

Transfer discrepancies

- 1.52 In 2019, ADPAs for 2018 indicated a total of 1,700 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 841 transfers were declared with quantities above the declarations threshold, of which 577 involving 90 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.53 The Secretariat continued to follow up with the States Parties involved and also continued to work closely with other international organisations to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

Cooperation with the World Customs Organization

- 1.54 Within the framework of cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Secretariat initiated the Harmonized System (HS) Project for the identification by customs authorities of the most traded scheduled chemicals under the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. The project allocates unique international six-digit HS codes to the most traded scheduled chemicals, to identify globally traded scheduled chemicals and, ultimately, to ensure complete and accurate trade declarations crucial to the resolution of transfer discrepancies.
- 1.55 The first phase of the HS Project, focusing on the 33 most traded scheduled chemicals, was successfully completed and resulted in the inclusion, effective 1 January 2017, of these 33 chemicals with unique international subheadings (six-digit HS codes) in the 2017 edition of the HS nomenclature.
- 1.56 The second (currently ongoing) phase of the HS Project focuses on the allocation of unique HS codes to the next 13 most traded scheduled chemicals in the next edition of the HS nomenclature in 2022. The OPCW continued to cooperate closely with the WCO Secretariat towards the successful completion of this second phase.

Update of OPCW tools for the identification of scheduled chemicals

- 1.57 The OPCW Handbook on Chemicals is updated and revised on a regular basis to incorporate additional scheduled chemicals declared by States Parties, as well as any changes in identifiers assigned to scheduled chemicals, such as Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers (CAS RN) and HS codes. The 2019 version of the Handbook on Chemicals includes changes in chemical names and the replacement of OPCW keys for certain chemicals by their respective CAS RNs.

Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange system

- 1.58 In 2019, the Secretariat continued the development of EDIS, the new electronic declarations platform. The EDIS beta version was released to States Parties in November 2019. EDIS will further strengthen the verification regime by bringing usability enhancements and new functions to the declaration preparation and submission process.
- 1.59 In 2019, the Secretariat continued its efforts to promote the Secure Information Exchange (SIX) system, which has been available to States Parties since 2014 (S/1192/2014, dated 1 July 2014). By the end of the reporting period, 107 users from 59 States Parties had registered to use the system.
- 1.60 In 2019, the Secretariat provided a basic course on electronic declarations as part of the “Training Course on National Authority and Chemical Databases”, organised in August 2019 by the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN). In addition, the Secretariat provided training on EDNA and SIX during each Article VI training event organised at the OPCW Headquarters and during the Article VI training for National Authorities organised in Panama in March 2019.

Analytics platform and business intelligence

- 1.61 As part of its ongoing efforts to modernise and improve its analytical capabilities, the Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, which includes a data warehouse, consolidating the different data sources available in the Verification Division and a new business intelligence tool (Qlik Sense). Qlik Sense will replace the existing tool (Cognos) by delivering dynamic dashboards and visualisations that will further instil an analytical culture within the Division.

Riot control agents

- 1.62 At the end of the reporting period, 137 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 53 States Parties had declared that they do not possess such agents. One State Party had not yet provided an initial declaration, and two further States Parties had not provided information on riot control agents in their initial declarations. Additional information on possession of riot control agents is provided in Annex 4.

Informal consultations

- 1.63 Four informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections (for example, Industry Cluster consultations) were conducted in 2019. Webcasting to enable National Authorities to remotely observe consultation proceedings was reinstated in 2019. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of verification-related topics, including:
- (a) industry verification in 2018 and refinements in the conduct of Article VI inspections;
 - (b) site selection mechanisms and the performance of the site selection methodology;
 - (c) outcome of the fifth annual meeting of representatives of the chemical industry and National Authorities;
 - (d) a proposal by Argentina entitled “Implementation of the Methodology for the Selection of Other Chemical Production Facilities for Inspection”;
 - (e) OCPF inspection frequency;
 - (f) EDIS, the new electronic declarations platform;
 - (g) blockchain technology in practice: exploring its utility for the trade in chemicals;
 - (h) highly active pharmaceutical ingredients – a Swiss contribution;
 - (i) technological evolution and chemical production;
 - (j) observed trends in the Schedule 2 industry; and
 - (k) an update on sampling and analysis during Article VI inspections.

OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories

- 1.64 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that wish to be a part of the OPCW's network of analytical laboratories. The reporting period saw the completion of the forty-fourth, the holding of the forty-fifth, and the start of the forty-sixth official OPCW proficiency tests for environmental analysis. Additionally, the fourth proficiency test for biomedical sample analysis was conducted. At the end of the reporting period, 22 laboratories from 18 Member States had been designated for environmental analysis (four of which had had their designation temporarily suspended), and 17 laboratories from 12 Member States had been designated for biomedical sample analysis. Annex 5 shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2019.
- 1.65 A confidence-building exercise for the analysis of biologically derived toxins was finished at the beginning of 2019, and a fourth exercise began in December 2019. These exercises were specifically targeted at the analysis of the protein toxin ricin. The biological toxin saxitoxin was included in the third exercise.

Project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology

- 1.66 Good progress was made in 2019 in the project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology (ChemTech Centre). The design tender process was completed, as were negotiations with the municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp for the purchase of the land upon which the ChemTech Centre will be built. In addition, recruitment processes for the Project Management Team were completed, and the team became fully operational in October. These developments successfully concluded the project's preparatory phase and enabled the design phase to begin. Furthermore, to help keep States Parties and other stakeholders informed, the Secretariat established a dedicated webpage for the project on the OPCW website, which will be updated regularly. The project remains on schedule and within budget.
- 1.67 Once completed, the ChemTech Centre will provide expanded and enhanced analytical, operational, and capacity-building capabilities that will help States Parties to better prepare for and respond to threats and uses of chemical weapons by non-State actors. An update on the project was provided in Note S/1769/2019 (dated 9 July 2019), entitled "Progress in the Project to Upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology", which contains information on project progress and detailed information regarding the project's expected benefits, as well as its revised scope, cost, and schedule. Briefings were provided to States Parties in the margins of Council and Conference sessions in March, July, October, and November 2019, as well as to the Friends of the OPCW Laboratory Group.

OPCW Central Analytical Database

- 1.68 Table 6 below reflects the number of chemicals covered in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) for each technique for the last five years. Only the gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI)) and mass spectrometry (MS) data were used in on-site analysis.

TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHEMICAL SPECIES IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE

Status at the Beginning of	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Infrared (IR)	726	734	734	745	756	775	775
Gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI))	3,740	3,866	3,878	4,089	4,439	4,482	4,543
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)	n/a	298	298	298	298	299	300
Mass spectrometry (MS)	3,898	4,003	4,022	4,225	4,566	4,602	4,647
Tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	38

Training provided by the Inspectorate Division

- 1.69 In 2019, the Capacity-Building and Contingency-Planning Cell (CBCP) coordinated or delivered 2,502 training days. The training programme comprised 42 individual training courses offered over 48 calendar weeks of training. Sixty percent of the training courses in 2019 were delivered in the Netherlands, with the remainder conducted in Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. These States Parties assisted in the delivery of training programmes, either as host nations, through in-kind contributions, or through the conclusion of technical agreements. The CBCP also continued to provide the mandatory inspector refresher courses to keep inspectors abreast of technological and verification policy developments, as well as refresher courses on the use of protective equipment and on the OPCW confidentiality regime. An induction training course for inspectors newly promoted as inspection team leaders was also conducted.
- 1.70 The new group of inspectors (Group R) underwent an 11-week mandatory initial training programme. The new inspectors’ toxic chemical training provided them with the knowledge, skills, and experience to safely and effectively perform verification activities in a toxic environment. The new chemical weapons munitions specialists and health and safety specialists followed reconnaissance and storage training, OCW and ACW training, and ordnance field identification training.
- 1.71 Training activities included the “Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE)” and a hosted hostile environment awareness training programme that are required for Secretariat personnel deployed to high-risk areas. Additional specialised courses for OPCW staff comprised non-destructive evaluation (NDE) theory levels I and II, as well as NDE work permit levels I and II, to help them maintain their certification and improve their knowledge and skills of the OPCW NDE-approved methods.

Knowledge management

- 1.72 The Secretariat further strengthened its efforts in knowledge management through the establishment of the position of Senior Knowledge Management Officer, which was filled in 2019. A new strategy to consistently identify, develop, preserve, and transfer knowledge—entitled Continuous Knowledge Management—was introduced. The strategy aims to reinforce the OPCW as the global repository of knowledge with regard to chemical weapons disarmament, destruction, and verification. Relevant processes and activities in the framework of Continuous Knowledge Management were implemented in 2019, including systematic identification of core expertise, the holding of knowledge-sharing events, and targeted knowledge transfer of separating staff throughout the Organisation, prioritising the Verification and Inspectorate Divisions.
- 1.73 The Verification Division included knowledge management in its regular operational areas by continuing to implement, inter alia, knowledge transfer activities with staff separating from the Division, in order to capture knowledge and lessons learned. Furthermore, the Division continued to identify possible knowledge gaps following the conclusion of chemical weapons destruction programmes, and to develop plans to retain relevant knowledge.
- 1.74 The Inspectorate Division has implemented knowledge-sharing activities to identify and share lessons learned, especially involving rehired inspectors, leading to tangible outcomes in the further streamlining of the inspection processes. Knowledge transfer interviews were introduced for Inspectorate staff separating from the Organisation, ensuring expertise retention and identification of possible knowledge gaps.

2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2019, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through a wide range of capacity-building programmes and outreach activities in support of States Parties' efforts to effectively implement the provisions of the Convention.
- 2.2 During the reporting period, the OPCW carried out 90 training courses, workshops, seminars, and other capacity-building programmes, such as support to 12 conferences, 10 individual research projects, 12 fellowships, and two equipment exchanges, involving 2,476 participants from all regional groups.
- 2.3 While these diverse activities are, necessarily, tailored to specific capacity-building priorities and targeted theme-appropriate audiences of stakeholders, the Secretariat continued its efforts to plan and manage them in an integrated manner at the strategic level, based on needs identified in close dialogue with the National Authorities of States Parties and in line with the principles of results-based management. This approach is, for example, explicitly manifest in the design of the fifth phase of the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Africa Programme"), covering the period from 2020 to 2022, planning and consultations for which took place extensively during this reporting period.

National implementation and technical assistance

- 2.4 In 2019, the Secretariat continued to provide capacity-building support to States Parties in their efforts towards full and effective national implementation of the Convention. Support for the National Authorities and stakeholders included building their institutional capacities for meeting the national obligations under the Convention. Twenty-seven activities were implemented as part of this subprogramme, with a total of 883 participants from over 157 States Parties participating in and benefiting from the programmes.
- 2.5 As at the end of 2019, out of 193 States Parties, 160 had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures. This is an increase of four States Parties from the previous year. The remaining 33 States Parties had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation. One hundred and nineteen States Parties had reported the adoption of comprehensive legislation covering all initial measures. Detailed information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.¹⁸
- 2.6 The fifth session of the Influential Visitors Programme was organised from 27 to 29 May 2019 with a high-level delegation from Togo, which included two members of the Togolese Parliament. The programme was aimed at providing assistance to Togo in moving forward the process of adoption of its draft implementing legislation on the Convention. As the outcome of the visit, the delegation developed a plan to move forward with the adoption of legislation.

¹⁸ Annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention in 2019: EC-92/DG.7 C-24/DG.8, dated 26 August 2019 and Corr.1, dated 28 November 2019; EC-92/DG.8 C 24/DG.9, dated 26 August 2019 and Corr.1, dated 28 November 2019; and EC-92/DG.9 C-24/DG.10, dated 26 August 2019 and Corr.1, dated 28 November 2019.

- 2.7 Two internship programmes for legal drafters were conducted from 4 to 8 March and 26 to 30 August 2019. The programmes were attended by 10 participants from five States Parties: Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Participants drafted implementing legislation that complies with the provisions of the Convention, and prepared action plans and indicative road maps to support the adoption process.
- 2.8 Two national awareness-raising and legislative assistance workshops were held in Brunei Darussalam on 26 and 27 March and in Kyrgyzstan from 20 to 22 June 2019. The workshops, which were organised by the respective States Parties with technical support from the Secretariat, were useful in enhancing understanding and awareness of national implementing legislation.
- 2.9 In response to a request from the Syrian Arab Republic, a national legal workshop for the Syrian Arab Republic was organised at the OPCW Headquarters from 12 to 15 November 2019. Five delegates from different Syrian Government ministries attended. The programme included two days of presentations aimed at familiarising them with the Convention and the obligations thereunder, and two days of legal drafting during which the delegates developed a draft bill implementing obligations under the Convention.
- 2.10 Two round-table side events on the role of parliamentarians in enhancing national implementation were held during the 140th and 141st Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assemblies in Qatar on 7 April 2019 and in Serbia on 14 October 2019. The events were attended by parliamentarians from Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Malaysia, Mongolia, Qatar, Serbia, and Spain. The parliamentarians shared their views on how national parliaments can play a more active role in enhancing the national implementation of the Convention and shared national experiences.
- 2.11 The Secretariat also engaged with parliamentarians of seven States Parties from the Pacific Islands during the regional seminar on engaging parliaments of the Pacific region in the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), organised by the IPU in New Zealand from 18 to 20 September 2019.
- 2.12 The second workshop on the role of implementing legislation in addressing threats arising from non-State actors was held in Malaysia from 9 to 11 April 2019. The event aimed at raising awareness of relevant stakeholders in the region on how national legislation can contribute to addressing threats involving toxic chemicals arising from non-State actors, including chemical terrorism.
- 2.13 A pilot technical workshop on the sharing of best practices in the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks on chemical security was held on 24 and 25 July 2019 at the OPCW Headquarters. The workshop provided a forum for sharing information on participating States Parties' legal and regulatory frameworks on chemical security, as well as discussing approaches to the development of chemical security measures. The workshop was attended by more than 20 participants from 12 States Parties, and representatives from international organisations and industry associations.

- 2.14 To enhance the basic knowledge and skills required for effective national implementation, the Secretariat continued to offer a general training course on the Convention. In 2019, the target audience of this training course was expanded to include representatives of the chemical industry, customs agencies, and other stakeholders. The course was held from 25 February to 1 March 2019 at the OPCW Headquarters. Forty participants from 40 States Parties took part.
- 2.15 Two training courses to enhance the skills and knowledge necessary to implement the declaration and inspection requirements under Article VI of the Convention were held in 2019. The first course was held in Panama from 25 to 29 March, targeting National Authorities and stakeholders in the Latin America and Caribbean (GRULAC) region. A total of 30 participants from 16 States Parties, including seven from the chemical industry, attended and benefited from the training course. The second course was held at the OPCW Headquarters in The Hague from 2 to 6 September, with 37 participants from 35 States Parties, including four representatives of the chemical industry. Participants developed post-training action plans based on self-assessments prepared before attending the training course.
- 2.16 Four Mentorship/Partnership Programmes were implemented in 2019, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Gambia, Togo and Morocco, India and Afghanistan, and France and Côte d'Ivoire. The programme promotes bilateral cooperation and networking between States Parties that are at an advanced stage in their implementation of the Convention, and those States Parties that seek to make improvements in this regard.
- 2.17 The Secretariat continued to offer a training-of-trainers course for National Authority representatives and customs training institutions on the technical aspects of the Convention's transfers regime. In 2019, two regional courses were organised: in Laos for 14 States Parties from the Asia region from 16 to 19 July, and in Uruguay for 10 States Parties from the GRULAC region from 17 to 20 September. At the end of each course, the participants developed action plans for the integration of modules on the Convention in their national customs curricula, with the expectation of the introduction of those modules in 2020.
- 2.18 The sixth annual meeting of representatives of the chemical industry and National Authorities of States Parties to the Convention was held in Doha, Qatar, from 2 to 4 October 2019, with support from the Government of Qatar. A total of 74 participants from 25 States Parties, of which 23 representing the chemical industry, attended this event. The meeting provided an opportunity for direct interaction between National Authorities and the chemical industry to discuss cooperation for full and effective national implementation of the Convention.
- 2.19 Regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties in four regions were held in May, June, and July 2019: in Latvia for the Eastern European Group, Mongolia for the Asian Group, Ethiopia for the African Group, and Mexico for the Latin American and Caribbean Group. The main focus of the discussions was to address the thematic priorities and issues identified and recommended by States Parties in each respective region. The meetings provided opportunities to address specific aspects of national implementation and promote networking and collaboration between States Parties.

- 2.20 The Twenty-First Annual Meeting of National Authorities was organised from 5 to 7 November 2019 in The Hague. Over 160 participants from 110 States Parties attended the meeting. The attendees had an opportunity to review the impact of the OPCW's implementation-support and capacity-building activities and were briefed on recent developments under Articles VI, VII, X, and XI of the Convention. They were provided with updates on policy-related issues and had the opportunity to discuss specific issues in break-out groups.
- 2.21 Two subregional stakeholders' forums on advancing national implementation and regional cooperation were organised in 2019: from 21 to 23 May in Kenya for East African States Parties, and from 17 to 19 September in Argentina for States Parties from Latin America. The forums promoted an integrated approach to the national implementation of the Convention and sensitised relevant national stakeholders on Convention issues. Over 70 participants from 16 States Parties participated in the two forums.
- 2.22 A global stakeholders' forum on the adoption of national implementing legislation was held at the OPCW Headquarters from 3 to 5 December 2019. The forum was a follow-up to the four regional and subregional stakeholders' forums organised by the Secretariat in 2016 and 2017 aimed at assisting States Parties in advancing the status of adoption of national implementing legislation.
- 2.23 A briefing to Permanent Representations to the OPCW based outside The Hague was organised in Brussels, Belgium, on 14 November 2019. The event was attended by 28 delegates representing 24 States Parties.

Assistance and protection

- 2.24 Sixty-three States Parties made annual submissions pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X in 2019.
- 2.25 The Secretariat piloted the renewal of the assistance and protection databank to create a more functional and needs-oriented resource for States Parties. Testing of the new databank and development of the necessary user instructions and access processes commenced in 2019, with a view to launching this modernised resource in 2020.
- 2.26 In 2019 the Secretariat carried out 36 assistance and protection activities, allowing the OPCW to build and enhance the skills of more than 1,000 individuals from States Parties in different areas related to Article X implementation.
- 2.27 The Secretariat conducted international and regional assistance and protection training courses and capacity-building activities under Article X jointly with the governments of 31 States Parties, namely: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Czech Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Uganda.

- 2.28 Three full training cycles were successfully concluded in 2019: one designed for Arabic-speaking States Parties and two others for States Parties from the Asia and GRULAC regions. Basic international assistance and protection courses were held in Serbia and Switzerland. Advanced training courses were conducted in Pakistan and Switzerland for all geographical regions and in Brazil for Portuguese-speaking States Parties. Three regional table-top exercises in chemical emergency response were delivered for relevant stakeholders from Africa (Côte d'Ivoire), Asia (Indonesia), and the GRULAC region (Ecuador).
- 2.29 Assistance to States Parties in the establishment of national protective programmes continued to be provided in line with paragraph 4 of Article X. Accordingly, national workshops were held in Fiji, Mozambique, and Namibia, and in Peru for States Parties in the GRULAC region.
- 2.30 As part of the fourth phase of the Africa Programme, operational training courses on chemical emergency response were conducted in Uganda for Member States of the East African Community and in Ghana for Member States of the Economic Community of West African States, in August and September 2019 respectively.
- 2.31 The Secretariat continued to implement existing specialised training modules, which included live-agent training for experts and advanced laboratory skills training in Slovakia and Switzerland, as well as an international course on sampling and analysis in highly contaminated environments in Poland, and regional courses on the same subject in Algeria for the Africa region and in Colombia for the GRULAC region. The special capacity-development programme on the provision of care for individuals exposed to chemical warfare agents or toxic chemicals continued with workshops held in Bangladesh, Kenya, and Malaysia. A new international course on the medical aspects of assistance and protection also took place in Xi'an, China, in October 2019.
- 2.32 The Instructor Development and Exchange Programme and the train-the-trainers approach continued to be consistently implemented by the Secretariat. Accordingly, training-of-trainer courses with support from States Parties were run in conjunction with Belarus, Côte d'Ivoire, the Czech Republic, and Mexico.
- 2.33 Activities within the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons continued to support the objectives of the network. A wider participation in the funding of its activities in accordance with the relevant decision of the Conference (C-16/DEC.13, dated 2 December 2011) has been encouraged in support of future projects. In December 2019, the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 109,789.
- 2.34 For its part, the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,562,973.99, and the number of States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X stood at 47.

Economic and technological development

- 2.35 In 2019, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and to facilitate international cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. The programmes focused on integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge.
- 2.36 During the year under review, 28 capacity-building programmes for 604 experts were carried out by the Secretariat to support economic and technological development. These were on integrated chemicals management (including chemical security management), enhancement of laboratory capabilities (analytical skills development courses), and chemical knowledge promotion. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement four standing programmes, namely the Fellowship Programme, the Programme for Support of Research Projects, the Conference Support Programme, and the Equipment Exchange Programme. In 2019, the Secretariat also organised a workshop on the implementation of Article XI.
- 2.37 In 2019, the Secretariat organised two workshops on developing tools for chemical safety and security management. The workshops provided a platform for National Authorities and relevant stakeholders to discuss and develop tools and guidance that would be helpful to promote chemical safety and security. As an outcome of the two workshops, panel experts produced a set of non-binding indicative guidelines on chemical safety and security management for small and medium-sized enterprises.
- 2.38 In 2019, the Secretariat organised the 20th edition of the OPCW Associate Programme, which took place from 26 July to 27 September. Thirty-two participants from 32 States Parties benefited from the nine-week intensive programme, which involved training modules at the OPCW Headquarters and at the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as hands-on training at chemical industry plants worldwide. National Authorities, academia, specialised institutions, chemical industry associations, and chemical companies in a number of Member States, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Poland, Qatar, and Spain, assisted in organising various components of the programme. At the end of the reporting period, the Alumni Network of the Associate Programme featured a dynamic group of 519 alumni from 121 Member States.
- 2.39 In the area of integrated chemicals management, the Secretariat organised a series of 15 global and regional capacity-building events. They took place in Algeria, Costa Rica, Germany (two), Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Qatar (two), the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, nine training courses on the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention, advanced training on OPCW proficiency tests, customs laboratory training, and laboratory quality management took place. These courses were held in Finland (two), India, the Netherlands (four), South Africa, and Spain.

- 2.40 Under its Equipment Exchange Programme, the Secretariat facilitated the donation of a gas-chromatography mass spectrometer from Germany to the United Republic of Tanzania. In addition, the Secretariat assisted in the transfer of fume hoods from the OPCW Laboratory to Ethiopia.
- 2.41 In promoting chemical knowledge and exchange, the Secretariat approved the sponsorship under the Programme for Support of Research Projects of 10 new projects to be funded solely by the OPCW and of 15 new projects to be jointly funded with the International Foundation for Science. In total, 19 directly funded projects were running at the end of the reporting period. In addition, support was provided for 12 fellowships and 12 international conferences.
- 2.42 Within the OPCW Laboratory Twinning Initiative, the Secretariat began the implementation of a project entitled “Assessing and Enhancing the Capacity of Analytical Laboratories from African and GRULAC Member States” funded by a voluntary contribution from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Under this project, a series of technical visits were made to evaluate the capacity of laboratories; laboratories for further support have been identified in Brazil, Chile, Kenya, and Nigeria.
- 2.43 As part of education and outreach efforts by the Secretariat, a series of Policy and Diplomacy for Scientists workshops was continued. The third event, attended by 18 participants, was organised in Trieste, Italy, in cooperation with The World Academy of Sciences and the InterAcademy Partnership.

The OPCW Programme for Africa

- 2.44 2019 was the concluding year for the fourth phase of the Africa Programme. During the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to deliver on the activities scheduled under the programme and, in parallel, conducted an intensive consultative process with African States Parties to identify the objectives, and subsequently plan for the fifth phase of the programme.
- 2.45 In 2019, the Secretariat conducted specific activities aimed at addressing the seven objectives of the fourth phase of the programme. African States Parties were also given particular attention for inclusion in global activities. As a result, a total of 390 individuals from 39 African States Parties participated in regional and global capacity-building events organised by the Secretariat in 2019. The Secretariat issued a report entitled “The Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention” (EC-92/DG.13 C-24/DG.11, dated 9 September 2019), which outlined the progress made in implementing the programme during the year.

3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.1 The Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference took place from 25 to 29 November 2019 and was attended by representatives of 154 States Parties, a signatory State, and six international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. Eighty-seven non-governmental organisations (NGOs) also registered to attend. H.E. Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, delivered a message to the Conference.
- 3.2 The Conference reviewed the status of implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, including chemical disarmament, destruction-related issues, national implementation measures, assistance and protection, international cooperation, and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. States Parties discussed a report covering the activities carried out under the auspices of the Africa Programme and also considered progress made regarding the OPCW's efforts to engage with the chemical industry and the scientific community.
- 3.3 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 29 November 2019.
- 3.4 Among the decisions adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Fourth Session were the following:¹⁹
- (a) Technical Change to Schedule 1(A) of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention (C-24/DEC.4, dated 27 November 2019);
 - (b) Changes to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention (C-24/DEC.5, dated 27 November 2019);
 - (c) Submission of the 2019 OPCW Financial Statements to the External Auditor (Financial Rule 11.1.02) (C-24/DEC.6, dated 28 November 2019);
 - (d) Extension of the Special Fund for OPCW Special Missions (C-24/DEC.7, dated 28 November 2019);
 - (e) Proposal from Sierra Leone for a Payment Plan to Regularise the Payment of Its Outstanding Annual Contributions (C-24/DEC.8, dated 28 November 2019);
 - (f) Write-Offs of Irrecoverable Accounts Receivable (C-24/DEC.9, dated 28 November 2019);
 - (g) Rehiring of Inspectors (C-24/DEC.10, dated 28 November 2019);

19 Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.

- (h) Transition of the OPCW to a Biennial Programme and Budget (C-24/DEC.11, dated 28 November 2019);
- (i) Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2020 (C-24/DEC.12, dated 28 November 2019); and
- (j) Scale of Assessments for 2020 (C-24/DEC.13, dated 28 November 2019).

Activities of the Executive Council

3.5 In 2019, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.

3.6 The Council also:

- (a) reviewed progress in and adopted a number of decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
- (b) reviewed progress in the implementation of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3;
- (c) discussed the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
- (d) reviewed the work of the DAT;
- (e) considered a summary update of FFM activities (S/1677/2018, dated 10 October 2018) and a report of the FFM (S/1731/2019, dated 1 March 2019);
- (f) adopted a decision on lists of newly validated data on non-scheduled chemicals relevant to the Convention (EC-91/DEC.1, dated 11 July 2019), and a decision on lists of newly validated data on scheduled chemicals (EC-91/DEC.2, dated 11 July 2019) for inclusion in the OCAD;
- (g) approved facility agreements and modifications or amendments to facility agreements between the OPCW and States Parties;
- (h) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters; and
- (i) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Fourth Session.

Activities of subsidiary bodies

3.7 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter “the Confidentiality Commission”) held its Twenty-First Meeting from 1 to 3 May 2019.

- 3.8 The ABAF held its Forty-Sixth Session from 4 to 7 June 2019, and its Forty-Seventh Session from 30 July to 2 August 2019.
- 3.9 The SAB held its Twenty-Eighth Session from 10 to 14 June 2019.
- 3.10 The ABEO held its Seventh Session from 26 to 28 February 2019, and its Eighth Session from 20 to 22 August 2019.
- 3.11 The Chairperson of the Council, Ambassador Andrea Perugini of Italy, reported to the Conference at its Twenty-Fourth Session on the status of the work of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.

4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Universality

- 4.1 In 2019, the number of OPCW Member States remained at 193. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2019. As in previous years, the Secretariat invited representatives of States not Party to participate in selected OPCW activities, including the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference.
- 4.3 Four representatives of Israel attended the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference as observers. The Secretariat maintained regular contact with the Embassy of Israel in the Netherlands throughout the year. Contacts took place between the Secretariat and the Embassy of Egypt in The Hague, and a representative of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs attended the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference.
- 4.4 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with representatives of States not Party, senior officials of States Parties, and in his interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.5 The Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to conduct visits to countries and participate in meetings and conferences relevant to the implementation of the Convention, as set out below. Furthermore, a number of high-level guests visited the OPCW Headquarters.
- 4.6 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.

Visits by the Director-General

- 4.7 The Director-General paid bilateral visits to Belgium, China, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. During these visits he met with high-level government officials. The Director-General also addressed a diverse range of audiences, including representatives of the scientific community, academic institutions, government agencies, and the chemical industry.
- 4.8 On 7 November 2019, the Director-General briefed the United Nations Security Council on the Organisation's activities, with special focus on the Syrian Arab Republic, and met with H.E. António Guterres, the United Nations Secretary-General, and H.E. Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

- 4.9 In November 2019, the Director-General travelled to Brussels, Belgium, to brief Permanent Representations to the OPCW that are not based in The Hague, as part of the Secretariat's efforts to keep Non-Resident Representations apprised of developments within the Organisation, particularly in advance of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference.
- 4.10 The Director-General also addressed a number of academic forums, conferences, and other events including: the 22nd International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference in London, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the 13th CBRNe²⁰ Protection Symposium in Malmö, Sweden; and the GLOBSEC 2019 Bratislava Forum in Bratislava, Slovakia.

Visits by the Deputy Director-General

- 4.11 The Deputy Director-General paid a bilateral visit to Peru, where she opened a regional pilot workshop on national protective programmes and held bilateral meetings with high-level officials.

Protocol and privileges and immunities support

- 4.12 The External Relations Division (ERD) continued to provide support to senior management and other members of the Secretariat for protocol services, as well as for the administration of privileges and immunities related to the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. Thirty Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2019.

OPCW-The Hague Award

- 4.13 Mr Robert Mikulak of the United States of America, Mr Cheng Tang of China, and the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) were awarded the OPCW-The Hague Award for 2019.

Other activities

- 4.14 On 16 September 2019, the OPCW hosted 25 fellows of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Fellowship Programme for a day of briefings. A visit to the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store in Rijswijk was also organised for 17 September.
- 4.15 The 19th induction workshop for diplomatic personnel was held at the OPCW on 12 and 13 September 2019. Sixty-nine delegates attended the workshop.
- 4.16 Public interest in the Convention and the work of the OPCW continued to increase in 2019, with a 28% rise in the number of visitors compared to 2018. The ERD organised and received 77 visiting groups consisting of a total of 2,180 visitors at the OPCW Headquarters, where briefings and presentations were made on the OPCW's work.

²⁰ CBRNe = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive.

Public affairs and media profile

OPCW website

- 4.17 The Secretariat's website continues to be at the centre of the OPCW's digital diplomacy strategy. The website is the foremost public source of information on the OPCW and the Convention, and continues to attract new visitors. Traffic to the website in 2019 totalled around 365,000 visitors.

OPCW Open Day

- 4.18 On 22 September 2019, the OPCW participated in the annual International Open Day organised by the Municipality of The Hague, attracting over 1,150 visitors, a 15% increase on 2018 and a new record. The programme included briefings by OPCW experts, as well as interactive activities to understand OPCW tasks and tools. The average rating of the event given by visitors in a survey carried out by the Municipality was 8.7/10. A further 150,000 people were reached through social media.

Open Day of the European Institutions

- 4.19 On 6 May 2019, the OPCW presented its work at the Open Day of the European External Action Service in Brussels, Belgium, which attracted approximately 3,200 visitors. OPCW experts provided equipment demonstrations and answered questions about the OPCW's work and the Convention.

T.M.C. Asser Institute

- 4.20 The 10th edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute's training programme on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction took place from 30 September to 4 October. Thirty-five early and mid-career professionals from 19 States Parties attended, increasing their knowledge about the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. For the first time, and with financial support from the European Union, the OPCW offered four scholarships to support the further development of expertise from civil society representatives. They were awarded to four women from Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jordan, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 4.21 A record number of 93 civil society organisations represented by 286 individuals applied to attend the Conference session, of which 87 organisations were approved for participation. A record number of 62 civil society organisations represented by 137 individuals attended, marking the highest-ever civil society attendance at a Conference session. The growing number of applications and attendance level testifies to an increased and sustained interest by civil society in participating in OPCW meetings. The OPCW, with European Union funding, was able to support 14 NGOs from countries with economies that are developing or in transition in attending the Conference.

- 4.22 The Secretariat publicised the Conference session in the digital domain. A live webcast attracted over 3,380 viewers, while a multi-channel social media campaign provided information about the purpose of the sessions, speakers, and side events.

Social media growth

- 4.23 The Secretariat’s digital communications capacity continued to increase significantly according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Each social media post and campaign is designed to increase awareness and enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention. Overall, the OPCW’s social media platforms experienced an average growth rate of 15%.

TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH

Social Media	2018	2019	Change 2018/2019
Facebook followers	17,298	18,674	8%
Twitter followers	30,200	32,312	7%
YouTube followers	1,031	1,340	30%
LinkedIn followers	8,585	12,383	44%

5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Administrative and budgetary matters

- 5.1 The 2020 Programme and Budget (C-24/DEC.12) was formulated with a view to securing the resources required for the Secretariat to carry out its functions in the context of the current challenges confronting the OPCW, including the constraints of zero nominal growth. One-off provisions for a major capital investment fund, capacity-building support for laboratories, and the enterprise resource planning (ERP) project were included in the regular budget. For the preparation of the 2020 Programme and Budget, the Administration Division (ADM) continued to further develop templates and costing sheets for the use of zero-based budgeting and standard costing, and to improve the linkages between objectives, strategies, activities, and resources.
- 5.2 The ADM continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation's tenuous cash situation throughout 2019, apprising States Parties of the financial position on a monthly basis, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. These steps, together with close oversight of budgetary expenditure, proved effective in controlling the cash situation of the Secretariat in 2019.
- 5.3 The 2018 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in May 2019 (EC-92/DG.2 C-24/DG.5, dated 13 August 2019); both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2018 Financial Statements for the OPCW included for the second time a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting for the financial year key trends and issues of importance for the readers of the Financial Statements, including States Parties.
- 5.4 The ADM supported the other divisions of the Secretariat with essential general services including travel arrangements, logistic support to the various sessions and meetings of the policy-making organs, visa and United Nations laissez-passer support, facility services, and procurement guidance, as well as management of the Secretariat's assets.
- 5.5 Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 20.1 million in 2019. This amount was reached through 266 contracts or purchase orders raised centrally by the Procurement Section for a total value of EUR 18.6 million, and 581 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low value procurements), for a total value of EUR 1.5 million.
- 5.6 Work continued to review the implementation of the tenure policy. Following a wider assessment of the implications of tenure policy by external consultants, the Secretariat presented a discussion paper to address tenure policy in a larger workforce management context. To complement the existing staffing modalities and provide a more agile approach, the Secretariat launched a new Junior Professional Officer Programme and partnered with the United Nations Volunteers Programme.

- 5.7 The Secretariat launched a new and modern employee recognition programme that aims to increase the level of positive feedback among staff while also serving as the platform to recognise outstanding performance on an annual basis. Furthermore, in order to receive and record actionable feedback from staff at the time of separation about their experience at the Secretariat, the Human Resources Branch developed a web-based exit survey.
- 5.8 The OPCW is committed to providing equal opportunities for everyone as we work to rid the world of chemical weapons. To further improve gender diversity, divisions nominated Gender Focal Points to advise management on gender-related issues and to support gender mainstreaming. The OPCW participated in the Interagency Gender Training Programme with other agencies based in The Hague and joined the International Gender Champions network that brings together decision-makers to advance gender equality in international institutions and organisations. Targeted sourcing and outreach geared towards gender diversity led to an improved gender balance in the Professional category (from 21% to 28%) and in senior management (to 50%).
- 5.9 A key component of the OPCW People Strategy 2020 is a focus on improving the employee experience. In this regard, the Secretariat introduced the new United Nations diversity and inclusion training, provided training on emotional intelligence and personal resilience, and implemented measures to address the potential for unconscious bias in recruitment processes. A new onboarding app and a focus on structured induction and leadership training began to have an impact and a positive effect on staff joining the Organisation and taking up new roles.
- 5.10 To enhance data-driven decision-making in human resources, the Secretariat launched new interactive, real-time dashboards. A recruitment dashboard began to provide actionable insights into recruitment while providing monitoring and alerting capabilities, and a staff composition dashboard presented complete data on active staff, as well as broad historical trends.
- 5.11 The Information Services Branch (ISB), in collaboration with the International Cooperation and Assistance Division, developed online submission portals for Article VII and Article X-related submissions. Both online submission portals were demonstrated to National Authorities during the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of National Authorities, held from 5 to 7 November 2019. The online submission portals were launched as a pilot involving a number of States Parties in November 2019 and the complete launch for all States Parties was scheduled for early 2020.
- 5.12 In December 2019, the ISB launched a new online system for managing the complete lifecycle of official-series documents. The system allows for improved collaboration across the Secretariat during document creation, and provides a robust repository for managing and sharing documents with OPCW stakeholders. The Document Forecast module was launched in December 2019.
- 5.13 In 2019, the ISB implemented an identity and access management solution for all staff in the Secretariat, allowing staff to securely log in to different OPCW applications using a single login mechanism while at the office, as well as during duty travel. In the future, this solution will be expanded to allow representatives of States Parties to securely log in to authorised OPCW external applications.

- 5.14 The implementation of the core component (System of Record – SoR) of the ERP system solution continued in 2019, with work on the finalisation of the software configuration and defect resolution by the vendor as user acceptance testing progressed, along with the development of user training material. The go-live of the SoR was replanned for early 2020, subject to the successful completion of the end-to-end business process testing, along with the delivery of end-user training at go-live. In parallel, implementation of the Talent Management (TM) solution continued, with the TM Learning module and Performance module planned for go-live in early 2020.
- 5.15 In line with the ERP implementation, the ISB implemented a modern analytics platform (Qlik Sense) in 2019 that serves as a single solution for Organisation-wide interactive analytics and reporting. The new platform allows the OPCW to retire legacy business intelligence systems and save significant costs. Furthermore, it provides the Organisation with advanced analytics that also have dashboards and self-service capabilities.
- 5.16 Within the ADM, the Knowledge Management Section was created under the supervision of the Senior Knowledge Management Officer, with the task of consolidating the Organisation's explicit and tacit knowledge and institutional memory. Synergies were established throughout the Secretariat, stimulating work in the area of core expertise and knowledge identification, sharing, and preservation, with continued contributions from a cross-divisional team of Knowledge Champions.

Internal oversight

- 5.17 During the period under review, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) conducted its audits in conformity with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors, United States of America. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for evaluation were also observed.
- 5.18 In 2019, the OIO conducted the following audits and evaluations: Audit of the Management of Official Duty Travel; Audit of the Management of the Staff Recruitment Process; Audit of the Implementation of the Confidentiality Regime in the Chemical Demilitarisation Inspection Cell of the Inspectorate Division; Audit of the Management of Software Licences; Audit of the Management of Logical Access Controls, Logging, and Monitoring in the Security Critical Network (SCN); and Evaluation of OPCW Committees (first batch). In addition, the OIO certified the process leading to the authentication of updates included in OCAD version 22_2020 and performed six certifications of the process leading to the testing, preparation, and packing of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry equipment.
- 5.19 To manage the quality management system (QMS) of the OPCW, the OIO performed four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and prepared management reviews of accredited areas.

- 5.20 The OIO continued to receive requests for advice in 2019 related to, among other issues, the revision of administrative directives, the improvement of internal controls, risk assessment, confidentiality policy, and IT governance. Furthermore, OIO auditors participated as observers in meetings of the Investment Committee, the Property Survey Board, the Committee on Contracts, the IT Strategy Advisory Committee, the Information Services Steering Committee, the ERP Project Board, the ERP Project Steering Committee, and the Risk Management Committee.
- 5.21 In 2019, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of the implementation of recommendations contained in all of its audit and evaluation reports, in order to assess the actions taken by management for implementation of the audit recommendations. The outcome of the follow-up exercises was reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the OIO's annual report. To facilitate the timely follow-up of recommendations, the OIO has launched an online Sharepoint-based "Audit Tracker" tool and a dashboard "Audilytics" tool for reporting thereon.

Legal affairs

- 5.22 In 2019, the LAO provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.23 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the negotiation of international agreements, including voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements on the conduct of training activities; cooperation with other international organisations; administrative policies and procedures; and financial questions, including commercial contracts for the procurement of goods and services. The LAO represented the OPCW before judicial and other quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, including the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization.
- 5.24 The Secretariat registered 50 international agreements in 2019 and nine amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8).

Strategy and policy

- 5.25 In 2019, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism remained the primary platform for the States Parties to interact with international experts and to exchange their views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. The focus of the discussions throughout 2019 was on the role of international legal cooperation in bringing perpetrators of acts of chemical terrorism to justice; the importance of national implementation of the Convention, in particular Article VI, in combating the threat of the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors; and lessons learned from other international efforts to build national capacity against the threat of CBRN²¹ terrorism.

²¹ CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.

- 5.26 In 2019, the OPCW continued its active participation in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it became a signatory in 2018. Under the Compact's auspices, the Organisation was selected as a Vice-Chair of the newly established Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection, which is chaired by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). In this framework, a proposal was jointly developed by the OPCW, alongside the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, INTERPOL, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, for the third phase of a project to enhance interagency interoperability and public communications in the event of a chemical or biological attack. The third phase will begin in 2020.
- 5.27 The Secretariat and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee Group of Experts continued to collaborate in strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and to offer practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.

Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.28 The OPCW continued to expand its engagement with the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) in 2019. The seventh meeting of the Chemical Industry Coordination Group took place on 29 March 2019, and the eighth was held on 10 September 2019 at the OPCW Headquarters. Participants discussed practical steps for improving the efficiency of industry inspections and capacity building in chemical safety and security.
- 5.29 In 2019, representatives of the ICCA participated in a number of the Secretariat's activities and vice versa, which contributed to raising awareness of the Organisation's work and promoting the importance of the industry's support for implementation of the Convention. The Director-General submitted a Note to the Conference at its Twenty-Fourth Session entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" (C-24/DG.17, dated 4 November 2019), which provided a detailed account of the OPCW's engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The report covers activities related to verification, education and outreach, national implementation and capacity building, and chemical safety and security.
- 5.30 In the reporting period, the Secretariat was approached by the International Chemical Trade Association (ICTA), which expressed its desire to formalise cooperation with the OPCW. In the autumn of 2019, an informal meeting took place between representatives of ICTA and the Secretariat. ICTA presented information about the association's purpose, membership, and its scope of activities. By the end of 2019, the Secretariat was evaluating how closer cooperation with ICTA could benefit OPCW programmes and strengthen a broader dialogue with chemical industry associations.

Education and outreach

- 5.31 The ABEO held two sessions in 2019. The Eighth Session (February 2019) was the first meeting of the Board in its new composition, following the appointment of several new members (as announced to States Parties by the Director-General in EC-90/DG.3 C-24/DG.1, dated 12 December 2018). During this session, the Board discussed its work plan for 2019 and decided to establish four intersessional working groups. The working groups focused on the following issues: the history of chemical weapons use, active learning approaches, new education and outreach resources to be added to the OPCW website, and the development of new education and outreach materials. In August 2019 at its Ninth Session, the Board continued its work along the thematic division decided previously. In addition, Professor Hernández Rizzardini, an ABEO member, conducted a one-day training event on e-learning for Secretariat staff, which covered best practices in this area.

Confidentiality and security

- 5.32 In the period under review, the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) worked to ensure an appropriate level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, operations, missions, and information using a risk management-based approach aligned with the risk appetite of the Organisation and with international best practices.
- 5.33 In response to an increase in the frequency and sophistication of cyber-attacks, a strategic review of cybersecurity resilience was performed by the OCS to derive a strategic plan for the modernisation of technology and personnel security controls, taking into account best practice and assessed risks.
- 5.34 The OCS continued to provide training and awareness to personnel on security and confidentiality, physical security services and support for major meetings. The OCS also supported the annual meeting of the OPCW Confidentiality Commission and the conduct of an internal investigation, delivered ad hoc classified briefings, and coordinated security for OPCW missions in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security.

Health and safety

- 5.35 No serious incidents occurred during standard OPCW operations, including inspections and training activities. However, one serious accident involving a staff member took place on the way to work. The overall number of accidents at the Secretariat and on missions (13) was comparable to 2018. There were no delays in mission health and safety preparedness, which involved an increased workload in support of inspectorate training activities, updates of safety-related standard operating procedures, and the update of the radiation safety programme.
- 5.36 The annual workplace inspection in 2019 focused on safe working conditions that are suitable for both women and men, in addition to a greater focus on fire safety-related issues. Several elements for improvement were identified, including issues highlighted in the 2018 workplace inspection report, which are at various stages of being addressed. The annual workplace inspection confirmed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace.

- 5.37 The Health and Safety Branch continued to assist other branches in routine work and training, as well in regular and high-risk inspection missions. This support ranged from providing tailored risk assessments for all inspections, advising on safety equipment, supervising safety aspects of training activities, and maintaining the radiation safety programme, to addressing health and safety issues related to facilities (for example, fire safety) and the workplace (for example, ergonomics).

6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

- 6.1 Underpinned by science and technology, the full and effective implementation of the Convention requires a sound understanding of the impact of scientific and technological change.
- 6.2 Given the rapid pace and disruptive nature of technological change, ensuring that the OPCW remains a fit-for-purpose organisation is strengthened through innovation, viewing technological evolution as an opportunity to enhance capability, and a strong science-policymaker discourse. The SAB serves as a resource to inform the Director-General and provide practical, actionable, and sound scientific advice.
- 6.3 Building on its report on developments in science and technology to the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Fourth Review Conference”) (RC-4/DG.1, dated 30 April 2018), the SAB held its Twenty-Eighth Session in June 2019, where it initiated its next review process. Additionally, three meetings of the SAB’s temporary working group (TWG) on investigative science and technology were held in April, September, and November 2019.
- 6.4 The Secretariat’s collaboration and engagement across scientific communities continued to grow in 2019. Conference attendance, interactions with the leadership of professional chemistry societies, the partnership with the IUPAC and publications in scientific literature are key enablers for the Secretariat to stay abreast of developments in chemistry, maintain visibility and credibility amongst scientists, promote responsible and ethical scientific practices, and support education and outreach activities.
- 6.5 States Parties received briefings from the SAB Chairperson in the margins of the Board’s Twenty-Eighth Session in June 2019, and during the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference. Further engagement with States Parties was facilitated through the continuation of the “Science for Diplomats” initiative held in the margins of the Ninetieth, Ninety-First, and Ninety-Second Sessions of the Council, and during the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference. To further enhance science-policymaker discourse, technical and educational materials were made available through the science and technology section of the OPCW public website, and engagement was augmented through social media.

The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

- 6.6 In June 2019, the Board met for its Twenty-Eighth Session (SAB-28/1, dated 14 June 2019). The Board used this session, the first since the 2018 Fourth Review Conference, to identify priority topics and develop a road map for the next scientific review process. The Director-General’s response to the report and recommendations within it was issued in September 2019 (EC-92/DG.12, dated 9 September 2019).
- 6.7 The TWG on investigative science and technology met three times in 2019. Its third and fourth meetings were held at the OPCW Headquarters in April and September (SAB-28/WP.3, dated 4 June 2019 and SAB-29/WP.1, dated 25 November 2019), while its fifth and final meeting was held in Helsinki, Finland, in November 2019.

The final meeting saw the drafting of a substantive end-of-mandate report on the in-depth review, which the TWG was tasked with undertaking, of the methods and technologies applicable to the investigative work of the Secretariat, especially non-routine missions,. The Director-General's response to the recommendations and advice given in this report will be provided with his response to the SAB's next session (its Twenty-Ninth) in 2020. An update on the work of the TWG was presented to States Parties through the Science for Diplomats briefing held in the margins of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference.

- 6.8 The SAB's 2018 advice on new types of nerve agents (SAB-28/WP.1, dated 3 July 2018) continued to be drawn upon to inform the Secretariat's evaluations of the proposals to add new chemicals and families of chemicals to Schedule 1 (EC-M-62/DG.1, dated 14 December 2018 and EC-M-63/DG.1 and Corr.1, both dated 29 January 2019, and Corr.2, dated 1 February 2019), and the briefings held on these evaluations for States Parties in January and February 2019.

Engagement with the scientific community

- 6.9 The Secretariat's engagement with global scientific communities continued to grow in 2019. Activities included meeting with the leadership of the American Chemical Society (ACS) in March 2019 and addressing the ACS International Affairs Committee in March and August 2019, engagement across divisions of the IUPAC with a view to deepening collaboration (July 2019), inviting ACS and IUPAC leaders to attend OPCW events, Secretariat staff members continuing to serve on IUPAC committees, and a statement read on behalf of the IUPAC President-elect delivered to the Conference at its Twenty-Fourth Session in November 2019 (C-24/NAT.20, dated 27 November 2019).
- 6.10 The Secretariat and members of the SAB remained a visible presence amongst technical communities in 2019, delivering presentations at the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) designated laboratory (Rijswijk, the Netherlands, February 2019) and during events that included the 43rd International Committee of Military Medicine World Congress (Basel, Switzerland, May 2019), university lectures for the Young Chemists' chapters of the German Chemical Society (Cologne, Mainz, and Tübingen, Germany, June 2019), the 257th and 258th ACS National Meetings (Orlando and San Diego, United States of America, March and August 2019), the 47th IUPAC World Chemistry Congress and the 50th General Assembly (Paris, France, July 2019), the 5th Summer School on Sustainable Chemistry (Lüneburg, Germany, September 2019), the World Science Forum 2019 (Budapest, Hungary, November 2019) and the ninth edition of the Malta Conference (Valetta, Malta, December 2019).
- 6.11 Publications in scientific literature provided additional visibility and awareness-raising across scientific communities. These included papers on medical countermeasures in the peer-reviewed journal *Toxicology* (volumes 413 and 415) that were developed from the SAB's 2014 and 2015 responses to the Director-General's request for advice on assistance and protection, and on highlights of OPCW-IUPAC cooperation in the IUPAC membership magazine *Chemistry International* (volume 41, issue 2).

Activities at the science-security interface

- 6.12 The Secretariat and the SAB continued to engage with other security-focused organisations, contributing to discussions on science advice and science diplomacy in international treaties, and participated in a number of science-security-focused events.
- 6.13 Briefings at the science-security interface were provided either by Secretariat representatives or SAB members at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, United States of America, April and December 2019), a workshop on the history of nerve agents (Canterbury, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 2019), the 22nd International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 2019), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty: Science and Technology 2019 event (Vienna, Austria, June 2019), the third meeting of the Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group (San Diego, United States of America, August 2019), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Meeting of Experts and its Meeting of States Parties (Geneva, Switzerland, August and December 2019), the Science–Peace–Security 2019 Conference (Darmstadt, Germany, September 2019), the Asser Institute’s 10th annual training programme on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (The Hague, the Netherlands, October 2019) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security Global Forum on Scientific Advances Relevant to the BWC (Geneva, Switzerland, December 2019).
- 6.14 Other science-security related events attended either by Secretariat representatives or SAB members included a workshop on qualitative frameworks to assess the risks and benefits of advances in science and technology organised by the InterAcademy Partnership and United States National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (Geneva, Switzerland, August 2019), the Fifth UNSGM²² Designated Laboratories Workshop (Spiez, Switzerland, September 2019), and a UNICRI workshop on assessing the risks of new technologies (Geneva, Switzerland, October 2019).

²² UNSGM = United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Annex 1

**STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019²³**

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97

²³

For each State Party listed, the date in the “Signature” column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the “Deposit” column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, “[a]” means “deposit of instrument of accession”, “[A]” means “deposit of instrument of acceptance”, and “[d]” means “deposit of instrument of succession”.

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Palestine (State of)		17-05-18	16-06-18
133.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
134.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
135.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
136.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
137.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
138.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
139.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
140.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
141.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
142.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
143.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
144.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
145.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
146.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
147.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
148.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
149.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
150.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
151.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
152.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
153.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
154.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
155.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
156.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
157.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
158.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
159.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97
160.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
161.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13

	State Party	Dates		
		Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
162.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
163.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97
164.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Turkey	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

Annex 2

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2019

Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party	
United States of America	Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant Static Detonation Chamber (BGCAPP-SDC) Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF) Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP)* Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System (CTF/MAPS)** Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)**

* Construction was complete; systemisation was ongoing at the end of 2019.

** The facility remained in service in 2019, but no destruction operations took place.

Annex 3

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN²⁴
 AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019**

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed²⁵
Category 1		
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	14,769.933
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,471.323
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD, HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	16,076.711
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and lewisite (including HD/L mixture in dichloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.875
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.173
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.859	3.817
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
Total Category 1:	70,493.636	68,737.917
Category 2		
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorous trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725

²⁴ Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

²⁵ Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed²⁵
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorous pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorous oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
Total Category 2:	1,810.703	1,810.703
Totals	72,304.339	70,548.620

Annex 4

**NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT,
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019²⁶**

Name of Riot Control Agent	Number of States Parties that have Declared Possession
CS	122
CN	64
Capsaicinoids	35
CR	13
Other types	3

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 137

²⁶ The CAS nomenclature for riot control agents listed in this chart is as follows:

CS: CAS number 2698-41-1;
CN: CAS number 532-27-4; and
CR: CAS number 257-07-8.

Capsaicinoids include capsaicin, pelargonic acid vanillylamide, oleoresin capsicum, dihydrocapsaicin, and E-capsaicin.

Other types include mixtures of chemicals mentioned in the table or older types of riot control agents.

Annex 5

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019
(ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)**

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Belgium	Belgian Defence Laboratories (DLD)	12 May 2004
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	17 Nov 1998
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	29 Jun 1999
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection	29 Jun 1999
7.	India	Vertox Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defence Chemical Research Laboratory	3 Aug 2011
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	17 Nov 1998
10.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defence Science Technology Organisation	18 April 2018
11.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CB Department, Agency for Defence Development	3 Aug 2011
12.	Republic of Korea	Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence Research Institute	4 Sept 2012
13.	Romania	Scientific Research Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis and Special Synthesis Laboratory	15 April 2018
14.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	4 Aug 2000
15.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, "State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology"	15 Apr 2015
16.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
17.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa	16 Aug 2004
18.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	17 Nov 1998
19.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
20.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	29 Jun 1999
21.	United States of America	Edgewood Chemical Biological Center Forensic Analytical Center	17 Nov 1998
22.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

**LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019
(BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)**

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	1 Aug 2016
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Vertex Biochemistry Division Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	1 Aug 2016
9.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
10.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
11.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
12.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	1 Aug 2016
13.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Porton Down	1 Aug 2016
14.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017
15.	United States of America	Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic Analytical Center	1 Aug 2016
16.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
17.	United States of America	US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense	19 Aug 2019

Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2019²⁷

STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME
AND SUBPROGRAMME FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2019

Funding Programme 1	Final Appropriation 2	Total Expenditure 3	Balance of Appropriations 4 (2-3)
CHAPTER 1			
1. Verification Programme	9,853,472	9,448,767	404,705
2. Inspections Programme	20,270,335	20,267,224	3,111
TOTAL CHAPTER 1	30,123,807	29,715,991	407,816
CHAPTER 2			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	7,294,750	7,231,218	63,532
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	4,850,095	4,849,549	546
5. External Relations Programme	1,974,843	1,972,401	2,442
6. Executive Management Programme	9,571,953	9,568,822	3,131
7. Administration Programme	14,419,464	14,417,561	1,903
TOTAL CHAPTER 2	38,111,105	38,039,551	71,554
GRAND TOTAL	68,234,912	67,755,542	479,370

²⁷ Source: Report by the Director-General – OPCW Income and Expenditure for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2019 (S/1854/2020, dated 26 February 2020) (unaudited).

BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019

Fund	Balance	
	As at 31 December 2019²⁸	As at 31 December 2018
General Fund	3,980,862	4,159,187
Working Capital Fund	7,336,791	7,086,272
Special ERP Fund	2,249,158	3,540,528
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,562,975	1,562,975
OPCW special accounts	2,105,243	525,671
OPCW trust funds	29,615,495	13,002,286
Total	46,850,524	29,876,919

²⁸

The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances due to timing differences.

Annex 7

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2019

Fund Balances

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds, Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2019	2019 Income	Refunds/Transfers During 2019	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2019	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2019
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	7,093,287	850	1,046,654	-	-	8,140,791
Special funds	3,702,932	13	2,186,235	31,713	1,608,081	4,312,812
Voluntary fund for assistance (Article X)	1,562,974	-	-	-	-	1,562,974
Trust funds	10,282,642	27,028,512	(81,135)	281,898	10,327,503	27,184,412

Syria Trust Fund Balances

Syria Trust Funds	Balance as at 1 January 2019	2019 Income	Refunds/Transfers During 2019	Prior Years' Adjustments	Expenditure During 2019	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2019
	A	B	C	D	E	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Syria trust fund for the destruction of chemical weapons	236,720	-	-	3,128	67,715	172,133
Trust fund for Syria missions	1,569,539	12,432,490	(81,135)	185,234	6,051,614	8,054,514

Annex 8

**INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
FROM 1 JANUARY 2019 TO 31 DECEMBER 2019**

International Agreements Registered in 2019				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 551	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Trust Fund for Security and Business Continuity	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	02-01-19 28-01-19	28-01-19
IAR 552	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of Switzerland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Switzerland	19-02-19 28-01-19	19-02-19
IAR 553	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of France and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW France	07-03-19 07-03-19	07-03-19
IAR 554	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection, WIS Laboratory, Germany, Concerning Sample Preparation for the 45th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection, WIS Laboratory (Germany)	27-03-19 04-03-19	27-03-19
IAR 555	Voluntary Contribution Arrangement Between the Government of Australia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Australia	15-03-19 15-03-19	15-03-19
IAR 556	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA, Concerning Evaluation of the 44th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States of America)	08-03-19 12-02-19	08-03-19
IAR 557	Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Junior Professional Officers Programme Between the Government of Japan and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Japan	27-03-19 27-03-19	27-03-19

International Agreements Registered in 2019

OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 558	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Vertox Laboratory, Defence R&D Establishment, Gwalior, DRDO, Ministry of Defence, India, Concerning Evaluation of the Results of the 4th Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Vertox Laboratory (India)	12-03-19 08-04-19	08-04-19
IAR 559	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17-04-19 17-04-19	17-04-19
IAR 560	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17-04-19 17-04-19	17-04-19
IAR 561	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17-04-19 17-04-19	17-04-19
IAR 562	Contribution Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	29-03-19 03-04-19	03-04-19
IAR 563	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Slovenia	27-05-19 27-05-19	26-06-19
IAR 564	Technical Agreement Between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at the Training Center of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection in Zemianske Kostol'any, Slovakia	OPCW Technical Secretariat Slovakia	28-05-19 20-05-19	28-05-19
IAR 565	Technical Arrangement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense Research Institute of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Command of the Republic of Korea Regarding the Off-Site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Command (Republic of Korea)	02-07-19 13-12-18	02-07-19
IAR 566	Understanding on Ad Hoc Medical Emergency	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	08-07-19 09-07-19	09-07-19

International Agreements Registered in 2019				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 567	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of his Serene Highness Albert II of Monaco and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Monaco	03-06-19 29-04-19	03-06-19
IAR 568	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Germany	28-06-19 28-07-19	28-07-19
IAR 569	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for Regional Seminars	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	24-06-19 24-06-19	24-06-19
IAR 570	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Republic of Korea	24-06-19 24-06-19	24-06-19
IAR 571	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial, Spain, Concerning Evaluation of the Results of the 45th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial (Spain)	02-05-19 13-05-19	13-05-19
IAR 572	European Union Contribution Agreement CFSP/2019/05/OPCW VII	OPCW Technical Secretariat European Union	07-08-19 31-07-19	07-08-19
IAR 573	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Norway	06-08-19 12-08-19	12-08-19
IAR 574	Technical Arrangement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, People's Republic of China, Regarding Off-Site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Technical Secretariat Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis, Academy of Military Medical Sciences (China)	05-09-19 05-09-19	05-09-19
IAR 575	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel Between the International Criminal Court and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat International Criminal Court	13-09-18 17-09-18	17-09-18

International Agreements Registered in 2019

OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 576	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between Japan and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Japan	14-06-19 06-06-19	14-06-19
IAR 577	Exchange of Letters Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Sweden	25-04-19 29-11-18	25-04-19
IAR 578	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between Turkey and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Turkey	17-10-19 17-10-19	17-10-19
IAR 579	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Slovenia	27-05-19 27-05-19	26-06-19
IAR 580	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Slovenia	27-05-19 25-05-19	26-06-19
IAR 581	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel Between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	05-11-19 05-11-19	06-11-19
IAR 582	Agreement Concerning the Reimbursable Loan of Personnel Between the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Technical Secretariat Special Tribunal for Lebanon	05-11-19 05-11-19	06-11-19
IAR 583	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat China	08-11-19 08-11-19	08-11-19

International Agreements Registered in 2019				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 584	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) Concerning Sample Preparation for the 46th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) (Netherlands)	07-10-19 23-10-19	23-10-19
IAR 585	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Concerning Evaluation of the Results of the 46th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)	07-10-19 11-11-19	11-11-19
IAR 586	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Sweden, Concerning Sample Preparation for the 46th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	OPCW Technical Secretariat FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency (Sweden)	07-10-19 25-10-19	25-10-19
IAR 587	Arrangement Between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning Voluntary Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Netherlands	12-11-19 08-11-19	12-11-19
IAR 588	Arrangement Between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning Upgrading the OPCW Chemical Laboratory to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Netherlands	12-11-19 08-11-19	12-11-19
IAR 589	Grant Agreement for Project "South East Asia-Support to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Workshop on Chemical Supply Chain Safety and Security Management"	OPCW Technical Secretariat US Civilian Research and Development Foundation (United States of America)	10-09-19 11-09-19	11-09-19
IAR 590	Grant Agreement for Project "Mali-Support to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Workshop Enhancing Chemical Security in Mali"	OPCW Technical Secretariat US Civilian Research and Development Foundation (United States of America)	10-09-19 11-09-19	11-09-19

International Agreements Registered in 2019

OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 591	Exchange of Letters Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Sweden	18-06-19 08-07-19	08-07-19
IAR 592	Exchange of Letters Between the Government of Hungary and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Hungary	30-10-19 30-10-19	30-10-19
IAR 593	Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Arab Emirates	09-12-19 05-12-19	09-12-19
IAR 594	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Trust Fund for Training	OPCW Technical Secretariat United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	20-11-19 07-11-19	20-11-19
IAR 595	Exchange of Letters Between the Government of Portugal and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Portugal	11-12-19 11-12-19	11-12-19
IAR 596	Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Cyprus	12-12-19 10-12-19	12-12-19
IAR 597	Agreement Between the Government of Switzerland, Represented by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), Acting Through the Division for Security Policy, and the OPCW Technical Secretariat Concerning the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Switzerland	—	—
IAR 598	Exchange of Letters Between the Czech Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Czech Republic	06-12-19 06-12-19	06-12-19

International Agreements Registered in 2019				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 599	Exchange of Letters Between the Government of Luxembourg and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Technical Secretariat Luxembourg	17-12-19 17-12-19	17-12-19
IAR 600	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	OPCW Technical Secretariat Luxembourg	17-12-19 17-12-19	17-12-19

Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2019				
OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 381(l)	Amendment No.12 to the Agreement Between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	11-02-19 16-02-19 25-03-19	11-02-19
IAR 436(b)	Amendment No. 2 to the Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the OPCW Technical Secretariat	OPCW Technical Secretariat New Zealand	24-06-19 07-06-19	24-06-19
IAR 511(a)	Addendum No. 1 to Delegation Agreement CFSP/2017/37/OPCW Chemical Weapons Libya	OPCW Technical Secretariat European Union	08-08-19 07-08-19	08-08-19
IAR 512(a)	Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United States of America on the Contribution of Funds in Support of Certain Non-Proliferation Activities Concerning Chemical Weapons in Syria	OPCW United States of America	14-01-19 10-01-19	14-01-2019
IAR 515(c)	Addendum No. 2 to Delegation Agreement CFSP/2017/38/OPCW SatCen	OPCW Technical Secretariat European Union	18-12-19 13-12-19	18-12-19

Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2019

OPCW Registration Number	Subject of agreement/instrument	Parties	Date of	
			Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 520(a)	Amendment One (1) to UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services	10-01-19 14-01-19	14-01-19
IAR 520(b)	Amendment Two (2) to UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services	03-06-19 06-06-19	06-06-19
IAR 520(c)	Amendment Three (3) to UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services	01-08-19 05-08-19	05-08-19
IAR 520(d)	Amendment Four (4) to UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services	—	—

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