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DRAFT REPORT OF THE OPCW ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION IN 2018

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INTRODUCTION

- 1. The OPCW's work remained the focus of international attention throughout 2018. Against the backdrop of continued chemical weapons use, several key events provided a focus for the activities of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat"). These included the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter "the Conference") in June 2018 and the implementation tasks arising therefrom; the completion of the term in office of the previous Director-General, Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, and the arrival of the new Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias, in July 2018; and preparations for and the convening in November 2018 of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Fourth Review Conference"). At the same time, progress continued to be made in destroying the remaining declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, implementing and enhancing industry verification, expanding international cooperation and assistance, addressing the challenge posed by chemical terrorism, and broadening education and outreach.
- 2. In the process of destruction of declared chemical weapons in 2018, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 248.161 metric tonnes (MT) of Category 1 chemical weapons. Between entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Convention") and 31 December 2018, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 68,125.828 MT¹ of declared Category 1 chemical weapons, representing 96.64% of the declared total amount. The single remaining possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed, the United States of America, continued to work towards its target date of September 2023 for the complete destruction of its remaining chemical weapons stocks. Progress was also recorded in the destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the territory of China. During the year, the Secretariat conducted 12 inspections regarding abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) and six inspections concerning old chemical weapons (OCWs). The final two of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic were verified as destroyed in 2018.
- 3. The OPCW again carried out 241 inspections of industrial facilities in 2018. Sampling and analysis activities were carried out during nine of those inspections, seven of which were Schedule 2 inspections and two of which were inspections of other chemical production facilities (OCPFs). The Secretariat released two updated tools for the identification of scheduled chemicals: the Handbook on Chemicals and the online scheduled chemicals database. The Secretariat also started the development of the next version of the electronic declarations tool for National Authorities (EDNA), the electronic declaration information system (EDIS).
- 4. Work continued to clarify the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic and to address the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in that country. The Fourth Special Session of the Conference adopted a decision that, inter alia, tasked the Secretariat

This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter "the Verification Annex").

with putting in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic; work to implement this and other aspects of the decision continued throughout the second half of 2018. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) continued its activities in 2018, guided by the relevant decisions of the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), aimed at resolving outstanding issues identified in relation to the Syrian Arab Republic's initial declaration and related submissions, continued throughout 2018.

- 5. Following incidents involving a toxic chemical displaying the properties of a nerve agent in Salisbury and Amesbury, the Secretariat, upon request, provided technical assistance to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on three occasions during 2018. As a result of those incidents, and the fact that the toxic chemical involved was not listed in the Convention's schedules, two proposals were made (as outlined in S/1682/2018, dated 25 October 2018; and S/1697/2018, dated 7 December 2018 and Corr.1, dated 21 January 2019) to introduce additional chemical families to the schedules of chemicals in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals.
- 6. In 2018, the Secretariat continued to implement capacity-building programmes in support of States Parties' implementation of the Convention. The Secretariat conducted 96 activities and programmes for more than 2,000 participants from around the world.
- 7. The Open-Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities of the OPCW, which was established by the Council in June 2016, finalised its work in the first half of 2018.
- 8. The full and effective implementation of the Convention continued to underlie the OPCW's contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. To further focus attention on this issue, the OPCW hosted the first Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism in June 2018. The Council's Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism continued to explore a number of areas in which the OPCW could advance this contribution.
- 9. The three advisory bodies of the OPCW, namely the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF), and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), continued to provide advice to the OPCW according to their respective mandates. The SAB submitted a report to the Fourth Review Conference on developments in science and technology of relevance to the implementation of the Convention.
- 10. The Joint Steering Committee of the OPCW and the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) met in October to discuss common initiatives and give guidance to the Chemical Industry Coordination Group (CICG). An ICCA representative also addressed the Fourth Review Conference in November.
- 11. During International Open Day on 24 September, the OPCW welcomed 1,000 people to its Headquarters and reached over 388,000 people through its social media outreach. The programme included briefings by OPCW experts, interactive activities to understand OPCW tasks and tools, and more.

12. OPCW membership increased to 193 States Parties in 2018, with the accession to the Convention of the State of Palestine.

1. VERIFICATION

1.1 A summary of the inspections carried out in 2018 is provided in Table 1. The OPCW conducted 297 inspections in 2018, of which 19% were related to chemical weapons and accounted for 43% of the inspection effort not related to the Syrian Arab Republic (5,397 inspector days). Operations connected with the Syrian Arab Republic accounted for a further 1,395 inspector days in 2018.

TABLE 1: INSPECTIONS COMPLETED IN 2018

Type of Facility	Number of	Number of Facilities	Number of							
Type of Facility	Inspections	Inspector Days								
Chemical weapons-related inspections										
CWDF ²	24	3^3	1,864							
CWSF ⁴	3	3	62							
CWPF	11 ⁵	11	141							
OCW	6	6	57							
ACW ⁶	12	220								
Syrian Arab		1 205								
Republic ⁷		n/a	1,395							
Subtotal	56 31		3,739							
	Artic	le VI inspections								
Schedule 1	11	11	216							
Schedule 2	42	42	984							
Schedule 3	19 19		196							
OCPF	169 169		1,657							
Subtotal	241	241	3,053							
Total	297	272	6,792							

1.2 As at 31 December 2018, eight States Parties (a State Party, ⁸ Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United States of America) had declared 72,304.290 MT⁹ of Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons and 417,833 items of Category 3 chemical weapons. Additional information is provided in Annex 3.

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² CWDF = chemical weapons destruction facility.

Three in the United States of America.

⁴ CWSF = chemical weapons storage facility.

This includes visits to the five underground structures of CWPFs declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

This includes ACW storage and destruction facilities.

Given the continuous nature of OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic, it is not possible to quantify the precise number of missions undertaken there as is the case for other States Parties.

As the State Party in question has requested that its name be regarded as highly protected information, for the purposes of this report it is hereinafter referred to as "a State Party".

This total does not include the weight of the thickening agent declared by the Russian Federation or the remnants of chemical weapons declared by Iraq.

1.3 Progress continued with respect to OCWs and ACWs. States Parties that declared possession of OCWs continued to carry out their destruction in a safe and effective manner. China and Japan continued to cooperate in the field of ACWs and their destruction in accordance with the decision adopted by the Council at its Sixty-Seventh Session (EC-67/DEC.6, dated 15 February 2012). Furthermore, in 2018, China and Japan continued to carry out the "Destruction Plan Beyond the Year 2016 for the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People's Republic Of China", submitted to the Council at its Eighty-Fourth Session (EC-84/NAT.6, dated 2 March 2017), which contains updated information on destruction facilities and time frames for destruction.

Chemical weapons destruction

- 1.4 During the reporting period, three CWDFs located in the United States of America were involved in the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons¹⁰ (see Annex 2). Through a combination of the continuous presence of inspectors, the use of monitoring and dedicated recording equipment, as well as the review of relevant documentation, the Secretariat in 2018 verified the destruction of 248.161 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons.
- 1.5 As Annex 3 shows, between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2018, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 68,125.828 MT, 11 or 96.64% of declared Category 1 chemical weapons; 1,810.703 MT, or 100% of declared Category 2 chemical weapons; and 417,833 items, or 100% of declared Category 3 chemical weapons.
- 1.6 At the end of the review period, the United States of America was the only possessor State Party with declared chemical weapons yet to be destroyed.
- 1.7 Progress in the destruction of chemical weapons is summarised below.

Syrian Arab Republic

1.8 The Secretariat had previously verified the destruction of 100% of the Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.

1.9 The Syrian Arab Republic continued to submit its monthly destruction reports in accordance with paragraph 19 of Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 (dated 15 November 2013). During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic also submitted around 70 notifications regarding the activities of various armed groups. The process to clarify the Syrian initial declaration continued throughout 2018.

Not counting OCWs or ACWs, or the two CWDFs under systemisation in the United States of America (Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) and BGCAPP Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) (see Annex 2)).

This figure includes 2.913 MT of Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 2(d) of Part VI of the Verification Annex.

United States of America

- 1.10 In 2018, the Secretariat verified the destruction of 248.161 MT of chemical weapons in the United States of America. Up until the end of 2018, the Secretariat had verified the destruction of a total of 25,402.020 MT of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by the United States of America, or 91.47% of the declared stockpile. All of the United States' Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons had previously been destroyed.
- 1.11 In addition, parallel to the destruction operations, the Secretariat verified the destruction of removed energetics components at the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant's (PCAPP) non-contiguous SDC site at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and the destruction of hydrolysate at the PCAPP's non-contiguous Veolia treatment, storage and disposal facility at Port Arthur, Texas.
- 1.12 In 2018, the United States of America submitted two amendments to its initial declaration, thereby adjusting its chemical weapons inventory. For the PCAPP Explosive Destruction System (EDS), the United States also submitted a modification to the facility agreement, allowing the destruction of palletised problematic chemical weapons. For the BGCAPP SDC, the United States submitted a revision of the detailed facility information together with the draft facility agreement and an agreed detailed plan for verification. For the BGCAPP, the detailed facility information was submitted.
- 1.13 The Secretariat conducted an initial visit to the BGCAPP SDC in Richmond, Kentucky, from 15 to 17 October 2018 and finalised the facility agreement and the agreed detailed plan for verification.
- 1.14 In early January 2019, the Secretariat conducted an inspection to review documents related to the destruction of two items recovered and destroyed at the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility-Dugway Proving Ground (RCWDF-DPG). Based on the review of destruction documentation, including video recordings, made available by the United States, the inspection team confirmed the destruction of 0.00590 MT of unknown agent contained in two M121 155mm projectiles at the RCWDF-DPG on 18 September 2018.

Chemical weapons storage facilities

1.15 In 2018, the Secretariat conducted three inspections at three CWSFs in two States Parties: two in the United States of America and one in Libya (final inspection). At the end of the review period, two CWSFs remained subject to systematic verification.

Chemical weapons production facilities

- 1.16 By 31 December 2018, all 97 CWPFs declared to the OPCW by 14 States Parties had been certified by the Director-General as having been destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited by the Convention (74 had been certified as destroyed and 23 had been certified as converted).
- 1.17 In 2018, the Secretariat conducted 11 inspections or visits at 11 former CWPFs in two States Parties.

1.18 In the Syrian Arab Republic, the Secretariat conducted two inspections in July 2018 at the remaining two CWPFs declared by this State Party and verified their destruction. The Secretariat also visited the five underground structures of CWPFs that had been destroyed previously. In Iraq, the Secretariat carried out three inspections to verify the destruction of three former CWPFs in February 2018 and one inspection at a converted CWPF in August 2018.

Abandoned chemical weapons

1.19 Between the entry into force of the Convention and 31 December 2018, three States Parties had reported ACWs on their territory. One State Party, Japan, had reported ACWs on the territory of another State Party, China. In 2018, the Secretariat conducted 12 ACW inspections in China.

Old chemical weapons

1.20 Up until 31 December 2018, 18 States Parties had declared over 144,000 items of OCWs. In 2018, the Secretariat conducted six OCW inspections: in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Industry verification

1.21 States Parties to the Convention provide declarations related to the production, import, export, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are listed in the three schedules of chemicals contained in the Convention's Annex on Chemicals, as well as OCPFs producing discrete organic chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. Table 2 below provides information about such chemical industry declarations received by the OPCW as at 31 December 2018.

TABLE 2: DECLARED FACILITIES BY TYPE, AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018

Type of Facility	Declared Facilities	Facilities Subject to Inspection ¹²	States Parties Having Reported Declarable Facilities ¹³	States Parties With Facilities Subject to Inspection	
Schedule 1	26	26	23	23	
Schedule 2	497	208	35	21	
Schedule 3	398	357	34	33	
OCPF	4,420	4,246	80	79	
Total	5,341	4,837	80 ¹⁴	79 ¹⁵	

1.22 Table 3 below shows that the Secretariat carried out 241 Article VI inspections in 2018. These comprised 11 Schedule 1 facilities, 42 Schedule 2 plant sites,

Above the threshold for verification through on-site inspections.

Includes annual declarations on anticipated activities, and annual declarations on past activities.

Eighty States Parties declared having at least one Article VI facility.

Seventy-nine States Parties declared having at least one inspectable Article VI facility.

19 Schedule 3 plant sites, and 169 OCPFs (respectively 41%, 21%, 5%, and 4% of the total of inspectable facilities). No uncertainties were recorded. Thirteen inspections resulted in issues requiring further attention (down from 23 in 2017), and 89 inspections recommended further information to be provided in declarations (down from 152 in 2017). In addition, three inspections were carried out at plant sites that were found during those inspections not to be inspectable, because of declaration errors (down from nine in 2017).

TABLE 3: ARTICLE VI INSPECTIONS

Number of Article VI Inspections by Year									
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
208	209	219	229	241	241	241	241	241	

- 1.23 For the OCPF and Schedule 3 sites inspected in 2018, the site selection was performed as described in the "Alternative Approach to Verification at Mixed Plant Sites" (S/1202/2014, dated 23 July 2014). If a Schedule 3 or OCPF mixed plant site has already been inspected under one Article VI verification regime, the plant site is, for the purpose of the random selection of Schedule 3 and OCPF plant sites for inspection, considered as previously inspected. As a result, this plant site should, statistically, be selected for inspection less often.
- 1.24 In 2018, the Secretariat continued its efforts to maximise the number of sequential inspections as a way of saving resources. Twelve of the 13 States Parties that received four or more industry inspections in 2018 advised the Secretariat that they concurred with the use of sequential inspections on their territory. With the continuation of inter-country sequential inspections in 2018, 11 of the 58 pairs of sequential inspections shown in Table 4 were carried out in two different countries. This represents the second highest number of inter-country sequential inspections in a year to date.

TABLE 4: SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS

Number of Sequential Inspections by Year									
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018									
40	47	48	57	51	59	54	58	58	

- 1.25 In 2018, the Secretariat continued its efforts to further improve the verification system by using updated reporting templates for inspections to reduce reporting burden, further improve consistency of data reported, optimise post-inspection periods, and reduce the time for inspection report review, as reported by the Secretariat in its Note S/1419/2016 (dated 13 September 2016).
- 1.26 In 2018, sampling and analysis activities were conducted during nine Article VI inspections, seven of which were Schedule 2 inspections and two of which were OCPF inspections. In the case of the OCPFs, the inspections, including sampling and analysis, were successfully completed within the 24-hour time limit prescribed by the Convention. The annual numbers of inspections carried out using sampling and analysis are shown in Table 5. The two OCPF inspections with sampling and analysis were both carried out in States Parties that had never before received a sampling and

analysis inspection, thus giving a broader geographic distribution of States Parties receiving these inspections.

TABLE 5: SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS AT INDUSTRY PLANT SITES

Nun	Number of Inspections Completed with Sampling and Analysis by Year										
2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018			
9	8	9	8	9	11	11	10	9			

Declarations

- 1.27 In 2018, 75 of the 90 States Parties (83%) that submitted annual declarations on past activities (ADPAs) did so by the deadline imposed by the Convention. In the year under review, 92.5% of the States Parties with declarable OCPFs fully updated the lists of OCPFs in their ADPAs, with the result that 97.4% of declarable OCPFs were updated. By providing full, annual updates to their OCPF lists, States Parties greatly facilitate the operation of the verification regime.
- 1.28 In addition, in the course of 2018, further efforts were made to reach out to the sole remaining State Party that had yet to submit its initial declarations under both Articles III and VI of the Convention.

Transfers of scheduled chemicals

- 1.29 Six transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals were declared by six States Parties in their ADPAs for 2017. All six transfers were notified and declared by both the sending and receiving States Parties.
- 1.30 ADPAs for 2017 indicated that 61 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 10,203 MT of Schedule 2 chemicals, and that 119 States Parties were involved in the transfer of approximately 442,276 MT of Schedule 3 chemicals.
- 1.31 Eight States Parties declared the export of four Schedule 3 chemicals to three States not Party.

Transfer discrepancies

- 1.32 In 2018, ADPAs for 2017 declared a total of 1,706 transfers of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals between States Parties. Of these, 829 transfers were declared with quantities above the declarations threshold, of which 546 involving 83 States Parties showed discrepancies.
- 1.33 The Secretariat continued its follow-up action with the States Parties involved and also continued to work closely with other international organisations to support States Parties in the reduction and resolution of these transfer discrepancies.

Cooperation with the World Customs Organization

1.34 Within the framework of cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO), the Secretariat initiated the Harmonized System (HS) Project for the identification by customs authorities of the most traded scheduled chemicals under the International

Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. This project aims to allocate unique international six-digit HS codes to the most traded scheduled chemicals, to identify globally traded scheduled chemicals and, ultimately, to ensure complete and accurate trade declarations crucial to the resolution of transfer discrepancies.

- 1.35 The first phase of the HS Project, focusing on the 33 most traded scheduled chemicals, was successfully completed and resulted in the inclusion, effective 1 January 2017, of these 33 chemicals with unique international subheadings (six-digit HS codes) in the 2017 edition of the HS nomenclature.
- 1.36 The second (currently ongoing) phase of the HS Project focuses on the allocation of unique HS codes to the next 15 most traded scheduled chemicals in the next edition of the HS nomenclature in 2022. The OPCW continued to cooperate closely with the WCO Secretariat towards the successful completion of this second phase.

Update of OPCW tools for the identification of scheduled chemicals

1.37 In November 2018, the Secretariat released two updated OPCW tools for the identification of scheduled chemicals: the Handbook on Chemicals and the online scheduled chemicals database. These 2018 versions included additional scheduled chemicals declared by States Parties between 2014 and 2017, as well as those scheduled chemicals registered by the Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) in the same period. The Handbook on Chemicals contains 2,060 scheduled chemicals and the online scheduled chemicals database covers 34,291 scheduled chemicals.

Electronic declarations and the Secure Information Exchange system

- 1.38 In September 2018, the Secretariat started the development of the next version of EDNA, the EDIS. The EDIS will further strengthen the verification regime by bringing usability enhancements and new functionalities to the declaration preparation and submission process.
- 1.39 In 2018, the Secretariat also intensified its efforts to promote and support the Secure Information Exchange (SIX) system, which has been available to States Parties since 2014 (S/1192/2014, dated 1 July 2014). By the end of the reporting period, 99 users from 57 States Parties had registered to use the system. The Secretariat undertook technical assistance visits (TAVs) to five States Parties in 2018 to support them in the setting up and configuration of the system. One of the key benefits of the system is that it allows the National Authorities to work on their declarations until a few days before the deadlines without having to take into account the time it takes for the delivery of the classified information to the Secretariat. This can represent a gain of several weeks compared to the traditional diplomatic pouch.
- 1.40 In 2018, the Secretariat also provided a basic course on electronic declarations as part of the "Training Course on National Authority and Chemical Databases", organised in August 2018 by the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN). In addition, the Secretariat provided training on EDNA and SIX during each Article VI training event organised at OPCW Headquarters.

Analytics platform and business intelligence

1.41 As part of its ongoing efforts to modernise and improve its analytical capabilities, the Secretariat has continued to work on a new analytics platform, including a data warehouse consolidating the different data sources available in the Verification Division. A new business intelligence tool (Qlik Sense) will replace the existing tool (Cognos), delivering a dynamic dashboard and visualisations and further instilling an analytical culture within the Division.

Riot control agents

1.42 At the end of the review period, 138 States Parties had declared the possession of riot control agents (mainly tear gases), and 53 States Parties had declared no possession of such agents. Around 10% of the initial declarations on riot control agents have been updated since the entry into force of the Convention. Additional information is provided in Annex 4.

Informal consultations

- 1.43 Three informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections were conducted in 2018. Webcasting to enable National Authorities to remotely observe consultation proceedings was not possible in 2018, owing to technical constraints; however, work to reinstate this capability continued throughout 2018. States Parties undertook consultations on a number of outstanding verification-related topics, including:
 - (a) continuous additions to the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD);
 - (b) preparations for the Fourth Review Conference;
 - (c) industry verification in 2017;
 - (d) performance of the OCPF site selection methodology in 2017;
 - (e) the future of Article VI implementation, as a follow-up to the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of National Authorities, held in 2017;
 - (f) States Parties' findings regarding the use of biomediated processes;
 - (g) enhancing Article VI sampling and analysis efforts;
 - (h) inspection frequency and site selection parameters; and
 - (i) transfer discrepancies.

Challenge inspections, investigations of alleged use, and contingency operations

1.44 No challenge inspections (CIs) or investigations of alleged use (IAUs) under the Convention were requested in 2018. Nevertheless, the Secretariat conducted several deployments of the FFM, TAVs, and non-routine missions pursuant to Council decision EC-83/DEC.5 (dated 11 November 2016). Furthermore, the Secretariat

reviewed the measures for training and preparedness for CIs and in 2018 started consultations with delegations from States Parties that may be willing to host a full CI field exercise in 2019 or 2020.

1.45 In 2018, the Secretariat held a Headquarters workshop involving key members of all divisions that would be involved in the planning and possible deployment of a Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM). The Secretariat also conducted a RRAM field deployment exercise to Serbia, during which all elements of the RRAM operation were exercised, including rapid, real-time preparation for deployment and the subsequent in-country activities that would be required in the event of a State Party requesting this type of assistance mission.

OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

- 1.46 A summary update of the activities carried out by the FFM in 2018 was provided in a Note by the Secretariat entitled "Summary Update of the Activities Carried Out by the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria" (S/1677/2018, dated 10 October 2018).
- 1.47 The FFM issued three reports determining whether chemicals had been used as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: in Saraqib on 4 February 2018 (S/1626/2018, dated 15 May 2018 and Corr.1, dated 18 July 2018); in Ltamenah on 24 and 25 March 2017 (S/1636/2018*, dated 13 June 2018); in Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and in Karm Al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016 (S/1642/2018, dated 2 July 2018); and one interim report regarding the progress of the FFM regarding an incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma on 7 April 2018 (S/1645/2018, dated 6 July 2018 and Corr.1, dated 10 July 2018).
- 1.48 At the end of September 2018, the FFM deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic to gather further information and conduct interviews regarding five reported incidents currently under investigation: two incidents in Kharbit Masasnah on 7 July and 4 August 2017; one incident in Qalib Al-Thawr, Al-Salamiyah, on 9 August 2017; one incident in Yarmouk, Damascus, on 22 October 2017; and one incident in Al-Balil, Souran, on 8 November 2017. The Secretariat is currently analysing the information collected with regard to these incidents and will report to the Council on the results of the analysis in due course.
- 1.49 In response to a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic dated 28 November 2018, the Director-General deployed an advance team to Damascus from 4 to 6 December 2018 to collect information provided by the Syrian National Authority regarding an incident of alleged use of chemicals as a weapon in Aleppo on 24 November 2018.

Scientific Studies and Research Centre, Syrian Arab Republic

1.50 In accordance with paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is to conduct inspections, including sampling and analysis, twice a year at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and twice a year at the Jamrayah SSRC facilities "on dates to be determined by the Secretariat with full and unfettered access to all buildings at these sites and all rooms within these buildings".

1.51 The Secretariat conducted the third and fourth rounds of inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah SSRC facilities from 5 to 12 November and from 6 to 14 December 2018, respectively. During both inspections, samples were taken for analysis at OPCW designated laboratories. The Secretariat was waiting for results of the analysis at the end of 2018. After receiving these results, the Secretariat will report to the Council on the results of both inspections. During the 2018 inspections, the Secretariat observed some ongoing construction activities at both inspected locations. In this regard, the Syrian Arab Republic was advised that the Secretariat is to be notified of the nature and scope of such activities prior to their commencement so that they can be taken into consideration during the inspection planning process.

Other verification-related activities

Declaration Assessment Team

- 1.52 In 2018, the Secretariat continued its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in order to resolve outstanding issues pertaining to its initial declaration and related submissions, mainly through the exchange of correspondence. As at 31 December 2018, the DAT had conducted a total of 19 rounds of consultations.
- 1.53 At the request of the Council (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), the Director-General reported all unresolved issues regarding the Syrian declaration and related submissions in three Notes¹⁶ circulated to the Council at its Eighty-Seventh, Eighty-Eighth, and Eighty-Ninth Sessions. In the last Note issued in 2018, the Director-General concluded that "the Secretariat remains unable to resolve all of the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies in the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration, and therefore cannot fully verify that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a declaration that can be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention or Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".
- 1.54 In an effort to make progress in clarifying the outstanding issues with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic's declaration, the DAT subsequently continued its work through an exchange of letters with the Syrian Arab Republic up until the end of 2018.

Technical assistance to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

1.55 In March 2018, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requested the Secretariat to provide technical assistance following the exposure of three individuals to a toxic chemical with the properties of a nerve agent in Salisbury on 4 March 2018. The results of analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories of environmental and biomedical samples collected by the OPCW team confirmed the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used.

¹⁶ EC-87/HP/DG.1 (dated 2 March 2018), EC-88/HP/DG.2 (dated 28 June 2018), and EC-89/HP/DG.2 (dated 1 October 2018).

- 1.56 The United Kingdom further requested technical assistance in relation to the exposure of two individuals to a chemical agent in Amesbury on 4 July 2018. One of the individuals subsequently died. The subsequent analysis performed by the OPCW designated laboratories confirmed that the chemical in question was the same toxic chemical that was found in the samples relating to the Salisbury incident, and was a neat agent of high purity.
- 1.57 The Secretariat published summaries of the reports relating to each TAV (S/1612/2018, dated 12 April 2018 and S/1671/2018, dated 4 September 2018).
- 1.58 As the Salisbury and Amesbury incidents involved a toxic chemical that was not listed in the Convention's schedules of chemicals, two proposals were submitted during 2018, in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article XV of the Convention, to amend Schedule 1 of the Convention's Annex on Chemicals. The first proposal was jointly submitted by Canada, the Netherlands and the United States of America (S/1682/2018) and the second by the Russian Federation (S/1697/2018). As at the end of 2018, States Parties were considering both proposals.

Technical assistance to Latvia

1.59 In early 2018, the Latvian authorities requested technical assistance to assist them in assessing a number of suspected OCWs that had recently been discovered. A TAV was conducted in March 2018. Following the assessment of the TAV team, eight OCW items produced before the year 1925 were declared as having been discovered on the territory of Latvia. All of the OCWs will be destroyed in accordance with the national legislation.

<u>Implementation of C-SS-4/DEC.3</u>

- 1.60 The Fourth Special Session of the Conference adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat of Chemical Weapons Use" (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018). The decision called on the Secretariat to, inter alia, put in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Furthermore, it enabled the Director-General to provide technical expertise, if requested, to a State Party investigating possible chemical weapons use on its territory.
- 1.61 In 2018, initial steps were taken to implement the key aspects of this decision. In particular, the Director-General decided to establish an Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) pursuant to paragraph 10 of the decision. The IIT is responsible for identifying the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report. As at the end of 2018, the process of recruitment to fill the new positions established for the IIT was ongoing.
- 1.62 Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the decision, the Secretariat is working to put in place appropriate measures to preserve and provide information to the body established by

the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 71/248 (2016), namely the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 (IIIM), as well as to any relevant investigatory entities established under the auspices of the United Nations. In this regard, in September 2018 the Secretariat signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations regarding the sharing of information with this body. Consultations between the Secretariat and the IIIM are ongoing with regard to the implementation of this arrangement.

- 1.63 Pursuant to paragraph 18 of C-SS-4/DEC.3, the Secretariat is developing options for further assistance to States Parties to help prevent the chemical weapons threat posed by non-State actors, and to aid States Parties' contingency planning in the event of a chemical weapons attack. The Secretariat is reviewing and will build on existing activities in this regard, including with respect to preparedness, prevention, and response, taking into consideration, inter alia, the decision of the Council entitled "Addressing the Threat Posed by the Use of Chemical Weapons by Non-State Actors" (EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017).
- In 2018, the Director-General submitted two reports to the Conference on aspects of the implementation of the decision. The first, entitled "Report Pursuant to Paragraph 20 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018) on Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use" (C-23/DG.17, dated 15 November 2018) outlined the Secretariat's plan to establish the capability to respond to requests for assistance under paragraph 20 of C-SS-4/DEC.3. The second, entitled "Report on Proposals and Options Pursuant to Paragraph 21 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018) on Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use" (C-23/DG.16 RC-4/DG.4, dated 15 November 2018), presented proposals to strengthen the implementation of the verification regime of the Convention, to provide further assistance to States Parties to enable them to implement their obligations under the Convention, to enhance chemical security, to enable international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and to further strengthen the capabilities of the Secretariat.

OPCW proficiency tests and designated laboratories

- 1.65 Each year, the OPCW carries out proficiency tests for institutions that may wish to be a part of the OPCW's network of analytical laboratories. The year under review saw the completion of the forty-second, the holding of the forty-third, and the start of the forty-fourth official OPCW proficiency tests for environmental analysis. Additionally, the third proficiency test for biomedical sample analysis was conducted. At the end of the reporting period, 22 laboratories from 18 Member States had been designated for environmental analysis (one of which had had its designation temporarily suspended), and 17 laboratories from 13 Member States had been designated for biomedical sample analysis. Annex 5 shows the status of each designated laboratory as at 31 December 2018.
- 1.66 A confidence-building exercise for the analysis of protein toxins was finished at the beginning of 2018 and a third exercise began in December 2018. These exercises

were specifically targeted towards the analysis of the protein toxin ricin. The biological toxin saxitoxin was included in the third exercise.

Project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology

1.67 Progress was made in the project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology in 2018. After an extensive search, the Secretariat identified a plot for the construction of the Centre in the municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp, and signed a land reservation agreement with the municipality for the plot. The Secretariat also put in place the internal project governance structure with the establishment and initial meetings of the project board, and the "Friends of the OPCW Laboratory Group" was established under the leadership of Canada and Indonesia and held its first meeting. With regard to fundraising, approximately EUR 10.8 million was pledged or provided to the project's trust fund by nine States Parties by the end of 2018: Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Republic of Korea, and Slovakia. Briefings were provided to States Parties in the margins of Council and Conference sessions in March, July, October, and November 2018, as well as to the Friends of the OPCW Laboratory Group.

OPCW Central Analytical Database

1.68 Table 6 below reflects the number of chemicals covered in the OCAD for each technique for the last five years. Only the gas chromatography (retention index) and mass spectrometry data were used in on-site analysis. The new OCAD release for 2019 will include for the first time electronic nuclear magnetic resonance data and continue to include data on Convention-relevant non-scheduled chemicals (apart from analytical derivatives) for use, on an optional basis, in on-site analysis during inspections or an IAU.

TABLE 6: NUMBER OF CHEMICAL SPECIES IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE

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Status at the Beginning of	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019			
Infrared (IR)	723	726	734	734	745	756	775			
Gas chromatography (retention index) (GC(RI))	3,560	3,740	3,866	3,878	4,089	4,439	4,482			
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR)	n/a	n/a	298	298	298	298	299			
Mass spectrometry (MS)	3,731	3,898	4,003	4,022	4,225	4,566	4,602			

Training

1.69 In 2018, the Capacity-Building and Contingency-Planning Cell (CBCP) coordinated or delivered 1,640 training days. The training programme comprised 37 individual training courses offered over 48 calendar weeks of training. All participants were inspectors, some of whom attended several training courses. The Secretariat also

offered other capacity-building programme training courses for States Parties, such as the Associate Programme and assistance and protection courses. Fifty-four percent of the training courses in 2018 were delivered in the Netherlands, with the remainder conducted in Belgium, Canada, Italy, Serbia, Slovakia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. These States Parties assisted in the delivery of training programmes, either as host nations, through in-kind contributions, or through the conclusion of technical agreements. The CBCP also continued to provide the mandatory inspector refresher courses to keep inspectors abreast of technological and verification policy developments, as well as refresher courses on the use of protective equipment and on the OPCW confidentiality regime. An induction training course for inspectors newly promoted as inspection team leaders was also conducted.

- 1.70 Training activities included the "Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE)" and contingency operations skills courses, which are required for Secretariat personnel deployed to high-risk areas. Additional specialised courses for OPCW staff comprised non-destructive evaluation (NDE) theory levels I and II, as well as NDE work permit levels I and II, to help them maintain their certification and improve their knowledge and skills of the OPCW NDE-approved methods.
- 1.71 Furthermore, the CBCP contributed to the sixth OPCW assistance and protection course for instructors, and provided expertise in training courses for local authorities conducted in Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Croatia, Panama, the Republic of Korea, Tunisia, and Turkey.

Knowledge management

- 1.72 The Secretariat continued to systematically implement knowledge management initiatives to support the position of the OPCW as a global repository of knowledge and expertise with regard to chemical weapons and verification activities.
- 1.73 The Verification Division included knowledge processes in its regular operational areas by continuing to implement, inter alia, a knowledge retention programme in respect of staff separating from the Organisation, in order to capture knowledge and lessons learned. Furthermore, the Verification Division continued to identify possible knowledge gaps following the conclusion of chemical weapons destruction programmes, and to define concrete actions to mitigate this risk.

2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE

- 2.1 In 2018, the Secretariat continued to provide technical assistance through a wide range of capacity-building programmes and outreach activities in support of States Parties' efforts to effectively implement the provisions of the Convention.
- 2.2 During the reporting period, the OPCW carried out 96 training courses, workshops, seminars, and other capacity-building programmes involving more than 2,000 participants from all regional groups.
- 2.3 Africa remains a priority region for the OPCW. In 2018, the Secretariat continued implementing the fourth phase of the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Africa Programme") for the period from 2017 to 2019. During the year, 15 activities were carried out within the programme, and African States Parties were given particular attention for inclusion in global activities. The Secretariat issued a report entitled "The Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention" (EC-89/DG.14 C-23/DG.10, dated 5 September 2018), which outlined the progress made in implementing the programme during the year.
- 2.4 To enhance further the efficiency of its capacity-building programmes, the Secretariat launched a project in 2018 on monitoring and evaluation, with assistance from external experts.

National implementation and technical assistance

- 2.5 In 2018, the Secretariat continued to provide capacity-building support to States Parties in their efforts towards full and effective national implementation. This included legislative support for the drafting and enactment of comprehensive national legislation and support to enhance capacity among National Authorities and other stakeholders to fulfil their duties under the Convention. Twenty-four activities were implemented as part of this sub-programme, with a total of 718 participants from over 140 States Parties.
- 2.6 As at the end of 2018, out of 193 States Parties, 156 had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures, while 37 had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation. Further information is contained in the Secretariat's annual reports on the status of implementation of Article VII of the Convention.¹⁷
- 2.7 The fourth session of the Influential Visitors Programme (IVP) was organised in September 2018, featuring a high-level delegation from Chile. The IVP helped to enhance the awareness and understanding of senior officials and policymakers on the urgent need for the enactment of national legislation implementing the Convention.

These reports (EC-89/DG.9 C-23/DG.8, EC-89/DG.8 C-23/DG.7, and EC-89/DG.7 C-23/DG.6, all dated 24 August 2018) were based on updates provided by 130 States Parties and covered the period from 1 August 2017 to 31 July 2018. Since publication of the annual reports, one State Party has informed the Secretariat that it has adopted legislation covering all initial measures.

- 2.8 In April 2018, a national legal workshop on the implementation of the Convention in Iraq was organised in The Hague. The Iraqi delegation prepared draft text addressing gaps in its laws and regulations to be included in a comprehensive draft law. The Secretariat also provided support to a national awareness-raising and legislative assistance workshop on the implementation of the Convention in Brunei Darussalam in April 2018. During the workshop, this State Party also produced a revised version of the initial text of its draft legislation for further consideration by relevant authorities.
- 2.9 Two sessions of the Internship Programme for Legal Drafters and National Authority Representatives were organised in 2018 for representatives of six States Parties: Chad, Eswatini, Guinea, the State of Palestine, Timor-Leste, and Zimbabwe. All the participating States Parties prepared draft national legislation and an indicative action plan for adoption.
- 2.10 Following the OPCW Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism, held on 7 and 8 June 2018 at OPCW Headquarters, the Secretariat held a pilot workshop on the role of implementing legislation in addressing threats arising from non-State actors. The event brought together over 80 participants from 10 African States Parties and representatives of international organisations. The workshop provided a forum to raise awareness and further enhance the understanding of participants on how national implementing legislation could contribute to addressing emerging threats, including chemical terrorism, and on the role of national stakeholders in the implementation of national legislation on the Convention.
- 2.11 To enhance the knowledge and skills of the National Authorities, the Secretariat continued to offer a general training course on the Convention and a training course on Article VI obligations (declarations and inspections). In 2018, the target audience of these training courses was expanded to include representatives of the chemical industry and other stakeholders. The two events had a total of 109 participants from all regional groups.
- 2.12 Four Mentorship/Partnership Programmes were implemented in the course of 2018, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Nigeria, Cuba and Bolivia, Brazil and Panama, and Togo and Morocco. The programme promoted bilateral cooperation and networking between States Parties that are at an advanced stage in their implementation of the Convention, and those States Parties that seek to make improvements in this regard.
- 2.13 The Secretariat continued to offer a training-of-trainers course for National Authority representatives and customs training institutions on the technical aspects of the Convention's transfers regime. In 2018, as part of the fourth phase of the Africa Programme, the course took place in Algiers, Algeria. At the end of the course, representatives of 11 African French-speaking States Parties developed action plans for the integration of modules on the Convention in their national customs curricula, with the expectation of the introduction of those modules in 2019.
- 2.14 Representatives of States Parties who had attended previous training-of-trainers courses were invited to a lessons learned workshop to share their experiences,

- progress, and achievements in the introduction of modules on the Convention in their national curricula. Apart from serving as a peer-learning platform, the event provided the Secretariat with an opportunity to evaluate the outcomes of its training activities and identify good national practices for further dissemination.
- 2.15 In order to further engage the chemical industry in the national implementation of the Convention, the Secretariat organised the annual meeting of representatives of the chemical industry and National Authorities from 2 to 4 October 2018. The meeting, funded by the Government of Qatar, was attended by 46 participants from 25 States Parties, including representatives from the chemical industry. The meeting resulted in specific recommendations aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the Article VI verification regime.
- 2.16 Regional meetings of National Authorities of States Parties in four regions were held in May, June, and July: in the Czech Republic for the Eastern European Group, Bhutan for the Asian Group, Morocco for the African Group, and Guatemala for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC). The focus of the meetings was on the role of customs administrations in the implementation of the Convention's transfers regime. During these meetings, the Secretariat introduced a new National Implementation Framework for comments and feedback by the National Authorities.
- 2.17 The Twentieth Annual Meeting of National Authorities was organised on from 6 to 8 November 2018 in The Hague. The discussion was devoted to the Secretariat's capacity-building programme, with the aim of fostering national ownership and the sustainability of programme results. A total of 148 participants from 123 States Parties attended the meeting.
- 2.18 Two subregional stakeholders' forums on regional cooperation for national implementation of the Convention were held as a pilot programme, one in Bangkok, Thailand (24 to 26 April) for the Southeast Asian subregion and the other in Tirana, Albania (2 to 4 October) for the Western Balkans subregion. These pilot activities provided an opportunity to promote networking and the sharing of experiences at the subregional level, capitalising on existing regional cooperation frameworks such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Over 70 participants from 16 States Parties participated in the two forums.

Assistance and protection

- 2.19 Fifty-three States Parties made annual submissions pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article X in 2018.
- 2.20 In 2018, the Secretariat carried out 40 assistance and protection activities, allowing the OPCW to build and enhance the skills of more than 850 individuals in different areas related to Article X implementation.
- 2.21 The Secretariat conducted international and regional assistance and protection training courses and capacity-building activities under Article X, jointly with the governments of Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, the

Republic of Korea, Slovakia, South Africa, the Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, and Zambia.

- 2.22 Six full training cycles were successfully concluded in 2018. Of these, one was for Russian-speaking participants, three for the Asian region, and two for the GRULAC region. Two new training cycles, one for Portuguese-speaking and one for Arabic-speaking participants, were initiated in 2018. Three regional table-top exercises in chemical emergency response were conducted for stakeholders from Africa, Asia, and GRULAC. As part of the fourth phase of the Africa Programme, a planning meeting for a subregional chemical emergency response project for States Parties in North Africa and the Sahel took place in Algiers, Algeria. A similar meeting for States Parties in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)¹⁸ subregion was held in Khartoum, the Sudan. An operational training on chemical emergency response, planning, and management for States Parties that are members of the Eastern Africa Community was successfully conducted in Uganda.
- 2.23 The Secretariat continued to implement existing specialised training modules, which included a live agent training course and an advanced laboratory skills course in Slovakia, as well as a sampling and analysis course in Poland and a regional course for police first responders in Colombia. The special capacity-development programme on medical aspects of chemical emergency response under Article X, aimed at training medical professionals in the provision of care for individuals exposed to chemical warfare agents or toxic chemicals, was further reinforced. Courses of this type were conducted in Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kenya, Panama, and Turkey. An inaugural Hospital Preparedness Project was conducted in Turkey.
- 2.24 The Instructor Development and Exchange Programme and the training-of-trainers approach continued to be consistently implemented by the Secretariat. Accordingly, training-of-trainer courses were conducted in the Netherlands, while others with sponsorship from States Parties were run in conjunction with the Czech Republic, Peru (for Spanish-speaking participants), and South Africa.
- 2.25 During the reporting period, the eighth workshop to coordinate assistance and protection under Article X was organised with the support of Morocco and for the first time a workshop devoted to discussions on chemical emergency coordination and response planning at major events was jointly organised with the Government of Qatar.
- 2.26 In the context of the International Support Network for Victims of Chemical Weapons, an international symposium on the medical treatment of chemical warfare victims was held at OPCW Headquarters in June. In December, the Trust Fund for Victims stood at EUR 105,000.
- 2.27 For its part, the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under subparagraph 7(a) of Article X of the Convention, reached a balance of EUR 1,562,964 and the number

The members of the IGAD are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, and Uganda.

of States Parties offering assistance in accordance with subparagraph 7(c) of Article X stood at 46. Offers pursuant to subparagraph 7(b) remained at two.

Economic and technological development

- 2.28 In 2018, the Secretariat continued to deliver capacity-building programmes and to facilitate international cooperation to promote the peaceful uses of chemistry. Such programmes focused on integrated chemicals management, enhancement of laboratory capabilities, and the promotion and exchange of chemical knowledge.
- 2.29 During the year under review, 29 capacity-building activities for 584 experts were carried out by the Secretariat. In addition, the Secretariat continued to implement three standing programmes, namely the Fellowship, Research Projects, and Conference-Support Programmes. Furthermore, programmes on integrated chemicals management (including chemical security management), the enhancement of laboratory capabilities (analytical skills development courses), and chemical knowledge promotion and exchange were carried out. In 2018, the Secretariat also organised a workshop on the implementation of Article XI.
- 2.30 On 23 October 2018, the Secretariat hosted the third OPCW forum on the peaceful uses of chemistry, which focused for the first time on the potential contribution of the OPCW to the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The discussion during the forum provided an insightful overview of various initiatives, approaches, and perspectives within academia, industry, and international organisations on the use of chemistry for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and the relevance of the OPCW's work in that regard.
- 2.31 In 2018, the Secretariat organised the 19th edition of the OPCW Associate Programme, which took place from 3 August to 5 October. Thirty-one participants from 31 States Parties benefited from the nine-week intensive programme, which involved training modules at OPCW Headquarters and the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as hands-on training at chemical industry plants worldwide. National Authorities, academia, specialised institutions, chemical industry associations, and chemical companies in several Member States, including Brazil, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Switzerland assisted in organising various components of the programme. At the end of the reporting period, the Alumni Network of the Associate Programme featured a dynamic group of 487 alumni from 121 of the OPCW's Member States.
- 2.32 In the area of integrated chemicals management, the Secretariat organised a series of 13 global and regional training events on chemical safety and security, which took place in Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, Ethiopia, Germany (two), the Netherlands, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Viet Nam. In the framework of enhancing the capabilities of analytical laboratories, 11 training courses on the analysis of chemicals related to the Convention, OPCW proficiency tests, customs laboratory training, and laboratory quality management were held. These courses were held in Finland (two), India, the Netherlands (five), South Africa, Spain, and Tunisia.

- 2.33 Under its Equipment Exchange Programme, the Secretariat facilitated the donation of a liquid chromatography mass spectrometer from Sweden to Laos. In addition, the Secretariat assisted in the transfer of fume hoods from the OPCW Laboratory to Ethiopia, the Gambia, and Senegal.
- 2.34 The Secretariat organised a workshop entitled "Green and Sustainable Chemistry: Fostering Safety and Security through Innovation" in The Hague on 4 and 5 December 2018.
- 2.35 In promoting chemical knowledge and exchange, the Secretariat approved the sponsorship under the Programme for Support of Research Projects of 11 new projects to be funded solely by the OPCW and of five new projects to be jointly funded with the International Foundation for Science. In total, 12 directly funded projects were active at the end of the reporting period. In addition, support was provided for 10 fellowships and 12 international conferences.
- 2.36 Within the OPCW Laboratory Twinning Initiative, the Secretariat oversaw the signing of a letter of intent between the Netherlands and South Africa towards the establishment of a formal partnership between their respective national laboratories.

3. POLICY-MAKING ORGANS

Activities of the Conference of the States Parties

Fourth Review Conference

- 3.1 The Open-Ended Working Group for the Preparation of the Fourth Review Conference (OEWG-RC) met at regular intervals from January to October 2018 to lay the foundations for the Fourth Review Conference. The work of the OEWG-RC was carried out in two stages: until July 2018, the OEWG-RC reviewed all aspects of the operation of the Convention; subsequently, in September and October 2018, the working group focused on a draft report that was submitted to the Fourth Review Conference for its consideration. The programme of work also included exchanges with representatives of civil society as well as chemical industry associations.
- 3.2 The Fourth Review Conference was held from 21 to 30 November 2018 in The Hague. One hundred and fifty States Parties to the Convention took part in the conference, along with one signatory State and one non-signatory State. Seven international organisations and specialised agencies, 75 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and representatives of the global chemical industry and scientific community also registered to attend. The Conference received a message from the United Nations Secretary-General, H.E. Mr António Guterres, delivered by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, H.E. Ms Izumi Nakamitsu.
- 3.3 The Conference elected, by acclamation, as its Chairperson Ambassador Agustín Vásquez Gómez of El Salvador. The Conference also elected representatives of 10 States Parties as Vice-Chairpersons of the Conference, as well as Ambassador Marcin Czepelak of Poland as the Chairperson of the Committee of the Whole.
- The Conference conducted a review of the operation of all provisions of the 3.4 Convention as provided for in paragraph 22 of its Article VIII, taking into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. Dr Christopher Timperley, Chairperson of the SAB, briefed the Conference on the Board's report on developments in science and technology (RC-4/DG.1, dated 30 April 2018), highlighting the science review process, thematic areas for consideration, and recommendations. In accordance with decision C-16/DEC.11 1 December 2011), the Conference conducted a comprehensive review of the destruction of remaining declared chemical weapons stockpiles and progress achieved to meet the planned completion date.
- 3.5 The Review Conference ended without achieving consensus on a final report. As a result, the Chairperson issued a report of the proceedings of the Conference under his own responsibility (RC-4/3/Rev.1, dated 30 November 2018). The Chairperson's report mirrored the convergence of views among States Parties on a number of recommendations to enhance the verification system of the OPCW, augment capacity-development programmes, and strengthen organisational governance. It also mentioned issues on which no agreement was reached, reflecting the Chairperson's assessment of the views expressed.

3.6 States Parties marked the Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare on 26 November 2018, during the Review Conference.

Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties

- 3.7 The Fourth Special Session of the Conference took place on 26 and 27 June 2018 and was convened in accordance with Article VIII(B) of the Convention and Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Conference, at the request of the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America (EC-M-60/1, dated 30 May 2018).
- 3.8 The Conference was attended by representatives of 152 States Parties, a Signatory State, and one specialised agency, as well as representatives from eight NGOs.
- 3.9 The Conference adopted a decision entitled "Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use" (C-SS-4/DEC.3).

Twenty-Third Session of the Conference of States Parties

- 3.10 The Twenty-Third Session of the Conference took place on 19, 20, and 29 November 2018 and was attended by representatives of 160 States Parties, a signatory State, a non-signatory State, and six international organisations, specialised agencies, and other international bodies. Seventy-five NGOs also registered to attend.
- 3.11 The Conference reviewed the status of implementation of the Convention in all its aspects, including national implementation measures, chemical disarmament, assistance and protection, international cooperation, and activities related to preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. States Parties discussed a report covering the activities carried out under the auspices of the Africa Programme and also considered progress made regarding the OPCW's efforts to engage with chemical industry and the scientific community.
- 3.12 Among the decisions adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Third Session were the following: 19
 - (a) Submission of the 2018 OPCW Financial Statements to the External Auditor (Financial Rule 11.1.02) (C-23/DEC.5, dated 19 November 2018);
 - (b) Extension of the Special Fund for OPCW Special Missions (C-23/DEC.6, dated 19 November 2018);
 - (c) Proposal from El Salvador for a Multi-Year Payment Plan to Regularise the Payment of its Outstanding Annual Contributions (C-23/DEC.7, dated 19 November 2018);

Other (unclassified) decisions can be found on the public website of the OPCW.

- (d) Charter of the Office of Internal Oversight (C-23/DEC.8, dated 19 November 2018);
- (e) Amendments to the Staff Regulations of the OPCW (C-23/DEC.9, dated 19 November 2018);
- (f) Programme and Budget of the OPCW for 2019 (C-23/DEC.10, dated 20 November 2018);
- (g) Cash Surplus for 2016 (C-23/DEC.11, dated 20 November 2018);
- (h) Establishment of a Special Fund for Cybersecurity, Business Continuity, and Physical Infrastructure Security (C-23/DEC.12, dated 20 November 2018);
- (i) Establishment of a Special Fund for IT Infrastructure to Support the Implementation of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (C-23/DEC.13, dated 20 November 2018); and
- (j) Scale of Assessments for 2019 (C-23/DEC.14, dated 20 November 2018).

Activities of the Executive Council

- 3.13 In 2018, the Council considered a number of reports by the Secretariat on the status of implementation of the Convention, including verification activities and the implementation of Articles VI, VII, X, and XI.
- 3.14 The Council welcomed the completion by Iraq (EC-87/DG.18, dated 28 February 2018), Libya (EC-87/DG.9, dated 24 January 2018), and the Russian Federation (EC-87/DG.3, dated 26 October 2017) of the destruction of their respective chemical weapons stockpiles and remnants.

3.15 The Council also:

- (a) reviewed progress in and adopted a number of decisions on the destruction of chemical weapons;
- (b) addressed the implementation of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3;
- (c) discussed the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
- (d) reviewed the work of the DAT;
- (e) considered three reports of the FFM (S/1636/2018*, dated 13 June 2018; S/1642/2018, dated 2 July 2018; and S/1645/2018, dated 6 July 2018 and Corr.1, dated 10 July 2018);
- (f) reviewed the work done by the Secretariat in response to a request for technical assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with regard to the Salisbury incident (EC-M-59/DG.1, dated 18 April 2018);

- (g) adopted a decision on lists of newly validated data on scheduled chemicals (EC-88/DEC.3, dated 12 July 2018), and a decision on lists of newly validated data on non-scheduled chemicals relevant to the Convention (EC-88/DEC.4, dated 12 July 2018) for inclusion in the OCAD;
- (h) approved facility agreements and modifications or amendments to facility agreements between the OPCW and States Parties;
- (i) adopted decisions on administrative and financial matters, including on a proposal from El Salvador for a multi-year payment plan to regularise the payment of its outstanding annual contributions (EC-89/DEC.3, dated 11 October 2018), and on amendments to the Staff Regulations of the OPCW (EC-89/DEC.4, dated 11 October 2018); and
- (j) forwarded its recommendations on a number of matters to the Conference at its Twenty-Third Session.

Activities of subsidiary bodies

- 3.16 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes Related to Confidentiality (hereinafter "the Confidentiality Commission") held its Twentieth Meeting on 7 and 8 May 2018.
- 3.17 The ABAF held its Forty-Fourth Session from 5 to 8 June 2018, and its Forty-Fifth Session from 31 July to 3 August 2018.
- 3.18 The SAB held its Twenty-Seventh Session from 19 to 23 March 2018.
- 3.19 The ABEO held its Fifth Session from 27 February to 1 March 2018, and its Sixth Session from 28 to 30 August 2018.
- 3.20 The Chairperson of the Council, Ambassador Jana Reinišová of the Czech Republic, reported to the Conference at its Twenty-Third Session on the status of the work of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.

4. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Universality

- 4.1 In 2018, the number of OPCW Member States rose to 193 with the accession of the State of Palestine to the Convention on 17 May. Israel has signed but not ratified the Convention; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have neither signed nor acceded to the Convention.
- 4.2 Within the framework of the Action Plan for the Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretariat continued to reach out to the remaining States not Party throughout 2018. As in previous years, the Secretariat invited representatives of States not Party to participate in OPCW-related activities, including the Fourth Special Session of the Conference, the Twenty-Third Session of the Conference, and the Fourth Review Conference.
- 4.3 Two representatives of Israel participated in the Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism, held at OPCW Headquarters on 7 and 8 June 2018. Three representatives of Israel also attended the Fourth Special Session of the Conference as observers on 26 and 27 June 2018.
- 4.4 On 6 July 2018, the Secretariat, in cooperation with Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), hosted a day-long workshop for Israeli opinion shapers at OPCW Headquarters. The participants received briefings and presentations from the Director-General and staff members.
- 4.5 Contact continued with representatives of the Embassy of South Sudan to the European Union (EU) and the Benelux Countries in Brussels, Belgium, with a view to facilitating the process for South Sudan to join the Convention. On 10 October 2018, the Ambassador of South Sudan met with the Director-General at OPCW Headquarters. Furthermore, in November, a representative of the Embassy of South Sudan attended the annual briefing in Brussels for Permanent Representations based outside The Hague. South Sudan also registered for and was approved to participate in the Twenty-Third Session of the Conference and the Fourth Review Conference.
- 4.6 In 2018, the Secretariat for the first time engaged with entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On 16 May 2018, through an initiative of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, representatives of the Secretariat met with members of the Korean National Peace Committee from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to brief them on the work of the OPCW and the benefits and obligations of joining the Convention.
- 4.7 A representative of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs attended the Twenty-Third Session of the Conference and the Fourth Review Conference.
- 4.8 Upon assuming office as the Director-General, Ambassador Fernando Arias sent letters to the foreign ministers of all States not Party, reaffirming the Organisation's commitment to working with their governments towards accession to or ratification of

- the Convention and inviting them to attend the Twenty-Third Session of the Conference and the Fourth Review Conference.
- 4.9 The Director-General continued to underline the importance of achieving universality in his contacts with senior officials and interactions with international organisations, academic institutions, and think tanks.

External engagement and outreach activities

- 4.10 The Director-General and the Deputy Director-General continued to conduct visits to countries and participate in meetings and conferences relevant to the implementation of the Convention, as set out below. Furthermore, a number of high-level guests visited the OPCW Headquarters.
- 4.11 The Secretariat also continued its activities to strengthen its partnership with the United Nations, as well as enhance relations with other international organisations, with a view to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation issues relevant to the OPCW.

Visits by the Director-General

- 4.12 The Director-General paid bilateral visits to Algeria, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and Viet Nam. During these visits he met with high-level government officials, including ministers and vice-ministers. The Director-General also addressed a diverse range of audiences, including representatives of the scientific community, academic institutions, government agencies, and the chemical industry.
- 4.13 The Director-General briefed the United Nations Security Council on the Organisation's activities in the Syrian Arab Republic and met with H.E. António Guterres, the United Nations Secretary-General; H.E. Ms Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs; and H.E. Mr Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism. The Director-General also spoke to the 138th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva, Switzerland, and met with the H.E. Ms Gabriela Cuevas Barron, President of the IPU, and H.E. Mr Martin Chungong, Secretary-General of the IPU.
- 4.14 In November 2018, the Director-General travelled to Brussels, Belgium, to brief Permanent Representations to the OPCW which are not based in The Hague, as part of the Secretariat's efforts to keep Non-Resident Representations apprised of developments within the Organisation, especially in advance of the Fourth Review Conference.
- 4.15 The Director-General also addressed a number of academic forums, conferences, and other events including: the meeting launching the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons in Paris, France; the *Rencontres du Vietnam* conference on "Science for Development" in Quy Nhon, Viet Nam; the Wilton Park Conference on "Chemical Weapons Disarmament and the Future of the

OPCW" in Sussex, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; the 21st International Chemical Weapons Disarmament Conference in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on "Restoring Restraint: Enforcing Accountability for Users of Chemical Weapons" in Washington D.C., the United States of America; and the seventh EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference in Brussels, Belgium.

Visits by the Deputy Director-General

4.16 The Deputy Director-General paid a bilateral visit to Algiers, Algeria, in September 2018, where he met with members of the Algerian National Authority and representatives of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Protocol and privileges and immunities support

4.17 The External Relations Division (ERD) continued to provide support to senior management and other members of the Secretariat for protocol services, as well as for the administration of privileges and immunities related to the Headquarters Agreement and relevant rules and regulations of the Host Country. Twenty-nine Permanent Representatives presented their letters of credentials to the Director-General in 2018.

OPCW-The Hague Award

4.18 The Selection Panel concluded that the number of nominations received in 2018 was limited and that none of the nominees met the established criteria. The panel agreed that no awardee would be selected for 2018. The Secretariat and the Municipality of The Hague agreed to revise, in cooperation with the other panel members, the current rules of the OPCW-The Hague Award in order to attract a wider range of nominations.

Other activities

- 4.19 On 19 and 20 September 2018, the OPCW hosted 25 fellows of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Fellowship Programme for a day of briefings and a visit to the Equipment Store and Laboratory in Rijswijk.
- 4.20 The 18th induction workshop for diplomatic personnel was held at the OPCW on 24 September 2018. Eighty-one delegates, including eight ambassadors, attended.
- 4.21 Public interest in the Convention and the work of the OPCW continued to increase in 2018. The ERD organised and received 73 visiting groups consisting of a total of 1,701 visitors at OPCW Headquarters, where briefings and presentations were made on topics of interest.

Public affairs and media profile

Website launch

4.22 The new OPCW website was launched in September 2018 to serve as the new digital face of the Organisation. The project included a top-to-bottom re-design of the user interface, replacing the entire back-end content management system, moving to a new hosting platform, and re-developing featured content to better explain the work of the OPCW. By the end of 2018, the OPCW had received 792,500 unique visitors to its digital properties. This is an 18% increase in unique visitors compared to 2017.

OPCW Open Day

4.23 On 24 September 2018, the OPCW participated in another successful edition of the annual International Open Day facilitated by The Hague Municipality. The Open Day is the OPCW's largest public outreach event that raises awareness about the Organisation's work and its continued relevance. In 2018, the event attracted a record number of 1,000 visitors—10% more than in 2017. The Open Day social media campaign reached over 388,000 people—a 90% increase compared to 2017. The programme included briefings by OPCW experts, as well as interactive activities to understand OPCW tasks and tools. The short documentary from the EU-supported FIRES series, entitled "Fingerprints in the Mountains", also premiered at the Open Day.

Open Day of the European Institutions

4.24 On 5 May 2018 in Brussels, the OPCW presented its work at the Open Day of the European External Action Service, visited by approximately 6,000 people. The OPCW was again honoured to be the only non-EU institution to be invited to this event.

T.M.C. Asser Institute

4.25 The ninth edition of the T.M.C. Asser Institute's annual Summer Programme on "Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", organised with the OPCW's cooperation, took place in The Hague from 1 to 5 October 2018. Twenty-one early- to mid-career professionals increased their knowledge about the diplomatic, legal, and technical aspects of the disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The OPCW provided a number of speakers and hosted a tour of its Headquarters and of the Laboratory in Rijswijk. The OPCW also publicised the training programme through a social media and mailing campaign that reached over 328,000 people and included short testimonial videos, graphics, and insights into the programme.

FIRES documentary series

4.26 The short documentary of the FIRES project, *Fingerprints in the Mountains*, was completed in June 2018 as the final part of a successful series realised thanks to financial support from the EU. The series includes six documentaries depicting the intersection of people and chemical weapons. Subtitled in the OPCW's six official

languages, these videos are an effective tool for raising awareness about chemical weapons issues.

OPCW UpClose videos

4.27 In December 2018, the Secretariat's Public Affairs Branch (PAB) launched the OPCW UpClose short video series, a youth outreach initiative co-funded by the EU. The videos aim to inspire the next generation to think about careers in international affairs, while offering information on the work of the Organisation. Each video is subtitled in the six official languages of the OPCW. The videos were promoted through a multi-channel social media campaign that reached over 3.5 million people in its first month. OPCW UpClose is the Organisation's most successful social media campaign to date.

Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties

4.28 The PAB facilitated the participation of eight NGOs in the Fourth Special Session of the Conference. The Branch also produced a dedicated section on opcw.org and launched a multi-channel social media campaign to support and promote the event. The social media campaign reached approximately 293,000 people across the OPCW's social media channels.

<u>Twenty-Third Session of the Conference of the States Parties and the Fourth Review</u> Conference

- 4.29 Fifty-seven NGOs with some 120 individuals attended the Twenty-Third Session of the Conference and the Fourth Review Conference, making this the largest NGO participation in regular sessions of the Conference to date. Twenty-five NGOs made statements during the general debate and many provided exhibits and organised side events. As part of the Secretariat's effort to facilitate participation by NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition, representatives of 33% of approved NGOs (up from 24% at the Twenty-Second Session of the Conference) were able to attend the session thanks to financial support from the EU. The PAB coordinated logistical and financial support for the attendance of NGOs.
- 4.30 The importance of civil society was also highlighted through the promotion of a video about civil society's role in sessions of the Conference and in advancing the Convention. The Secretariat further publicised the Conference session and the Review Conference in the digital domain. A live webcast attracted over 6,700 viewers, while a multichannel social media campaign provided information about the purpose of the sessions, and about the speakers and side events.

Media interest

4.31 The OPCW continued to attract high media interest, especially with regard to its activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, its response to requests for technical assistance from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the decision of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference, and the Organisation's work to counter the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors. The OPCW received 88,600 media citations in 2018, a 243% increase compared to 2017.

Social media growth

4.32 The Secretariat's digital communications capacity continued to increase significantly according to metrics for social media platforms, as shown in Table 7 below. Each social media post and campaign is designed to increase awareness and enhance stakeholder understanding of the work and activities related to the Organisation and the Convention. Overall, the OPCW's social media platforms experienced an overall average of 56.6% increase in growth.

TABLE 7: SOCIAL MEDIA GROWTH

Social Media	2017	2018	Change 2017/2018
Facebook followers	13,295	17,298	30.11%
Twitter followers	15,518	30,200	94.61%
YouTube video views	30,414	36,900	21.33%
LinkedIn followers	6,396	8,585	34.22%

5. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Administrative and budgetary matters

- 5.1 The 2019 Programme and Budget (C-23/DEC.10) was formulated to reflect the resources required for the Secretariat to carry out its functions and to address the current realities confronting the OPCW with regard to new and evolving challenges. Investments in cybersecurity, physical security, and business continuity were included. In addition, resources were included for the mandate given to the OPCW to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to paragraph 10 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3. For the preparation of the 2019 Programme and Budget, the Administration Division (ADM) continued to further develop templates and costing sheets for the use of zero-based budgeting and standard costing, and to improve the linkages between objectives, strategies, activities, and resources.
- 5.2 The ADM continued to closely monitor and actively address the Organisation's tenuous cash situation throughout 2018, apprising States Parties of the financial position on a monthly basis, including the status of payment of assessed contributions and reimbursements of Article IV and Article V invoices. These steps, together with close oversight of budgetary expenditure, proved effective in controlling the cash situation of the Secretariat in 2018.
- 5.3 The 2017 Financial Statements for both the OPCW and the Provident Fund were audited and certified by the External Auditor of the OPCW in May 2018 (EC-89/DG.3 C-23/DG.4, dated 7 August 2018); both received unqualified audit opinions. The 2017 Financial Statements for the OPCW included for the first time a comprehensive introduction and commentary by the Director-General, highlighting for the financial year key trends and issues of importance for the readers of the Financial Statements, including States Parties.
- 5.4 The ADM supported the other divisions of the Secretariat with essential general services including travel arrangements, logistic support to the various sessions and meetings of the policy-making organs, visa and United Nations laissez-passer support, facility services, and procurement guidance, as well as management of the Secretariat's assets.
- 5.5 Secretariat procurement reached a total volume of EUR 19.9 million in 2018. This amount was reached through 237 contracts or purchase orders raised centrally by the Procurement Section for a total value of EUR 18.2 million, and 624 purchase orders raised at the individual Secretariat unit level (for low value procurements), for a total value of EUR 1.7 million.
- 5.6 The Information Services Branch (ISB) coordinated the overall information technology (IT) activity and strategy of the Secretariat, within the federated governance framework established in 2017. In line with the strategic priorities of increased organisational resilience, efficiency, and field agility, the ISB deployed a new corporate telecommunications solution in 2018. The solution delivers Internet Protocol telephony and greater resilience of outgoing Internet lines, thus ensuring

- reliable and secure access to externally hosted services. The solution enables further outsourcing of IT services and planned field mobility initiatives.
- 5.7 A review of the organisational IT strategy was initiated, to ensure continued alignment of IT priorities with OPCW strategy. In addition to standardisation and outsourcing, enhanced field mobility through secure remote access to the corporate IT environment will be a key focus area for 2019.
- 5.8 The implementation of the core component (System of Record SoR) of the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system solution remained ongoing in 2018, with pending work on software configuration and defect resolution by the vendor required before the necessary user acceptance testing, data migration, and end-user training could be accomplished. The go-live of the SoR that had been planned for the end of 2018 was delayed pending completion of this work. In parallel, implementation of the Talent Management (TM) solution continued, with the TM Recruitment module brought into service in December.

Internal oversight

- 5.9 During the period under review, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) conducted its audits in conformance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing of the Institute of Internal Auditors. The United Nations Evaluation Group Norms and Standards for evaluation were also observed.
- 5.10 In 2018, the OIO conducted audits of the system for management of sick leave; vendor management; a spot check on cash management in the Treasury Section; strategic planning in the Secretariat; and physical security at the OPCW Headquarters, Laboratory, and Equipment Store. In addition, the OIO certified updates included in OCAD version 21_2019 and performed eight certifications of the process leading to the testing, preparation, and packing of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry equipment.
- 5.11 To manage the quality management system (QMS) of the OPCW, the OIO performed four QMS internal audits, provided secretarial support for the QMS Technical Committee, and prepared management reviews of accredited areas.
- 5.12 The OIO continued to receive requests for advice in 2018 related to, among other issues, the revision of administrative directives, the improvement of internal controls, risk assessment, confidentiality policy, and IT governance. Furthermore, OIO auditors participated as observers in meetings of the Investment Committee, the Property Survey Board, the Committee on Contracts, the IT Strategy Advisory Committee, the Information Services Steering Committee, the ERP Project Board, the ERP Project Steering Committee, and the Risk Management Working Group.
- 5.13 The OIO established a working group on the QMS to review and prepare a new version of the Secretariat Quality Manual. As an outcome of the working group's meetings, the Secretariat Quality Manual and the Policy Statement were revised and reviewed by the QMS Technical Committee and all Directors. The final document was published on 18 December 2018.

5.14 In 2018, the OIO continued to follow up on the status of the implementation of recommendations contained in all of its audit and evaluation reports, contributing to their full implementation. The outcome of each follow-up exercise was reported periodically to the Management Board and to the States Parties in the OIO's annual report.

Legal affairs

- 5.15 In 2018, the Office of the Legal Adviser (LAO) provided legal advice to the policy-making organs, States Parties, the Director-General, and units of the Secretariat.
- 5.16 This legal advice pertained to the interpretation and implementation of the Convention and its verification regime; the negotiation of international agreements, including voluntary contribution agreements and technical agreements on the conduct of training; cooperation with other international organisations; administrative policies and procedures; and financial questions, including commercial contracts for the procurement of goods and services. The LAO represented the OPCW before judicial and other quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, including the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization.
- 5.17 The Secretariat registered 37 international agreements in 2018 and 10 amendments to international agreements (see Annex 8).

Strategy and policy

- 5.18 In 2018, the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism and its subworking group on non-State actors remained the primary platforms for the States Parties to interact with international experts and to exchange their views on challenges posed by terrorism and on how the OPCW could further address this subject through the full and effective implementation of the Convention. The focus of the discussions throughout 2018 were on the role of international legal cooperation in bringing perpetrators of acts of chemical terrorism to justice; the importance of national implementation of the Convention, in particular Article VI, in combating the threat of the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors; and lessons learned from other international efforts to build national capacity against the threat of CBRN²⁰ terrorism.
- 5.19 In June 2018, the Secretariat hosted the first OPCW Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism. The two-day conference gathered together participants from more than 65 States Parties, as well as representatives from the chemical industry, NGOs, and academia. By bringing both counter-terrorism and chemical weapons experts to the OPCW, the conference aimed to stimulate new thinking and precipitate further action on one of the most pressing threats to the global norm against chemical weapons. Through panel discussions, the conference promoted an interactive dialogue among the participants that supported the development of shared understandings about how States, international organisations, and other stakeholders can counter the

²⁰ CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.

threat of chemical terrorism, building on existing frameworks and efforts. This event underlined the widely shared concern about chemical terrorism, as well as the contribution that the OPCW and the Convention can make to tackle this threat.

- 5.20 In 2018, the OPCW became a signatory to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, and participated as an observer in the first United Nations High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism. The Organisation also continued to lead, with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Global Compact Working Group on Preventing and Responding to WMD Attacks, which aims to take further steps to enhance coordination among key international stakeholders—including international organisations and the chemical industry—to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorism.
- 5.21 Recognising that the Convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing in a number of areas, such as national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control, the OPCW continued its long-standing cooperation with the 1540 Committee.

Engagement with chemical industry associations

- 5.22 The OPCW continued to broaden its engagement with the ICCA in 2018. A meeting of the CICG, consisting of OPCW staff and ICCA officials, took place in June. The Director-General and other senior OPCW staff, as well as the ICCA Board of Directors, participated in a OPCW-ICCA Joint Steering Committee meeting in October. These meetings provided opportunities for continuing consultations on issues of priority, as well as planning for joint activities.
- 5.23 In 2018, representatives of the ICCA and the Secretariat participated in a number of activities, which contributed to raising awareness of the Organisation's work and promoting the importance of industry's support for implementation of the Convention. Notably, following the Secretariat's participation in a meeting of the Responsible Care Leadership Group in April, the group recommended the endorsement of The Hague Ethical Guidelines to the ICCA's Steering Committee. The ICCA officially endorsed the guidelines on 27 April 2018.
- 5.24 The ICCA actively contributed to the preparatory process for the Fourth Review Conference by presenting a position paper and participating in one of the meetings of the OEWG-RC. An ICCA representative was also invited to address the Fourth Review Conference in November 2018. The Director-General submitted a Note to the Conference at its Twenty-Third Session entitled "Engaging the Chemical Industry Associations" (C-23/DG.14, dated 13 November 2018) to report in detail on the OPCW's engagement with industry associations since the previous session of the Conference. The report covered activities related to verification, education and outreach, national implementation and capacity building, and chemical safety and security.

Future priorities of the Organisation

5.25 The Open-Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities of the OPCW, which was established by the Council in June 2016, finalised its work in the first half of 2018. In

July, the working group's two Co-Chairpersons, Ambassador Sabine Nölke of Canada and Ambassador Vusi Bruce Koloane of South Africa, issued their report containing recommendations to the Fourth Review Conference (RC-4/WP.1, dated 16 July 2018). The substantive areas of the OPCW's work covered in the report included verification, capacity development, engagement of external partners, and OPCW governance, resources, and management.

Education and outreach

5.26 The ABEO held two sessions in 2018. Building on its report to the Director-General on the role of education and outreach in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons (ABEO-5/1, dated 12 February 2018), the Board produced a brochure for States Parties to assist them in their education and outreach efforts towards different stakeholder groups. 2018 also marked the final year of the ABEO in its original composition. The Secretariat therefore issued a call for nominations for membership from 2019 to 2021 (S/1574/2018, dated 31 January 2018) and, after completion of the selection process, notified States Parties of the appointed Board members (EC-90/DG.3 C-24/DG.1, dated 12 December 2018).

Confidentiality and security

- 5.27 In the period under review, the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) worked to ensure an appropriate level of security for OPCW personnel, facilities, operations, missions, and information using a risk management-based approached aligned with the risk appetite of the Organisation and with international best practices. The OCS continued to provide training and awareness to personnel on security and confidentiality, physical security services, and support for major meetings.
- 5.28 The OCS coordinated security for OPCW missions in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security. Furthermore, the OCS supported the annual meeting of the OPCW Confidentiality Commission in May 2018.

Health and safety

- 5.29 There were no significant health and safety incidents in the Secretariat in 2018. There were no delays in mission health and safety preparedness, but there was an increased workload in support of deployments of the FFM and contingency operations.
- 5.30 The annual workplace inspection in 2018 showed that the Secretariat is a safe workplace. Issues that had been highlighted in the 2017 report were at various stages of being addressed.
- 5.31 The Health and Safety Branch continued to assist other branches in delivering substantive input for routine work and training, as well as for regular and high risk inspection missions. No radiation safety-related issues, excessive noise level issues, or poor air quality issues were reported or identified in the course of the year.

6. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

- 6.1 Implementation of the Convention requires a strong scientific foundation, necessitating that policymakers take into account key scientific and technical inputs for decision making. Given the current security environment and the rapid pace of technological change, the need for scientific expertise and literacy in chemical disarmament and non-proliferation has never been greater.
- 6.2 In 2018, the SAB delivered its report on developments in science and technology to the Fourth Review Conference (RC-4/DG.1). The Board also produced one intersessional report, and held its Twenty-Seventh Session in March 2018. Additionally, a new temporary working group of the SAB, focused on investigative science and technology, began its work.
- 6.3 The Secretariat continued to foster collaboration and engagement across scientific communities in 2018. Conference attendance, the partnership with the IUPAC and publications in scientific literature have enhanced the Secretariat's ability to stay abreast of developments in chemistry, maintain its visibility and credibility amongst scientific communities, promote responsibility and ethics in science, and support education and outreach activities.
- Science engagement initiatives of the Secretariat in 2018 focused on the provision of science advice to States Parties and the dissemination of the outputs of the SAB's findings on science and technology for the Fourth Review Conference. States Parties received briefings from the SAB Chairperson in the margins of the Board's Twenty-Seventh Session in March 2018, at a briefing to the OEWG-RC in June 2018, and during the Fourth Review Conference itself. Further engagement with States Parties was facilitated through the continuation of the "Science for Diplomats" initiative held in the margins of the Eighty-Seventh, Eighty-Eighth, and Eighty-Ninth Sessions of the Council, and during the Fourth Review Conference. Science and technology engagement was augmented with technical and educational materials made available through the OPCW public website and through the use of social media. Similar activities will continue in 2019 to maintain and further enhance the science-policymaker discourse.

The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board

6.5 In March 2018, the Board met for its Twenty-Seventh Session (SAB-27/1, dated 23 March 2018), during which it finalised its report to the Fourth Review Conference on developments in science and technology. The report synthesised inputs and considerations gathered from more than 25 meetings and workshops and more than 30 reports that had been generated since the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013. The report was discussed with States Parties at the informal consultations on Article VI verification and inspections in July 2018 and in the margins of Eighty-Seventh Session of the Council. The Director-General's response to the report and the recommendations within it was issued in June 2018 (RC-4/DG.2, dated 1 June 2018).

- In the year under review, the SAB initiated a new temporary working group to review investigative science and technology. Its mandate is to conduct an in-depth review of the methods and technologies applicable to the investigative work of the Secretariat, especially non-routine missions, which have increased in frequency since 2013. The group held meetings in February (SAB-27/WP.1, dated 26 February 2018) and November (SAB-28/WP.2, dated 21 January 2019). An update on the work of the group was presented to States Parties in the margins of the Fourth Review Conference.
- 6.7 In response to the findings of the March 2018 TAV requested by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (S/1612/2018), the Director-General tasked the SAB with providing advice on toxic chemicals that have been identified as, or are suspected of being, new types of nerve agents (S/1621/2018, dated 2 May 2018), and the SAB delivered a report on that matter (SAB-28/WP.1, dated 3 July 2018). The findings of the report on new nerve agents provided information that was drawn upon by States Parties in order to make proposals to modify Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Convention submitted in October (S/1682/2018) and November 2018 (S/1697/2018 and Corr.1).

Engagement with the scientific community

- In 2018, the Secretariat built upon its ongoing engagement with global scientific communities as a means to augment its capability to maintain pace with technological change, and to strengthen its ties with scientists and scientific societies. Activities included the Director-General addressing the leadership of the American Chemical Society (ACS) (March 2018) and the Royal Society of Chemistry (May 2018), and a jointly organised an IUPAC-OPCW event in the margins of the Fourth Review Conference. IUPAC members attended a number of OPCW events and participated in meetings of the ABEO. Secretariat staff served on the IUPAC's Committee on Chemistry Education and Interdivisional Committee on Green Chemistry for Sustainable Development, and the IUPAC President delivered a statement during the Fourth Review Conference.
- 6.9 The Secretariat, along with members of the SAB, maintained a visible presence amongst technical communities, delivering presentations at events that included the Third Green and Sustainable Chemistry Conference (Berlin, Germany, May 2018), the 2018 Meeting of the American Thoracic Society (San Diego, United States of America, May 2018), the IUPAC Postgraduate Summer School on Green Chemistry (Venice, Italy, July 2018), the 256th ACS National Meeting (Boston, United States of America, August 2018), the 8th IUPAC International Conference on Green Chemistry (Bangkok, Thailand, September 2018), the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society's 24th International Symposium on the Forensic Sciences (Perth, Australia, September 2018), and the 4th Summer School on Sustainable Chemistry (Lüneburg, Germany, September 2018).
- 6.10 Visibility and awareness-raising across scientific communities was enhanced through publications in peer-reviewed scientific journals. This included a special issue of the IUPAC journal *Pure and Applied Chemistry* (Volume 90, Issue 10, October 2018), which featured a series of papers resulting from the 2017 SAB workshop on emerging

technologies; contributions to an ACS Symposium Series book (based on a symposium in which the Secretariat had participated in 2015); and the SAB's advice on isotopic labelling and stereoisomers of scheduled chemicals, sample storage and stability, and riot control agents.

Activities at the science-security interface

- 6.11 With support from the SAB, the Secretariat engaged with other security-focused organisations and participated in a number of science-security-focused events. These activities explored security-relevant issues in science and technology, and facilitated dissemination of the SAB's advice.
- Presentations were made at a "Schedule 1 Users Forum" held at Spiez Laboratory 6.12 (Spiez, Switzerland, January 2018), in the first Executive Committee meeting and second meeting of the Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group (Richland, WA, United States of America, April 2018; and Boston, MA, United States of America, August 2018), at a workshop on the history of nerve agents (Canterbury, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 2018), the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts (Geneva, Switzerland, August 2018), and in Fourth Review Conference side events on the future of verification (organised by VERIFIN) and digitalisation (co-organised with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute) (The Hague, Netherlands, November 2018). Other events attended by the Secretariat and the SAB included a workshop on the Governance of Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences (Zagreb, Croatia, June 2018), the Fourth UNSGM²¹-Designated Laboratories and the Third Spiez Convergence Workshops (Spiez, Switzerland, September 2018), and the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties (Geneva, Switzerland, December 2018).

²¹

Annex 1

STATES PARTIES TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018²²

		Dates		
	State Party	Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
1.	Afghanistan	14-01-93	24-09-03	24-10-03
2.	Albania	14-01-93	11-05-94	29-04-97
3.	Algeria	13-01-93	14-08-95	29-04-97
4.	Andorra		27-02-03[a]	29-03-03
5.	Angola		16-09-15[a]	16-10-15
6.	Antigua and Barbuda		29-08-05[a]	28-09-05
7.	Argentina	13-01-93	02-10-95	29-04-97
8.	Armenia	19-03-93	27-01-95	29-04-97
9.	Australia	13-01-93	06-05-94	29-04-97
10.	Austria	13-01-93	17-08-95	29-04-97
11.	Azerbaijan	13-01-93	29-02-00	30-03-00
12.	Bahamas	02-03-94	21-04-09	21-05-09
13.	Bahrain	24-02-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
14.	Bangladesh	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
15.	Barbados		07-03-07[a]	06-04-07
16.	Belarus	14-01-93	11-07-96	29-04-97
17.	Belgium	13-01-93	27-01-97	29-04-97
18.	Belize		01-12-03[a]	31-12-03
19.	Benin	14-01-93	14-05-98	13-06-98
20.	Bhutan	24-04-97	18-08-05	17-09-05
21.	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14-01-93	14-08-98	13-09-98
22.	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16-01-97	25-02-97	29-04-97
23.	Botswana		31-08-98[a]	30-09-98
24.	Brazil	13-01-93	13-03-96	29-04-97
25.	Brunei Darussalam	13-01-93	28-07-97	27-08-97
26.	Bulgaria	13-01-93	10-08-94	29-04-97
27.	Burkina Faso	14-01-93	08-07-97	07-08-97
28.	Burundi	15-01-93	04-09-98	04-10-98
29.	Cabo Verde	15-01-93	10-10-03	09-11-03
30.	Cambodia	15-01-93	19-07-05	18-08-05

²²

For each State Party listed, the date in the "Signature" column is that on which it signed the original of the Convention, which was received by the United Nations Secretary-General as depositary, while the date in the "Deposit" column is that on which the Secretary-General received an instrument of accession or ratification by the State Party. Throughout the table, "[a]" means "deposit of instrument of accession", "[A]" means "deposit of instrument of succession".

		Dates		
	State Party	Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
31.	Cameroon	14-01-93	16-09-96	29-04-97
32.	Canada	13-01-93	26-09-95	29-04-97
33.	Central African Republic	14-01-93	20-09-06	20-10-06
34.	Chad	11-10-94	13-02-04	14-03-04
35.	Chile	14-01-93	12-07-96	29-04-97
36.	China	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
37.	Colombia	13-01-93	05-04-00	05-05-00
38.	Comoros	13-01-93	18-08-06	17-09-06
39.	Congo	15-01-93	04-12-07	03-01-08
40.	Cook Islands	14-01-93	15-07-94	29-04-97
41.	Costa Rica	14-01-93	31-05-96	29-04-97
42.	Côte d'Ivoire	13-01-93	18-12-95	29-04-97
43.	Croatia	13-01-93	23-05-95	29-04-97
44.	Cuba	13-01-93	29-04-97	29-05-97
45.	Cyprus	13-01-93	28-08-98	27-09-98
46.	Czech Republic	14-01-93	06-03-96	29-04-97
47.	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14-01-93	12-10-05	11-11-05
48.	Denmark	14-01-93	13-07-95	29-04-97
49.	Djibouti	28-09-93	25-01-06	24-02-06
50.	Dominica	02-08-93	12-02-01	14-03-01
51.	Dominican Republic	13-01-93	27-03-09	26-04-09
52.	Ecuador	14-01-93	06-09-95	29-04-97
53.	El Salvador	14-01-93	30-10-95	29-04-97
54.	Equatorial Guinea	14-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
55.	Eritrea		14-02-00[a]	15-03-00
56.	Estonia	14-01-93	26-05-99	25-06-99
57.	Eswatini	23-09-93	20-11-96	29-04-97
58.	Ethiopia	14-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
59.	Fiji	14-01-93	20-01-93	29-04-97
60.	Finland	14-01-93	07-02-95	29-04-97
61.	France	13-01-93	02-03-95	29-04-97
62.	Gabon	13-01-93	08-09-00	08-10-00
63.	Gambia	13-01-93	19-05-98	18-06-98
64.	Georgia	14-01-93	27-11-95	29-04-97
65.	Germany	13-01-93	12-08-94	29-04-97
66.	Ghana	14-01-93	09-07-97	08-08-97
67.	Greece	13-01-93	22-12-94	29-04-97
68.	Grenada	09-04-97	03-06-05	03-07-05
69.	Guatemala	14-01-93	12-02-03	14-03-03
70.	Guinea	14-01-93	09-06-97	09-07-97
71.	Guinea-Bissau	14-01-93	20-05-08	19-06-08
72.	Guyana	06-10-93	12-09-97	12-10-97
73.	Haiti	14-01-93	22-02-06	24-03-06

	Dates			
	State Party	Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
74.	Holy See	14-01-93	12-05-99	11-06-99
75.	Honduras	13-01-93	29-08-05	28-09-05
76.	Hungary	13-01-93	31-10-96	29-04-97
77.	Iceland	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
78.	India	14-01-93	03-09-96	29-04-97
79.	Indonesia	13-01-93	12-11-98	12-12-98
80.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	13-01-93	03-11-97	03-12-97
81.	Iraq		13-01-09[a]	12-02-09
82.	Ireland	14-01-93	24-06-96	29-04-97
83.	Italy	13-01-93	08-12-95	29-04-97
84.	Jamaica	18-04-97	08-09-00	08-10-00
85.	Japan	13-01-93	15-09-95	29-04-97
86.	Jordan		29-10-97[a]	28-11-97
87.	Kazakhstan	14-01-93	23-03-00	22-04-00
88.	Kenya	15-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
89.	Kiribati		07-09-00[a]	07-10-00
90.	Kuwait	27-01-93	29-05-97	28-06-97
91.	Kyrgyzstan	22-02-93	29-09-03	29-10-03
92.	Lao People's Democratic Republic	13-05-93	25-02-97	29-04-97
93.	Latvia	06-05-93	23-07-96	29-04-97
94.	Lebanon		20-11-08[a]	20-12-08
95.	Lesotho	07-12-94	07-12-94	29-04-97
96.	Liberia	15-01-93	23-02-06	25-03-06
97.	Libya		06-01-04[a]	05-02-04
98.	Liechtenstein	21-07-93	24-11-99	24-12-99
99.	Lithuania	13-01-93	15-04-98	15-05-98
100.	Luxembourg	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
101.	Madagascar	15-01-93	20-10-04	19-11-04
102.	Malawi	14-01-93	11-06-98	11-07-98
103.	Malaysia	13-01-93	20-04-00	20-05-00
104.	Maldives	04-10-93	31-05-94	29-04-97
105.	Mali	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
106.	Malta	13-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
107.	Marshall Islands	13-01-93	19-05-04	18-06-04
108.	Mauritania	13-01-93	09-02-98	11-03-98
109.	Mauritius	14-01-93	09-02-93	29-04-97
110.	Mexico	13-01-93	29-08-94	29-04-97
111.	Micronesia (Federated States of)	13-01-93	21-06-99	21-07-99
112.	Monaco	13-01-93	01-06-95	29-04-97
113.	Mongolia	14-01-93	17-01-95	29-04-97
114.	Montenegro		23-10-06[d]	03-06-06
115.	Morocco	13-01-93	28-12-95	29-04-97
116.	Mozambique		15-08-00[a]	14-09-00

			Dates	
	State Party	Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
117.	Myanmar	14-01-93	08-07-15	07-08-15
118.	Namibia	13-01-93	24-11-95	29-04-97
119.	Nauru	13-01-93	12-11-01	12-12-01
120.	Nepal	19-01-93	18-11-97	18-12-97
121.	Netherlands	14-01-93	30-06-95	29-04-97
122.	New Zealand	14-01-93	15-07-96	29-04-97
123.	Nicaragua	09-03-93	05-11-99	05-12-99
124.	Niger	14-01-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
125.	Nigeria	13-01-93	20-05-99	19-06-99
126.	Niue		21-04-05[a]	21-05-05
127.	North Macedonia		20-06-97[a]	20-07-97
128.	Norway	13-01-93	07-04-94	29-04-97
129.	Oman	02-02-93	08-02-95	29-04-97
130.	Pakistan	13-01-93	28-10-97	27-11-97
131.	Palau		03-02-03[a]	05-03-03
132.	Palestine (State of)		17-05-18	16-06-18
133.	Panama	16-06-93	07-10-98	06-11-98
134.	Papua New Guinea	14-01-93	17-04-96	29-04-97
135.	Paraguay	14-01-93	01-12-94	29-04-97
136.	Peru	14-01-93	20-07-95	29-04-97
137.	Philippines	13-01-93	11-12-96	29-04-97
138.	Poland	13-01-93	23-08-95	29-04-97
139.	Portugal	13-01-93	10-09-96	29-04-97
140.	Qatar	01-02-93	03-09-97	03-10-97
141.	Republic of Korea	14-01-93	28-04-97	29-04-97
142.	Republic of Moldova	13-01-93	08-07-96	29-04-97
143.	Romania	13-01-93	15-02-95	29-04-97
144.	Russian Federation	13-01-93	05-11-97	05-12-97
145.	Rwanda	17-05-93	31-03-04	30-04-04
146.	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16-03-94	21-05-04	20-06-04
147.	Saint Lucia	29-03-93	09-04-97	29-04-97
148.	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	20-09-93	18-09-02	18-10-02
149.	Samoa	14-01-93	27-09-02	27-10-02
150.	San Marino	13-01-93	10-12-99	09-01-00
151.	Sao Tome and Principe		09-09-03[A]	09-10-03
152.	Saudi Arabia	20-01-93	09-08-96	29-04-97
153.	Senegal	13-01-93	20-07-98	19-08-98
154.	Serbia		20-04-00[a]	20-05-00
155.	Seychelles	15-01-93	07-04-93	29-04-97
156.	Sierra Leone	15-01-93	30-09-04	30-10-04
157.	Singapore	14-01-93	21-05-97	20-06-97
158.	Slovakia	14-01-93	27-10-95	29-04-97
159.	Slovenia	14-01-93	11-06-97	11-07-97

		Dates		
	State Party	Signature	Deposit	Entry Into Force
160.	Solomon Islands		23-09-04[a]	23-10-04
161.	Somalia		29-05-13[a]	28-06-13
162.	South Africa	14-01-93	13-09-95	29-04-97
163.	Spain	13-01-93	03-08-94	29-04-97
164.	Sri Lanka	14-01-93	19-08-94	29-04-97
165.	Sudan		24-05-99[a]	23-06-99
166.	Suriname	28-04-97	28-04-97	29-04-97
167.	Sweden	13-01-93	17-06-93	29-04-97
168.	Switzerland	14-01-93	10-03-95	29-04-97
169.	Syrian Arab Republic		14-09-13[a]	14-10-13
170.	Tajikistan	14-01-93	11-01-95	29-04-97
171.	Thailand	14-01-93	10-12-02	09-01-03
172.	Timor-Leste		07-05-03[a]	06-06-03
173.	Togo	13-01-93	23-04-97	29-04-97
174.	Tonga		29-05-03[a]	28-06-03
175.	Trinidad and Tobago		24-06-97[a]	24-07-97
176.	Tunisia	13-01-93	15-04-97	29-04-97
177.	Turkey	14-01-93	12-05-97	11-06-97
178.	Turkmenistan	12-10-93	29-09-94	29-04-97
179.	Tuvalu		19-01-04[a]	18-02-04
180.	Uganda	14-01-93	30-11-01	30-12-01
181.	Ukraine	13-01-93	16-10-98	15-11-98
182.	United Arab Emirates	02-02-93	28-11-00	28-12-00
183.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	13-01-93	13-05-96	29-04-97
184.	United Republic of Tanzania	25-02-94	25-06-98	25-07-98
185.	United States of America	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97
186.	Uruguay	15-01-93	06-10-94	29-04-97
187.	Uzbekistan	24-11-95	23-07-96	29-04-97
188.	Vanuatu		16-09-05[a]	16-10-05
189.	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	14-01-93	03-12-97	02-01-98
190.	Viet Nam	13-01-93	30-09-98	30-10-98
191.	Yemen	08-02-93	02-10-00	01-11-00
192.	Zambia	13-01-93	09-02-01	11-03-01
193.	Zimbabwe	13-01-93	25-04-97	29-04-97

Annex 2

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES IN SERVICE OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN 2018

	Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities by State Party			
United States	Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP)*			
of America	BGCAPP Static Detonation Chamber (BGCAPP-SDC)**			
	Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP)			
	PCAPP Explosive Destruction System (PCAPP-EDS)			
	Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (RCWDF)			
	Chemical Transfer Facility/Munition Assessment Processing System			
	(CTF/MAPS)***			
	Prototype Detonation Test and Destruction Facility (PDTDF)***			

- * Construction was complete; systemisation was ongoing at the end of 2018.
- ** Construction and systemisation were ongoing at the end of 2018.
- *** The facility remained in service in 2018, but no destruction operations took place.

Annex 3

CHEMICAL WEAPONS DECLARED, DESTROYED, AND WITHDRAWN²³
AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed ²⁴
Ca	·	
Sarin (GB)	15,047.041	14,769.933
Soman (GD) + viscous soman	9,057.203	9,057.203
Tabun (GA) + GA with UCON	2.283	2.283
VX/Vx + viscous Vx	19,586.722	19,471.323
EA 1699	0.002	0.002
Sulfur mustard (sulfur mustard, H, HD,		
HT, sulfur mustard in oil product)	17,439.877	15,464.643
Mixtures of sulfur mustard and lewisite		
(including HD/L mixture in		
dicloroethane)	344.679	344.679
Lewisite	6,746.876	6,746.875
DF	1,024.765	1,024.765
QL	46.174	46.173
OPA	730.545	730.545
Unknown	3.810	3.795
Toxic waste	1.705	1.705
Hexamine	78.231	78.231
IZO	133.325	133.325
Substance A	112.300	112.300
Substance B/BB	97.879	97.879
Substance B salt	40.170	40.170
Total Category 1:	70,493.587	68,125.828
	tegory 2	
Adamsite	0.350	0.350
CN	0.989	0.989
CNS	0.010	0.010
Chloroethanol	323.150	323.150
Thiodiglycol	50.960	50.960
Phosgene	10.616	10.616
Isopropanol	114.103	114.103
Phosphorous trichloride	154.056	154.056
Pinacolyl alcohol	19.257	19.257
Thionyl chloride	100.834	100.834

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Chemical warfare agents and precursors declared as Category 1 and Category 2 chemical weapons.

Including Schedule 1 chemicals withdrawn from chemical weapons stocks (2.913 MT). The rounding rule has been applied.

Common Name of Chemical	Number of MT Declared	Number of MT Destroyed ²⁴
Sodium sulfide	246.625	246.625
Sodium fluoride	304.725	304.725
Tributylamine	238.655	238.655
DIPA ethanol	8.356	8.356
DMP	5.725	5.725
Hydrogen fluoride	31.850	31.850
Hydrogen chloride	44.500	44.500
Methanol	1.480	1.480
Monoisopropylamine	36.120	36.120
Butanol	3.792	3.792
Phosphorous pentasulfide	11.250	11.250
Phosphorous oxychloride	13.500	13.500
TEA	34.000	34.000
TMP	55.800	55.800
Total Category 2:	1,810.703	1,810.703
Totals	72,304.290	69,936.531

Annex 4

NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES THAT HAD DECLARED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS, BY TYPE OF AGENT AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018²⁵

Name of Riot Control Agent	Number of States Parties that have Declared Possession
CS	127
CN	68
Capsaicinoids	50
CR	14
Other types	17

Total number of States Parties that had declared possession of riot control agents: 138

The CAS nomenclature for riot control agents listed in this chart is as follows:

CS: CAS number 2698-41-1;

CN: CAS number 532-27-4; and

CR: CAS number 257-07-8.

Capsaicinoids include capsicin, pelargonic acid vanillylamide, dihydrocapsaicin, and E-capsaicin. Other types include 4-Nonanoylmorpholine, adamsite, ethylbromideacetate, and mixtures of CN, CS, and capsaicinoids.

Annex 5 LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018 (ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS)

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Belgium	Defence Laboratories Department	12 May 2004
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	17 Nov 1998
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology Academy of Military Medical Sciences	14 Sept 2007
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	17 Nov 1998
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	29 Jun 1999
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection	29 Jun 1999
7.	India	Vertox Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	18 Apr 2006
8.	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Defence Chemical Research Laboratory	3 Aug 2011
9.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	17 Nov 1998
10.	Pakistan	Analytical Laboratory, Defence Science Technology Organisation	18 April 2018
11.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CB Department, Agency for Defence Development	3 Aug 2011
12.	Republic of Korea	Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence Research Institute	4 Sept 2012
13.	Romania	Scientific Research Center for CBRN Defense and Ecology, Chemical Analysis and Special Synthesis Laboratory	15 April 2018
14.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	4 Aug 2000
15.	Russian Federation	Central Chemical Weapons Destruction Analytical Laboratory of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, "State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry And Technology"	15 Apr 2015
16.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	14 Apr 2003
17.	Spain	Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas (LAVEMA), INTA Campus La Marañosa	16 Aug 2004
18.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	17 Nov 1998
19.	Switzerland	Spiez Laboratory Swiss NBC Defence Establishment	17 Nov 1998

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
20.	United Kingdom of Great	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory	29 Jun 1999
	Britain and Northern	Chemical and Biological Systems	
	Ireland	Porton Down	
21.	United States of America	Edgewood Chemical Biological Center	17 Nov 1998
		Forensic Analytical Center	
22.	United States of America	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	14 Apr 2003

LIST OF DESIGNATED LABORATORIES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018 (BIOMEDICAL ANALYSIS)

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
1.	Australia	Defence Science and Technology Group	1 Aug 2016
2.	China	The Laboratory of Analytical Chemistry Research Institute of Chemical Defence	1 Aug 2016
3.	China	Laboratory of Toxicant Analysis Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology Academy of Military Medical Sciences	1 Aug 2016
4.	Finland	Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	1 Aug 2016
5.	France	DGA Maîtrise NRBC Département d'analyses chimiques	1 Aug 2016
6.	Germany	Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology	1 Aug 2016
7.	India	Vertox Laboratory Defence Research and Development Establishment	1 Aug 2016
8.	Netherlands	TNO Defence, Security and Safety	1 Aug 2016
9.	Republic of Korea	Chemical Analysis Laboratory CB Department, Agency for Defence Development	1 Aug 2016
10.	Russian Federation	Laboratory for Chemical and Analytical Control Military Research Centre	1 Aug 2016
11.	Russian Federation	Laboratory of Chemical Analytical Control and Biotesting, Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (RIHOPHE)	1 Aug 2016
12.	Singapore	Verification Laboratory Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National Laboratories	1 Aug 2016
13.	Sweden	FOI, CBRN Defence and Security Swedish Defence Research Agency	1 Aug 2016
14.	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Chemical and Biological Systems Porton Down	1 Aug 2016
15.	United States of America	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	11 Jul 2017

	State Party	Laboratory Name	Date of Designation
16.	United States of	Edgewood Chemical Biological Center	1 Aug 2016
	America	Forensic Analytical Center	
17.	United States of	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	1 Aug 2016
	America		

Annex 6

SUMMARISED FINANCIAL INFORMATION FOR 2018²⁶

AND SUBPROGRAMME FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2018 STATEMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING PROGRAMME

Funding Programme	Final Appropriation	Total Expenditure	Balance of Appropriations
1	2	3	4 (2-3)
CHAPTER 1			
1. Verification Programme	8,713,772	7,929,630	784,142
2. Inspections Programme	20,270,334	19,892,395	377,939
TOTAL CHAPTER 1	28,984,106	27,822,025	$1,162,081^{27}$
CHAPTER 2			
3. International Cooperation and Assistance Programme	7,249,700	7,112,570	137,130
4. Support to the Policy-Making Organs	1,405,396	1,382,405	22,991
5. External Relations Programme	2,016,683	1,854,929	161,754
6. Executive Management Programme	685'029'6	9,617,143	53,446
7. Administration Programme	13,606,872	13,068,846	538,026
TOTAL CHAPTER 2	37,830,815	36,907,465	923,350
GRAND TOTAL	66,814,921	64,729,490	2,085,431

Source: Report by the Director-General - OPCW Income and Expenditure for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2018 (S/1730/2019, dated 1 March 2019) (unaudited).

Approximately EUR 0.436 million of the Chapter 1 balance of appropriations of EUR 1.16 million pending finalisation of the 2018 accounts closure is eligible for transfer to the OPCW special account for the Equipment Store and the OPCW special account for use beyond 2018 by the Inspectorate and Verification Programmes, respectively.

BANK BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018

	Balance	nce
Bank Account	As at	As at
	31 December 2018 ²⁸	31 December 2017
General Fund	4,159,187	1,689,494
Working Capital Fund	7,086,272	5,835,963
Voluntary Fund for Assistance (Article X)	1,562,975	1,557,975
OPCW special accounts	4,066,199	5,652,365
OPCW trust funds	13,002,286	12,144,565
Total OPCW	29,876,919	26,880,362

The bank balances of funds will usually differ from the status of fund balances due to timing differences.

STATUS OF FUND BALANCES AS AT 31 DECEMBER 2018
STATU

Working Capital Fund, Special Funds,	Balance as at	2018	Refunds/Transfers	Prior Years'	Expenditure	Fund Balance as at
Voluntary Fund for Assistance, Trust Funds	1 January 2018	Income	During 2018	Adjustments	During 2018	31 December 2018
	∢	В	U D	D	Щ	F (A+B+C+D-E)
Working Capital Fund	6,842,787	1	250,000	1	1	7,092,787
Special funds	4,019,323	358	1,453,946	2,867	1,773,562	3,702,932
Voluntary fund for assistance (Article X)	1,557,974	5,000	1	1	1	1,562,974
Trust funds	11,309,763	9,975,579	-1,724	48,882	10,237,168	11,095,333

	Fund Balance as at 31 December 2018	F(A+B+C+D-E)	236,720	2,382,230
	Expenditure During 2018	E	752,529	4,871,178
	Prior Years' Adjustments	D	3,115	69,463
	Refunds/Transfers Between Trust Funds During 2018	C	1	(11,732)
	2018 Income	В	ı	1,756,350
	Balance as at 1 January 2018	A	986,133	5,439,327
Syria 1 rust f und balances	Syria Trust Funds		Syria trust fund for the destruction of chemical weapons	Trust fund for Syria missions

Annex 8

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LEGAL INSTRUMENTS REGISTERED BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT FROM 1 JANUARY 2018 TO 31 DECEMBER 2018

	Date of	Entry Into Force	14-08-18	08-06-18	02-05-18	12-01-18	12-01-18	08-01-18	21-02-18
	Da	Signature	28-03-12	12-06-17 29-06-17	06-09-17 06-09-17	12-01-18 14-11-17	12-01-18 18-12-17	03-01-18 08-01-18	21-02-18 21-02-18
gistered in 2018		Parties	OPCW Paraguay	OPCW Bahrain	OPCW Romania	OPCW Sweden	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW Vertox Laboratory, India	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services
International Agreements Registered in 2018		Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Article VIII(50) privileges and immunities agreement	Article VIII(50) privileges and immunities agreement	Article VIII(50) privileges and immunities agreement	Exchange of Letters Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Regarding Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Exchange of Letters Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning the Trust Fund for Implementation of Article X for the Purposes of Supporting Regional Training Under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Project	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Vertox Lab of DRDE Gwalior, DRDO Min of Defence, India Concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 42nd Official OPCW Proficiency Test	UN Agency to UN Agency Contribution Agreement
	OPCW	Registration Number	IAR 254	IAR 496	IAR 497	IAR 508	IAR 509	IAR 510	IAR 520

Annex 8 page 58		Date of	Entry Into Force	16-03-18	16-03-18	20-02-18	17-04-18	03-05-18	16-05-18	29-05-18
		Da	Signature	16-03-18 12-03-18	16-03-18 12-03-18	20-02-18 20-02-18	17-04-18 16-04-18	03-05-18 02-05-18	30-04-18 16-05-18	29-05-18 31-01-18
	gistered in 2018	,	Parties	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW Libya	OPCW The Central School of the State Fire Service, Częstochowa, Poland	OPCW Spiez Laboratory, Switzerland	OPCW Slovakia	OPCW Defence Chemical Research Laboratory, Islamic Republic of Iran
	International Agreements Registered in 2018		Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution to Support the Trust Fund for Training (TBT) for the Purposes of Providing Specialist Witness Interview Training for the OPCW Inspectors	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution to Support the Trust Fund for Training (TBT) for the Purposes of Providing Training in Support of the Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM) and Forensic Investigation Training for the OPCW Inspectors and other Relevant Personnel	Agreement with the Libyan National Authority Setting Forth Understandings for the Clean-Up of the Former Chemical Weapons Storage Site in Ruwagha	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Hague, Netherlands, and the Central School of the State Fire Service, Częstochowa, Poland Concerning the Training Course in Sampling and Analysis of Substances in a Highly Contaminated Environment on 7-11 May 2018 at the Central School of the State Fire Service, Częstochowa, Poland	Technical Arrangement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Spiez Laboratory, Switzerland Regarding the Off-Site Analysis of Samples	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Ministry of the Economy of the Slovak Republic Concerning the Live Agents Training for Experts from the Member States of the OPCW at the Training and Testing Center of NBC Protection in Zemianske Kostol'any, Slovakia	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Defence Chemical Research Laboratory, Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning Evaluation of the Results for the 43rd Official OPCW Proficiency Test
		OPCW	Kegistration Number	IAR 521	IAR 522	IAR 523	IAR 524	IAR 525	IAR 526	IAR 527

International Agreements Registered in 2018	Date of	Farties Signature Force	fund for OPCW 31-05-18 01-06-18 or the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 01-06-18 Northern Ireland		nt of OPCW 29-06-18 29-06-18 New Zealand 28-06-18	61.4	or the OPCW 30-07-18 30-07-18 Foreign France-MFA 26-07-18 Officers Officers 26-07-18	of the OPCW 24-07-18 24-07-18 istry of Republic of Korea-MFA 23-07-18 of	Slovak OPCW 03-10-18 03-10-18 onnel of 01-10-18 01-10-18	of OPCW 25-10-18 25-10-18 torate Agency for Defense Development, 18-10-18 cerning Republic of Korea st	of OPCW 13-11-18 01-01-18 Germany 13-11-18
Internation		lon Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution to Support the Trust Fund for OPCW Events for the Purpose of Supporting Interpretation Costs for the Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism		Exchange of Letters Concerning the Contribution New Zealand to the Trust Fund for the Impler	Arrangement Between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning Support for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties	Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France Concerning the Provision of Junior Professional Officers				
	OPCW	Kegistration Number	IAR 528	IAR 529	IAR 530	IAR 531	IAR 532	IAR 533	IAR 534	IAR 535	IAR 536

Annex 8 page 60		Jo (Entry Into Force	25-10-18	23-01-19	19-10-18	19-09-18	27-11-17	01-11-18	15-11-18
		Date of	Signature	25-10-18 18-10-18	21-12-18 23-01-19	19-10-18 18-10-18	19-09-18 14-09-18	27-11-17	05-12-18 05-12-18	15-11-18 29-10-18
	gistered in 2018		Parties	OPCW Chemical Analysis Laboratory, CBR Directorate Agency for Defense Development Daejeon, Republic of Korea	OPCW Slovakia	OPCW Belgium	OPCW United States	OPCW Germany	OPCW Germany	OPCW Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
	International Agreements Registered in 2018		Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Technical Agreement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Analysis Laboratory, CBR Directorate Agency for Defense Development Daejeon, Republic of Korea Concerning the Sample Preparation for the 44 th Official OPCW Proficiency Test	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution by the Slovak Republic to Support the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution by the Government of Kingdom of Belgium to support the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology and the Activities of the OPCW Technical Secretariat	Exchange of Letters: Voluntary Contribution by the United States to Support the Installation of a Tracking and Inventory System and Assist the OPCW Technical Secretariat in Demonstrating a Proper Chain of Custody for Samples	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	Technical Arrangement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), the Netherlands, Regarding the Off-Site Analysis of Samples
		OPCW	Registration Number	IAR 537	IAR 538	IAR 539	IAR 540	IAR 541	IAR 542	IAR 543

	International Agreements Registered in 2018	gistered in 2018		
OPCW			Daí	Date of
Registration Number	Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Parties	Signature	Entry Into Force
IAR 544	Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic – Directorate General for Development Cooperation – and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Concerning the Sponsoring of Italy-Funded Junior Professional Officers	OPCW Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Italian Republic – Directorate General for Development Cooperation	30-10-18 07-11-18	07-11-18
IAR 545	Technical Arrangement Between the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Finnish Institute for Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN), Finland, Regarding the Off-Site Analysis of Samples	OPCW Finnish Institute for Verification of Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN)	15-11-18 12-10-18	15-11-18
IAR 546	Grant Arrangement Between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as Represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to Support the OPCW's Activities under the CWC with the Establishment of a New Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada	11-10-18 27-10-18	27-10-18
IAR 547	Letter from the Republic of Poland Concerning Voluntary Contribution to the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for the Development of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology	OPCW Poland	14-11-18	
IAR 548	Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	OPCW Denmark	19-12-18 19-12-18	19-12-18
IAR 549	Voluntary Contribution by the Government of Estonia for the Trust Fund for a Centre for Chemistry and Technology ("the Project"), to Support the Activities of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Including the Aim to Upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store	OPCW Estonia	19-12-18 06-12-18	19-12-18

International Agreements Registered in 2018	Date of	Entry Into Force	26-09-18		
		Signature	26-09-18	26-09-18	
	Parties		OPCW	United Nations	
		Subject of Agreement/Instrument		Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International, Impartial and	Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011, Regarding Provision of Access, Storage, and Handling of Information and Evidence
	OPCW	Kegistration Number	IAR 550		

	Date of	Entry Into Force	12-03-18	26-09-18	19-12-18	19-09-18
ements Registered in 2018	Da	Signature	12-03-18 12-03-18 12-03-18	12-09-18 24-09-18 26-09-18	19-12-18	19-09-18 No date
	Parties		OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services Syrian Arab Republic	OPCW United Nations Office for Project Services Svrian Arab Republic	OPCW France	OPCW Chile
Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2018	Subject of Agreement/Instrument		Amendment No. 10 to the Arrangement Between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of Syrian Arab Republic	Amendment No. 11 to the Agreement Between the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic	Amendment No. 2 to the Administrative Agreement Between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development of the French Republic and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	Addendum No. 2 to the Voluntary Contribution Agreement Between the Republic of Chile and the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
	OPCW	Kegistration Number	IAR 381(j)	IAR 381(k)	IAR 428(b)	IAR 440(b)

Amendments to International Agreements Registered in 2018	Date of	Entry Into Force	12-02-18	12-02-18	04-09-18	14-01-19	16-04-18	18-12-18
		Signature	12-02-18 11-10-17	12-02-18 18-12-17	04-09-18	14-01-19	21-03-18 16-04-18	18-12-18 18-12-18
	Parties		OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	OPCW United States of America	OPCW Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canada	OPCW European Union
		Subject of Agreement/Instrument	Amendment No. 2 to the Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the OPCW Technical Secretariat Concerning a Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Amendment No. 3 to the Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the OPCW Technical Secretariat Concerning a Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Amendment No. 4 to the Exchange of Letters Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the OPCW Technical Secretariat Concerning a Contribution to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions	Amendment to the Agreement Between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United States of America on the Contribution of Funds in Support of Certain Non-Proliferation Activities Concerning Chemical Weapons in Syria	Amendment No. 1 to the Grant Arrangement Project CWD-2017-0001 Support for the OPCW to Strengthen Capacity to Investigate Chemical Weapons (CW) Incidents in Syria	Addendum No. 1 to Delegation Agreement "CFSP/2017/38/OPCW SATCEN"
	OPCW	Kegistration Number	IAR 491(b)	IAR 491(c)	IAR 491(d)	IAR 512(a)	IAR 513(a)	IAR 515(b)