Chairman, Director-General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I had the great honor of attending the CSPs here in The Hague and addressing the honorable delegates as well as taking part in the side events organized by Green Cross International on several occasions.

Allow me to start by saying that many of my colleagues in the nuclear weapons proliferation area are quite proud of dealing with a topic of utmost strategic importance.

Yet, they acknowledge the successes of the CWC, thanks to the many important accomplishments of the OPCW to date.

As we all know very well, despite the utterly important mission undertaken by the IAEA, there is no institutional body that serves as the quarterback of the NPT that would be comparable to the OPCW.

That said, my concern is that the feeling of satisfaction with the work done by the OPCW over the past two decades, having certified the elimination of some 96 percent of the declared CW stockpiles worldwide, may lead to undermining the role it can play for international security in the decades ahead.

I sense this, as an outsider, from the budgetary constraints and the diminishing number of especially technical personnel, particularly the inspectors, who are, indeed, in short supply.

Raising a cadre of highly skilled and qualified technical personnel must be a highly demanding task, and should require lots of time and effort as well as large sums of money.

Yet, I also believe, the OPCW must keep a good number of such skilled and experienced personnel regardless of whether their employment is justified financially in times of relative peace and stability in the international system.
There are a number of reasons why one cannot afford to risk downgrading or downsizing the capacity of a highly crucial institution, such as the OPCW.

First and foremost, among these reasons, we all know that there are still countries that have not adhered to the CWC and this is in no way a negligible issue.

Second, there are nearly 5,000 industrial facilities all over the world that have been declared to the OPCW, which should be taken care of, as per the provisions of the CWC.

Third, there exist challenges emanating from the emergence of failed states that may fall into the control of non-state actors (i.e., terrorist organizations), which may take advantage of the existing facilities and the resources on their territories that may help them develop CW capabilities of their own.

Fourth, there may be situations where alleged uses of CW may be the case and the international community may request clear answers as to the perpetrators who should be held responsible for the incidents.

For all these and other reasons, the world needs a powerful organization, such as the OPCW that would keep its capabilities intact, having no fear of budgetary cuts that might have a negative impact on the operational capacity of the Organization, let alone the morale of its staff from top to bottom.

Based on the information that I gathered from the Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention (on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction) in 2017, I can see that the overall budget of the OPCW is approximately 67.2 million Euros, and this figure is about 10 million Euros down from a decade ago.

I can also see in the Report that only 7 inspectors were hired by the OPCW last year, and that many positions in the Technical Secretariat have been downgraded in recent years.

Hence, no growth in the budget over at least a decade, and limited, if not diminishing, number of recruited and highly skilled personnel who are crucial especially for inspections, tells me that the OPCW is not being appreciated as much as it used to be until recently.

I hope to be proven wrong in my observations from the outside.
In the light of the present day challenges, and also anticipating future threats, I believe, the commitment of the OPCW to contributing to the safety and security of its members should be fully acknowledged by everyone.

Hence, the Organization should be endowed with more, not less, financial, technical and technological assets, such as expanding its network of designated labs that would enhance its analytical capabilities.

The probability of negative scenarios with respect to the proliferation of CW and their use by states and/or non-state actors may be low, but the consequences of such incidents, if and when they are realized, may be extremely high.

This would be the message that I would like to convey to the decision-making authorities of the States Parties to the Convention.

I thank you all for your attention and for giving me this precious opportunity to address such a highly distinguished audience.

Thank You

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