
Mr Chairman, distinguished Delegates, ladies and gentlemen.

Let me start with congratulating the new Director General Mr. Fernando Arias and wish him all the success in his not so easy job.

I represent here the organisation with a rather complex name: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World affairs. It was born more than 60 years ago in a tiny village called Pugwash on the east coast of Canada, and initially comprised a small group of outstanding nuclear scientists, who happened to be among the key creators of nuclear weapons in the US, USSR and the UK. Their mission was to explain to their and other governments the existential dangers of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the arsenals and the need to prevent nuclear. And since those days one of Pugwash’s key principles and mottos has been working across divides.

I apologise for this historical reference and promise that the rest of my comments will be very short. I specifically mentioned divides, because they now tend to become a determining feature of the CWC. This is putting at risk not just the effective implementation of the CWC, but its future. Unfortunately, there is a growing number of divides in the world at large, including in a broader area of arms control and disarmament. Treaties and agreements are coming under increasing stress, and the CWC, as the beginning of this week has shown, is hardly an exception, although for many years it had been praised, and very rightly so, as a great success story. This should be a cause of great concern.

There are and will always be differences and conflicting interests. But divides are different. It is when people close their eyes and ears to the arguments and concerns of the opposite side. This is dangerous not only because it undermines trust, but also because this logic of confrontation inevitably leads to misinterpretation of the convention – it may happen even unintentionally. In the meantime the convention is a complex set of mutually related and mutually dependent legal, technical and political norms. Over time, some of them need to be revisited, but not at the expense of the fundamental principles, which took many years to negotiate in Geneva. For example, the question of CWC schedules, whose revisiting has been long overdue. But, if this is being done now with the purpose of preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons, shouldn’t we also look at quantitative limits that the convention imposes on the production and possession of Schedule one chemicals? I mean the legitimate production of one ton of schedule 1 chemicals per year, legitimate single small scale facility, then one additional 10kg per year facility for production of schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes, then unlimited number of 10kg facilities for other permitted purposes with the requirement that all of them must be approved by the state party, and then unlimited number of labs with the aggregate limit of
100 grams per year per laboratory, which are not subject to any declaration or verification?

Or take the important question of attribution. How would that work without trust-inspiring fact-finding procedures? By the way, this is one of the issues which for objective historical reasons – if you are familiar with the course of negotiations, could not receive the same thorough attention, which was the case with the verification of CW destruction.

I am not suggesting any solution to these issues, just highlighting the need to look at them carefully, calmly in order to analyse all the implication. In a climate characterized by the fundamental lack of trust it would be hardly possible.

On the other hand looking seriously into these and other issues, discussing them, listening to each other may have a potential for rediscovering the lost trust. This is, in my view, something, that could play a useful role in the next few years, and I hope the Review Conference could be in a position to issue the necessary guidance for such work.

Thank you very much.