OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON FUTURE PRIORITIES OF THE OPCW
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FOURTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Introduction

The Open-Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OEWG-FP),

Pursuant to Executive Council decision EC-82/DEC.2, dated 14 July 2016 and in accordance with its mandate to act “as an informal mechanism for receiving, discussing, prioritising, elaborating, and integrating ideas and proposals from States Parties and the Secretariat on the future priorities of the OPCW on any aspect of the Convention or developments relevant to it with a view to supplying a holistic, coherent, forward-looking, and action-oriented document consisting of recommendations for consideration by the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention as a contribution to the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention”;

Pursuant to its Methods of Work, as agreed by participating States Parties (see Annex 1);

Taking note of the reports by the Technical Secretariat (“the Secretariat”) entitled “The OPCW in 2025: Ensuring a World Free of Chemical Weapons” (S/1252/2015, dated 6 March 2015) and the Permanent Representatives’ retreat on the future of the OPCW (S/1316/2015, dated 14 October 2015);

Taking note also of presentations and submissions made to the OEWG-FP by the Secretariat, subsidiary bodies of the OPCW and facilitators of other working groups, as well as by representatives of industry, other international organisation and civil society (see Annex 2);

Taking into account responses to and discussions of the above-mentioned presentations and submissions by States Parties, as well as oral and written submissions made by them (see Annex 3), in open-ended meetings of the OEWG-FP, as well as the work done by other facilitators, working groups and sub-working groups, in particular the outcome of the Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors under the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017),
Makes the following recommendations to the Fourth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention ("the Convention"), on the future priorities of the OPCW:

**General recommendations**

1. The OPCW should continue to focus on achieving the object and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, assistance and protection, international cooperation and outreach, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.

2. Universalisation of the Convention and prevention of use of the chemical weapons by anyone, under any circumstances, must continue to be high on the agenda of the OPCW and the Member States. The Organisation and States Parties individually should commit to joint efforts, including with international and regional organisations, to achieve universality goals. The Organisation must continue to explore in depth the relevant circumstances in each case and to recommend the steps to be taken to achieve universal adherence to the Convention.

3. Given that the destruction of States Parties’ declared chemical weapons stockpiles is nearly complete, the OPCW should increasingly focus on preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons and avoiding the risk of their proliferation, with a view to excluding the possibility of their use by any state, non-State actor or individual, anywhere and at any time.

4. Border control, import and export control regimes, as well as law enforcement measures need to be enhanced by States Parties to detect, deter, and combat illicit trafficking and brokering of chemicals of dual use, to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of non-State actors. The OPCW should assist and encourage States Parties in this regard and ensure that there will be a “level playing field” for such controls, prioritising developing countries, to avoid loopholes.

**Recommendations related to verification**

5. The verification regime is a core element of the Convention and the commitments of the States Parties, is key to creating confidence and strengthening transparency among States Parties, enhancing knowledge about global use and trade of dual-use chemicals, and for detecting or deterring prohibited activities; as such, its integrity must be maintained.

6. Given the ongoing relevance of verification of the complete destruction of all categories of chemical weapons, the OPCW should maintain the capacity to deal with non-stockpile-related issues, such as ongoing discoveries of old and abandoned chemical weapons, which will need to be destroyed in accordance with the Convention.

7. In light of the changing security environment and scientific and technical advances made since the negotiation of the Convention, and in order to ensure the continuing relevance and effectiveness of the Convention’s verification regime, the Convention’s verification regime will need to continue to adapt, including with regard to the
convergence of chemistry and biology, especially the issue of production of scheduled or harmful chemicals related to the Convention through bio-mediated synthesis, and the possibility of new chemicals being developed that could be more toxic than the ones currently listed in the Convention. This convergence not only calls for a closer interaction in the implementation of the Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, but highlights the need to work closely with industry and academia.

8. Verification activities should be carried out based on a risk-based approach, in which States Parties’ declarations would continue to form the basis for such activities, but factors such as States Parties’ technical capacities, advances in science and technology, voluntary measures by relevant stakeholders, and the degree to which effective national implementation measures are in place should be taken into account in prioritising activities. Any information used in this context should be based on credible sources.

9. The Convention mandates the Organisation to verify compliance in order to prevent violations of the Convention. In this regard, the OPCW should continue to perform verification activities on-site as well as off-site, including, as appropriate, through non-routine missions and sampling and analysis, with reliable, state-of-the-art inspection equipment and with adequate fit-for-purpose procedures. This will require adaptations in information management, funding, staffing and the introduction of improved methodologies and new technologies.

10. In light of the increase of non-routine verification activities the Organisation should augment its remote verification capabilities, including through the use of drones, in order to minimise risks for inspectors after a suspected chemical weapons release. This will ensure that the Secretariat improves and strengthens the verification processes of the OPCW Fact-Finding Missions and will ensure that the Secretariat maintains the integrity and independence required under the Convention.

11. Close cooperation and exchange with the chemical industry are essential to a robust and evolving verification regime; accordingly, the Executive Council’s Industry Cluster and its programme of work should be revitalised, to ensure consensus-based progress on long-standing issues, incorporating the inputs of technical and industry experts. A facilitation process should be used to arrive at common understandings of terms and approaches to ensure consistency in declarations among States Parties and OPCW verification activities.

12. The Secretariat’s capabilities of conducting both inspections and fact-finding missions should be further strengthened, including by enhancing capabilities for assessment of declarations and sampling and analysis, and by adopting new or emerging technologies as identified by the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and the Secretariat. The OPCW’s laboratory capabilities and the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) should keep abreast of evolving technologic and scientific developments and be updated as required.

13. In order to close existing gaps in geographical coverage in both Latin America and Africa and consistent with the effective implementation of Article XI, the OPCW should increase the number of designated laboratories, and develop a special initiative to that end. Training currently offered by the Secretariat for specialists from the
different regions should be augmented with a view to enhance their laboratories’ prospects of qualifying as an OPCW designated laboratory.

14. The OPCW Laboratory should be transformed into a sustainable state-of-the-art facility, with additional and relevant new equipment and expertise, as outlined in the report presented to the OEWG-FP (S/1512/2017, dated 10 July 2017). To that end, the Secretariat should:

(a) further assess the needs for laboratory expansion, providing the business case and cost analysis for different options;

(b) define the infrastructure requirements for equipment, supported by internal and external experts;

(c) prepare concrete plans for project implementation;

(d) establish a trust fund for the expansion of the OPCW Laboratory; and

(e) encourage States Parties, in a position to do so, to make voluntary financial contributions to the above-mentioned trust fund.

15. OPCW proficiency testing should increasingly address the identification of unknown or novel toxic chemicals, in order to enable investigations of alleged use in which no match with a scheduled chemical could be found. The Secretariat should evaluate approaches for such a scenario.

16. The Organisation should continuously strengthen its sampling and analytical capabilities, accompanied by strengthening forensic and attribution capabilities. Joint efforts of the OPCW Laboratory and States Parties to build capacity in the areas of environmental and clinical/biomedical samples, toxins, and central nervous system-acting chemicals should be augmented.

17. The OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) should be expanded and improved and the Organisation should ensure a steady increase of its content of the OCAD with the Convention’s relevant chemicals, including, but not limited to, riot control agents, central nervous system-acting chemicals, and their degradation products.

18. In order to facilitate the forensic analysis and attribution of use of chemical weapons, the Organisation should develop a “fingerprint data base” for chemical weapons agents developed by different State and non-State actors, as this will be imperative for tracing and cross-referencing a toxic chemical or precursor to a particular source or production route.

19. The Organisation should add newer, highly toxic agents and their precursors to the Schedules on a regular basis, or as needed, using the mechanism under Article XV on “changes of a technical nature.”

Recommendations related to capacity development

20. The threat of re-emergence of chemical weapons and their potential use by State and non-State actors requires States Parties to ensure that they have adopted all necessary
measures to fully implement their obligations as required under Article VII, including a clear legislative framework and monitoring system for imports and exports of relevant chemical agents.

21. In order to ensure the full implementation by all States Parties of their obligations under the Convention and to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons; and consistent with States Parties’ commitments under Article XI with regard to the economic or technological development of States Parties and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities, capacity building must remain a key element in the Organisation’s activities and should be strengthened, if possible. Without prejudice to its primary function as a specialised security organisation, the OPCW could make a contribution to the economic development of States Parties by helping them create and maintain legal and policy frameworks—including with regard to import and export—that fully implement the Convention and foster international cooperation.

22. The outcome of the work of the Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors under the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism (EC-86/DEC.9, dated 13 October 2017) should be considered as a future priority of the Organisation, in particular in the context of capacity building activities.

23. The OPCW’s capacity development activities should pursue an improved strategic approach, including the transition from an activity-based approach to a programme-based one, to ensure implementation of effective programmes and maximise value for money. The Secretariat’s International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) programme remains central to these activities and should be planned and implemented with a clear vision on outcomes and sustainable results.

24. The effectiveness and efficiency of the Organisation’s capacity development activities should be enhanced. To this end, the Organisation should pursue a more systematic application of results-based management (RBM) and integrated planning in its programmes, consistent with “Medium-term goal six”, from the document ‘Medium Term Plan for the OPCW 2017-2021’ (document EC-83/S/1 C-21/S/1, dated 8 April 2016). The OPCW should build relevant skills and methodologies within the Secretariat.

25. The Secretariat should strive for strict implementation of RBM, including through needs assessments, monitoring, evaluation, impact studies, meaningful key performance indicators and a lessons-learned approach, is essential for increasing the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of capacity development activities within the ICA programme. Capacity building activities should address all aspect of the implementation cycle, including ensuring enforcement capabilities.

26. States Parties in receipt of capacity building initiatives should intensify their engagement—both proactive and responsive—with the Secretariat and should make practical, implementable and sustainable proposals for programmes that they view as beneficial to their full implementation of the Convention. They should assist the Secretariat by identifying appropriate participants in OPCW courses, capable of transferring acquired knowledge domestically. They should provide evidence of knowledge transfer after participation in training courses by their nationals, ensure
that there is effective follow-up to activities, and proactively provide evidence of impact of learning activities.

27. States Parties should ensure that funding for capacity development programmes is strengthened through the regular OPCW budget, rather than primarily depending on voluntary contributions.

28. The Secretariat should pursue other opportunities for enhancing the Organisation’s capacity development portfolio, including by considering how the ICA can help build up the designated laboratory system, making the most of the alumni network, improving subregional cooperation within national and the sharing of best practices between States Parties and with the Secretariat. National Authorities are encouraged to reach out to the Secretariat to propose laboratories to take part in the proficiency test for designated laboratories.

29. The OPCW should develop guidelines on integrated chemicals management, to help equip developing countries with knowledge on best practices in chemical management. To this end, the Secretariat could develop guidelines on how best to control chemical trade, offer practical technical assistance to help States Parties adapt these guidelines to their specific national conditions, and provide training, implementation tools and other forms of implementation support.

30. The OPCW should consider the creation of regional or subregional centres of excellence, with technical support from the OCPW, in partnership and with active participation of the States Parties in the region or subregion, and with sponsorship by donors, especially in regions where resources are limited. The Organisation should explore the increased use of existing centres of excellence or labs in universities or industrial facilities, as engines able to pool and spread knowledge and build capacity in the regions and respective industries.

31. The Organisation should ensure that proposals are coordinated with existing initiatives, such as the EU centres of excellences or the capacity building activities of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and should explore and leverage possible synergies with other international organisations working in related fields. Close cooperation between governments and chemical industry is essential for effective and efficient implementation of the Convention, including through capacity building.

**Recommendations related to the engagement of external partners**

32. The OPCW’s engagement activities should serve to achieve the goals of the Convention by raising public awareness of and support for those goals through engagement with external stakeholders. In addition, the OPCW should be able to simultaneously engage with multiple audiences during crisis situations and to manage sensitive issues.

33. Enhanced cooperation with other international organisations would produce important synergies, in particular as regards sharing best practices on CBRN incident responses. The Secretariat should explore additional opportunities for joint demarches, capacity building events or coordination on assistance and protection, including response to
major contingencies with relevant organisations like the IAEA, the CTBTO, and the BWC-ISU.

34. In view of the convergence between biology and chemistry, the OPCW should explore further cooperation with the BWC-ISU, and consider inviting BWC-ISU officials to hold BWC-focussed discussions on the margins of regional Convention meetings attended by relevant National Authorities.

35. The Secretariat should develop a forward-looking, long-term strategic blueprint and roadmap for education and outreach, commensurate with the needs and requirements of the Organisation’s core mandate and future priorities. Mechanisms should be put in place to evaluate the results of engagement activities.

36. Public engagement, education, and awareness-raising must become an integral part of OPCW activities, taking into account advice by the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO), in order to strive for maximum public awareness, education, and augmented engagement of external partners. The Secretariat should increase its investment in the External Relations Division to develop the tools and specialised expertise necessary to reach and communicate with multiple audiences around the world. This includes cutting edge digital outreach and crisis communication tools, webcasting, new e-learning modules, public diplomacy activities, participation by staff in external events and conferences, updating and improvement of the OPCW website, and exploration of new channels of communication, especially in the social media sphere.

37. To advance the important role civil society, academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can play in assisting States Parties to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons, in the prevention of their re-emergence, and in supporting National Authorities to improve domestic implementation of the Convention, the OPCW should engage with as broad a range of civil society organisations as possible.

38. Civil society involvement in OPCW activities should be strengthened, including through round tables among stakeholders (IGOs, NGOs, academia, industry) at conferences where national delegates are invited to attend. The OPCW should continue making available and enhancing materials and information provided to civil society organisations. States Parties should support such engagement through the regular budget, as well as consider doing so through voluntary contributions, and should encourage civil society participation in appropriate domestic activities and events.

39. The Conference of States Parties should be treated as an inclusive and non-discriminatory event for NGO engagement. Accreditation of NGOs should be apolitical. Groups that have undergone the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) vetting procedure and have subsequently received ECOSOC accreditation should be accredited, upon request, for attendance at OPCW events, including sessions of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) or the Review Conference. At the same time, not all civil society groups or NGOs can be permitted to automatically participate in all activities of the Organisation, and certain conditions may govern their attendance at specific events.
40. OPCW and States Parties should work actively with non-governmental stakeholders, including industry, academia, NGOs, and media to facilitate the organisation of timely and pertinent side events at CSPs and Review Conferences.

**Recommendations related to organisational governance, management and resources**

**Human resources and knowledge management**

41. In order to enable the OPCW to swiftly react to potential threats of chemical terrorism, and to respond to emergency situations or incidents on the territory of States Parties, the OPCW’s incident response activities should be adequately resourced with strong and up-to-date capabilities, including the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and the Rapid Response and Assistance Mission (RRAM).

42. Mindful that the OPCW is a non-career organisation and that the total length of service for staff is seven years, except as otherwise specified, and taking note of Executive Council decision EC-M-31/DEC.2, dated 24 November 2011, which allows the Council to explore alternative employment models to meet the Organisation’s operational requirements, as well as subsequent decisions on the rehiring of inspectors, the OEWG-FP recommends that in order to sustain successes on its complex and technical mandate, the Director-General should be empowered to retain the Organisation’s most talented and experienced personnel, particularly in the area of chemical weapons related knowledge and expertise, beyond the current seven-year-tenure.

43. In order to preserve the continuity of knowledge and expertise in the Secretariat and to ensure the OPCW’s ability to meet its business needs and operational effectiveness, the Secretariat should augment its talent management, knowledge management, training, and succession planning policies with a view to further minimising the risk of loss of knowledge, expertise and experienced personnel.

44. The Director-General should be provided with the option of creating further limited exemptions from the seven-year tenure rule for select staff in key functions, keeping in mind the importance of geographic diversity.

45. The OPCW should provide adequate training, including on-site training and practice, for industry inspectors, particularly their leaders, to ensure a high degree of knowledge, skill and experience. Practical training exercises, facilitating interaction with other treaty organisations and stakeholders, as well as knowledge sharing should be provided to facilitate team building and selection. Particularly in the context of investigations of alleged use it will be vital to ensure SSAFE training for all appropriate inspectors. States Parties should consider offering or supporting relevant training efforts upon request by the Secretariat.

46. The Organisation in its recruitment policy should take into account the importance of gender balance and guarantee equal access to women in the process of selection for posts in the Secretariat. To this end, it should increase the number of women in management positions, without implying any fixed quota. States Parties should ensure that the candidates they submit for consideration for posts within the Organisation, at all levels, include qualified women.
47. The OPCW should provide new staff members with a good understanding of the Organisation, its history, and important decisions by the policy-making organs (PMOs). Specialised training should include case studies about past investigations and non-routine verification activities.

Financial resources and planning

48. In order to facilitate incorporating a longer-term and more strategic view when prioritising funding and to reduce the labour required in creating an annual programme and budget, bring visibility to unfunded requirements, and factor in inflation into the non-staff component of the budget, the Organisation should move from an annual to a biennial programme and budget cycle from 2019 onwards, beginning with the 2020-2021 programme and budget cycle. Future financing of the Organisation should be increasingly based on results-based management (RBM) principles.

49. States Parties should ensure that their assessed contributions are paid on time in order to allow effective planning by the Organisation.

50. The OPCW Working Capital Fund (WCF) is essential for bridging the gap between cash inflow and outflow. The Organisation should ensure that the WCF maintains sufficient liquidity.

51. Acknowledging the importance of extra-budgetary funding through earmarked contributions, programme support costs, non-governmental donors, and innovative financing, the Secretariat should pursue improved centralisation of functions for extra budgetary resources with a view to improve external outreach, the understanding of existing funding and management mechanisms, the effective use of programme support costs, related information management, and building and maintaining trust with States Parties and extra-budgetary donors.

52. The Technical Secretariat should also, in close cooperation with States Parties, develop and maintain a major capital investment plan to prevent “spikes” in its regular programme and budget and give visibility to irregular or non-recurrent funding requirements. Such requirements could be potentially resourced by assessed contributions, voluntary trust funds or the use of a cash surplus, if and when available, and if the relevant PMO so decides.

Recommendations related to future policy discussions

Aerosolising central nervous system-acting chemicals in law enforcement scenarios

53. Noting the increasing concern, notwithstanding Convention Article II, paragraph 9 (d), among States Parties that toxic chemicals which target the central nervous system (CNS), and their potential use in aerosolised form in certain law enforcement scenarios, undermine the object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board conclusion that CNS-acting chemicals cannot be used safely for law enforcement purposes, the Organisation should commence an inclusive policy discussion in its PMOs without pre-empting its outcome. Such a policy discussion could take into account the implications of any interpretative
statements on the use of CNS-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes for the implementation of the Convention, including its verification regime.

54. States Parties in a position to do so should make known their national positions on these chemicals for law enforcement purposes.

Voluntary consultations and collaboration on the issue of sea-dumped chemical weapons

55. Taking into account United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/258, dated 24 July 2013 on “Cooperative measures to assess and increase awareness of environmental effects related to waste originating from chemical munitions dumped at sea,” the Organisation should:

(a) invite States Parties to support voluntary sharing of information related to chemical munitions dumped at sea;

(b) raise awareness and facilitate cooperation on this issue, and;

(c) continue to serve as a forum for voluntary consultation and cooperation on this matter.

Annexes

Annex 1: Methods of Work of the OEWG-FP

Annex 2: Work Programme of the OEWG-FP, 2016-17

Annex 3: List of Written Submissions by States Parties to the OEWG-FP
Annex 1

Methods of Work (as of 1 November 2016)¹

The co-chairs of the OPCW’s Open-Ended Working Group on Future Priorities (OEWG-FP) will apply the following methods of work in executing the body’s mission:

1. **Mandate**: The deliberations of the OEWG-FP will be guided by the mandate provided by the Executive Council in EC-82/DEC.2 (July 14, 2016):

   “...an informal mechanism for receiving, discussing, prioritising, elaborating, and integrating ideas and proposals from States Parties and the Secretariat on the future priorities of the OPCW on any aspect of the Convention or developments relevant to it with a view to supplying a holistic, coherent, forward-looking, and action-oriented document consisting of recommendations for consideration by the [Fourth Review Conference] as a contribution to the full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of all provisions of the Convention”.

2. **Frequency of Meetings**: Plenary meetings of the OEWG-FP will be convened approximately once per quarter, with additional meetings – including informal meetings or consultations – to be scheduled by the co-chairs as required.

3. **Timing**: The co-chairs will strive to convene plenary meetings a minimum of two weeks in advance of sessions of the Policy-Making Organs (PMOs).

4. **Agenda / Documents**: A notional agenda will be circulated a minimum of two weeks in advance of meetings. Any documents for discussion will be circulated as far in advance of meetings as possible, and no later than one week prior.

5. **Participation**: The OEWG-FP shall operate on a transparent and inclusive basis. All States Parties will be invited to be represented at meetings and to share their views in oral or written form on all aspects of the Convention. The Scientific Advisory Board, Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, and outside stakeholders (other international organizations, private sector associations, academics, civil society, etc.) may be invited to provide input on specific subjects as appropriate, with a view to informing States Parties’ discussions.

6. **Presiding chair**: The co-chairs will decide in advance of every meeting on a lead chair who will preside.

7. **Technical Secretariat**: The work of the OEWG-FP will be supported principally by the Office of Strategy & Policy, with specialized support from relevant branches as needed.

8. **Minutes**: A summary of discussion of every plenary meeting of the OEWG-FP will be circulated by the co-chairs to States Parties prior to the next plenary.

¹ Note: In the interest of transparency, this document was circulated to States Parties for discussion at the first meeting of the OEWG-FP on September 26, 2016 and was revised to reflect input received.
9. **Relationship with other informal mechanisms**: In order to avoid duplicating the work or competence of existing informal mechanisms, the co-chairs will consult with other facilitators and may refer topics falling within the mandate of another mechanism to that body for discussion, feedback, and formal input as appropriate, including text for integration into the recommendations of the OEWG-FP. The co-chairs may also convene joint meetings of the OEWG-FP with other mechanisms to assist and inform the deliberations of States Parties on individual topics.

10. **Outputs**: The OEWG-FP will endeavour to reach its recommendations to the Fourth Review Conference (RC-4) on the basis of consensus. Those enjoying broad cross-regional support among a large majority of participating States Parties will be transmitted directly to RC-4. Where a significant divergence of opinion exists, options will be presented by the OEWG-FP to an appropriate PMO for decision prior to submission to RC-4. The OEWG-FP may, where consensus exists, submit recommendations or documents on specific self-contained issues that arise in the course of discussions to the PMOs for consideration and decision on an ad hoc basis.

11. **Relationship to the preparatory OEWG for RC-4**: The OEWG-FP is separate and distinct from the preparatory OEWG for RC-4. Pursuant to its mandate from the Executive Council, the OEWG-FP’s substantive recommendations will be transmitted directly to RC-4.

12. **Reporting to PMOs**: The PMOs will be kept regularly informed of the proceedings of the OEWG-FP through written reports and/or oral updates from the co-chairs.

13. **Replacement of co-chairs**: In the event a co-chair is unable to continue in the position, she/he will be replaced through the usual nomination process for facilitators. It is recommended that nominees hold ambassadorial rank and hail from a different regional group than the other co-chair. The appointment of any new co-chair must be confirmed by a PMO.
## Annex 2

### Work programme of the OEWG-FP, 2016-17:

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<td>The evolution of the verification regime; presentations by:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Mr Philippe Denier, Director of Verification, Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td>- Mr Cheng Tang, Vice-Chairperson, OPCW Scientific Advisory Board</td>
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<td>- Mr Wolfgang Rechenhofer, Facilitator of the Industry Cluster</td>
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<td>- Mr Detlef Männig, International Council of Chemical Associations</td>
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<td>13 Feb 2017</td>
<td>States Parties discussion on the presentations and on the evolution of</td>
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<td>the verification regime</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>10 Apr 2017</td>
<td>Capacity development needs and tools, presentations by:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Mr Shawn DeCaluwe, Head, Assistance and Protection, Technical</td>
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<td>- Mr M. Khaliq, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security,</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
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<td>- Ms Deidre Penfold, CAIA, South Africa</td>
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<td>- Ms Kim Reid, Canada</td>
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<td>3 May 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>- Mr Chen Kai, Director, External Relations Division, Technical</td>
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<td>- Ms Edith Valles, Vice-Chairperson, OPCW Advisory Board on</td>
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<td>- Mr Paul Walker, Chairperson, CWC Coalition, and,</td>
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<td>- Mr Daniel Feakes, Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit, Geneva</td>
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<td>27 Jun 2017</td>
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Annex 3

List of Written Submissions by States Parties to the OEWG-FP

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<th>Submission received from</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Segment 1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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| Segment 2                                 | Australia, on 15 November 2016  
Japan, on 26 November 2016 |
| Segment 3                                 | United Kingdom, on 14 February 2017  
Japan, on 15 February 2017  
Switzerland, on 16 February 2017  
Cuba, on 3 November 2017 (NV containing EC-85/NAT.12, dated 13 July 2017) |
| Segment 4                                 | Romania, on 3 May 2017  
Japan, on 3 May 2017  
Nigeria, on 4 May 2017  
United Kingdom, on 17 May 2017  
Cuba, on 3 November 2017 (NV containing EC-85/NAT.13, dated 12 July 2017)  
Article XI facilitator, on 30 January 2018 (list of ideas from Art. XI workshop held 21 November 2017) |
| Segment 5                                 | N/A                      |
| Segment 6                                 | N/A                      |
| Segment 7                                 | Pakistan, on 3 November 2017  
OEWG-T and SWG-NSA, on 14 November 2017  
Switzerland, on 4 December 2017 |
| First draft recommendations document circulated on 8 February 2018 | Japan, on 21 February 2018  
Portugal, on 22 February 2018  
United States of America, on 23 February 2018  
Australia, on 6 March 2018  
Iran, on 9 March 2018  
Cuba, on 9 March 2018  
Brazil, on 12 March 2018  
Russian Federation, on 18 March 2018 |
| Revised draft recommendations document circulated on 30 April 2018 | Cuba, on 11 May 2018  
Iran, on 16 May 2018 |