



International Cooperation and
Assistance Division
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**REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST MEETING TO COORDINATE
ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE X OF THE CONVENTION**

1. Introduction

- 1.1 The first meeting to coordinate assistance under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention was held at the Karel Appel Hall in The Hague on Monday 26 January 1998. The following delegations were represented at the meeting:

Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Chile, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.

- 1.2 The meeting adopted its agenda (annex 1 to this report) and deliberated on the various items contained in it. The matters which generated most discussion and interest are reported on below.

2. Agenda items 3 - 5

- 2.1 A background paper prepared by the International Cooperation and Assistance Division (annex 2 to this report) was presented to the meeting. Updated and detailed information on the offers of assistance and contributions to the Voluntary Fund for Assistance made so far was provided, and the need for more specific and detailed information on the offers of assistance was identified.

- 2.2 Some delegations considered it to be inevitable that, in the initial stage, only very general offers of assistance could be made in certain cases, and that efforts would be made to gradually make such offers more specific and detailed, as more became known about the fields in which the most urgent needs existed. Several delegations expressed the intention of their capitals to review their initial declarations of assistance and to provide more detailed information about their offers. Some delegations anticipated new offers in different categories of assistance.

- 2.3 The Secretariat, through the provision of information and advice on areas in which deficiencies existed, should undertake to assist States Parties to elaborate more specific offers. It was generally recognised that there was a need for as many specifications as possible, preferably in accordance with the format contained in document C-I/DEC.12, with the purpose of facilitating the proper planning of assistance activities.
- 2.4 One delegation suggested the elaboration of detailed explanations of the different scenarios relating to the use or threat of use of chemical weapons which could trigger the OPCW's assistance mechanism. This would facilitate an assessment of the required resources needed which, in turn, would help States Parties to prepare their offers of assistance.
- 2.5 A number of delegations expressed their intention to establish contact with the Secretariat, in order to inform it about their capacity to provide additional offers in certain time-critical areas of assistance such as means of protection and medical treatment for the civilian population.
- 2.6 Other points raised and suggestions made in the initial general discussion are exemplified by the following:
- assistance in cases of chemical catastrophes is outside the scope of the Convention;
 - information on chemical catastrophes can be of use when planning Convention-related assistance;
 - a list of national disaster contact points should be compiled and distributed;
 - establishment of regional stocks of material for assistance should be considered;
 - the operational framework for assistance measures should be clearly defined; and
 - the legal aspects of assistance operations must be clarified.

3. Agenda item 6

An overview was provided of the presently available offers, broken down into the various categories of assistance. The need for additional offers within those categories was pointed out and discussed as follows:

(a) Detection

- (i) Nine offers of detection equipment, specialists or detection teams had been made. Many of these offers were very non-specific.
- (ii) Several delegations stated that they had made only general offers and would be prepared to come back with details, once a better overview of the actual need had been obtained. One delegation suggested that the Secretariat should contact Member States and specify what was required.

(b) Decontamination

Decontamination-related offers ranged from individual experts and analytical techniques to decontamination units equipped with heavy equipment. The Secretariat stated that an emphasis should be placed on personal decontamination equipment, and that further offers of this kind would be most welcome. Further offers of decontamination teams would also constitute very useful contributions. As decontaminants often had a limited shelf life, it was important for such offers to include information on the remaining useful life of the products.

(c) Acute medical treatment

- (i) Only five offers of assistance of this type have been made so far. This is clearly insufficient, and more offers would be most welcome. There is an urgent need for medical antidotes, as well as for medical teams.
- (ii) Several delegations indicated that they intend to discuss specific offers of antidotes and other pharmaceuticals with the Secretariat. One delegation stated that it would take up with the Secretariat the possibility of providing a rescue team at short notice. Such a team would include resources for acute medical treatment.

(d) Long-term medical treatment

- (i) Only one general offer has so far been made of long-term medical assistance. The two main possibilities are field hospitals and medical care at hospitals in assisting States. Several delegations indicated a preparedness to consider providing care of the latter type, and one delegation suggested that the Secretariat should try to acquire information which would provide a worldwide overview of available resources of this type.
- (ii) Although field hospitals are very costly to operate, some delegations indicated that their Member States were prepared to consider providing them, either on their own or in cooperation with other Member States. Furthermore, it was pointed out that field hospitals normally were not specifically for the care of CW-related injuries, but instead for all kinds of (battlefield) injuries.

(e) Personal protection

- (i) A number of offers of personal protection equipment have been received, especially offers of protection masks. However, should the need arise to equip large numbers of civilians with personal protective

equipment because of the risk of continued chemical weapons usage in an area, the need might be far larger than could be covered by the present offers.

- (ii) Several delegations stressed the importance of providing proper instruction in the use of personal protective equipment. Local instructors will have to be trained, and this could be done, for example by OPCW inspectors.
- (iii) Some delegations indicated that they would come back with specific offers in this area of assistance.

(f) Collective protection

One non-specific offer has been made. There is a special need for collective protection devices which can be used to provide a gas-tight seal for "normal" buildings, rooms, etc., and which can then supply purified air under over-pressure.

(g) Evacuation from the combat area

Several delegations indicated that general evacuation measures were beyond the scope of the Convention. However, specialist advice could be given as to where contamination could be expected and which routes might be safe from the point of view of contamination.

(h) Chemical assistance/multipurpose units

It was noted that four offers of this type had been made, and that more offers were desirable. The advantage of being able to select from a multipurpose team the individual parts that would be needed under a specific set of circumstances was highlighted.

4. Agenda item 7

The transportation of assistance equipment and teams is a critical issue. No offers of transportation have been made so far. It was pointed out that, from the insurance point of view, it will be impossible to charter civilian aircraft to fly into a combat zone, and that military aircraft would therefore have to be used. It was also pointed out that it might be possible to airlift material and personnel into a safe zone and to provide transport by road from there.

5. Agenda item 8

With regard to the use of the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, the need to discuss and develop guidelines was identified. It was generally stated that the Voluntary Fund should not be used for the advance procurement of items which it could be nice to have, but only when an actual emergency had occurred. It was suggested that, in

addition to the procurement of equipment, the Voluntary Fund could also be used to cover deployment costs such as air transport. Some delegations also suggested that the money could be used for preparations to provide assistance. Amounts could be conveniently ear-marked for specific purposes.

6. Agenda items 9 - 11

- 6.1 When item 9 of the agenda was being considered, the need to clarify through bilateral consultations the provision of advance training in the use of equipment which had been offered by another Member State was mentioned. Several participants expressed their preference for the training in the use of this equipment to be provided by the Member States making the respective offers.
- 6.2 When considering the issue of general instruction material on assistance and chemical protection, it was considered convenient to make such material available to Member States under the data bank on protection and to encourage contributions from Member States and, whenever possible, to have these contributions in other official languages of the Convention. The Secretariat is to identify gaps in this material and to fill these gaps. One major area in which there is a clear lack of information which could be readily distributed is that relating to protection against chemical weapons in tropical climates. One delegation expressed the willingness of its government to share information in this regard.
- 6.3 In this context, one delegation stated that the existing budgetary allocation for the procurement of material for the data bank on protection was not enough, and requested the Secretariat to draw the attention of the competent decision-making organs of the Organisation to the requirement for more resources for the procurement of assistance.

7. Agenda item 12

Some delegations considered that the Organisation's involvement in chemical catastrophes not related to the use or threat of use of chemical weapons does not fall within the mandate of Article X of the Convention. It was noted that this issue could merit further consideration. It was suggested that Member States be requested to provide information on the chemical catastrophes which they have endured and the experience gained in handling them, as an invaluable information resource for others. It was also suggested that the Secretariat should compile a listing of national contact points for disaster relief, for use by Member States. One delegation expressed its willingness to receive requests of assistance in this regard through the Organisation and to respond to such requests on a bilateral basis.

8. Agenda item 13

When considering the OPCW's relations with other international organisations for the purpose of providing assistance, several delegations considered it appropriate to identify in advance the role of the OPCW in the field when the sharing of assistance work with other international organisations was being contemplated.

9. Agenda item 14

Until now, the Secretariat has not received any confidential offers of assistance. It was stressed by several delegations that offers made by Member States should be transparent, and that such information should also be available to other Member States. The availability of such information would help delegations to prepare their offers of additional and/ or detailed assistance, and would also simplify regional planning. Such openness would also strengthen Article X.

Annex 1

**AGENDA FOR THE ASSISTANCE COORDINATION MEETING
26 JANUARY 1998**

1. Opening of the meeting
2. Adoption of the agenda
3. Review of declarations, offers and contributions made under Article X, paragraph 7
4. The need for specific and detailed information to facilitate planning
5. Identification of time-critical areas of assistance
6. Review of assistance categories to identify gaps, both in terms of equipment and personnel
 - (a) Detection
 - (b) Decontamination
 - (c) Acute medical treatment
 - (d) Long-term medical treatment
 - (e) Personal protection
 - (f) Collective protection
 - (g) Evacuation from combat areas
 - (h) Chemical assistance/protection multipurpose units
7. Deployment, including transportation, of assistance equipment and personnel
8. The use of the voluntary fund for assistance
 - (a) Advance procurement to cover gaps in assistance offers
 - (b) Procurement upon demand
9. Advance training in the use of offered equipment or development of "instant training modules"
10. General instruction material on assistance and chemical protection
 - (a) Making such material available to States Parties under the data bank on protection
 - (b) Translation of the material into (other) Convention languages
 - (c) Development of additional material

11. Assistance in cases of threats of use of chemical weapons, or riot control agents as a method of warfare
 - (a) Various forms of training and courses
 - (b) Provision of expert advice
 - (c) Provision of equipment
12. Chemical catastrophes not related to chemical weapons
 - (a) Assistance requests on a bilateral basis
 - (b) Channelling of assistance requests through the OPCW
 - (c) Coordination of assistance by the OPCW
13. Cooperation with international relief organisations
14. Any other business
15. Closure of the meeting

Annex 2

FIRST COORDINATION MEETING ON ASSISTANCE UNDER ARTICLE X OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

BACKGROUND PAPER BY THE ICA DIVISION¹

1. Introduction

- 1.1 The objectives of the OPCW are to achieve the elimination and non-proliferation of chemical weapons, to bring them under international control, and thus to contribute to international peace and security. To a large extent, the test of the relevance of the Organisation will be whether it achieves these goals.
- 1.2 Under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the OPCW is required to provide assistance to States Parties in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them. The CWC has generated high expectations both among the Member States of the OPCW, and among the international community as a whole.
- 1.3 Although the CWC and the establishment of the OPCW have served as deterrents to the future use of these weapons of mass destruction, their total elimination is still a medium-to long-term goal. Despite its impressive membership, the Convention is still not universal, with the result that the threat of chemical warfare will remain for a long time to come.
- 1.4 If chemical weapons were to be used, the Organisation and its ability to provide timely and efficient assistance to victims would be scrutinised by both the international community and the world's media. Any failure to perform adequately would undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the Organisation's credibility and its influence on the process of international disarmament.

2. Building the OPCW's capability to provide assistance

- 2.1 Building the OPCW's capability to respond as required to provide assistance is an enormous task. Adequate levels of assistance can be attained only through the commitment of the Member States to the provisions of Article X of the Convention and to proper planning, both of which are prerequisites for the successful implementation of the CWC. It will be through the offers and contributions of the States Parties that the Organisation will develop its capability to respond in a crisis situation.
- 2.2 Nine months after the entry into force of the Convention in April 1997, much remains to be done in the field of assistance. The appendix to annex 2 to this paper provides a

¹ Edited version.

number of examples of the substantive offers of assistance received so far. These examples illustrate the very different ways in which such offers are formulated, making proper planning extremely difficult.

- 2.3 A closer look at what has been offered so far, and at what may be required in a crisis situation, shows that the present level of resources would have to be improved, and that proper coordination mechanisms would have to be established to respond appropriately in the case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. It is of course impossible to predict when and where such an event will occur. This uncertainty lends a sense of urgency to the process of building the Organisation's capability to respond.
- 2.4 Estimates of assistance requirements have so far been made on the basis of the occurrence of a single CW attack, even though it is likely that there would be more than one attack during a conflict. If several incidents were to occur simultaneously at different locations, the need for resources for emergency assistance would of course be even greater.

3. Voluntary Fund (Article X, subparagraph 7(a))

- 3.1 By 27 January 1998, a total of ten States Parties had contributed to the OPCW's Voluntary Fund, and a number of other States Parties had promised to contribute in the future (see EC-VIII/DG.7, dated 27 January 1998).
- 3.2 There are no upper or lower limits to the States Parties' contributions to the Voluntary Fund. However, in order to ensure an appropriate level of resources for the Voluntary Fund, it has been suggested that each State Party's contribution should be approximately 5.7% of its annual contribution to the regular OPCW budget (EC-IV/DG.4, dated 28 August 1997).
- 3.3 As of 27 January 1998, the balance of the Voluntary Fund account was only NLG 452,601.69, which represented just over 5% of the NLG 8 million deemed by the Director-General to be the minimum amount necessary to deal with a **single** CW attack (EC-IV/DG.4, dated 28 August 1997).

4. Bilateral agreements (Article X, subparagraph 7(b))

No bilateral agreements have yet been concluded, although some Member States are considering the usefulness of this option.

5. Unilateral declarations (Article X, subparagraph 7(c))

By 20 January 1998, twenty unilateral declarations of assistance had been provided by States Parties, some of which had also announced their intention to contribute to the Voluntary Fund.

6. Areas of deficiency

6.1 In general, the offers of assistance that have been made so far have been insufficient. For example, no offers have yet been made in the areas of transportation, field hospitals or communications, all of which will be essential in providing emergency and humanitarian assistance.

6.2 The low level of resources that are currently available to the Voluntary Fund means that it will not be possible to provide funds to rectify these areas of deficiency. Any assistance operation would be inconceivable without the appropriate resources in these areas.

7. Benefits of coordinating assistance, and the need for further information on offers of assistance

7.1 In a crisis situation, decisions have to be made in a very short space of time, to ensure that advance information will facilitate the timely delivery of assistance. Coordinating the offers of assistance of Member States can greatly benefit the overall efforts to this end. Proper coordination would have many advantages, particularly in helping to avoid duplication of efforts, as well as to identify and rectify areas of deficiency.

7.2 The material (equipment, provisions, etc.) and expertise available for assistance will basically remain with the Member States. It is therefore of the utmost importance that each Member State provides the OPCW with as much detailed information as possible on the resources that could be made available to the Organisation in the different geographic regions, particularly in the region closest to the event in question. This would greatly facilitate the prompt and efficient delivery of emergency assistance in the form in which it will be needed.

7.3 Some of the unilateral declarations made by Member States simply state their willingness to provide assistance available to them when called upon by the Organisation. This kind of general information, although perfectly consistent with the provisions of the Convention, does not enable the Organisation to plan effectively for events, and entails certain potential risks. Furthermore, for various reasons, the actual assistance given may differ in detail at the time of delivery from what was promised. It is therefore necessary to look closely at ways and means of ensuring that any necessary assistance is available as and when it is needed.

7.4 In order for the OPCW to be able to fill the gaps in the resources that are available for assistance purposes, offers from Member States should be regularly updated, and updated information on such changes should be made available to the Organisation. Alternative ways to fill in any gaps in the resources available could also be considered, such as providing the Voluntary Fund with sufficient resources.

8. Other special circumstances to be considered

- 8.1 Special circumstances may arise which could severely test the Organisation's capability to provide timely and meaningful assistance. These circumstances should therefore be considered.
- 8.2 Chemical catastrophes occur with an alarming frequency. Some of the most dramatic accidents have taken place in developing countries², and have claimed thousands of lives. For any country, whether developing or industrialised, a chemical catastrophe is an arduous and devastating experience, and each country will handle such an event as best it can. Some recent incidents have dramatically demonstrated the need for international assistance:
- In 1976, the accident in Seveso, Italy, caused 183 cases of tetrachlorodibenzo-*p*-dioxin poisoning. Many children were disfigured by chloracne, and 4,450 acres of farmland were poisoned, resulting in the death of 100,000 animals, and the evacuation of 1,000 people.
 - In 1986, a fire at the warehouse of Sandoz AG in Basel, Switzerland, caused a massive spill of contaminated water into the River Rhine. The spill affected drinking water supplies within the densely populated area and resulted in the death of more than 500,000 fish.
 - In 1996, a fire at a CMI storage facility containing about 100 tonnes of hydrochloric acid and chlorine-based products in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, caused the release of a cloud of poisonous fumes that drifted over parts of Europe's largest port. In this first full disaster alert since World War II, the residents of the city were instructed to stay indoors, and 17 people were injured.³
 - In 1981, an accidental release of chlorine in Montana, Mexico, killed 29 people, injured 100, and 5,000 had to be evacuated.
 - The case of Bhopal, in India, in 1984, is perhaps the most notorious chemical catastrophe, in which 2,500 people were killed, 10,000 were seriously injured, 20,000 were partially disabled, and 180,000 were adversely affected in other ways. In addition, 150,000 cases of injury appeared only some time later.
- 8.3 Article X of the CWC defines assistance as "the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons". Each State Party has the right to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. Article X identifies three kinds of assistance: emergency, humanitarian, and supplementary, all of which require resources to be readily available on demand.

² *The Bhopal Syndrome*, David Weir, 1988.

³ Environmental Disaster Timeline. ebase@earthbase.org12/4/97.

- 8.4 It should be recognised that the development of the OPCW's assistance capability will inevitably have an impact on the way in which future Member States, particularly those in the developing world, will look to the OPCW for support to deal with problems created by major chemical disasters, especially in the initial stages when emergency and humanitarian assistance are most urgently required. Chemicals-related catastrophes other than the use of chemical weapons could confront the Organisation with the need to act politically and on humanitarian grounds, beyond what is strictly stipulated in Article X.
- 8.5 In the case of an unexpected chemical accident on the territory of a Member State such as those referred to in subparagraph 8.2 above, the OPCW's capacity and willingness to go beyond a strict legal interpretation of its mandate to provide assistance could be put to the test.
- 8.6 In such a context, it would be difficult to conceive of a situation in which the OPCW would not be called upon to provide assistance in the event of a chemical catastrophe, since the OPCW is the one international organisation with specialised expertise in the field of the toxic properties of chemicals. A scenario such as this would require an immediate political assessment and a decision by the Executive Council, which is empowered to trigger the Organisation's assistance mechanism. It would therefore be appropriate to give advance consideration to this possible scenario, and to design ways and means of dealing with it. For this purpose, general guidelines could be elaborated and submitted for consideration by the Executive Council, through the appropriate procedures.

Appendix 1 to Annex 2

EXAMPLES OF OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE MADE BY STATES PARTIES (UPDATED)

29 April 1997 to 26 January 1998

This annex lists a number of examples of the offers of assistance that have been made by States Parties. These offers are repeated here to illustrate the need to make such offers of assistance more precise, to facilitate planning.⁴ Although information on assistance is not classified, in the examples given here the names of the States Parties which made these offers of assistance have been omitted.

Example 1

- “ 1. Hand books on chemical defense
2. A specialist instructor for schools and laboratories of nuclear, biological and chemical defence, to give instruction in protection, detection and decontamination techniques.
3. Skilled support in analytical techniques which could be used for decontamination ”

Example 2

“ ...provide assistance in any of the general areas mentioned under Article X including:

- detection equipment (e.g. portable CW detection systems, hand-held monitors, detector kits, detector paper)
- protective equipment (e.g. respirators, NBC protective suits, NBC gloves, overboots)
- decontamination equipment and decontaminates (e.g. personnel decontamination kits, equipment decontamination stations)
- medical antidotes and treatments (e.g. therapeutic and prophylactic drugs such as nerve agent pre-treatment and treatment (autoinjectors) artificial respiration units)
- technical advice (on appropriate operation of CW defence equipment and treatment of casualties).”

Example 3

“ Disaster relief unit:

...the special unit is capable of the following missions due to its modular structure:

- Detection

⁴ The original texts have been retained as far as possible.

- Special analyses
- Decontamination
- SAR Tasks
- EOD Tasks
- Medical First Aid for Own Forces.

The modular structure of the unit allows, depending on the situation, various mission - types for assistance within the framework of the OPCW,

- Dispatch of single experts,
- Dispatch of special teams tailored to the task
- Establishment of groups according organigraph unit
- Establishment of the entire unit

The unit has the capability to fulfil the following detection and analysis tasks:

- Detection of personnel,
- Detection of equipment,
- Local detection of hazardous areas,
- Taking samples,
- Special analyses

The following equipment is available:

IMS CAM Graseby Dynamics Ltd.;
 Proengin AP2C
 IMS M 43A1
 Drager Multitwarn
 Drager Detector Pump System
 Mobile Mass Spectrometer
 Karcher Decojet-trailer Decontamination System
 Vehicles for Material and Personnel Decontamination
 Karcher Portable Lightweight Decontamination System DS10”

Example 4

“ I. Detection and decontamination equipment, include decontaminates for chemical warfare agents:

No.	Name	Type	Quantity
1.	Detector Kit for CWA	ORI-217	1
2.	Detective Tubes for Detection of CWA	TT11	100
		TT12	100
		TT13	100
		TT14.1	100
3.	Chemical agent Liquid detector	CALID-3	10

No.	Name	Type	Quantity
4.	Nerve agents Detection Strip	DETEHIT	10
5.	Decontamination Kit	OS-3	1
6.	Decontamination Solution	OR-3	5

II. Mobile chemical laboratory equipped with portable instruments as e.g. Gas Chromatographs, Mass of Infrared Spectrometers and analyzers with electrochemical detectors, including qualified staff. In the case of your interest, it is necessary to discuss the questions concerning the transfer to the place of use and the costs. It should be specified in an agreement between OPCW and ...”

Example 5

“ *Annex I: Specialized Assistance Team: Module no. 2*

8 team members (5 men and 3 women)

Gas and liquid detection of nerve agents, mustard agents and other toxic agents.

Detection of beta and gamma radiation and surface contamination

All team members are immunized against zymotic infections common in Europe

Motor car Ford-Transit with laboratory field, specialized lorry PV3s, caravan
personal chemical protection equipment for team members,
portable gas-analyzer, spectrophotometer, chemical detector of gas agents
quantimeter of dosage input of beta and gamma radiation
quantimeter of surface contamination by radiation
instrumental and chemical equipment, decontamination equipment
communication and administrative equipment

Capacity of the specialized team per 24 hours is about:

from 50 to 100 analysis of chemical agents

from 10 to 20 radiation analysis (20-50 radiation contamination detections)

Required preparation time before dispatch of the team is about 3 days.

It is advisable to provide local railway transport of specialized lorry PV3S for long distances (6,5m x 2m x 2,5 m / 7,25f)

Local infrastructure requirements of the team are: water, electricity, pabulum, fuel, lubrication.

For team members, appropriate accommodation and meals are required.

(...)

Annex 3: Specialized Assistance Team: two radiation and chemical recon platoons

18 team members (all men)

Detection source contamination, indicate contamination place, chemical survey way and military analytic control person, techniques, equipment and terrain

All team members are immunized against zymotic infections common in Europe.

6 recon armored personnel carrier BRDM-2rch, automatic detection of nerve agents (G and V) military chemical detector of gas agents (nerve agents (G and V), mustard agents, personal chemical protection equipment for team members, decontamination kit, filtration recon armored personnel carrier, communication equipment

Capacity of the specialized team is about: 30 km way or analytic control 10 samples per hour.

Required preparation time before dispatch of the team is about 2 days

Local infrastructure requirements of the team are: fuel (petrol BA-90, 67l/100km or 20l/h)

(...)

Annex 4: Specialized Assistance Team: One decontamination platoon.

19 team members (all men)

Decontamination techniques, equipment, terrain and objects

All team members are immunized against zymotic infections common in Europe.

2 pack car ARS-12M for decontamination techniques, equipment, terrain, carry water and preparation decontamination mixture

2 pack car TZ-74 for decontamination techniques (common in Europe).

2 pack car ARS-12M for decontamination techniques, equipment, terrain, carry water and preparation decontamination mixture

2 pack car TZ-74 for decontamination techniques (warm-air equipment)

1 pack car ST-t-815 for techniques decontamination

1 pack car PV3S - logistic

Capacity of the specialized team is about: from 16 - 20 unit technic per hour

Required preparation time before dispatch of the team is about 2 days.

S/38/98

Appendix 1

Annex 2

page 18

Local infrastructure requirements of the team are: fuel (ARS-12M naphtha 35 l / 100 kms or 20 l / hour; TZ-74 naphtha 50 l / 100 km and air petrol 700 l / 1 hour; St-T-815 naphtha 90 l/100 km or 10 l / hour and air petrol 650 l / hour)

Appropriate accommodation and meals are required for team members

Annex 5: Specialized Assistance team: Automobile laboratory

3 team members (all men)

Determine sort and quantify all known warlike toxic chemical substances at pattern, ascertain decontamination effectiveness and activity of decontamination mixture.

All team members are immunized against zymotic infections common in Europe.

1 pack car AL-1 PV3S with trail car. Enable to execute analysis sample measuring. Colorimetric and spectrophotometric method.

Capacity of the specialized team is: from 10 routine analysis or one analysis unknown substance per hour.

Required preparation time before dispatch of the team is about 2 days

Local infrastructure requirements of the team are : fuel (AL-1naphtha 35 l / 100 kms or electric generator petrol 10 l / hour.

Team members require appropriate accommodation and meals.

(...)

Annex 6: Treatment at assisting State Party Hospitals

Specialized treatment of intoxication

Specialized treatment of burnt injury

Specialized treatment of intoxication: 55 patients

Specialized treatment of burns: 50 patients

Fully specialized treatment of intoxication in three different faculty hospitals: 55 patients

Specialized treatment of burns in two cities hospitals: 50 patients.”

Example 6

“ Such assistance might comprise:

- 1) expert advice as regards
 - diagnosis and evaluation of resources to be deployed,
 - protection of the public.
- 2) Sending teams set up for the purpose and supplied with their own equipment:
 - to carry out detection procedures of any kind and procedures for marking out, bypassing and delimiting exclusion zones,
 - to organise general operations of assistance to the public, including care of victims and medical treatment of cases of poisoning.
- 3) more specifically, the rapid deployment of a team to gather information and evidence where it is alleged that chemical weapons have been used.”

Example 7

“...individual protective equipment, detection equipment and experts...”

Example 8

“...personnel and equipment for chemical agent detection and decontamination. A unit of up to battalion size can be made available in accordance with requirements specified by the Technical Secretariat in relation to unit tasks, composition and equipment.”

Example 9

“ Function of the equipment: personal protection, respiratory and eye protection;
Name, number or other designation of the equipment: individual gas protection mask - (military type)
Brief description of the purpose (s) for which the equipment can be used:
respiratory and eye protection against the action of gases, such as: general toxins, vesicants, nerve agents
Quantity that can be made available: 150 units
Estimated remaining useful shelf-life in years: 4
Time required for preparation before the equipment could be dispatched provided that transportation was available: 72 hours
Transportation information:
Number in each transportation unit package: 25 units
Size and weight of transportation unit package: 800x620x400 mm, 70 kg

Health or safety aspects to be observed: none
The regulations regarding the training for safety use of the equipment are included in each unit.”

Example 10

“... This could include expertise in the following areas:

- Detection
- Detection equipment and alarm systems
- Protective equipment
- Decontamination and decontamination equipment
- Medical antidotes and treatments
- Rescue service and protection of the population in a CW environment.

Some rescue service, antidotes against nerve agents, and protective equipment for medical personnel could also be considered.”

Example 11

“ Specialists from the national NBC-Laboratory
Test equipment and expertise needed to evaluate and test protection equipment
Training courses on CW-decontamination and protection against CW
Individual and collective protection for 10 000 persons.”

Example 12

“...medical antidotes, treatment and other assistance...”

Example 13

“...1000 kits for individual protection of the respiratory organs against toxic chemicals and chemical weapons;
1000 kits for individual protection of the skin against toxic chemicals and chemical weapons;
1000 individual protective packages, ...”

Example 14

“...medical treatment and advisory services... up to five medical specialists in the field of toxicology .”