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**ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**

**STATEMENT BY H.E. MR KAZEM GHARIB ABADI  
AMBASSADOR AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE OPCW  
AT THE SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**

Mr Chairperson,

Please allow me to welcome you to the Chair of the Council. My delegation looks forward to fully cooperating with you and other delegations to ensure that you steer the deliberations of the Council to a successful conclusion. I would also like to assure Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, the Director-General, of the support of my delegation for his undertakings.

I also wish to associate myself with the policy statement delivered by the distinguished delegate of Cuba on behalf of NAM CWC States Parties and China.

Mr Chairperson,  
Mr Director-General,  
Distinguished delegates,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Total destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities still remains to be the primary objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The continued existence of chemical weapons not only threatens international peace and security but also undermines the integrity and credibility of the Convention, which is why my delegation is hopeful that the major possessor States Parties shall meet the final extended destruction deadline. Given that the Executive Council has the oversight of implementing the Convention, the Council members should be ready to provide for all possible contingencies should the final extended destruction deadline not be met. Although the States Parties took note of the projections announced by the major possessor States about being unable to meet the destruction deadline, they stressed the commitment of these possessors States to comply with the Convention provisions. Should the major possessor States Parties fail to meet the destruction deadline, it will be viewed as non-compliance, and the Convention is quite transparent on how to deal with a case of non-compliance. My delegation is of the view that when non-compliance has occurred, it should be formally recognised. Should there be a call for setting a new cut-off date, it will be determined by States Parties rather than by possessor States.

Since keeping of chemical weapons stockpiles is directly related to international security and violates the core provisions of an international Convention, we are of the view that this



breach of the Convention should be brought to the attention of United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Security Council and the OPCW Conference of the States Parties. It is on the basis of this fundamental argument that Article XII of the Convention stipulates that in cases of non-compliance, the issue should be brought to the attention of such international authorities as well.

There are of course other important issues that we discussed during informal consultations. While appreciating the efforts put in by the Chairperson of the Executive Council during these discussions, we are of the belief that in any plan we should be observant of fundamental dynamics. Hence, inserting a new item into the agenda of the Executive Council with a view to formally embarking on official discussions on destruction and compliance with the final extended deadline is of paramount significance and my delegation will bring forward its principled perspectives during the discussions conducted to this effect under this item.

The other issue to which we must pay heed is the situation of destruction of chemical weapons in Libya. There are two sources of concern in this connection. First, there is the possibility of serious damage to the facilities of chemical weapons in the present situation. Second, the barring entry of destruction equipment into Libya. We call upon all the parties involved to discharge their responsibilities for protecting the security of weapons and destruction facilities and that they should pave the ground for the arrival of destruction equipment in Libya. We also call on Libya to fulfil its obligations and destroy all chemical weapons in due legal course.

With a look at the report of the verification activities of the OPCW in 2010, while thanking the Director-General for preparing the report, we are awakened to the trends that require careful consideration by the States Parties.

According to this report, the grand total of destroyed chemical weapons stockpiles in 2010 as compared with the equivalent period in 2009 has been reduced by half. This takes place against a backdrop of the demand made by the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council on the possessor States Parties to expedite and intensify their destruction efforts so that they can meet the deadline. Such a trend will not only be a source of concern but will also ignore the request made by the policy-making organs of the Organisation and that such a move shall be in clear violation of the obligations stipulated in the Convention.

The other important issue is related to the measures adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom in destruction of chemical weapons in Iraq prior to accession of this country to the Convention. Unfortunately, there is no transparent information available on the measures taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in destruction of chemical weapons. The provisions of the Convention have been readily breached in this connection.

It is imperative that requisite information be circulated to the States Parties openly. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the continuity of measures taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq as well as uncovering of chemical weapons has taken place without fully observing the provisions stipulated in the Convention, and that such an approach is unacceptable to my delegation. The safety and security reservations should not be used as a pretext in order to ignore the obligations set forth in the Convention. The lurking concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the explanations provided by the States concerned have not enlightened the situation. Hence, the numerous questions raised to this effect are still unanswered. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the OPCW to seriously consider this issue.

As for inspections, it has to be remembered that, from the viewpoint of the Convention, inspections should centre around facilities that pose greater risks. Unfortunately, the ongoing discussions have neglected this issue. Bringing forward arguments that favour decreasing scheduled inspections but increasing OCPF inspections is in the same vein. As per inspection reports, thus far no threat or diversion has been posed by unscheduled facilities. Therefore, any plan or proposal should carefully consider the Convention provisions.

Another important issue on the agenda is full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article XI. The promotion of trade amongst States Parties short of restrictions in the field of trade in chemicals, equipment and technologies that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention would give rise to a conducive environment by which all the States Parties shall benefit.

It is high time that an action plan were developed for Article XI. My delegation shall closely cooperate with other delegations in this regard. As for an action plan, we should not adopt a selective approach. At a time when Article VII and universality are blessed with action plans, why should Article XI be deprived of it?

The next item on the agenda is implementation of Article X providing for assistance and protection to the States Parties in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons against them. Having been the direct victim of deployment of chemical weapons by the Saddam regime in Iranian cities, particularly the city of Sardasht, my delegation insists on ensuring practical capacity building and also making available adequate resources in order to expeditiously respond to the emergency needs of the States Parties that have been exposed to chemical attacks.

The reason for the coming into existence of the Chemical Weapons Convention lies with the victims of the chemical weapons and deployment of such chemicals, whereas the Convention has failed to provide the assistance they need and has instead emphasised provision of care to the future possible victims.

We are of the conviction that establishment of such a network is the least that the States Parties and the Organisation can do in order to display their sympathy for the victims of chemical weapons. This issue is not exclusively related to one country only and at least several other countries have offered victims in this regard. Article X of the Convention constitutes the legal base for setting up of such a network.

What is more a source of concern is that there are efforts being undertaken that will marginalise the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles that practically constitute the same chemical disarmament and will focus on other issues such as non-proliferation. Organising numerous seminars and workshops in order to explain different dimensions of this fabricated term by some countries and provision of finances, bringing forward plans for paying less attention to schedules whereas paying more attention to unscheduled facilities, bringing up political solutions in order to bypass an important issue such as destruction, special attention paid by some countries to issues such as anti-terrorism efforts that go contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention, intentional negligence in implementation of the provisions of Articles X, XI, and destruction, all are expressive of organised efforts aimed at diverting the Organisation from the primary objectives of the Convention.

In closing, Mr Chairperson, may I request that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Sixty-Fifth Session of the Executive Council.