OPCW Technical Secretariat

S/2415/2025
20 June 2025
ENGLISH only

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT ON THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF A REQUEST BY UKRAINE (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TAV/02/25 AND TAV/03/25)

1. The OPCW Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat), within its framework to provide assistance under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention), and under the provision of subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Convention, received a request from Ukraine for technical assistance, in relation to samples it had in its custody, as well as other elements potentially related to the samples, and documentation and evidence related to their collection. Ukraine reported to the Secretariat that these samples had been collected following an incident involving toxic chemicals, on 28 February 2025, near the village of Mariivka, in Nikopol district, in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

2. Under the same subparagraph of Article VIII of the Convention, Ukraine requested that the Secretariat visit Ukraine and receive the aforementioned documentation and evidence, interview witnesses, and provide a technical evaluation of the samples, including for scheduled and unscheduled chemicals through its network of OPCW designated laboratories. The Director-General dispatched an OPCW technical assistance visit team (TAV team) to provide the requested assistance to Ukraine.

3. The TAV team conducted two deployments, collected related documentation and digital files, as well as testimonies from first-hand witnesses, and received seven environmental samples collected by Ukraine: two grenade shells (one of them collected with parts of a fuse system), two soil samples, two vegetation samples, and remnants of one first-person view (FPV) drone, all collected from a location adjacent to a dugout at an observation post, along the confrontation lines with the opposing troops.

4. After the first deployment, the OPCW Laboratory received the samples from the TAV team, and unpacked and prepared them for off-site analysis by two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General, separately and independent from one another.

5. All these activities were carried out in strict compliance with OPCW procedures.

6. Within the framework of the requested technical assistance, the Secretariat continuously assessed the methodologies and the practices applied by the Ukrainian experts against the international standards related to sample collection, evidence handling, and maintenance of the chain of custody, as followed by the OPCW Secretariat. The TAV team analysed the material handed over by the Ukrainian authorities and assessed that, overall, the procedures followed by the Ukrainian experts were in line with these standards.

7. Digital photos and videos that were considered by the Secretariat in the assessment and evaluation by the TAV team contain metadata that serves to identify the date, time, equipment, and location of their creation. The TAV team examined and verified the authenticity of the digital files it had received. It assessed that the information contained in the documentation and records provided by Ukraine was consistent with the content of the digital files as well as with witnesses' testimonies and was able to confirm that the chain of custody of the digital files had been maintained.

8. Taken together, the documentation and evidence handed over by Ukraine to the TAV team during the visit, the content of the digital files provided, as well as the information collected and the narrative described by first-hand witnesses, enabled the TAV team to corroborate that, as reported by Ukraine to the OPCW TAV team, the chain of custody of the seven samples, collected in Ukraine from a location close to the dugout located along the confrontations lines with the opposing troops, had been maintained.

9. The results of the analyses of the samples conducted by two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General, separately and independently from one another, indicate that: the grenades collected from the location close to an observation post of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine contained the riot control agent CS, and/or its precursors and degradation products; the soil and vegetation collected from the locations where the grenades were found also contained CS, its precursors and/or its degradation products; and the soil sample collected approximately 15 metres away from one of the grenades in the incident location as well as the solvent wipe sample from the frame of remnants of the collected FPV drone also contained CS at very low levels.

10. Upon receipt of the TAV report on 20 June 2025, the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the OPCW on the same day requested the Secretariat to declassify and share the full report (Annexed hereto) with all States Parties to the Convention and to publish it on the OPCW official website.

Annex: Report of the OPCW Technical Assistance Visit on the Activities Carried out in Support of a Request by Ukraine (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25)

Annex

REPORT OF THE OPCW TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT ON THE ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF A REQUEST BY UKRAINE (TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TAV/02/25 AND TAV/03/25)

This document contains the report of the technical assistance visit conducted by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon a request by Ukraine pursuant to subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

1. Ukraine requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat (the Secretariat) under subparagraph 38(e) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Convention) in relation to "samples that it had in its custody, as well as other elements potentially related to the samples, and documentation and evidence related to their collection". Ukraine reported to the Secretariat that these samples were collected following an incident of "use of chemical riot agents during military operations against the Defence Forces of Ukraine on positions of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine" in Nikopol district, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, on 28 February 2025 near the village of Mariivka. Under the same subparagraph of Article VIII of the Convention, Ukraine requested the Secretariat to visit Ukraine and receive the above-mentioned samples, documentation and digital files, to interview witnesses, and to provide a technical evaluation of the samples, including for scheduled and unscheduled chemicals, through OPCW designated laboratories. The Director-General dispatched an OPCW technical assistance visit team (TAV team) to provide the requested assistance to Ukraine. A mandate was issued by the Director-General to guide the team's activities.

2. The TAV team conducted two deployments to carry out its activities as set out by the mandate. During the first deployment, the TAV team held its first meeting with the Ukrainian authorities and agreed on the plan of the visit, which included the handover of samples and the receipt of related documentation and digital files.

3. The TAV team received environmental samples from the Ukrainian authorities, which consisted of soil and vegetation samples, two items—referred to as "RG-Vo" gas grenades— as well as remnants of one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)—referred to as an "FPV" (first-person view) drone. Additional information describing the samples, their collection, and analysis is provided below in this report and in Appendices 2 and 7.

4. The TAV team packed the samples in line with the Secretariat procedures, including for maintaining the chain of custody, and ensured that the handling of the samples was kept to a minimum. This was achieved first through the verification of the integrity of each sample in its original packaging and with the seals that had been applied by the Ukrainian investigative teams during the sample collection in the field. Subsequently, the TAV team overpacked and sealed each sample, prepared them for shipment, and arranged their transportation to the OPCW Laboratory to proceed with the preparation for off-site analysis by OPCW designated laboratories (see Appendix 3).

5. During the first deployment, the TAV team also received documents related to the reported incident. These documents were provided both in Ukrainian and in official English translation, and included, inter alia, the "report of the inspection" of the incident location by the Ukrainian investigative teams, documentation of the chain of custody, and information connected to the samples.

6. Additionally, the TAV team received digital files related to the reported incident and examined and verified the authenticity of all files through the analysis of their metadata.

7. The digital files included video recordings of the sampling activities carried out by the relevant Ukrainian services during the inspection of the incident location (see Appendix 1).

8. Within the framework of the requested technical assistance, the Secretariat continuously assessed the methodologies and the practices applied by the Ukrainian experts against the international standards related to sample collection, evidence handling, and maintenance of the chain of custody, as followed by the OPCW Secretariat. The TAV team analysed the material handed over by the Ukrainian authorities and assessed that, overall, the procedures followed by the Ukrainian experts were in line with these standards.

9. From the documents it received, the TAV team established that the location near the village of Mariivka is the same observation post that was subject of the technical assistance visit report S/2370/2025 (dated 14 February 2025) and Corr.1 (dated 21 March 2025). The report concluded that two samples collected from the area—a deployed grenade marked "RG-Vo 862-2-24" and blackened vegetation next to the grenade—contained the riot control agent CS and its degradation products.

10. The TAV team deployed a second time under the same mandate by the Director-General. During this visit, the TAV team received additional documents both in Ukrainian and in official English translation, which included the chain of reporting, witness interview protocols, and chain of custody documentation.

11. The Ukrainian authorities also provided the TAV team with recordings related to witness interviews conducted by the Ukrainian investigators and further digital evidence.

12. During this second deployment, the TAV team conducted six interviews with individuals who were either first-hand witnesses of the reported incident, or who were involved in the chain of command or as experts in the collection of the samples in the field. The interviews were conducted in accordance with OPCW standard operating procedures. Only the witness, the TAV team members, and one interpreter were present during each interview to guarantee the independence and the impartiality of the interview process.

13. A summary of the information collected during the interviews is provided below in the following paragraphs of this report.

14. One witness reported that, on 28 February 2025, he was on duty monitoring the military activity in the vicinity at an observation post near Mariivka village in the Nikopol district. Between 11:15 and 11:30, he had intercepted an FPV-type drone and observed on the interceptor monitor the images that the camera of this FPV drone had been capturing during its flight. The witness stated that the drone was approaching their position in the dugout, as he had recognised on the screen the electrical power lines across the Dnieper River between their position and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar City, located on the opposite side of the river (Figure 1). The witness also mentioned that, from the monitoring screen, he was able to see the front part of the drone's frame during its flight.

FIGURE 1: MAP SHOWING THE AREA OF THE REPORTED INCIDENT (IN THE BLUE RECTANGLE, MARIIVKA) IN UKRAINE; THE ELECTRIC POWER LINES IN THE ORANGE RECTANGLE ARE ILLUSTRATED IN B AND C). THE AREAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE ARE HATCHED IN RED (INCLUDING ZAPORIZHZHIA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT).

15. The witness immediately informed the head of the group at the observation post, who rushed outside the dugout and was able to see the drone approaching from a distance of approximately 50 metres.

16. The head of the group decided to shoot at the drone when it was at about 30 metres from their position. At the same time, the first witness who had been monitoring the screen mentioned that he could still see the intercepted image from the drone, which was showing grass at the location where it hit the ground. A few seconds later, the screen went dark and the witness mentioned that a fire had broken out at the drone's location. This fire was also reported to the head of the group by another witness who was positioned close to the observation post; the witness had detected the fire through a spectral camera.

17. After approximately 20 minutes, two members of the group at the observation post were instructed to extinguish the fire. One witness stated they could see the body of a drone, two grenades, and a battery assembly while they were putting out the fire. The head of the observation post reported about this incident to the duty officer of the 3rd outpost.

18. Later on the same day, around 12:15, one witness stated that he was instructed to take photographs and video footage of the burned drone and grenades using the service mobile phone of the post. The TAV team received a copy of the digital material for which the date and time stamps corroborated the witnesses' account.

19. In relation to the chain of reporting and the chain of command following the reported incident, the TAV team collected information both through witnesses' accounts and through documents received from the Ukrainian authorities. During the interviews, the TAV team was able to visualise the transfer and exchange of messages regarding the reported incident through communication platforms on witnesses' mobile phones. The TAV team video recorded these messages and was able to verify their date and time through the analysis of the messages' metadata as found on the mobile phone. The information passed through the chain of command as detailed below was consistent with the account of the witnesses.

20. The following is a summary of the information reported through the chain of command:

    (a) On 28 February 2025, at 11:35, the Head of the Department of Border Guard Service Unit—stationed at an observation post near Mariivka village—reported the incident to the duty officer of Border Detachment Outpost of the State Border Guard Services of Ukraine (SBGSU).

    (b) On the same day, the information was further relayed through the chain of command at the outpost, whose head ordered the documentation of the scene at the incident location.

    (c) Between 12:12 and 12:14, photographs and short video footage had been recorded at the incident location; one of the witnesses reported observing two RG-Vo grenades and one FPV drone. Using the service mobile phone at the post, the photographs and the video recordings were sent to the Head of the 3rd Border Outpost of the 8th Border Detachment of the SBGSU.

(d) Later in the afternoon of the same day, the collected information from the incident scene were passed through the chain of command and reached the Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) in Dnipropetrovsk region.

(e) On 28 February 2025, at 15:00, the Head of the Investigation Department of the SSU Office instructed a team to inspect the scene and collect evidence.

21. On 1 March 2025, an investigation team from the SSU Investigation Department in Dnipropetrovsk region dispatched to the location of the reported incident, inspected the area, collected samples, and documented its sample-collection activities.

22. The area inspected by the SSU investigation team was described as an open field located on the outskirts of Mariivka village. It is a riparian zone near a water reservoir station of the Dnieper River. The location consisted of trenches and a dugout of the SBGSU. The incident location was approximately 50 metres away from the dugout.

23. During the inspection of the scene at the incident location and throughout the sampling process, the Ukrainian investigators simultaneously used several video recording devices. All of the video recordings presented with date-time stamps of the sampling activities that had taken place on 1 March 2025. The TAV team was able to cross-corroborate all of the video recorded information, and to corroborate it with the information from the documentation provided by the Ukrainian authorities, including witnesses' testimonies.

24. The samples received from the Ukrainian authorities during the first deployment of the OPCW TAV team consisted of:

(a) one grenade (Grenade #1, see Figure 2) collected with a metallic piece assembly that resembles a part of a fuse system (sample code SDS06);

(b) one grenade (Grenade #2, see Figures 3 and 4) showing signs of being burned (sample code SDS07);

(c) one soil sample collected close to where Grenade #2 was found (sample code SLS05);

(d) one soil sample collected approximately 15 metres from Grenade #2 as a soil control sample (sample code SLS02);

(e) one vegetation sample collected close to Grenade #1 (sample code SDS04);

(f) one vegetation sample collected approximately 15 metres away from Grenade #1 as a vegetation control sample (sample code SDS03); and

(g) remnants of a UAV frame collected together with remnants of an object similar to a battery (sample code SDS01).

25. The TAV team handed over the samples it had received to the OPCW Laboratory where they were unpacked and prepared for off-site analysis by OPCW designated laboratories. This was carried out following OPCW procedures and in the presence of observers from the Ukrainian Permanent Representation to the Organisation (Appendix 5). Additionally, the TAV team conducted a thorough examination of all the items received and collected measurements of the relevant parts of these items (Appendices 3 and 7).

26. Solvent extracts were obtained for the soil and vegetation samples as well as for the content of both grenades. Two sets of generated sample splits for each sample were subsequently dispatched for analysis by two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General, separately and independently from one another.

27. The scope of analysis covered the identification of chemicals scheduled under the Convention, their precursors and degradation products, and non-scheduled chemicals relevant to explosives and riot control agents. Relevant chemicals that were confidently identified at low concentrations (less than one part per million) were also to be reported.

28. The results of the analyses of the environmental samples are provided below in this report, and in Appendix 7.

FIGURE 2: GRENADE #1 AND PARTS OF A FUSE SYSTEM (IN THE RED RECTANGLE) AS FOUND AT THE INCIDENT LOCATION (A) AND AS HANDLED BY THE TAV TEAM AT THE OPCW LABORATORY (B).

A

FIGURE 3: GRENADE #2: (A) AS FOUND AND PHOTOGRAPHED AT THE INCIDENT LOCATION AND (B) PARTS OF A FUSE SYSTEM OBSERVED BY THE TAV TEAM ON THE PHOTOGRAPH.



FIGURE 4: GRENADE #2 AS PHOTOGRAPHED AT THE OPCW LABORATORY BY THE TAV TEAM. A SIDE VIEW (A) AND A TOP VIEW (B) OF THE GRENADE



Description of the collected grenades from the reported incident location

29. The collected grenades are very similar in shape and in size to those grenades that were the subject of previous TAV reports (S/2338/2024 (dated 18 November 2024) and S/2370/2025 and Corr.1). A detailed description and measurements of both grenades are provided in Appendix 6 to this report.

30. One of the grenades appears as a silver-coloured metallic cylindrical canister; the appearance of the second one showed signs that it had been burned. From the video recordings taken during sampling activities, the environment close to Grenade #2 displayed also signs of being burned. Both grenades show indications of being deployed or activated. No fuse system was attached to either of the grenades, and the half O-ring shaped opening on the top face of Grenade #1 had ruptured and displayed some black agglomeration around it.

31. The TAV team also examined the inner structure of one of the two collected grenades. At the OPCW Laboratory, the team proceeded with a longitudinal cut on Grenade #1 to further explore the inner parts of this activated grenade. Figure 5 showcases views of a longitudinal cut of Grenade #1 (SDS06).

32. The top part of the cut grenade reveals the shape of the fuse assembly and the opening in the metallic lid at the level of the half O-ring shaped opening in the green plastic lid.

33. A burned black solid substance fills the inside body of the grenade. The cut of the grenade further reveals the convex-shaped bottom of the deployed canister.

34. As visible in Figure 5-A, the cut of the grenade clearly shows the fuse assembly which consists of the igniter, the delay, and the detonator components.

FIGURE 5: GRENADE #1. (A): TOP VIEW OF THE LONGITUDINAL CUT. (B): SIDE VIEW AFTER THE CUT SHOWING THE TOP GREEN LID OF THE GRENADE. (C): A VIEW OF THE CUT GRENADE SHOWING THE GOUGED MIDDLE PART AND THE CONVEX SHAPE OF THE BOTTOM.



35. A second structure is observed inside the silver-coloured metallic canister (Figure 5-A). It consists of: a silver-coloured metallic cylindrical part with fuse inlet and the discharge opening at the top part of the grenade; and a light grey plastic-like canister containing a burned black solid substance and a thin O-ring at the bottom of the grenade. The centre part of the burned black solid content looks gouged and the bottom part of the plastic-like cylinder is ruptured, likely as a result of the pressure increase during the detonator explosion, which also led to the convex shape of the bottom part of the outer silver-coloured metallic canister (Figure 5-C).

36. Grenade #1 (SDS06) was collected with an item that resembles parts of a fuse system. With reference to Figure 2-B and Figure 5-A, it was possible to reconstruct the collected fuse parts into the fuse system.

37. When examining the photographs and video recordings received from the Ukrainian authorities, the TAV team noted that, at close proximity to the burned Grenade # 2, a second item that resembles a fuse system was laying on the ground in the burned area of the incident location (Figure 3-B). This item was not collected from the scene.

Reconstructed model of the grenades

38. Although both grenades showed damaged parts or were missing some of the components, the TAV team was able to reconstruct a model of these grenades. This model was based on the detailed measurements of each item and its parts, as well as on the examination of publicly available data relevant to this type of grenade.

39. Figure 6 displays several sides of view of the reconstructed models with an emphasis on the parts and items relevant to the collected grenades and the fuse assembly.

FIGURE 6: RECONSTRUCTED MODELS OF THE GRENADES

(1) A view of a full, non-deployed grenade with visible markings. (2) A view of a longitudinal cut of a full, non-deployed grenade and its fuse system. (3) An exploded view of fuse assembly parts and a grenade, similar to those collected from the incident location. (4) An inclined front view of a grenade with its central plug and visible markings and without its fuse system. (5) A top-side view of a grenade showing its central plug and a half O-ring shaped indent on the green lid. (6) A view of a longitudinal cut of a deployed grenade together with its fuse system and the burned solid substance inside the canister.

Description of the collected remnants of the UAV from the reported incident location

40. The TAV team conducted an assessment of the remnants of the drone that was reported to be "potentially related to the samples". The FPV drone shows signs of significant damage following burning. Nevertheless, the TAV team was able to identify the main components of the drone including its frame, remnants of four electric motors, as well as parts of electronic components.

41. The frame of the drone is about 26 cm long and 9 cm wide at its widest part. The electric motors are positioned at about 36 cm and 43 cm along the longest axes from one another.

42. The remnants of the drone were collected together with remnants of a burned and damaged battery. A solvent wipe sample from the frame of the drone was collected at the OPCW laboratory and splits thereof were sent for analysis by the OPCW designated laboratories according to the same scope of analysis detailed above.

43. No further study of the two remnants was conducted at this stage for the purpose of this TAV request. As is the case with all samples, the Secretariat will maintain custody of these items.

Results of sample analyses

44. The results of the analyses conducted by the two OPCW designated laboratories of the seven samples indicate that:

(a) The collected Grenade # 1 (SDS06) contained 2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, a riot control agent known as CS. The precursor/degradation product of CS 2-Chlorobenzaldehyde and the degradation product 2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide were also identified in the solvent extracts. One designated laboratory also identified 2-Chlorobenzylmalononitrile as a degradation product of CS in this sample.

(b) The vegetation (SDS04) collected near Grenade #1 (SDS06) contained CS and its precursor/degradation compound 2-Chlorobenzaldehyde as well as the degradation product 2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide. One designated laboratory also identified 2-Chlorobenzylmalononitrile as a degradation product of CS in this sample.

(c) The collected Grenade #2 (SDS07) contained several degradation products of CS including 2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide and the precursor/degradation compound 2-Chlorobenzaldehyde. One designated laboratory reported also the presence of CS at very low levels in this burned grenade.

(d) The soil sample (SLS05) collected near Grenade #2 (SDS07) contained CS and its precursor/degradation product 2-Chlorobenzaldehyde at low levels, as reported by one designated laboratory. Both designated laboratories identified TNT[1] and RDX[2] in this sample.

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1 TNT: 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene.

2 RDX: 1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazinane

(e) No chemicals relevant to the scope of analysis were reported in the vegetation sample (SDS03) collected approximately 15 metres away from Grenade #1 as a vegetation control sample.

(f) One OPCW designated laboratory reported the presence of CS at very low levels in the soil sample (SLS02) that was collected approximately 15 metres from
Grenade # 2 (SDS07) as a soil control sample.

(g) One designated laboratory reported the presence of CS at very low levels in the solvent wipe sample collected from the frame of the drone (SDS01).

Conclusions

45. As instructed by the Director-General of the OPCW, the TAV team was able to:

(a) receive samples in the possession of the Ukrainian authorities according to the requirements of the procedures followed by the OPCW;

(b) collect and examine copies of documents and records pertaining to the reported incident;

(c) collect testimonies from relevant individuals;

(d) collect photographs and video recordings and examine the transfer of pertinent information from telephone correspondence, and where possible, collect copies of video and telephone records;

(e) ensure maintenance of the chain of custody for all material received and gathered; and

(f) assess and analyse all of the above information received and collected during the visit.

46. Based on the information and documents received from the Ukrainian authorities, the data collected and analysed, the verified authenticity of all digital files through the analysis of their metadata, the testimonies of first-hand witnesses of the reported incident, and the corroboration thereof, the TAV team was able to establish the following:

(a) The samples received by the TAV team from the Ukrainian authorities came from a location close to an observation post of the Border Guard Service of Ukraine near the village of Mariivka in Nikopol district.

(b) The results of the analyses of the samples by two OPCW designated laboratories, conducted separately and independently from one another, indicate that both grenades collected from the reported location contained the riot control agent CS and/or its precursors and degradation products.

(c) The soil and vegetation samples collected from the locations where the grenades were found also contained CS, its precursors and/or its degradation products.

(d) A soil sample collected at approximately 15 metres away from the reported incident location contained CS at very low levels.

(e) The solvent wipe sample from the remnants of a frame of a drone contained CS at very low levels.

Appendices:

Appendix 1: Documents and Digital Material Handed over by the Ukrainian Authorities

Appendix 2: Samples Received from the Ukrainian Authorities

Appendix 3: Information Generated by the Technical Assistance Visit Team

Appendix 4: Information Gathered by the Technical Assistance Visit Team

Appendix 5: Information Handed over to the Technical Assistance Visit Team by the OPCW Laboratory

Appendix 6: Measurements for the Grenades and Items

Appendix 7: Sample Analysis Results

Appendix 1

DOCUMENTS AND DIGITAL MATERIAL HANDED OVER BY THE UKRANIAN AUTHORITIES

The tables below summarise the physical evidence collected from the National Authority of Ukraine.

TABLE A1.1: DOCUMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE BY THE TAV TEAM

Entry No.		**Assigned Code**	
1		**U015**	
01	Protocol	Scene inspection, Ukrainian	7 pages
02	Protocol	Scene inspection, English	7 pages
03	Transcript	Video files 00000, 00001, 00002	19 pages
04	Transcript	Video files GX010614, GX020614, GX030614, GX040614, GX050614, GX060614, GX070614, GX080614	19 pages
05	Transcript	Video files GX010615, GX020615, GX030615, GX040615, GX050615, GX060615, GX070615, GX080615	19 pages
06	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS01, Ukrainian	2 pages
07	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS01, English	2 pages
08	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SLS02, Ukrainian	2 pages
09	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SLS02, English	2 pages
10	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS03, Ukrainian	2 pages
11	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS03, English	2 pages
12	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS04, Ukrainian	2 pages
13	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS04, English	2 pages
14	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SLS05, Ukrainian	2 pages
15	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SLS05, English	2 pages
16	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS06, Ukrainian	2 pages
17	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS06, English	2 pages
18	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS07, Ukrainian	2 pages
19	Chain of Custody for Sample	Sample Info SDS07, English	2 pages
20	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 01, Ukrainian	1 page
21	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 01, English	1 page

Entry No.		Assigned Code	
1		**U015**	
22	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, Ukrainian	1 page
23	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, English	1 page
24	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, Ukrainian	1 page
25	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, English	1 page
26	Hash Values	SD-card 01, Ukrainian	2 pages
27	Hash Values	SD-card 01, English	2 pages
28	Hash Values	SD-card 02, Ukrainian	3 pages
29	Hash Values	SD-card 02, English	3 pages
30	Hash Values	SD-card 03, Ukrainian	3 pages
31	Hash Values	SD-card 03, English	3 pages
32	Chain of Custody for digital information	Protocol on processing video files, Ukrainian	7 pages
33	Chain of Custody for digital information	Protocol on processing video files, English	7 pages
34	Transcript	Video files 00000, 00001, 00002, 00003, GX010618, GX020618, GX030618, 00000, 00001	11 pages
35	Hash Values	SD-card 04, Ukrainian	2 pages
36	Hash Values	SD-card 04, English	2 pages
37	Hash Values	SD-card 05, Ukrainian	1 page
38	Hash Values	SD-card 05, English	1 page
39	Hash Values	SD-card 06, Ukrainian	2 pages
40	Hash Values	SD-card 06, English	2 pages
41	Hash Values	SD-card 07, Ukrainian	4 pages
42	Hash Values	SD-card 07, English	5 pages
43	Hash Values	SD-card 08, Ukrainian	2 pages
44	Hash Values	SD-card 08, English	2 pages
45	Report	Incident description, English	2 pages
46	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 07, Ukrainian	1 page
47	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 07, English	1 page
48	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 08, Ukrainian	1 page

Entry No.		Assigned Code	
1		**U015**	
49	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 08, English	1 page
50	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 09, Ukrainian	1 page
51	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 09, English	1 page
52	Hash Values	SD-card 09, Ukrainian	2 pages
53	Hash Values	SD-card 09, English	2 pages

Entry No.		Assigned Code	
2		**U016**	
01	Protocol	Chain of report, Ukrainian	2 pages
02	Protocol	Chain of report, English	2 pages
03	Chain of Custody for digital information	Protocol on processing mobile phone files, Ukrainian	12 pages
04	Chain of Custody for digital information	Protocol on processing mobile phone files, English	12 pages
05	Transcript	Video file Video S1280001, S1280002, English	2 pages
06	Hash Values	SD-card 01, Ukrainian	2 pages
07	Hash Values	SD-card 01, English	2 pages
08	Hash Values	SD-card 02, Ukrainian	2 pages
09	Hash Values	SD-card 02, English	2 pages
10	Hash Values	SD-card 03, Ukrainian	1 page
11	Hash Values	SD-card 03, English	1 page
12	Interview Protocol	Report witness 1, Ukrainian	3 pages
13	Interview Protocol	Report witness 1, English	3 pages
14	Interview Protocol	Report witness 2, Ukrainian	3 pages
15	Interview Protocol	Report witness 2, English	3 pages
16	Interview Protocol	Report witness 3, Ukrainian	3 pages
17	Interview Protocol	Report witness 3, English	3 pages
18	Interview Protocol	Report witness 4, Ukrainian	3 pages
19	Interview Protocol	Report witness 4, English	3 pages
20	Transcript	Video file 00000.mts	4 pages
21	Transcript	Video file S3770001.mp4	7 pages

Entry No.		Assigned Code	
2		**U016**	
22	Transcript	Video file S1200001.mp4	6 pages
23	Transcript	Video file S1180001.mp4	9 pages
24	Hash Values	SD-card 04, Ukrainian	1 page
25	Hash Values	SD-card 04, English	1 page
26	Hash Values	SD-card 05, Ukrainian	1 page
27	Hash Values	SD-card 05, English	1 page
28	Hash Values	SD-card 06, Ukrainian	1 page
29	Hash Values	SD-card 06, English	1 page
30	Hash Values	SD-card 07, Ukrainian	1 page
31	Hash Values	SD-card 07, English	1 page
32	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 08, Ukrainian	1 page
33	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 08, English	1 page
34	Hash Values	SD-card 08, Ukrainian	2 pages
35	Hash Values	SD-card 08, English	2 pages
36	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, Ukrainian	1 page
37	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 02, English	1 page
38	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, Ukrainian	1 page
39	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 03, English	1 page
41	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 04, Ukrainian	1 page
41	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 04, English	1 page
42	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 05, Ukrainian	1 page
43	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 05, English	1 page
44	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 06, Ukrainian	1 page
45	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 06, English	1 page
46	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 07, Ukrainian	1 page
47	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card 07, English	1 page

Entry No.		Assigned Code	
2		**U016**	
48	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card U015-09, Ukrainian	1 page
49	Chain of Custody for electronic storage device	SD-card U015-09, English	1 page
50	Hash Values	SD-card U015-06, Ukrainian	2 pages
51	Hash Values	SD-card U015-06, English	2 pages
52	Hash Values	SD-card U015-09, Ukrainian	2 pages
53	Hash Values	SD-card U015-09, English	2 pages

TABLE A1.2: ELECTRONIC DATA RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE BY THE TAV TEAM

Entry No.	Assigned Code		
3	**U015**		
00000.mts	GX050614.mp4	GX040615.mp4	00002.mts
00001.mts	GX060614.mp4	GX050615.mp4	00003.mts
00002.mts	GX070614.mp4	GX060615.mp4	GX010618.mp4
GX010614.mp4	GX080614.mp4	GX070615.mp4	GX020618.mp4
GX020614.mp4	GX010615.mp4	GX080615.mp4	GX030618.mp4
GX030614.mp4	GX020615.mp4	00000.mts	00000.mts
GX040614.mp4	GX030615.mp4	00001.mts	00001.mts

Entry No.	Assigned Code		
4	**U016**		
S1280001.mp4	S1180001.mp4	IMG_20250228_121251.jpg	IMG_20250228_121305.jpg
S1280002.mp4	S1200001.mp4	IMG_20250228_121257.jpg	VID_20250228_121332.mp4
00000.mts	S3770001.mp4	IMG_20250228_121300.jpg	VID_20250228_121336.mp4

Appendix 2

SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM THE UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES

The table below summarises the samples the TAV team received from the National Authority of Ukraine.

TABLE A2.1: SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE BY THE TAV TEAM

Entry No.	Sample Code	Description
01	SLS02	Soil collected from the location as control sample
02	SDS03	Vegetation collected from the location as a control sample
03	SDS04	Vegetation collected near Grenade #1
04	SLS05	Soil sample collected near Grenade #2
05	SDS06	Grenade #1 collected with fuse part
06	SDS07	Grenade #2
07	SDS01	UAV with battery

Appendix 3

INFORMATION GENERATED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TEAM

The tables below summarise the electronic files created by the TAV team during meetings and sample handling.

TABLE A3.1: AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDINGS, PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING MEETINGS, AND SAMPLE HANDOVER FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE

Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
1	**U015**		
DR0000_1640.wav	00000.mts	00001.mts	
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
2	**U016**		
DR0000_1640.wav	DR_0000_1641.wav	DR0000_1654.wav	

TABLE A3.2: PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING SAMPLE HANDOVER FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE

Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
3	**U015**		
DSC00848.jpg	DSC00849.jpg		

TABLE A3.3: VIDEO RECORDINGS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING DEVICE EXAMINATION AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

Entry No.	**Assigned Code**			
4	**U015**			
00000.mts	00004.mts	00007.mts	00001.mts	MVI_3078.mp4
00001.mts	00005.mts	00008.mts	00002.mts	MVI_3079.mp4
00002.mts	00006.mts	00000.mts	MVI_3077.mp4	MVI_3080.mp4
00003.mts				

TABLE A3.4: PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING DEVICE EXAMINATION AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

Entry No.	**Assigned Code**			
5	**U015**			
IMG_2921.jpg	IMG_3063.jpg	IMG_3208.jpg	IMG_3349.jpg	IMG_3490.jpg
IMG_2922.jpg	IMG_3064.jpg	IMG_3209.jpg	IMG_3350.jpg	IMG_3491.jpg
IMG_2923.jpg	IMG_3065.jpg	IMG_3210.jpg	IMG_3351.jpg	IMG_3492.jpg
IMG_2924.jpg	IMG_3066.jpg	IMG_3211.jpg	IMG_3352.jpg	IMG_3493.jpg
IMG_2925.jpg	IMG_3067.jpg	IMG_3212.jpg	IMG_3353.jpg	IMG_3494.jpg
IMG_2926.jpg	IMG_3068.jpg	IMG_3213.jpg	IMG_3354.jpg	IMG_3495.jpg
IMG_2927.jpg	IMG_3069.jpg	IMG_3214.jpg	IMG_3355.jpg	IMG_3496.jpg
IMG_2928.jpg	IMG_3070.jpg	IMG_3215.jpg	IMG_3356.jpg	IMG_3497.jpg
IMG_2929.jpg	IMG_3071.jpg	IMG_3216.jpg	IMG_3357.jpg	IMG_3498.jpg
IMG_2930.jpg	IMG_3072.jpg	IMG_3217.jpg	IMG_3358.jpg	IMG_3499.jpg
IMG_2931.jpg	IMG_3073.jpg	IMG_3218.jpg	IMG_3359.jpg	IMG_3500.jpg
IMG_2932.jpg	IMG_3074.jpg	IMG_3219.jpg	IMG_3360.jpg	IMG_3501.jpg
IMG_2933.jpg	IMG_3075.jpg	IMG_3220.jpg	IMG_3361.jpg	IMG_3502.jpg
IMG_2934.jpg	IMG_3076.jpg	IMG_3221.jpg	IMG_3362.jpg	IMG_3503.jpg
IMG_2935.jpg	IMG_3081.jpg	IMG_3222.jpg	IMG_3363.jpg	IMG_3504.jpg
IMG_2936.jpg	IMG_3082.jpg	IMG_3223.jpg	IMG_3364.jpg	IMG_3505.jpg
IMG_2937.jpg	IMG_3083.jpg	IMG_3224.jpg	IMG_3365.jpg	IMG_3506.jpg
IMG_2938.jpg	IMG_3084.jpg	IMG_3225.jpg	IMG_3366.jpg	IMG_3507.jpg
IMG_2939.jpg	IMG_3085.jpg	IMG_3226.jpg	IMG_3367.jpg	IMG_3508.jpg
IMG_2940.jpg	IMG_3086.jpg	IMG_3227.jpg	IMG_3368.jpg	IMG_3509.jpg
IMG_2941.jpg	IMG_3087.jpg	IMG_3228.jpg	IMG_3369.jpg	IMG_3510.jpg
IMG_2942.jpg	IMG_3088.jpg	IMG_3229.jpg	IMG_3370.jpg	IMG_3511.jpg
IMG_2943.jpg	IMG_3089.jpg	IMG_3230.jpg	IMG_3371.jpg	IMG_3512.jpg
IMG_2944.jpg	IMG_3090.jpg	IMG_3231.jpg	IMG_3372.jpg	IMG_3513.jpg
IMG_2945.jpg	IMG_3091.jpg	IMG_3232.jpg	IMG_3373.jpg	IMG_3514.jpg
IMG_2946.jpg	IMG_3092.jpg	IMG_3233.jpg	IMG_3374.jpg	IMG_3515.jpg
IMG_2947.jpg	IMG_3093.jpg	IMG_3234.jpg	IMG_3375.jpg	IMG_3516.jpg
IMG_2948.jpg	IMG_3094.jpg	IMG_3235.jpg	IMG_3376.jpg	IMG_3517.jpg
IMG_2949.jpg	IMG_3095.jpg	IMG_3236.jpg	IMG_3377.jpg	IMG_3518.jpg
IMG_2950.jpg	IMG_3096.jpg	IMG_3237.jpg	IMG_3378.jpg	IMG_3519.jpg
IMG_2951.jpg	IMG_3097.jpg	IMG_3238.jpg	IMG_3379.jpg	IMG_3520.jpg
IMG_2952.jpg	IMG_3098.jpg	IMG_3239.jpg	IMG_3380.jpg	IMG_3521.jpg
IMG_2953.jpg	IMG_3099.jpg	IMG_3240.jpg	IMG_3381.jpg	IMG_3522.jpg
IMG_2954.jpg	IMG_3100.jpg	IMG_3241.jpg	IMG_3382.jpg	IMG_3523.jpg
IMG_2955.jpg	IMG_3101.jpg	IMG_3242.jpg	IMG_3383.jpg	IMG_3524.jpg
IMG_2956.jpg	IMG_3102.jpg	IMG_3243.jpg	IMG_3384.jpg	IMG_3525.jpg
IMG_2957.jpg	IMG_3103.jpg	IMG_3244.jpg	IMG_3385.jpg	IMG_3526.jpg
IMG_2958.jpg	IMG_3104.jpg	IMG_3245.jpg	IMG_3386.jpg	IMG_3527.jpg
IMG_2959.jpg	IMG_3105.jpg	IMG_3246.jpg	IMG_3387.jpg	IMG_3528.jpg

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
5	U015			
IMG_2960.jpg	IMG_3106.jpg	IMG_3247.jpg	IMG_3388.jpg	IMG_3529.jpg
IMG_2961.jpg	IMG_3107.jpg	IMG_3248.jpg	IMG_3389.jpg	IMG_3530.jpg
IMG_2962.jpg	IMG_3108.jpg	IMG_3249.jpg	IMG_3390.jpg	IMG_3531.jpg
IMG_2963.jpg	IMG_3109.jpg	IMG_3250.jpg	IMG_3391.jpg	IMG_3532.jpg
IMG_2964.jpg	IMG_3110.jpg	IMG_3251.jpg	IMG_3392.jpg	IMG_3533.jpg
IMG_2965.jpg	IMG_3111.jpg	IMG_3252.jpg	IMG_3393.jpg	IMG_3534.jpg
IMG_2966.jpg	IMG_3112.jpg	IMG_3253.jpg	IMG_3394.jpg	IMG_3535.jpg
IMG_2967.jpg	IMG_3113.jpg	IMG_3254.jpg	IMG_3395.jpg	IMG_3536.jpg
IMG_2968.jpg	IMG_3114.jpg	IMG_3255.jpg	IMG_3396.jpg	IMG_3537.jpg
IMG_2969.jpg	IMG_3115.jpg	IMG_3256.jpg	IMG_3397.jpg	IMG_3538.jpg
IMG_2970.jpg	IMG_3116.jpg	IMG_3257.jpg	IMG_3398.jpg	IMG_3539.jpg
IMG_2971.jpg	IMG_3117.jpg	IMG_3258.jpg	IMG_3399.jpg	IMG_3540.jpg
IMG_2972.jpg	IMG_3118.jpg	IMG_3259.jpg	IMG_3400.jpg	IMG_3541.jpg
IMG_2973.jpg	IMG_3119.jpg	IMG_3260.jpg	IMG_3401.jpg	IMG_3542.jpg
IMG_2974.jpg	IMG_3120.jpg	IMG_3261.jpg	IMG_3402.jpg	IMG_3543.jpg
IMG_2975.jpg	IMG_3121.jpg	IMG_3262.jpg	IMG_3403.jpg	IMG_3544.jpg
IMG_2976.jpg	IMG_3122.jpg	IMG_3263.jpg	IMG_3404.jpg	IMG_3545.jpg
IMG_2977.jpg	IMG_3123.jpg	IMG_3264.jpg	IMG_3405.jpg	IMG_3546.jpg
IMG_2978.jpg	IMG_3124.jpg	IMG_3265.jpg	IMG_3406.jpg	IMG_3547.jpg
IMG_2979.jpg	IMG_3125.jpg	IMG_3266.jpg	IMG_3407.jpg	IMG_3548.jpg
IMG_2980.jpg	IMG_3126.jpg	IMG_3267.jpg	IMG_3408.jpg	IMG_3549.jpg
IMG_2981.jpg	IMG_3127.jpg	IMG_3268.jpg	IMG_3409.jpg	IMG_3550.jpg
IMG_2982.jpg	IMG_3128.jpg	IMG_3269.jpg	IMG_3410.jpg	IMG_3551.jpg
IMG_2983.jpg	IMG_3129.jpg	IMG_3270.jpg	IMG_3411.jpg	IMG_3552.jpg
IMG_2984.jpg	IMG_3130.jpg	IMG_3271.jpg	IMG_3412.jpg	IMG_3553.jpg
IMG_2985.jpg	IMG_3131.jpg	IMG_3272.jpg	IMG_3413.jpg	IMG_3554.jpg
IMG_2986.jpg	IMG_3132.jpg	IMG_3273.jpg	IMG_3414.jpg	IMG_3555.jpg
IMG_2987.jpg	IMG_3133.jpg	IMG_3274.jpg	IMG_3415.jpg	IMG_3556.jpg
IMG_2988.jpg	IMG_3134.jpg	IMG_3275.jpg	IMG_3416.jpg	IMG_3557.jpg
IMG_2989.jpg	IMG_3135.jpg	IMG_3276.jpg	IMG_3417.jpg	IMG_3558.jpg
IMG_2990.jpg	IMG_3136.jpg	IMG_3277.jpg	IMG_3418.jpg	IMG_3559.jpg
IMG_2991.jpg	IMG_3137.jpg	IMG_3278.jpg	IMG_3419.jpg	IMG_3560.jpg
IMG_2992.jpg	IMG_3138.jpg	IMG_3279.jpg	IMG_3420.jpg	IMG_3561.jpg
IMG_2993.jpg	IMG_3139.jpg	IMG_3280.jpg	IMG_3421.jpg	IMG_3562.jpg
IMG_2994.jpg	IMG_3140.jpg	IMG_3281.jpg	IMG_3422.jpg	IMG_3563.jpg
IMG_2995.jpg	IMG_3141.jpg	IMG_3282.jpg	IMG_3423.jpg	IMG_3564.jpg
IMG_2996.jpg	IMG_3142.jpg	IMG_3283.jpg	IMG_3424.jpg	IMG_3565.jpg
IMG_2997.jpg	IMG_3143.jpg	IMG_3284.jpg	IMG_3425.jpg	IMG_3566.jpg
IMG_2998.jpg	IMG_3144.jpg	IMG_3285.jpg	IMG_3426.jpg	IMG_3567.jpg
IMG_2999.jpg	IMG_3145.jpg	IMG_3286.jpg	IMG_3427.jpg	IMG_3568.jpg
IMG_3000.jpg	IMG_3146.jpg	IMG_3287.jpg	IMG_3428.jpg	IMG_3569.jpg
IMG_3001.jpg	IMG_3147.jpg	IMG_3288.jpg	IMG_3429.jpg	IMG_3570.jpg

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
5	U015			
IMG_3002.jpg	IMG_3148.jpg	IMG_3289.jpg	IMG_3430.jpg	IMG_3571.jpg
IMG_3003.jpg	IMG_3149.jpg	IMG_3290.jpg	IMG_3431.jpg	IMG_3572.jpg
IMG_3004.jpg	IMG_3150.jpg	IMG_3291.jpg	IMG_3432.jpg	IMG_3573.jpg
IMG_3005.jpg	IMG_3151.jpg	IMG_3292.jpg	IMG_3433.jpg	IMG_3574.jpg
IMG_3006.jpg	IMG_3152.jpg	IMG_3293.jpg	IMG_3434.jpg	IMG_3575.jpg
IMG_3007.jpg	IMG_3153.jpg	IMG_3294.jpg	IMG_3435.jpg	IMG_3576.jpg
IMG_3008.jpg	IMG_3154.jpg	IMG_3295.jpg	IMG_3436.jpg	IMG_3577.jpg
IMG_3009.jpg	IMG_3155.jpg	IMG_3296.jpg	IMG_3437.jpg	IMG_3578.jpg
IMG_3010.jpg	IMG_3156.jpg	IMG_3297.jpg	IMG_3438.jpg	IMG_3579.jpg
IMG_3011.jpg	IMG_3157.jpg	IMG_3298.jpg	IMG_3439.jpg	IMG_3580.jpg
IMG_3012.jpg	IMG_3158.jpg	IMG_3299.jpg	IMG_3440.jpg	IMG_3581.jpg
IMG_3013.jpg	IMG_3159.jpg	IMG_3300.jpg	IMG_3441.jpg	IMG_3582.jpg
IMG_3014.jpg	IMG_3160.jpg	IMG_3301.jpg	IMG_3442.jpg	IMG_3583.jpg
IMG_3015.jpg	IMG_3161.jpg	IMG_3302.jpg	IMG_3443.jpg	IMG_3584.jpg
IMG_3016.jpg	IMG_3162.jpg	IMG_3303.jpg	IMG_3444.jpg	IMG_3585.jpg
IMG_3017.jpg	IMG_3163.jpg	IMG_3304.jpg	IMG_3445.jpg	IMG_3586.jpg
IMG_3018.jpg	IMG_3164.jpg	IMG_3305.jpg	IMG_3446.jpg	IMG_3587.jpg
IMG_3019.jpg	IMG_3165.jpg	IMG_3306.jpg	IMG_3447.jpg	IMG_3588.jpg
IMG_3020.jpg	IMG_3166.jpg	IMG_3307.jpg	IMG_3448.jpg	IMG_3589.jpg
IMG_3021.jpg	IMG_3167.jpg	IMG_3308.jpg	IMG_3449.jpg	IMG_3590.jpg
IMG_3022.jpg	IMG_3168.jpg	IMG_3309.jpg	IMG_3450.jpg	IMG_3591.jpg
IMG_3023.jpg	IMG_3169.jpg	IMG_3310.jpg	IMG_3451.jpg	IMG_3592.jpg
IMG_3024.jpg	IMG_3170.jpg	IMG_3311.jpg	IMG_3452.jpg	IMG_3593.jpg
IMG_3025.jpg	IMG_3171.jpg	IMG_3312.jpg	IMG_3453.jpg	IMG_3594.jpg
IMG_3026.jpg	IMG_3172.jpg	IMG_3313.jpg	IMG_3454.jpg	IMG_3595.jpg
IMG_3027.jpg	IMG_3173.jpg	IMG_3314.jpg	IMG_3455.jpg	IMG_3596.jpg
IMG_3028.jpg	IMG_3174.jpg	IMG_3315.jpg	IMG_3456.jpg	IMG_3597.jpg
IMG_3029.jpg	IMG_3175.jpg	IMG_3316.jpg	IMG_3457.jpg	IMG_3598.jpg
IMG_3030.jpg	IMG_3176.jpg	IMG_3317.jpg	IMG_3458.jpg	IMG_3599.jpg
IMG_3031.jpg	IMG_3177.jpg	IMG_3318.jpg	IMG_3459.jpg	IMG_3600.jpg
IMG_3032.jpg	IMG_3178.jpg	IMG_3319.jpg	IMG_3460.jpg	IMG_3601.jpg
IMG_3033.jpg	IMG_3179.jpg	IMG_3320.jpg	IMG_3461.jpg	IMG_3602.jpg
IMG_3034.jpg	IMG_3180.jpg	IMG_3321.jpg	IMG_3462.jpg	IMG_3603.jpg
IMG_3035.jpg	IMG_3181.jpg	IMG_3322.jpg	IMG_3463.jpg	IMG_3604.jpg
IMG_3036.jpg	IMG_3182.jpg	IMG_3323.jpg	IMG_3464.jpg	IMG_3605.jpg
IMG_3037.jpg	IMG_3183.jpg	IMG_3324.jpg	IMG_3465.jpg	IMG_3606.jpg
IMG_3038.jpg	IMG_3184.jpg	IMG_3325.jpg	IMG_3466.jpg	IMG_3607.jpg
IMG_3039.jpg	IMG_3185.jpg	IMG_3326.jpg	IMG_3467.jpg	IMG_3608.jpg
IMG_3040.jpg	IMG_3186.jpg	IMG_3327.jpg	IMG_3468.jpg	IMG_3609.jpg
IMG_3041.jpg	IMG_3187.jpg	IMG_3328.jpg	IMG_3469.jpg	IMG_3610.jpg
IMG_3042.jpg	IMG_3188.jpg	IMG_3329.jpg	IMG_3470.jpg	IMG_3611.jpg
IMG_3043.jpg	IMG_3189.jpg	IMG_3330.jpg	IMG_3471.jpg	IMG_3612.jpg

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
5	U015			
IMG_3044.jpg	IMG_3190.jpg	IMG_3331.jpg	IMG_3472.jpg	IMG_3613.jpg
IMG_3045.jpg	IMG_3191.jpg	IMG_3332.jpg	IMG_3473.jpg	IMG_3614.jpg
IMG_3046.jpg	IMG_3192.jpg	IMG_3333.jpg	IMG_3474.jpg	IMG_3615.jpg
IMG_3047.jpg	IMG_3193.jpg	IMG_3334.jpg	IMG_3475.jpg	IMG_3616.jpg
IMG_3048.jpg	IMG_3194.jpg	IMG_3335.jpg	IMG_3476.jpg	IMG_3617.jpg
IMG_3049.jpg	IMG_3195.jpg	IMG_3336.jpg	IMG_3477.jpg	IMG_3618.jpg
IMG_3050.jpg	IMG_3196.jpg	IMG_3337.jpg	IMG_3478.jpg	IMG_3619.jpg
IMG_3051.jpg	IMG_3197.jpg	IMG_3338.jpg	IMG_3479.jpg	IMG_3620.jpg
IMG_3052.jpg	IMG_3198.jpg	IMG_3339.jpg	IMG_3480.jpg	IMG_3621.jpg
IMG_3053.jpg	IMG_3199.jpg	IMG_3340.jpg	IMG_3481.jpg	IMG_3622.jpg
IMG_3054.jpg	IMG_3200.jpg	IMG_3341.jpg	IMG_3482.jpg	IMG_3623.jpg
IMG_3055.jpg	IMG_3201.jpg	IMG_3342.jpg	IMG_3483.jpg	IMG_3624.jpg
IMG_3056.jpg	IMG_3202.jpg	IMG_3343.jpg	IMG_3484.jpg	IMG_3625.jpg
IMG_3057.jpg	IMG_3203.jpg	IMG_3344.jpg	IMG_3485.jpg	IMG_3626.jpg
IMG_3058.jpg	IMG_3204.jpg	IMG_3345.jpg	IMG_3486.jpg	IMG_3627.jpg
IMG_3059.jpg	IMG_3205.jpg	IMG_3346.jpg	IMG_3487.jpg	IMG_3628.jpg
IMG_3060.jpg	IMG_3206.jpg	IMG_3347.jpg	IMG_3488.jpg	IMG_3629.jpg
IMG_3061.jpg	IMG_3207.jpg	IMG_3348.jpg	IMG_3489.jpg	IMG_3630.jpg
IMG_3062.jpg				

TABLE A3.5: RECORDINGS TAKEN BY THE TAV TEAM DURING INTERVIEWS

Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
6	**U017**		
DR0000_1644.wav	DR0000_1645.wav	00000.mts	00001.mts
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
7	**U018**		
DR0000_1646.wav	00001.mts	DSC00852.jpg	DSC00855.jpg
DR0000_1647.wav	DSC00850.jpg	DSC00853.jpg	DSC00856.jpg
00000.mts	DSC00851.jpg	DSC00854.jpg	
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
8	**U019**		
DR0000_1648.wav	00000.mts	00002.mts	00003.mts
DR0000_1649.wav	00001.mts		
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
9	**U020**		
DR0000_1650.wav	00000.mts	00002.mts	00003.mts
DR0000_1651.wav	00001.mts		
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
10	**U021**		
DR0000_1652.wav	00000.mts	00001.mts	00002.mts
DR0000_1653.wav			
Entry No.	**Assigned Code**		
11	**U024**		
DR0000_1642.wav	00000.mts	00002.mts	00003.mts
DR0000_1643.wav	00001.mts		

Appendix 4

INFORMATION GATHERED BY THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TEAM

The table below summarises the evidence collected by the TAV team during interviews.

TABLE A4.1: EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY THE TAV TEAM DURING INTERVIEWS

Entry number	**Assigned Code**
1	**U017**
ERN 20250422U01703 - Drawing	
Entry number	**Assigned Code**
2	**U024**
ERN 20250422U02403 - Drawing	

Appendix 5

INFORMATION HANDED OVER TO THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE VISIT TEAM BY THE OPCW LABORATORY

The tables below summarise the electronic files generated by the OPCW Laboratory during the sample splitting and later handed over to the TAV team.

TABLE A5.1: VIDEO RECORDINGS AND PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE LABORATORY TEAM DURING SAMPLE SPLITTING AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
1	U015			
MAH00145.mp4	MAH00147.mp4	MAH00149.mp4	MAH00150.mp4	MAH00151.mp4
MAH00146.mp4	MAH00148.mp4			

TABLE A5.2: PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE LABORATORY TEAM DURING SAMPLE SPLITTING AT THE OPCW LABORATORY

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
2	U015			
IMG_1814.jpg	IMG_1873.jpg	IMG_1932.jpg	IMG_1990.jpg	IMG_2048.jpg
IMG_1815.jpg	IMG_1874.jpg	IMG_1933.jpg	IMG_1991.jpg	IMG_2049.jpg
IMG_1816.jpg	IMG_1875.jpg	IMG_1934.jpg	IMG_1992.jpg	IMG_2050.jpg
IMG_1817.jpg	IMG_1876.jpg	IMG_1935.jpg	IMG_1993.jpg	IMG_2051.jpg
IMG_1818.jpg	IMG_1877.jpg	IMG_1936.jpg	IMG_1994.jpg	IMG_2052.jpg
IMG_1819.jpg	IMG_1878.jpg	IMG_1937.jpg	IMG_1995.jpg	IMG_2053.jpg
IMG_1820.jpg	IMG_1879.jpg	IMG_1938.jpg	IMG_1996.jpg	IMG_2054.jpg
IMG_1821.jpg	IMG_1880.jpg	IMG_1939.jpg	IMG_1997.jpg	IMG_2055.jpg
IMG_1822.jpg	IMG_1881.jpg	IMG_1940.jpg	IMG_1998.jpg	IMG_2056.jpg
IMG_1823.jpg	IMG_1882.jpg	IMG_1941.jpg	IMG_1999.jpg	IMG_2057.jpg
IMG_1824.jpg	IMG_1883.jpg	IMG_1942.jpg	IMG_2000.jpg	IMG_2058.jpg
IMG_1825.jpg	IMG_1884.jpg	IMG_1943.jpg	IMG_2001.jpg	IMG_2059.jpg
IMG_1826.jpg	IMG_1885.jpg	IMG_1944.jpg	IMG_2002.jpg	IMG_2060.jpg
IMG_1827.jpg	IMG_1886.jpg	IMG_1945.jpg	IMG_2003.jpg	IMG_2061.jpg
IMG_1828.jpg	IMG_1887.jpg	IMG_1946.jpg	IMG_2004.jpg	IMG_2062.jpg
IMG_1829.jpg	IMG_1888.jpg	IMG_1947.jpg	IMG_2005.jpg	IMG_2063.jpg
IMG_1830.jpg	IMG_1889.jpg	IMG_1948.jpg	IMG_2006.jpg	IMG_2064.jpg
IMG_1831.jpg	IMG_1890.jpg	IMG_1949.jpg	IMG_2007.jpg	IMG_2065.jpg
IMG_1832.jpg	IMG_1891.jpg	IMG_1950.jpg	IMG_2008.jpg	IMG_2066.jpg
IMG_1833.jpg	IMG_1892.jpg	IMG_1951.jpg	IMG_2009.jpg	IMG_2067.jpg

Entry No.	Assigned Code			
2	**U015**			
IMG_1834.jpg	IMG_1893.jpg	IMG_1952.jpg	IMG_2010.jpg	IMG_2068.jpg
IMG_1835.jpg	IMG_1894.jpg	IMG_1953.jpg	IMG_2011.jpg	IMG_2069.jpg
IMG_1836.jpg	IMG_1895.jpg	IMG_1954.jpg	IMG_2012.jpg	IMG_2070.jpg
IMG_1837.jpg	IMG_1896.jpg	IMG_1955.jpg	IMG_2013.jpg	IMG_2071.jpg
IMG_1838.jpg	IMG_1897.jpg	IMG_1956.jpg	IMG_2014.jpg	IMG_2072.jpg
IMG_1839.jpg	IMG_1898.jpg	IMG_1957.jpg	IMG_2015.jpg	IMG_2073.jpg
IMG_1840.jpg	IMG_1899.jpg	IMG_1958.jpg	IMG_2016.jpg	IMG_2074.jpg
IMG_1841.jpg	IMG_1900.jpg	IMG_1959.jpg	IMG_2017.jpg	IMG_2075.jpg
IMG_1842.jpg	IMG_1901.jpg	IMG_1960.jpg	IMG_2018.jpg	IMG_2076.jpg
IMG_1843.jpg	IMG_1902.jpg	IMG_1961.jpg	IMG_2019.jpg	IMG_2077.jpg
IMG_1844.jpg	IMG_1903.jpg	IMG_1962.jpg	IMG_2020.jpg	IMG_2078.jpg
IMG_1845.jpg	IMG_1904.jpg	IMG_1963.jpg	IMG_2021.jpg	IMG_2079.jpg
IMG_1846.jpg	IMG_1905.jpg	IMG_1964.jpg	IMG_2022.jpg	IMG_2080.jpg
IMG_1847.jpg	IMG_1906.jpg	IMG_1965.jpg	IMG_2023.jpg	IMG_2081.jpg
IMG_1848.jpg	IMG_1907.jpg	IMG_1966.jpg	IMG_2024.jpg	IMG_2082.jpg
IMG_1849.jpg	IMG_1908.jpg	IMG_1967.jpg	IMG_2025.jpg	IMG_2083.jpg
IMG_1850.jpg	IMG_1909.jpg	IMG_1968.jpg	IMG_2026.jpg	IMG_2084.jpg
IMG_1851.jpg	IMG_1910.jpg	IMG_1969.jpg	IMG_2027.jpg	IMG_2085.jpg
IMG_1852.jpg	IMG_1911.jpg	IMG_1970.jpg	IMG_2028.jpg	IMG_2086.jpg
IMG_1853.jpg	IMG_1912.jpg	IMG_1971.jpg	IMG_2029.jpg	IMG_2087.jpg
IMG_1854.jpg	IMG_1913.jpg	IMG_1972.jpg	IMG_2030.jpg	IMG_2088.jpg
IMG_1855.jpg	IMG_1914.jpg	IMG_1973.jpg	IMG_2031.jpg	IMG_2089.jpg
IMG_1856.jpg	IMG_1915.jpg	IMG_1974.jpg	IMG_2032.jpg	IMG_2090.jpg
IMG_1857.jpg	IMG_1916.jpg	IMG_1975.jpg	IMG_2033.jpg	IMG_2091.jpg
IMG_1858.jpg	IMG_1917.jpg	IMG_1976.jpg	IMG_2034.jpg	IMG_2092.jpg
IMG_1859.jpg	IMG_1918.jpg	IMG_1977.jpg	IMG_2035.jpg	IMG_2093.jpg
IMG_1860.jpg	IMG_1919.jpg	IMG_1978.jpg	IMG_2036.jpg	IMG_2094.jpg
IMG_1861.jpg	IMG_1920.jpg	IMG_1979.jpg	IMG_2037.jpg	IMG_2095.jpg
IMG_1862.jpg	IMG_1921.jpg	IMG_1980.jpg	IMG_2038.jpg	IMG_2096.jpg
IMG_1863.jpg	IMG_1922.jpg	IMG_1981.jpg	IMG_2039.jpg	IMG_2097.jpg
IMG_1864.jpg	IMG_1923.jpg	IMG_1982.jpg	IMG_2040.jpg	IMG_2098.jpg
IMG_1865.jpg	IMG_1924.jpg	IMG_1983.jpg	IMG_2041.jpg	IMG_2099.jpg
IMG_1866.jpg	IMG_1925.jpg	IMG_1984.jpg	IMG_2042.jpg	IMG_2100.jpg
IMG_1867.jpg	IMG_1926.jpg	IMG_1985.jpg	IMG_2043.jpg	IMG_2101.jpg
IMG_1868.jpg	IMG_1927.jpg	IMG_1986.jpg	IMG_2044.jpg	IMG_2102.jpg
IMG_1869.jpg	IMG_1928.jpg	IMG_1987.jpg	IMG_2045.jpg	IMG_2103.jpg
IMG_1870.jpg	IMG_1929.jpg	IMG_1988.jpg	IMG_2046.jpg	IMG_2104.jpg
IMG_1871.jpg	IMG_1930.jpg	IMG_1989.jpg	IMG_2047.jpg	IMG_2105.jpg
IMG_1872.jpg	IMG_1931.jpg			

Appendix 6

MEASUREMENTS FOR THE GRENADES AND ITEMS

TABLE A6.1: SUMMARY OF MEASUREMENTS FOR THE DEVICES HANDED OVER BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE TO THE TAV TEAM

SDS06		**SDS07**	
Date of the Incident	28/02/2025	Date of the Incident	28/02/2025
			
Inscription	РГ-Во 862-2-24		РГ-Во 862-2-24
Length (whole, top to bottom)	11 cm (with plug, convex bottom)		10.4 cm (burned plug, convex bottom)
Diameter/calibre body (whole)	5.5 cm		5.5 cm
Lengths			
Length (body side, with bottom cone and without top part)	~10.2 cm	Length (body side, with bottom cone and without top part)	~10.3 cm
Length (body side, no bottom cone and no top part)	~9.5 cm	Length (body side, no bottom cone and no top part)	~9.5 cm
Length top part of body (from top to beginning of groove)	~1.0 cm	Length top part of body (from top to beginning of groove)	~1.0 cm
Length top part of body (from top to middle of groove)	1.2 cm	Length top part of body (from top to middle of groove)	1.2 cm
Length groove (from start of groove indent to end of indent)	0.35 cm	Length groove (from start of groove indent to end of indent)	--

SDS06		SDS07	
Length (from middle of groove to bottom without bottom cone)	8.25 cm	Length (from middle of groove to bottom without bottom cone)	8.2 cm
Diameters			
			
		Comment: The green disk is burned off, the structure underneath is visible. Structure referred to as “green disk space”	
Whole top 	5.5 cm	Whole top 	5.5 cm
At groove in body 	--	At groove in body 	5.35 cm
Outer visible diameter of green disk 	~4.35 cm	Outer diameter of green disk space 	~4.5 cm
Inner visible diameter of green disk (hole) 	~1.75 cm	Inner diameter of green disk space (hole) 	1.8 cm
Green disk visible thickness (“rim width”) 	~1.3 cm	Green disk space thickness (“rim width”) 	1.35 cm

SDS06		SDS07	
Inside green disk to outside of device 	~1.8 cm	Inside green disk space to outside of device 	~1.9 cm
Plug disk 	~1.65 cm	Plug disk (burned) 	~1.65 cm
Plug width -without protrusion  -with protrusion 	0.9 cm ~1.2 cm	Plug width	Not possible to measure, plug is burned
Plug, hole diameter inside 	~0.7 cm	Plug, hole diameter inside	
Plug material thickness 	~0.15 cm	Plug material thickness	
Top rim thickness 	~0.5 cm	Top rim thickness 	~0.5 cm
Other			
Letter sizes	“o” = ~0.8 cm “B” = ~1.05 cm “4” = ~1.0 cm	Letter sizes	“B” = ~1.0 cm

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">SDS06</th><th colspan="2">SDS07</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Details on top of device</td><td colspan="2">Details on top of device</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">  </td><td colspan="2">  </td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2"></td><td colspan="2">U-shaped opening for release of content</td></tr>
<tr><td>Hole punctured into lid of device at bottom of plug</td><td>~0.3 cm</td><td>Opening thickness
  </td><td>~0.6 cm</td></tr>
<tr><td>Two holes in the plug sides, opposing each other</td><td>0.28 cm
0.3 cm</td><td>Height
  </td><td>3.45 cm</td></tr>
<tr><td>Indent marking in green disk</td><td>~0.75 cm</td><td>Centre distance
  </td><td>~3 cm</td></tr>
<tr><td>Red dot on opposite side of plug protrusion</td><td></td><td>Width
  </td><td>~1.65 cm</td></tr>
</table>

SDS07	
Position of U-shaped opening	
From inside rim on bottom 	~0.5 cm
From inside rim on top 	~0.3 cm
Hole opposite of U-shaped opening	
Diameter 	~0.4 cm
Position of hole	
From inside rim on bottom 	~3.6 mm
From inside rim on top 	~0.45 cm

TABLE A6.2: SUMMARY OF MEASUREMENTS FOR THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS HANDED OVER BY THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE TO THE TAV TEAM

Additional items	SDS06			
	Dimensions		Diameter	
Metal tube 	Length, whole	~5.2 cm	Diameter bottom, - outside - inside	 1.15 cm 1.0 cm
	Length, side slit, wide bottom - width - length	 ~0.4 cm ~1.2 cm		
	Length, side slit, end of wide bottom to narrow end at top - width top - width bottom - length	 ~0.1 cm ~0.2 cm ~3.8 cm		
	Top trapezoid opening - short base - long base - height	 ~0.85 cm ~1 cm ~0.7 cm		
	2 Cavities in body	~0.2 x 0.3 cm		
Spring 	Length	~3.1 cm	Diameter, - inside - outside	 ~0.75 cm ~0.65 cm
Dart 	Length, whole	~3.1 cm	Diameter, - ring - main body	 ~0.9 cm ~0.4 cm
	From left to right - bottom cone - bottom cylinder - connecting rod - tapered part of main body - main body - tip cone	 ~0.1 cm ~0.1 cm ~0.45 cm ~0.08 cm ~1.9 cm ~0.4 cm		

Additional items	SDS06			
	Dimensions		Diameter	
Disk 	Height, whole	0.3 cm	Diameter outside, - wide end - narrow end	 ~0.9 cm ~0.5 cm
	Height, wide end of disk	0.15 cm	Diameter inside, - wide end - narrow end	 ~0.78 cm ~0.42 cm

Appendix 7

SAMPLE ANALYSIS RESULTS

The table below summarises the results of sample analyses reported by the two OPCW designated laboratories selected by the Director-General.

TABLE A7.1: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS RESULTS OF THE SAMPLES RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY OF UKRAINE BY THE TAV TEAM

Entry No.	Sample Code	Description	Laboratory 1		Laboratory 2	
			Compound	CAS RN[3]	Compound	CAS RN
01	SDS01	UAV with battery (wipes collected from the body of the UAV)	No chemicals relevant to the scope of analysis reported	-	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
02	SLS02	Soil collected from the location as a control sample	No chemicals relevant to the scope of analysis reported	-	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
03	SDS03	Vegetation collected from the location as a control sample	No chemicals relevant to the scope of analysis reported	-	No chemicals relevant to the scope of analysis reported	-
04	SDS04	Vegetation collected near Grenade #1 (SDS06)	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
			2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5	2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5
			2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5	2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5
					2-Chlorobenzylmalononitrile	40915-55-7

[3] CAS RN: Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.

Entry No.	Sample Code	Description	Laboratory 1		Laboratory 2	
			Compound	CAS RN[3]	Compound	CAS RN
05	SLS05	Soil sample collected near Grenade #2 (SDS07)	2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT)	118-96-7	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
			1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazinane (RDX)	121-82-4	2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5
					2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT)	118-96-7
					1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazinane (RDX)	121-82-4
06	SDS06	Grenade #1 collected with fuse parts (solvent extracts from the grenade were sent to designated laboratories)	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
			2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5	2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5
			2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5	2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5
					2-Chlorobenzylmalononitrile	40915-55-7
07	SDS07	Grenade #2 (solvent extracts from the grenade were sent to designated laboratories)	2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5	2-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)	2698-41-1
			2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5	2-Chlorobenzyl cyanide	2856-63-5
			2-Chlorobenzonitrile	873-32-5	2-Chlorobenzaldehyde	89-98-5
			2-Chlorohydrocinnamonitrile	7315-17-5		

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