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RUSSIAN FEDERATION

**STATEMENT BY H.E. AMBASSADOR A.V. SHULGIN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE
OPCW AT THE TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE
STATES PARTIES UNDER AGENDA ITEM 13**

Mr Chairperson,

During the course of the 101st Session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Russian Federation spoke against delaying the review by the Conference of the States Parties of the draft revised OPCW Programme and Budget for the year 2023. We continue to have serious issues with the draft prepared by the Technical Secretariat.

Unfortunately, we are forced to state that we completely disagree with the approaches taken towards compiling the budget, as they are not aligned with best practices or the requirements of a number of States in terms of budgetary procedures. In spite of the repeated calls for the Secretariat to adhere to two separate approaches as before—whereby the level of budgetary expenses is determined separately from the level of calculated contributions—dubious budgetary manipulations continue, accompanied by the chaotic reallocation of funds between the main budget and special funds.

We do understand the argument that the main budget was increased by EUR 1.178 million due to the need to cover growing inflation-related expenditures. In general, this is in line with the “zero nominal growth” principle, and we could support it.

However, as regards ideas about transferring EUR 2.13 million into special funds from the 2020 cash balance, we see in this proposal the misguided policy that took root in 2017, whereby the Secretariat accumulates additional financial resources, essentially leading to the steady increase of the Organisation’s budget, the dynamics of which considerably exceed the rate of inflation.

According to paragraph 6.3 of the OPCW Financial Regulations, cash surpluses are to be allocated among States Parties. This provision should remain a key element of the Organisation’s financial policy. It follows from provision 6.9 that it should be resorted to in exceptional circumstances, and not used as a way to justify what is essentially the cancellation of paragraph 6.3, as has been happening at the OPCW in recent years. In the absence of a consensus, each State Party has the right to independently decide on the ways in which their share of the cash surplus may be utilised.



Separately, we are forced to address the issue of financing the attribution activities of the OPCW. We cannot agree with how—in spite of the repeated statements made by us and a number of other States disagreeing with the establishment and activities of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) within the OPCW—its work continues and it is receiving considerable funds, not only from voluntary contributions, but from the regular budget. We have previously stated this more than once, and we will repeat it again today: attributive functions are in contradiction to the Convention. Their mere existence—and, consequently, their funding from the budget—are unacceptable to us.

Thus, in line with the above, the Russian Federation cannot support the draft decision on the approval of the OPCW's revised mid-biennial Programme and Budget for the year 2023.

I request that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties and published on the Catalyst platform and the OPCW website.

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