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Delivering Assistance and Protection |
Autumn / September 2001 |
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![]() By Hassan Mashhadi |
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The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires that States Parties cooperate with the Organisation in facilitating the coordination and delivery of assistance and protection to minimise the consequences of a chemical weapons attack, in countering the threat of use of chemical weapons, and in eliminating the threats posed by activities prohibited under Article I of the Convention. Each State Party has the right to request and to receive assistance and protection against the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons (subject to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Article X). |
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Assistance under Article X 'means the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia: detection equipment and alarm systems; protection equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.' To enhance transparency, the Convention also requires that States Parties annually provide information on their national programmes related to protective purposes. The Organisation carries out a number of functions with respect to Article X.
In the event of (a) the use of chemical weapons or riot control agents as a method of warfare, and/or (b) the threat of the use of chemical weapons, and/or (c) if any State Party considers that it is threatened by actions or activities of any state that are prohibited for States Parties under Article I the OPCW is obliged:
To facilitate many of the functions required under Article X of the Convention, the Organisation has established an assistance response system to provide 24-hour coverage.
The system developed by the OPCW for the provision of assistance and protection to one or more of its States Parties is based on a modular approach. The approach takes into account the current capacity of the OPCW in terms of offers of assistance by States Par ties (in the form of material and personnel), and the capacity of theSecretariat to store, maintain, transport, and distribute the items and resources most likely to be needed should a CW-related emergency arise. The components of this approach involve a central stockpile of resources and equipment in the Organisation's headquarters, available for immediate dispatch to a requesting State Par ty, and in addition, stockpiles of resources which have been offered by States Parties and organised in the form of modules. The modules are categorised into basic assistance modules (BAMs) for emergency assistance, and specialised assistance modules (SAMs) for supplementary and humanitarian assistance. While the Secretariat would store BAMs and a very limited stockpile of humanitarian assistance, while both BAMs and SAMs would be stockpiled by the States Par ties. The basic module would consist of pallet-packed items, ready to be airlifted within 12 hours after the request for assistance has been received.The BAMs in the headquarter's stockpile will be identical to the BAMs stored by States Par ties. This will facilitate identification, packing, dispatch, and the delivery of assistance.
The concept of limited, centrally-located resources has been assessed, applying the assumption that a Secretariat team and the assistance coordination and assessment team (ACAT), are required to reach the territory of the requesting State Party within hours after a request for assistance has been received. This team will consist of a limited number of OPCW staff members, who will be carrying the equipment required for them to perform their own activities; in addition, they will be carrying a limited amount of equipment for the requesting State Party. It is recommended that the Member States make provisions for a minimum internal capability within the Secretariat for the assistance needs of 1000 people (this is based on the standard payload of a C-130 Hercules transport plane). This limited central stockpile would be immediately dispatched, together with the ACAT. However, the ACAT dispatched by the OPCW will carry some additional equipment needed for its operations, along with a BAM for the requesting State Party, which they will use to assess the need for supplementary assistance and protection. In case humanitarian assistance is needed, this team would serve as a coordination team for the delivery of any further assistance. Additional supplies for the ACAT could be delivered with the IAU investigation team, or through other relevant international organisations. The ACAT needs to be self-sufficient for the first five days of its operations. The limited stockpile of assistance items could be pre-packed and stored in modules and ready to be picked up by an assistance team; this is necessary, since they must be dispatched within 12 hours of a request for assistance being received. Initial contacts with the Dutch Army have shown that a cost-free storage location for a limited stockpile of assistance items could be identified in the Netherlands (probably within driving distance from the airport, or even in the vicinity of The Hague). If this concept is approved, additional negotiations with relevant Dutch officials will follow. Maintenance of these items could be carried out without exceeding the funds made available to the Secretariat for the purpose of assessing the serviceability of assistance equipment. Based on the type of equipment, an annual inspection/calibration/rotation of the equipment will be required.
In addition to the modular storage equipment offered by States Par ties, there are heavy equipment items such as decontamination systems, mobile laboratories, field hospitals, medical equipment, and facilities for the temporary accommodation of persons. Protection equipment for the team will also be put into modules to facilitate storage, handling, and transport. The offering States Par ties will staff the heavy equipment; therefore, this complicating factor should be taken into account in any kind of planning. Besides these offers, there are States Parties which have made offers of self-sufficient teams.These teams could consist of 30-40 persons, including individuals who are specialists in handling protective equipment, in detection and warning systems, in decontamination equipment, and in other resources. The modalities of using these teams, including any possible liabilities and the legal status of these teams need to be addressed in bilateral agreements, or in arrangements between the offering States Parties and the Executive Council. As a matter of principle, the requesting State Party has the right to decide which of the teams or units to accept or reject.
The resources and offers currently made available to the Organisation by States Parties may be, in principle, sufficient to cover the immediate requirements of an assistance operation under Article X. Additional resources may be required to support such operations over a more extended period of time (for example, if casualties from a military conflict need medical attention). An appeal to donate such resources may be made once the actual needs become clear. However, the apparent sufficiency of resources available to the Organisation should not mask a number of important operational problems attributed to these national declarations of assistance. These problems are described below.
The solution to these problems is to expand the resources and offers from States Par ties and, more importantly, to try to conclude bilateral agreements and arrangements with the offering States Par ties to pinpoint all the practical and burden-sharing aspects of the offers.
The
role of the OPCW with regard to medical teams and medical offers of assistance
requires further elaboration. There is a need for guidance on whether
the Secretariat is responsible for one or more of the following tasks:
The main tasks of the ACAT are assessing the situation, advising and liaising with the Requesting State Par ty (RSP), instructing RSP personnel in the use of the items in the BAM, coordinating the receipt and delivery of assistance, and setting up the on-site operation coordination centre (OSOCC). The OSOCC may be set up by relevant international organisations such as UN-OCHA or a State Par ty (through an existing bilateral agreement, or an arrangement which has already been signed). However, the OSOCC should be staffed by the ACAT, which will be reinforced with outside experts and specialists. The ACAT will carry the equipment necessary for carrying out their activities.
Logistics Most of the offers of assistance made to date put the offered equipment at the disposal of the OPCW at an airport selected by the States Par ties. The OPCW would be required to transport the assistance to the requesting State Par ty.The transportation options are as follows:
A combination of these three options will provide the OPCW with reliable transportation. The mobilisation of these resources does not incur much cost to the Organisation, except for some training and participation in exercises during the later stages. The costs of these means of delivery of assistance, however, are high, and should be reimbursed by use of the voluntary fund. The present amount of cash in the voluntary fund may not be sufficient to cover the cost of a medium-sized operation. This should be addressed, either by an appeal by the Director-General to States Parties for additional contributions, or by the Conference of the States Par ties' approval of a one-time budget contribution to the fund, as a onference resource placed at the disposal of the Director-General for such contingencies.
To receive and distribute assistance, the ACAT of the OPCW, with the help of its external experts and in cooperation with States Parties and other relevant international organisations, will set up the centre and the OSOCC. There are States Parties and organisations which are willing to set up the OSOCC for the OPCW.This operation, however, requires conducting field exercises and training with the offering States Par ties and international organisations. The unique feature of coordinating assistance, which is not the case in other humanitarian relief operations, is the interdependency of units and teams. A medical team from one State Party has to rely on personal protective equipment from one other State Party, or from the OPCW.A decontamination team from a third State Party would require medical support from yet another team from another State Party, or from the OPCW. The focus should be on concluding bilateral agreements with international organisations and with States Par ties for setting up an OSOCC, and for training and for conducting exercises. By conducting an annual assistance delivery exercise, and by organising one or two training courses for field operators, the Secretariat, and other international organisations will create the necessary framework for field readiness.
It is recommended that the OPCW cooperate with relevant international organisations for the delivery of assistance. This recommendation is based on a lack of resources within the OPCW to individually provide delivery of assistance, and the fact that it is not economical for the Organisation to seek a delivery capability. In addition, cooperation with international organisations and national agencies helps avoid a duplication of activities, particularly on the site of operations; furthermore, the Organisation learns from the experience of others. Areas of cooperation with other international organisations and national agencies may expand to systematic information monitoring in certain cases; these cases could provide advance warning of a situation which might eventually result in an official request for assistance (early warning). Daily monitoring of international news, and the regular use of specialised databases, are possible through such cooperation. Furthermore, this approach enables the OPCW to have access to the experts and specialised expertise of other organisations. An analysis of the Convention's requirements and available resources indicates that cooperation with other organisations is required in at least the following four areas:
To ensure the predictability and reliability of the assistance mechanism of the Organisation, its relationships with other international organisations, as well as with specialised national agencies, the legal nature of those relationships will need to be put in the form of bilateral agreements. Where applicable, procedures for the procurement of their services may be required.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of Part XI of the Verification Annex, an IAU may be initiated pursuant to either Article IX or Article X. Under Article X, the IAU will become part of an investigation to provide a foundation for further action (for assistance), and is launched by the Director-General not later than 24 hours after receipt of a request for assistance. In other words, under Article X, a State Party cannot request an IAU independent of a request for assistance and protection against the use of chemical weapons or riot control agents as a method of warfare. It is therefore suggested that, when the Director-General receives the request for assistance and for an IAU, the assistance response system will be activated to address the request. The assistance coordination group, in which the Inspectorate, Verification, International Cooperation and Assistance Divisions, inter alia, are represented, will advise the Director-General on a course of action, and will manage the Secretariat's activities in connection with the request. The details and the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of conducting an IAU need to be further developed.
The staffing of the assistance response system will include outside personnel (qualified experts, protection network members, ACAT external members, etc.) and OPCW inhouse staff (the logistics officer and the communications officer from the Inspectorate; a medical doctor/health and safety specialist from the Health and Safety Branch; and some experts from other divisions). This
concept paper is based on implementing the obligations of the OPCW under
Article X, and minimising any costs related to its implementation. Therefore,
the costs of the headquarters stockpile and its refurbishment, the setting
up an OSOCC, the staffing of the ACAT from external resources, and related
costs would be covered by contributions from States Parties. However,
the most important role of the OPCW in implementing Article X is the mobilisation
of international mechanisms and the coordination international response.
Building capacity in the Secretariat to manage assistance and the effective
delivery of assistance are dependent upon preparation and training, which
requires
The OPCW will conduct exercises to ensure that the system functions properly. These exercises will involve a full response from the OPCW teams, and participation by several Member States and international organisations. The lessons learned during these exercises will help the OPCW to improve its assistance response system, to modify operational procedures, to upgrade resources and facilities, and to correct communication problems. The Secretariat will also organise an annual assistance coordination workshop, which will be conducted to review the report of activities of the previous year, discuss plans for the coming year, and evaluate the situation and analyse gaps in offers. Furthermore, this venue will be used to familiarise participants with offers of others, to seek solutions for coordination problems, and to get a hands-on knowledge about the offers of the host country. At this event, the participants will identify needs and requirements for the following year and prepare a list to appeal to States Par ties to provide them. Other activities necessary for the Assistance and Protection Branch to pursue in relation to this strategic concept for the provision of assistance include:
2. Article X, paragraph 7 stipulates:'each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organisation and to this end ' Paragraph 9 says: "The Director-General shall dispatch emergency assistance in case of use '. Paragraph 10 stipulates: 'the Director General shall provide assistance immediately'. Paragraph 11 indicates that:'the Director-General shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources '. 4.
The Conference shall 'establish at its first session the voluntary fund
for assistance in accordance with Article X' (Article VIII, subparagraph
21(j)); the Executive Council shall 'conclude agreements with States Parties
on behalf of the Organisation in 5. Article VIII, paragraph 34 (b). 6. The Executive Council shall ' coordinate the establishment and maintenance of permanent stockpiles of emergency and humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance with Article X, paragraphs (b) and (c) 8. Article VIII, subparagraph 39(c). 9. Article X, paragraphs 9-10. 13. Article X paragraph 11 ' the Director- General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his disposal for such contingencies' (emphasis added). 14. Article X paragraph 10 states ' For this purpose, the Director- General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organisations' (emphasis added). 15. Article X, paragraph 9 stipulates that the Director-General shall initiate an IAU in order to provide a 'foundation for further action'. It further says 'the investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and protection needed' |
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