Implementing Article XI - Achievements and Challenges.

Spring / April 2001

Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention has often been presented as a balance within the Convention. It reflected the view of the drafters of the Convention that disarmament and development are to complement each other. This relationship between the economic and social development of States and their participation in global disarmament regimes has become a well-recognised principle of global arms control. That, however, does not mean that there is one common conceptual approach on how to implement this principle.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is primarily a global disarmament regime. But, with its implementation, it also creates a new political and legal framework for the chemically related economic activities of the States Parties. With increased transparency through verification, and with the Convention’s trade provisions that prevent the unwitting participation of States Parties in CW proliferation attempts, there will be growing confidence that chemical activities in the States Parties are entirely legitimate. Within such a context, international cooperation between States Parties in the chemical field can no longer be repressed or distorted by unwarranted suspicions of intent to divert knowledge, material or equipment for chemical warfare purposes. This simple fact was recognised by the drafters of the Convention in their inclusion of Article XI.

In the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, a large number of countries stressed throughout the talks the need for an appropriate link in the Convention between disarmament and development. They insisted, and still insist, that the Convention must ultimately lead to a new relationship in which unilateral technology denial will no longer be acceptable. They also expected a direct contribution to international cooperation and economic development. Chemistry is, after all, a key area of science and technology that directly affects agricultural, public health, and other industries such as textiles, building, transportation, and mining, as well as the manufacture of consumer goods.

Some other nations regarded the Convention as very much confined to CW disarmament and non-proliferation, and consequently showed little inclination to create an international institution that would implement international cooperation programmes. Furthermore, they had begun designing and implementing a range of export control measures which had initially been a reaction to the ease with which Iraq was able to obtain production equipment and precursor chemicals on the global market, in order to manufacture chemical weapons which it used against Iran during the mid 1980s. Eventually these export controls became a response to what was perceived as the increasing danger of the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Australia Group served as a mechanism for coordinating these measures, and for sharing proliferation-related information.

Inevitably, Article XI became one of the most difficult provisions on which a degree of agreement had to be reached. Its text was one of the very last agreements reached in the Conference on Disarmament. The trade control issue took the entire Convention hostage until a formula was found that provided some assurance that the issue of unilateral export controls would be addressed during the implementation phase of the Convention. The often-quoted statement by Australia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations for Disamarment Matters, Ambassador O’Sullivan, on 6 August 1992, on behalf of members of the Australia Group, was an essential prerequisite for the agreement on the text of the Convention and on its referral to the United Nations General Assembly.

The subsequent debate in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1992 was an early indicator of what was subsequently to happen in the Preparatory Commission, and, eventually, in the OPCW. Statement after statement called for the fostering of international cooperation in the chemical field and for the early abolition of unilateral export controls.

Almost four years after the entry into force of the Convention, the Conference of the States Parties has yet to adopt a decision on how to implement Article XI. This is of itself ample evidence that the debate is anything but over. But the debate has changed character. At the end of the preparatory period, some degree of commonality had evolved with respect to the programmatic aspects of Article XI. Although the fundamental disagreements about the issue of unilateral export controls outside the context of the Convention persisted, the emerging acceptance of international cooperation programmes as part of the institutional mandate of the OPCW made it possible to use the annual process of developing the OPCW programme and budget as a means of moving forward on this issue. This is certainly not to say that the Member States of the OPCW have reached final agreement on international cooperation programmes. But there is, at least, no longer an argument about whether the OPCW should have such a programme at all, and discussion is instead focusing on whether the proportion of the Organisation’s budget which is allocated to international cooperation adequately reflects its importance.

The conceptual basis for the OPCW’s international cooperation programme was derived from the text of Article XI itself, which contains an undertaking to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

In developing the content of this programme, the OPCW Secretariat had to take account of the fact that the OPCW is not the only organisation active in the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful application of chemistry. In fact, a whole array of international organisations has been active in this area. Particular reference should be made to the Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC), an association of international organisations that have joined forces under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, an offspring of the Rio Earth Summit. The IOMC has for years been working in the area of the sound management of chemicals, and has developed a range of capacity-building programmes that are geared towards improving the manner in which developing countries in particular acquire, produce, handle, utilise and dispose of chemicals. Furthermore, there are also organisations that deal specifically with the promotion of chemical science and technology in developing countries. One such example is the Stockholm-based International Science Foundation, a non-governmental organisation sponsoring promising young scientists from developing countries by providing them with research grants.

Rather than duplicating these existing programmes, the OPCW had to identify which specific contributions it could make, and how it could best participate in the existing mechanisms. The OPCW needed to benefit from synergism and coordination. It was at least as important to develop a programme that could draw on the specific technical and scientific expertise of the OPCW. The OPCW’s contribution to international cooperation in the chemical field needed to be organically linked to its overall mandate, building on the specific technical competence acquired in the Convention’s implementation process. It finally became apparent that there was a degree of synergism between projects directed towards the peaceful application of chemistry and the development of the national capabilities required to implement the Convention itself. One striking example of this was a project assisting Member States in the development of their national capabilities in chemical analysis. This project had initially focused on laboratories that wanted to become designated laboratories. While the OPCW could offer some technical advice and support in this respect, it was also realised that the needs of many Member States in fact lay elsewhere. Perhaps the setting up of a designated laboratory was not in their best interest, given the cost of establishing and maintaining such a laboratory, and given the limited benefit that they would derive from it. There were, however, other things that could be done to improve their analytical capabilities that would not only help them in implementing the Convention, but that would also contribute to the solution of other problems which they face.

The latest addition to the list of OPCW programmes was the OPCW Associate Programme. Perhaps this is the most conspicuous example of how synergism between international cooperation and non-proliferation can be accomplished. At first glance, this might appear to be just another capacity-building programme. Scientists and engineers from developing countries receive training in Convention-related issues, undergo training in modern industrial operations, management and chemical safety, and work on research assignments. But consider the following: not only does the programme spread good industrial and safety practices to developing countries. Not only does it broaden the geographical basis for OPCW recruitment. It also helps Member States to broaden their understanding and practical knowledge of the implementation of the Convention itself. And it imparts an understanding of the goals of the Convention to companies and research institutions in developing countries, thus creating additional transparency and non-proliferation assurances. In short, here is a programme with a direct impact on the sound management of chemicals in Member States, and, with that, on their economic development, thus helping to strengthen the Convention’s non-proliferation regime.

The basis has been laid for the future development of the OPCW’s international cooperation programmes. The possible limiting factor for their future development will, however, primarily be the availability of funds. On trade issues the limiting factor will be the political will of the Member States. It is important not lose sight of the importance of reaching agreement on the implementation of Article XI in all its aspects. Continuing disagreements on trade controls and about the nature and extent of international cooperation programmes will have ramifications for much more than the degree of universality that this Convention will command. It will also influence attempts to establish strong multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes in other areas. Developments in The Hague are carefully monitored in the negotiations on a BTWC protocol. As countries move towards addressing other non-proliferation concerns, the question of how these regimes contribute to economic development, and thus attract the majority of nations, will continue to be of central importance if these new regimes are to be truly global and lasting.