A US Industry Perspective on the Implementation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention
This article was originally published in the November 2000 issue of OPCW Synthesis.

By Frederick L. Webber

In testimony submitted to the United States House of Representatives in September 2000, the American Chemistry Council 1 (the Council) made the following statement:‘The [Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)] is an unprecedented model of industry-government co-operation toward advancing peace and security and demonstrates the potency of an industry and government partnership.

Indeed, the international industry’s partnership with governments stands out as perhaps the most unique aspect of this critical arms control agreement.The strongest lesson for the future success of the CWC is that national governments, the OPCW Secretariat, and industry must continue to work together to ensure that the Convention remains a model of efficiency, practicality, and sound policy judgement. While only a few years ago our main mission was encouraging governments to sign and ratify the Convention, our collective challenge is now the day-to-day realisation of the commitments made in the treaty.

We’ve made excellent progress. And we have more to do, both in the United States and internationally.

Current US Experience

To date, the management of CWC treaty implementation has been exceptional. The first phase of implementation– requiring initial declarations from US commercial facilities on chemicals and activities covered by the CWC–is now complete. By March of this year US industry had submitted a total of some 775 initial CWC declarations.

The second phase of implementation, on-site inspections, has been underway since May 2000. Our experience with CWC inspections is somewhat limited. By mid-September of this year, a total of 10 US commercial facilities involved in scheduled chemical activities had been inspected. Our industry anticipates a total of between eight and 10 additional inspections by the end of the year 2000, including at least one inspection at an unscheduled discrete organic chemical (UDOC) facility.

I’m very pleased to note that facilities inspected in the United States have had only favourable reports of their interaction with inspectors from the OPCW Secretariat.

The question that still looms, however, is whether the CWC verification regime is meeting its goal of balancing the government interest in effective disarmament and verification with industry’s interest in protecting confidential business information and commercial competitiveness. I’m happy to report that, from the perspective of the US industry, CWC implementation has thus far met that goal.

A brief look at the estimated cost of CWC inspections for commercial facilities, and experience in protecting con-fidential business information, illustrates this point.

The American Chemistry Council originally estimated the cost of a routine on-site CWC inspection at some $50,000. The four Council member company facilities inspected thus far have not reported any unforeseen or excessive costs attributable to the inspection process. Naturally, the estimated costs of CWC inspections will vary from facility to facility, depending on the type of inspection, the size of the facility, and the cost categories included in the estimate. However, the Council expects that inspection costs will on the whole decline as our industry gains more experience with the CWC’s verification regime.

We have been very encouraged by the demonstrated effectiveness of protection for confidential business information 51 implemented under the CWC.The Council is not aware of any failure with or problems in protecting this information during industry CWC inspections. More to the point, I’m not aware that any proceedings to remedy the wrongful disclosure of confidential information have been initiated under the CWC’s Confidentiality Annex. Put simply— confidential information is staying that way.

Inspection costs will on the whole decline as our industry gains more experience with the CWC’s verification regime.

I’m also very pleased to note our industry’s confidence in the US government host teams for on-site inspections. Like the OPCW inspectors, the US government host teams have shown good judgement and respect for private commercial interests. In short, the view of US industry is that CWC implementation is going very well.

The Future Challenge

Throughout the negotiations on the CWC, the US chemical industry did not always agree with government negotiators. We had our share of disagreements with the US government delegation as well. But, regardless of our disagreements, governments and industry always worked together to explore various options and alternatives for addressing foreseeable industry and implementation issues. The give and take between industry and government at both the national and international levels involved regular trade-offs, and the CWC is a measurably better product due to the involvement of industry and the broad-based support of other allied business sectors.

International industry’s partnership with governments stands out as perhaps the most unique aspect of this critical arms control agreement.

Our experience is that the CWC is an effective tool for advancing the goal of eradicating chemical weapons. But there are outstanding and obligatory issues that require consideration and resolution. Our future challenge is to assure that implementation reinforces the Convention’s four pillars of disarmament: non-proliferation, international co-operation, protection and assistance, and industry’s involvement in treaty implementation.

States Parties have begun to consider the need to establish ‘other measures’ regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not party to the Convention. In our view it is important to consider several points.

First, the CWC’s Verification Annex requires the Conference of the States Parties to consider other Schedule 3 measures in 2002, five years after entry into force. An immediate decision on this issue is not required.

Second, industry now has nearly five years of experience with chemical specific end-use certificates and general treaty implementation. US industry in particular believes that the Conference’s review of other measures on Schedule 3 chemicals should be comprehensive, and not limited to any specific measure, such as a ban on Schedule 3 trade, comparable to the ban on Schedule 2 trade between States Parties and States not party as dictated by the Convention. Indeed, the term ‘other measures’ as used in the Verification Annex anticipates and accommodates the thoughtful consideration of a range of possible measures that might be applied to prevent the diversion of Schedule 3 chemicals for proliferation purposes.

Third, the volume and value of global Schedule 3 chemical trade is enormous. Although the major chemical producing countries account for the large part of Schedule 3 production, we are not the sole manufacturers of these materials. Production technologies for these chemicals are widely available. Mixtures account for a substantial share of Schedule 3 trade. It is critical for the Conference’s review to include a full and fair assessment of the commercial implications for Schedule 3 trade, trading routes and trading relationships of the options for ‘other measures’ regarding transfers of Schedule 3 materials to States not party. It is equally imperative for the Conference to invite and involve industry in this review.

By March of this year US industry had submitted a total of some 775 initial CWC declarations.

As of 15 September 2000, there were 189 members of the United Nations. As of the same date, 174 countries had signed the CWC, while 139 had ratified or acceded, and are now full States Parties. Are other measures in addition to end-use certificates on Schedule 3 chemicals likely to stem chemical weapons proliferation and to encourage participation by the 15 UN members who are non-signatories to the CWC?

My point is simply this: the CWC has been a success because it has engaged companies in the business of chemistry in developing meaningful measures to prevent chemical weapons proliferation and production through the diversion of chemicals essential to modern day manufacturing. In resolving outstanding industry issues affecting both the national and international implementation of the treaty, US industry cannot exaggerate the importance of taking only essential measures.

The strongest argument for the universality of the obligation to the CWC is an active demonstration that the Convention encourages and facilitates the legitimate business of chemistry—and provides an effective means of responding in a cooperative and constructive way to the illegal use of chemicals.

The US chemical industry supported the CWC throughout the negotiations. Our commitment to the Convention is a natural extension of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care® program. Responsible Care® is the industry’s premier voluntary environmental, health and safety performance improvement initiative, which is now practised in 42 countries around the world.Through Responsible Care®, companies in the business of chemistry are committed to a vision of no accidents, injuries or harm to the environment and to operating in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of industry employees and the public.

Our pledges in Responsible Care® and CWC implemen-tation are mutually reinforcing. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the implementation effort has fully met the industry’s expectations for a CWC verification regime that is not—and has not been—a ‘business as usual’ regulatory structure. Let’s keep it that way.

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