|
|
Declaration and Verification of the Global Chemical Industry |
|
|
|
The negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was a long and difficult process.There were, of course, many reasons for this, but one of the principal contributing factors was the realisation, early in the 1980s, that measures to counter the potential problem of proliferation were needed, and that a CWC without an integral means of verifying compliance on the part of the civilian chemical industry would be unable to produce the desired results. There were, of course, other conventions with verification regimes, but the concept of verifying the civilian chemical industry, and in particular of allowing teams of international inspectors to carry out on-site inspections of civilian chemical industrial facilities of the States Parties was quite unprecedented. |
||
|
The definition of the verification regime for the CWC therefore required much debate and careful drafting to ensure that the appropriate balance was achieved between the need to provide sufficient transparency to demonstrate compliance, while at the same time protecting legitimate national security and commercial business information.This was by no means an easy task. In the end, however, the drafters of the CWC were able to construct a framework which enabled this essential balance to be established.The construction of this framework required compromises by all those States participating in the negotiations, and it is fair to say that, when the CWC was opened for signature in Paris in January 1993, many States and their chemical industries still had doubts about whether it would be possible to implement the verification regime successfully, particularly in relation to Article VI, which addressed the regime to be applied to the chemical industries of States Parties. It is important to recall at this point that the chemical industry associations of those participating States with large chemical industries were heavily involved in the negotiating process, and that, once they had recognised the importance of the Convention and the necessity for an effective verification regime, they became strong supporters of the Convention.
The key to the long-term success of the verification regime under Article VI is to ensure that the chemical industries of all States Parties are treated equally.During the Preparatory Commission phase, which ran from January 1993 until end of April 1997, the debate on the detailed verification regime to be applied to the chemical industries, in accordance with Article VI of the Convention and the associated Parts of its Verification Annex, continued. Although the framework for this verification regime had been established by the drafters of the Convention, its practical application still required detailed discussion and many decisions by the signatory States. Although many issues were in fact resolved during this period, some were not.
The CWC without an integral means of verifying compliance on the part of the civilian chemical industry would be unable to produce the desired results.Some of those issues which were not resolved, despite much discussion, are still outstanding today. Nevertheless the Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997, and the first declarations by States Parties were received shortly thereafter. Inspections began in June 1997, and it is true to say that both States Parties and the Secretariat waited with some trepidation to see how things would develop. In the period since EIF the Secretariat has undertaken more than 300 inspections under Article VI at chemical industry sites in 43 States Parties. Despite the anxieties on both sides these inspections have proceeded without incident. There have naturally been minor problems, and a number of issues, both specific and general, have required clarification during this period, but most of the concerns expressed during the preparatory process in relation to industry inspections have simply not materialised. For example, the widespread apprehension that industry facilities receiving inspections from ‘chemical weapons’ inspectors under the ‘chemical weapons convention’ might be damaged by adverse publicity, has proved to be ground-less in practice. OPCW inspectors routinely arrive at industry sites, inspect them, and depart vir tually unnoticed.The only exception to this rule occurs when States Parties choose, for their own internal reasons, to actively publicise the inspection by OPCW inspectors of facilities on their territory. Even in these instances no adverse publicity has resulted. The other major concern during the negotiation process—the loss of confidential business information—has, so far, also not been borne out in practice. From the Secretariat’s point of view, the smooth implementation of the verification regime under Article VI is therefore one of the major factors contributing to the early success of the CWC. In May of this year the last major category of inspections to be undertaken in accordance with Article VI commenced. This category of inspections relates to the so-called ‘other chemical production facilities’ (OCPFs), of which approximately 4,000 of those declared were found to be inspectable under this regime.These inspections differ from the other inspections carried out under Article VI in that, in this case, the primary focus of the inspection is the facility, and not the chemicals which it routinely produces. Once again there is some trepidation within the chemical industry as to how these inspections will proceed. Some of these concerns are reflected in the articles by representatives of a number of the major chemical industry associations which are being published in this issue of Synthesis. In response, the Secretariat can only point out that, since May of this year, it has undertaken 33 inspections of OCPFs in 20 States Parties without incident. The inspection teams have readily been able to fulfil their mandate to verify that activities at each such plant site are consistent with the information provided in the declaration relating to it, and also to meet the more specific aim of verifying the absence of undeclared Schedule 1 chemicals at the plant site. None of the inspected facilities has declined the inspection team’s request to provide sufficient access to records to enable it to confirm that actual production is consistent with the declared range. In practice, inspection teams have encountered no restrictions on access other than those provided for under Part IX—the relevant Par t of the Verification Annex which is applicable to such facilities. All 33 inspections have been completed within the allotted 24 hours (in fact almost all were completed within a single eight-hour shift). In accordance with the programme and budget for 2000, the Secretariat plans to undertake a total 41 OCPF inspections by the end of this year, and has every expectation that the remaining eight OCPF inspections will proceed as smoothly as those already completed. The Secretariat is therefore of the view that the concerns expressed by some sectors of the chemical industry in relation to OCPF inspections will, as before, not be borne out in practice, and that the implementation of the verification regime under Article VI of the CWC will continue to be a shining example of how inspections by teams of international inspectors can be successfully undertaken in non-military commercial facilities. Despite the overall success of the implementation of the verification regime under Article VI, there are some clouds on the horizon, most of which stem from the failure by the States Parties to resolve a number of outstanding issues carried over from the Preparatory Commission. The majority of these issues relate to the manner in which industry declarations are made, rather than to the way in which declared facilities are inspected. Nevertheless, without an early resolution of these issues it will be impossible to ensure that the chemical industries of States Parties are faced with a level playing field. The key to the long-term success of the verification regime under Article VI is to ensure that the chemical industries of all States Parties are treated equally. In a short ar ticle of this nature it is not possible to address all of these issues, or to explain adequately why it is proving so difficult to resolve them satisfactorily. Two of those issues which, in the view of the Secretariat, are of particular concern are, however, outlined in the following paragraphs. The Secretariat and a number of States Parties have expressed concern about the rigour and consistancy with which the declaration obligations in relation to Schedule 2 and 3 plant sites and aggregate national data (AND) have been applied. This has been a subject of continuing discussion since the Second Session of the Conference of the States Parties, in December 1997. The Secretariat has, at the request of the Conference and the Executive Council, conducted several surveys of the basis on which States Parties collect data for their Article VI declarations, and has concluded that there is a wide variation in the approaches being used by individual States Parties for such declarations. It is clear to the Secretariat that the manner in which the application of low concentration limits is applied to AND, as well as to captive use and production, is a prime reason for the significant differences noted in the declarations between States Parties with similar chemical industries. Continuing lack of consensus on strict rules for captive use and the application to production of low concentration limits will not only prevent the establishment of a level playing field, but may ultimately also effectively eliminate large quantities of chemicals that should be declared for the activities covered by AND. It may also lead to the non-declaration of increasing numbers of plant sites which produce both Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals, thereby placing an unfair burden on those plant sites that have already been declared. A cursory examination of publicly available literature will confirm that this trend has already been established.
The Secretariat has undertaken more than 300 inspections under Article VI at chemical industry sites in 43 States Parties.The issue of the frequency of inspection of Schedule 2 plant sites has also been the subject of intense debate. This debate has centred on two related issues: the algorithms for determining the risk of a given plant site to the object and purpose of the Convention, and the inspection frequency to be applied to plant sites as a result of the risk which has been determined in each case. Several versions of the risk algorithm have been developed by the Secretariat on the basis of the requirements of Part VII of the Verification Annex and of the decision on risk determi-nation adopted the Conference of the States Parties at its First Session. These algorithms were designed to differentiate between plant sites on the basis of their chemicals, engineering characteristics, environment, and activities. It has not proved possible to reach consensus on any of the approaches proposed to date. The results of the initial inspections of Schedule 2 facilities undertaken by the Secretariat, have, however, shown that, whilst the vast majority of these plant sites pose little or no risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, a small number do have the potential to pose such a risk. This is not to say that these latter plant sites will be used to support the production of chemical weapons, but simply that, given the nature of the chemicals being produced, processed or consumed, and given the scale of operation or the particular engineering design characteristics of the plant site, they have the potential, given the necessary political commitment, to do so. In the Secretariat’s view such plant sites, irrespective of the State Party in which they are located, should be subjected to a realistic frequency of inspection. This was, after all, the principal reason for requesting the chemical industries of the world to accept the burden of on-site inspections.There has, however, so far been no agreement on this approach.The Secretariat nevertheless remains hopeful that the appropriate decisions will ultimately be made. The major chemical industries of the world have universally supported the object and purpose of the Convention since the days of the negotiations on the CWC in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; they have also accepted the onerous task of making declarations, and have willingly accepted on-site inspections by OPCW inspectors. It is only fair, therefore, that, in the drive to make this Convention succeed and to free the world from the scourge of chemical weapons, those of us who are responsible for its implementation should honour and reward the sacrifices made by the chemical industry by ensuring a level playing field and equal treatment for all.
|
||
