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Introduction | OPCW and Global Struggle against Terrorism | Possible Responses
The issue of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction is very much on the minds of the world community. In this regard, of particular concern to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is the real and proven threat of chemical terrorism. This is a complex issue, requiring thorough and careful consideration over the coming months at all levels. The paper prepared by the Secretariat is intended to facilitate that analysis, and stems from two fundamental observations:
The paper analyses the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) which apply to the danger of the terrorist use of chemical weapons, with a view to assisting in the development of an action plan for the OPCW’s contribution to the global struggle against terrorism.
The paper starts from the realisation that the Convention aims to completely rule out the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. The Convention not only establishes legal norms for its States Parties, but also requires them to enact prohibitions for any of their individual citizens who, anywhere in the world, engage in activities prohibited to States Parties under the Convention. In fact, the Convention requires making the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons a criminal offence in all States Parties, and for all citizens of all States Parties, irrespective of where the offence may have been committed. The same applies to assistance, encouragement or inducement to engage in such prohibited activities. There is accordingly no doubt that the Convention constitutes a solid legal basis for actions to prevent and prosecute chemical terrorism.
The paper firstly analyses those provisions of the Convention that apply to all States Parties, and identifies the following areas in which action should be considered:
The paper then analyses the provisions that apply to States Parties in relation to chemical weapons, including old and abandoned chemical weapons, and chemical weapons production facilities, including provisions on their elimination. The following areas of possible action are identified:
Finally, the paper looks at the competence which the Organisation as a whole – its Member States as well as its Secretariat – has acquired in the implementation process, that could be brought to bear in the international struggle against terrorism. The paper suggests that the Council may wish to consider:
Complete details are available in the attached Secretariat background paper entitled "Initial considerations regarding the OPCW's contribution to the global struggle against chemical terrorism".
Initial Considerations Regarding the OPCW's Contribution to the Global Struggle Against Chemical Terrorism
Secretariat Background Paper
1. Introduction
1.1 The terrorist attacks against the United States of America on 11 September 2001 have changed global priorities. The international community of nations finds itself in a new historical situation, in which not only states or national entities, but also organised terrorist groups, have the proven capacity to threaten international peace and security, to destabilise governments, and to foment regional, inter-regional, and global divisions, unrest, and instability.
1.2 The threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and continuing. Concerns have been raised at the highest level about the possibility of terrorists, inter alia, attempting to utilise chemical, biological, and nuclear materials. That terrorists will not be deterred from using chemical weapons was clearly demonstrated by their use of sarin in the Tokyo subway in 1995.
1.3 International terrorism is a menace to the whole of humanity. The struggle against this threat will require a multifaceted, well-coordinated and integrated response by all relevant national and international authorities and agencies, on the basis of their respective competence and mandates. A range of national and international judicial, police, customs, financial, diplomatic, military, disarmament non-proliferation and other measures need to be taken. And international organisations play a critically important role in the coordination of such efforts.
1.4 The Convention is founded on the premise that the States Parties to the Convention are “determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provision of this Convention, thereby completing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925”. From this, and from the requirements of Article VII of the Convention in relation to legislative action, including the enactment of penal legislation and the affording of international legal cooperation, it follows that the Convention does indeed contain provisions that give the OPCW authority to engage in the struggle against terrorism. Global adherence to the Convention and its comprehensive implementation will facilitate more effective global action against chemical terrorism and will reduce risks associated with it.
1.5 While the OPCW’s mandate has not changed since 11 September, the new level of threat posed by the possible use of chemical weapons by terrorists requires a re-evaluation of how the OPCW has been implementing its mandate. This re-evaluation must also encompass a consideration of whether Convention-related implementation practices, as well as the provisions of the Convention itself, respond adequately to this new level of threat. Accordingly, this paper attempts to identify and analyse the relevant provisions of the Convention that have a direct bearing on the struggle against terrorism, in relation to actions by both the Member States and the Organisation at large. It has been prepared by the Secretariat to facilitate discussions in the Council on this issue, and to raise awareness about the possible contribution which the OPCW, within its mandate, can make to this cause. The paper recognises that some areas of activity can be implemented without delay, as they fall within the purview of either the Council or the Secretariat, or both. Other activities may require further consideration by the Conference.
1.6 This paper may be used as a starting point for the development of an action plan to transform the potential of the present into reality for the future in the struggle against terrorism. Hopefully, it will lead to the recommendation of further practical measures that will make it even more difficult for terrorist organisations to acquire effective chemical weapons capabilities, and that will accordingly reduce the likelihood of loss of human life as a consequence of terrorist attacks involving chemical weapons.
2. General obligations of all States Parties, definitions, universal adherence
2.1 Promoting universal adherence to the Convention contributes tangibly to the struggle against terrorism by enlarging the area of the world in which chemical weapons are banned, and in which measures against terrorist activities involving chemical weapons have a longer reach and much greater legal force than would be the case without the Convention. Universal adherence to the Convention has been an OPCW priority of overriding importance ever since the entry into force of the Convention (compare Conference decisions C-II/DEC.11, dated 5 December 1997, C-III/DEC.9, dated 20 November 1998, C-IV/DEC.22, dated 2 July 1999, C-V/DEC.21, dated 19 May 2000, and C-VI/DEC.11, dated 17 May 2001). The activities undertaken by the Member States, the Director-General, and the Secretariat to attract further ratifications and accessions were most recently detailed in the report by the Director-General to the Conference at its Sixth Session, on the implementation of the decision of the Conference at its Fifth Session on ensuring the universality of the Convention (C-VI/DG.7, dated 15 May 2001). In considering this issue, the policy-making organs, as appropriate, may wish to:
(a) urge all Member States, individually as well as collectively, to redouble their efforts to promote universal adherence to the Convention, and to actively encourage the promotion of universal adherence through the various regional and other organisations and groupings of States to which they belong;
(b) request the Director-General to compile an updated status report on the activities undertaken by both the Member States and the Secretariat to achieve universal adherence to the Convention, and on the results achieved. This report could be prepared in time for the Twenty-Eighth Session of the Council, which is scheduled for 19 - 22 March 2002;
(c) consider specific measures to expand the Secretariat’s current efforts to promote universality through the continuation of dialogue with States not party and through the provision to them of assistance with the preparatory work for accession to the Convention.;
(d) consider including universality as a regular separate item on the agenda of alternate sessions of the Council, starting from its Twenty-Eighth Session in February 2002; and
(e) invite Member States to utilise the Secretariat’s expertise in their bilateral and regional efforts to promote universality.
2.2 The Convention stipulates, inter alia, that each State Party shall undertake never under any circumstances to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention (Article I, subparagraph 1(d)). It also requires States Parties to prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on their territory or in any other place under their jurisdiction as recognised by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity (subparagraph 1(a) of Article VII); not to permit, in any place under their control, any activity prohibited to a State Party by the Convention (Article VII, subparagraph 1(b)); to extend their penal legislation to any activity prohibited by a State Party undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing their nationality, in conformity with international law (subparagraph 1(c) of Article VII); and to afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to other States Parties, to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1 of Article VII (Article VII, paragraph 2). These general obligations, which are further amplified by the provisions of Article VI, clearly establish the responsibility of each Member State to actively prevent acts of terrorism involving chemical weapons, or preparations for them, and to cooperate with other Member States in the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to violations of the Convention.
2.3 The Convention defines chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 1. From this provision, as well as from the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article II, as well as from section B of the Annex on Chemicals, it is evident that the definition of “chemical weapons” is not limited to the chemicals listed in the Schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, but also extends to all toxic chemicals and their precursors, except when they are intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and as long as their types and quantities are consistent with such purposes. While most of the verification measures applied under the Convention relate to chemicals listed in the Schedules, the legislative, regulatory, administrative and law enforcement measures adopted by the Member States could be expected to extend to other relevant chemicals, and must be firmly based on the definition of the term “chemical weapon” contained in the Convention.
2.4 Many chemicals which are in circulation for legitimate applications would pose a considerable threat if they were used as chemical weapons by terrorists. It is prudent not to assume that terrorists will restrict themselves solely to the use of chemicals listed in the Schedules. This is an important consideration to bear in mind when addressing the applicability of the Convention’s provisions to the international struggle against chemical terrorism. In this regard, Member States may wish to consider whether some acceptable form of international evaluation of security at declared sites – both military and civilian – may be helpful to demonstrate to the world that the materials held there are kept secure. The Scientific Advisory Board, which is tasked with enabling the Director-General to render specialised advice in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention to the Conference, the Council or States Parties, may be an appropriate OPCW body to study this question and to render advice on it.
2.5 Even in the most robust of regimes, no single element of the regime may be neglected without calling into question the robustness of the regime itself. Therefore the maintenance of the integrity of the overall regime of the Convention will benefit the security of all Member States.
3. Provisions affecting all Member States, in relation to Articles VI and VII
3.1 Article VI, paragraph 2, requires each State Party to adopt the measures necessary to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Paragraphs 3 – 9 of Article VI stipulate the regime of declarations, verification through data monitoring and on-site inspections, and other measures applying to facilities and activities of States Parties in relation to activities not prohibited under the Convention. These provisions have to be seen in conjunction with the relevant provisions of Article VII (see subparagraph 2.2 above).
3.2 The foregoing demonstrates that there should be no doubt at all as to the legal authority of the OPCW to engage in the struggle against terrorism. The full implementation of these already existing requirements by all Member States would contribute substantially to:
(a) denying terrorists access to chemicals that could be used as chemical weapons;
(b) deterring the potential supply to terrorists of knowledge, equipment and chemicals;
(c) ensuring that any involvement with chemical weapons could, and would, be effectively prosecuted; and
(d) increasing the effectiveness of legal action against terrorists involved in activities prohibited to States Parties under the Convention, no matter where the terrorists are found, and irrespective of where the illegal activities have been conducted.
3.3 The following practical measures by Member States may be considered as having a direct bearing on the struggle against terrorism (with respect to terrorist activities involving chemical weapons):
(a) prohibitions, including the enactment of penal legislation, which would contain penalties sufficiently severe to deter a potential violator;
(b) extending prohibitions extraterritorially to natural persons possessing their own nationality, for activities undertaken anywhere in the world;
(c) establishing the instruments or arrangements necessary to enable full and effective legal cooperation with all other Member States;
(d) the designation or establishment of National Authorities, to enable the Member States to fulfil their obligations under the Convention;
(e) regular reporting to the OPCW on progress in the development of national implementing legislation and related enforcement measures including, if required, seeking the OPCW’s assistance (from both the Secretariat and Member States) in the preparation of such laws, regulations and measures;
(f) subjecting Schedule 1 chemicals to the prohibitions specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex, including those on production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use, except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Part VI of the Verification Annex, and the prohibitions on transfers and retransfers contained in section B of that Part;
(g) subjecting Schedule 1 facilities and chemicals to systematic verification and other measures in accordance with Part VI of the Verification Annex;
(h) considering measures to be adopted in relation to facilities that handle (store or consume) Schedule 1 chemicals, with a view to enhancing security and accountability;
(i) subjecting Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals and facilities to the measures stipulated in Parts VII and VIII, respectively, of the Verification Annex, amongst other things in relation to identifying declarable facilities and activities, and to the provisions on exports and imports vis-à-vis States not party to the Convention;
(j) considering which chemicals from Schedules 2 and 3, as well as other chemicals that are being manufactured, stored, transported or traded in their territory, may pose a particular danger if used by terrorists and may accordingly require additional measures to be taken including, as necessary, by the OPCW; and
(k) reviewing the measures implemented to provide physical protection against terrorist attacks on chemical plants and storage facilities holding toxic chemicals, in order to minimise the probability of releases of toxic materials as a result of such attacks, and instituting such improvements as may be necessary.
3.4 In order to maximise the contribution that OPCW Member States can make to the struggle against terrorism, by fully exploiting the potential of the Convention in this regard, the policy-making organs, as appropriate, may wish to discuss recommendations concerning, inter alia:
(a) the conclusion, as soon as possible, with the assistance of the Secretariat, as necessary, of all legislative and regulatory work required of Member States by the Convention (including, for example, national implementing legislation incorporating penal legislation, export control regulations, and the establishment of National Authorities). The Council may wish to propose a target date for this to be accomplished, and may wish to require regular
(e.g. half-yearly) updates on progress in the interim;b) measures to improve, where necessary, the framework and the arrangements necessary for appropriate legal cooperation between Member States (for example, to facilitate extradition or other mutual legal assistance in the investigation or prosecution of crimes involving chemical weapons when a suspect, an item of evidence, or a witness, are at a location under the jurisdiction of another Member State);
(c) increasing transparency and institutionalising the exchange of information, through the Secretariat, on relevant laws and regulations;
(d) measures to help Member States to accelerate the identification of solutions to outstanding industry declaration and verification issues, thus further harmonising the implementation of the Convention;
(e) the review by Member States of the effectiveness of their measures related to the development, production, acquisition, retention, transfer and use of chemicals listed in the Schedules, in order to identify and rectify any deficiencies. Such measures could, for example, include the following:
(i) measures taken to prevent the theft or diversion of relevant chemicals, including Schedule 1 chemicals, during their production, storage, transportation and use;
(ii) a reduction in the quantity of Schedule 1 chemicals stored at any given moment at Schedule 1 facilities (this may be particularly relevant to those single small-scale facilities that store larger amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals);
(iii) measures related to the authorisation of the synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities below 100 grams per year;
(iv) measures to prevent transfers of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 chemicals to States not party to the Convention (including cooperation between National Authorities in the identification, and, if necessary, interdiction of questionable transfers, and the reporting of any such acquisition attempts to the OPCW);
(v) measures to ensure that the consumption of Schedule 1 chemicals is carried out only for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and that such chemicals cannot be diverted during storage;
(vi) the consideration and adoption of appropriate measures with regard to the recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Board on relevant issues, in particular in order to prevent unauthorised access to relevant chemicals through gaps in the regulatory framework;
(vii) measures to ensure that end-use certificates are issued by the competent governmental authorities of States not party before exports of Schedule 3 chemicals are authorised to such countries, and also to ensure that the guarantees given in the certificates are in fact complied with (use only for purposes not prohibited, and no re-transfers);
(viii) the consideration of possible measures to ensure the enforcement of the ban on transfers of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 chemicals to States not party;
(ix) measures to improve the accuracy of data reporting on exports and imports of chemicals listed in the Schedules (national implementation, data reconciliation and other forms of cooperation between National Authorities, as well as between National Authorities and the Secretariat);
(x) the intensification of consultations on the need to establish other measures regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States not party, as required under paragraph 27 of Part VIII of the Verification Annex, including the consideration of a ban on such transfers to States not party; and
(xi) making it a criminal offence to publish on the Internet instructions for, or advice on, the synthesis of chemical agents for use as chemical weapons.
3.5 The Secretariat already provides support to Member States in developing their capacity to implement the Convention. The Secretariat stands ready to develop proposals on how it could further assist Member States in the development and implementation of their national measures to fully implement the provisions of the Convention. Such proposals could, for example, include:
(a) additional measures in relation to legal support provided by either the Secretariat or other Member States, or through regional networking;
(b) practical implementation support through information, training and other support for National Authorities and other relevant national agencies;
(c) the facilitation of exchanges between National Authorities;
(d) suggestions, based on inspection experience and the results of the implementation of the Convention’s verification regime, for identifying and addressing areas which might be exploited by terrorists to obtain either toxic chemicals suitable for use in chemical attacks, or precursors suitable for the manufacture of such toxic chemicals; and
(e) assistance in compiling lists of chemical production facilities under paragraph 1 of Part IX of the Verification Annex, as foreseen in paragraph 7 of Part IX of the Verification Annex, and other assistance in relation to identifying declarable facilities.
3.6 Furthermore, the policy-making organs, as appropriate, could recommend measures to increase industry inspections on a broad geographical basis, thus reinforcing the Convention’s non-proliferation regime, while also increasing overall awareness and transparency in relation to that regime. They may also consider including additional requirements emanating from the threat of chemical terrorism when they conduct the review of the overall verification regime under Article VI, as required by the Convention in the preparation of the First Review Conference. The financial implications of any additional measures would need to be identified, in order to facilitate an assessment of their feasibility.
4. Provisions affecting all Member States, in relation to Article X of the Convention
4.1 Article X of the Convention reaffirms the right of States Parties to engage in activities necessary to protect themselves against chemical weapons (paragraph 2), and to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons (paragraph 3). It requires the Secretariat to establish and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons, and to provide, upon request and within available resources, expert advice and assistance in identifying how programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented (paragraph 5). Paragraph 8 of Article X establishes the right of each State Party to request and receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, subject to the procedures contained in paragraphs 9 - 11 of Article X. Paragraph 11 of Article X requires the Director-General, in the event that there is sufficient proof that there are victims of the use of chemical weapons, and that immediate action should be indispensable, to notify all States Parties and to take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources which the Conference has placed at his/her disposal for such contingencies.
4.2 The information available to the Secretariat in relation to the protective programmes of Member States, although clearly incomplete (although only 23 States Parties have submitted to the OPCW information about their programmes for protective purposes, three of these have indicated that they have no such programme) seems to indicate that many Member States lack adequate protective capabilities. This increases the risks associated with chemical terrorism. The lack of submission of such information by Member States, as required under paragraph 4 of Article X, makes it difficult for the Secretariat to develop its approach towards providing Member States with adequate expert advice on their protective capacity. It also restricts the pool of potential resources for the delivery of assistance by the Organisation – a mandatory requirement under paragraph 8 of Article X.
4.3 All the provisions of Article X have a direct bearing on the capacity of Member States to deter and withstand attacks against themselves with chemical weapons, and to deal with the aftermath of any such attacks. Their effective implementation can considerably reduce the impact of chemical weapons, should they be used by terrorists, and can thus save human lives and minimise human suffering. It should be recalled that the Convention defines assistance as “coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures” (paragraph 1 of Article X). An important aspect of the implementation of these provisions is the undertaking of the States Parties, under paragraph 7 of Article X, to provide assistance through the Organisation. This undertaking forms the basis of the OPCW’s assistance delivery capability. Also important are the preparations undertaken by the Secretariat, together with the Member States, to establish and maintain a credible and cost-effective operational capability for the delivery of such assistance.
4.4 In order to improve both the status of implementation of the provisions of Article X, and the Organisation’s readiness to provide assistance, including in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons by terrorists, the policy-making organs, as appropriate, may wish to consider recommending to Member States measures such as the following:
(a) additional contributions to the Voluntary Fund for Assistance, which currently stands at only NLG 1.3 million. The latter amount will clearly not suffice to finance any significant and sustained delivery of assistance;
(b) the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the OPCW on the procurement, upon demand, of assistance, in order to increase the Organisation’s capacity to plan assistance delivery operations in advance;
(c) a review of the pledges for assistance submitted under subparagraph 7(c) of Article X, with a view to providing additional detail on these pledges, and on the conditions under which the offered assistance would be made available;
(d) the submission of additional information and documents relevant to countermeasures against terrorist uses of chemical weapons, for inclusion in the data bank on protection;
(e) the nomination of experts who the Organisation can draw upon when it needs to act upon the use or threat of use of chemical weapons by terrorists. These experts could, for example, become members of the protection network. Relevant expertise may include such fields of expertise as medical countermeasures, risk assessment and management, emergency response planning involving protection against chemical weapons, and decontamination, or rescue operations involving toxic chemicals; and
(f) a review of the resources placed at the Director-General’s disposal for the adoption of the emergency assistance measures required of him, should there be victims of chemical weapons, and should immediate action be necessary in this regard. (The Secretariat intends to submit a separate analysis of resource requirements in this respect). The Council could then propose to Member States practical measures for providing the Organisation with such resources.
4.5 Another important dimension of the implementation of Article X is the conduct of investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons. The possibility of the terrorist use of chemical weapons adds an additional dimension and urgency to this issue, in particular in relation to situations in which it is not initially clear whether chemical weapons have been used, or whether biological, radiological or other kinds of weapons that can kill indiscriminately were involved in an incident. The Director-General will prepare a report on the Secretariat’s state of preparedness to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons, with particular reference to a possible terrorist attack with chemical weapons, and in this context will also address the issue of cooperation with other relevant national and international organisations.
4.6 Under a separate agenda item for the Twenty-Seventh Session of the Council, the Secretariat has prepared a Note by the Secretariat on the implementation of Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention: assistance and protection against chemical weapons (S/272/2001, dated 1 October 2001), for consideration by the Council. The Council’s discussion of this issue may lead to the identification of priorities for, and measures to be taken by, the Secretariat which will further enhance the OPCW’s capability to deliver assistance. Other measures that the Secretariat could be requested to take might include the following:
(a) information to be submitted to Member States about the content of the data bank on assistance established under paragraph 5 of Article X, and about the procedures for access to the data bank by authorised agencies of the Member States and by other international organisations, as appropriate;
(b) regular reports on the Organisation’s state of readiness to conduct investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons;
(c) regular reports on the Organisation’s state of readiness to deliver assistance to Member States threatened by the use of chemical weapons, or to the victims of any such use. These reports could address, inter alia, the following: the status of the advance planning of assistance delivery operations for different types of scenarios, including terrorist attacks; related staff training; and related exercises involving the Secretariat, Member States, and, as appropriate, other international organisations;
(d) a report on the contribution that the protection network could make in addressing issues related to the possible use of chemical weapons by terrorists; and
(e) considering a possible training programme for personnel from States Parties to deal with the various aspects of assistance, particularly those which are preventive and medical.
5. The provisions of Articles IV and V
5.1 The Convention requires States Parties to take appropriate measures to secure their CW storage facilities and to prevent any movement of their chemical weapons out of such facilities, except for their removal to CW destruction facilities (paragraph 4 of Article IV). This requirement includes physical security requirements during the storage, transportation and destruction of chemical weapons. The Convention requires States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons pursuant to the Verification Annex, and in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction (paragraph 6 of Article IV). States Parties are not precluded from destroying such chemical weapons at a faster rate (paragraph 6 of Article IV). States Parties are required, during the transport, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons, to assign the highest priority to the safety of people and to protecting the environment (paragraph 10 of Article IV). The Convention also prohibits the construction of any new CW production facilities or the modification of any existing facilities for any activity prohibited under the Convention (paragraph 5 of Article V). The Convention requires all CWPFs to be declared, closed and inactivated, subjected to systematic verification, and destroyed or converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention (paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 – 10, and 13 – 18 of Article V, as well as the relevant provisions of the Verification Annex).
5.2 The full, effective and speedy implementation of these provisions will help to prevent terrorists from gaining access to chemical weapons and to equipment for their production. It would also shorten the time period during which chemical weapons and related production equipment remain potentially exposed to the danger of illegal activity.
5.3 In this respect, the policy-making organs, as appropriate, may wish to discuss the measures being taken by Member States in relation to chemical weapons, including old and abandoned chemical weapons, and CW production facilities, with a view to reinforcing and strengthening, where necessary, existing measures to prevent illegal access to chemical weapons and other sensitive materials and equipment, as well as to relevant expertise. This discussion could lead to a review of the measures taken by these Member States in relation to the following:
(a) further improvements in physical security at facilities where chemical weapons and/or specialised equipment are located, in order to prevent the theft by terrorists of chemical weapons and other sensitive materials and equipment;
(b) undertakings of additional measures to prevent knowledge and expertise about the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons from being acquired by terrorist organisations;
(c) the sharing of experiences in denying terrorists access to chemical weapons, sensitive materials and equipment;
(d) the identification and rectification of any weak points that could be exploited by terrorists, for the whole cycle from storage at CW storage facilities to transportation and temporary storage, and destruction at CW destruction facilities. One potentially vulnerable point in the process of moving chemical weapons from storage facilities to destruction facilities is the temporary holding area at CWDFs. These are areas of considerable activity, and ensuring both the physical security of these areas and the accurate and complete accountancy of all chemical weapons moved through them is essential to prevent theft;
(e) the identification of any additional measures that could be taken in the design and commissioning of future CW destruction facilities that would enhance physical security, and that would also prevent illegal access to such facilities, as well as to the weapons stored and processed there;
(f) the identification of any additional measures that would reduce the risk of releases of toxic chemicals from sites where chemical weapons are located, as a result of terrorist attacks on such sites;
(g) the acceleration of CW destruction and CWPF destruction/conversion activities;
(h) the speeding up of the process of reviewing documentation related to destruction of chemical weapons and the destruction/conversion of chemical weapons production facilities, and the acceleration of the OPCW decision-making process in this respect; and
(i) a review of how inspections at CW storage facilities can contribute to ensuring continuing high standards of security and full accountability for declared chemical weapons, bearing in mind that the purpose of the systematic verification of CW storage facilities is to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons takes place from such places (paragraph 41 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex).
6. Competence of the OPCW
6.1 Since the entry into force of the Convention the OPCW has become an international centre of excellence in all matters pertaining to chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as to the delivery of assistance and international cooperation in this regard. The OPCW – its Member States and the Secretariat alike – has acquired technical competence in a number of areas that are relevant to dealing with threats of the use, or the actual use, of chemical weapons. The Secretariat’s knowledge, understanding, and experience will be particularly valuable in relation to threats of terrorism involving chemical weapons, and includes the conduct of inspections at facilities containing chemical weapons, investigations of alleged use, advice on protection against chemical weapons, the delivery of assistance, the implementation of regulations in relation to chemical industry inspections and other verification measures with regard to the chemical industry, and legal support. That competence simply cannot be overlooked as a resource in the combat of chemical terrorism.
6.2 The OPCW can provide, within its mandate and on the basis of the provisions of the Convention, a context for consultations, clarifications, assistance, exchanges of experiences, and international cooperation. This is available to address the threats posed by terrorists engaging in preparations for, and possibly the conduct of, acts involving chemical weapons as defined in Article II of the Convention, and to devise possible countermeasures.
6.3 The OPCW has the responsibility, as well as the capability, to significantly contribute to the strengthening of the ethical norms against chemical weapons. Well before 11 September 2001, the Secretariat had begun to address this dimension, in its ethics project. This projects aims at promoting the adoption of ethical norms against involvement in prohibited activities with chemical weapons by chemists, chemical engineers and other professionals, including through international and national scientific and engineering societies, as well as through institutions teaching life sciences or chemical engineering. The project also plans to develop material on disarmament education for integration into the curriculum of chemists and chemical engineers. Other projects as well, for example the Associate Programme, can make a valuable contribution to the worldwide promotion of non-proliferation as a norm that scientists and engineers from OPCW Member States subscribe to. The Secretariat could be requested to review the effectiveness of these projects, with the aim of enhancing these efforts.
6.4 In a broader context, the establishment of an international (voluntary) fund could be considered to assist in the enhancement of the security of chemical facilities – both CW and industrial – in order to “harden” them against potential terrorist acts by preventing unauthorised access to, or releases of, toxic materials. If such a fund were set up, the OPCW could contribute to its establishment and operation.
7. Conclusions
7.1 Various provisions of the Convention of special relevance to the combat of chemical terrorism have not yet been fully implemented by a very significant proportion of Member States. The policy-making organs, within their respective areas of competence, may wish to consider identifying high priority actions in relation to the implementation of the Convention that Member States could take in order to immediately enhance their capacity to effectively combat terrorism involving the possible use of chemical weapons.
7.2 In addition to measures which Member States themselves may decide to take, individually or collectively, there are several Secretariat actions which could be implemented without delay, with a modest increase in resources. This would require re-focusing some existing programme activities, in order to ensure that those aspects of these activities which are of immediate relevance to the struggle against terrorism are effectively integrated and coordinated. Some examples of such activities have been highlighted in this paper, for example in the areas of the delivery of assistance, inspection conduct, legal support, and efforts to increase the membership of the Organisation.
7.3 Coordination with other international organisations would be a necessary precondition for effective work in this field, in order to avoid both the duplication of effort and possibly conflicting competencies, while maximising synergism. It is important in this context to recall that the UN Security Council, in its resolution S/RES/1373 of 28 September 2001, called upon all states to cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorists attacks and take action against perpetrators. In the same resolution, the Security Council reaffirmed and again stressed the vital role of the United Nations in strengthening international cooperation in combating terrorism, and emphasised the importance of enhanced coordination among States, international and regional organisations. Cooperation between the OPCW and the United Nations in this context becomes indispensable. It should also be noted in this respect that Security Council resolution 1373 included references to a range of necessary actions that coincide with possible OPCW contributions identified in this paper. Examples include the need for states to, inter alia, enact a range of prohibitions in their criminal codes including the establishment of terrorist acts as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations, to eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists, and to intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials, as well as the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also noted with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transitional organised crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasised the need to enhance the coordination of efforts at national, sub-regional, regional and international levels, in order to lay the foundation for a more powerful global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.
7.4 It is the Secretariat’s conclusion that the development of an action plan for the OPCW’s contribution to the combat of terrorism, containing both immediate measures and long-term strategic tasks, is of paramount importance under these circumstances. Such a plan would naturally have to include an assessment of the cost implications of the measures proposed in it. At its Twenty-Seventh Session, the Council may wish to decide on certain actions that can be implemented immediately as part of an action plan, while also tasking the Secretariat to prepare a proposal for a comprehensive, long-term plan for submission to the Council at its Twenty-Eighth Session.
Introduction | OPCW and Global Struggle against Terrorism | Possible Responses