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| Many
countries throughout the world have
companies and businesses involved in
the chemical industry. Chemicals
are used to make numerous products we
use each day, but some of the same chemicals
can also be used to make chemical weapons.
OPCW
inspectors verify the consistency of
industrial chemical declarations and,
together with the States Parties, monitor
the non-diversion of chemicals for activities
prohibited under this Convention. |
All
member countries must declare to the OPCW
their activities relating to certain chemicals.
The CWC contains the following three lists
of chemicals of particular concern, called
Schedules:
- Schedule
1 chemicals are either chemical weapons
themselves or are very closely related
to chemical weapons. Examples include
sarin (which was used in the terrorist
attacks in Japan in the 1990s)
and mustard gas.
- Schedule
2 chemicals can be used to make chemical
weapons, but can also be used for peaceful
purposes in industry, although they are
not produced in large quantities.
- Schedule
3 chemicals are toxic chemicals that
can be used to make chemical weapons,
but are also produced on a large scale
to make many common products, such as
oil, cement, cloth and paper.
In
addition, plant sites that produce a wide
range of chemicals not listed in the Schedules,
which the Convention defines as “discrete
organic chemicals” or DOCs, are also
subject to declaration and verification.
These plant sites could be capable of producing
chemical weapons, and must therefore be
monitored.
All
such facilities dealing with Schedule 1,
2 or 3 chemicals or DOCs are liable to inspection
by the OPCW. By inspecting the chemical
industry, the OPCW makes an important contribution
to preventing the spread of chemical weapons.
The
member countries of the OPCW are also prohibited
from trading in Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals
with countries that are not members. By
checking the international trade in all
listed chemicals declared by its member
countries, the OPCW works to prevent these
chemicals from being used to make new chemical
weapons, by either countries or individuals.
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Member
countries benefit from the free exchange
of chemicals, while ensuring
the non-proliferation of chemical weapons
by maintaining trade
restrictions with countries not party
to the CWC |
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