Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons

Non-proliferation of chemical weapons, through the application of the verification and implementation measures provided for in the Convention which also serve to build confidence between States Parties.

Declarations adviser

Declarations and inspections ( Article VI of the CWC )
  States Parties which have declared Facilities Declared Sites or Facilities Inspections Conducted Sites Inspected
Schedule 1 22 26 248 38
Schedule 2 37 508 657 329
Schedule 3 35 433 394 354
Other Chemicals Production Facilities, including DOC/PSF 80 4,390 1,300 1,219
Total   5,357 2,599 1,940

Introduction

Non-proliferation of chemical weapons or their precursors is one of the fundamental tenets of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  This is embodied in Article I of the Convention; paragraph 1 of that Article states (inter alia):

"Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (...) (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."

In the context of the chemical industry, the Convention addresses this aspect in Article VI.  Paragraph 2 of Article VI states:

"Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.  To this end, and in order to verify that activities are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, to verification measures as provided in the Verification Annex."

In principle, the verification process is intended (i) to serve as a confidence-building measure that each and every State Party is meeting its obligations under the Convention, and (ii) to have a deterrent effect on those having the intention to contravene the Convention's provisions.

The first aim of the verification process relevant to the chemical industry is achieved through the mechanisms set out in Parts VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Verification Annex of the Convention.  In essence, the process involves the submission of declarations by the State Party in relation to specified activities taking place in its chemical industry.  These declarations are the basis for carrying out data monitoring on and on-site inspections at the declared facilities on the territory of the State Party to verify that the activities are in accordance with the obligations under the Convention and consistent with the declared information.

The deterrent effect is achieved through a mechanism by which a State Party that has a concern regarding possible non-compliance with the Convention of another State Party can request that a challenge inspection be carried out under the rules set out in Part X of the Verification Annex. This is a unique feature in terms of multilateral disarmament treaties and makes the Chemical Weapons Convention the first international treaty that embodies such a provision.

It should be emphasised that the non-proliferation component of the Convention will be ineffectual if the authorities of all States Parties have not promulgated implementing legislation as required under the Convention, through appropriate procedures, in order to ensure that relevant information regarding its chemical industry is gathered and declared to the OPCW.  In the absence of appropriate legislation a State Party will not only be powerless to punish those who contravene the provisions of the Convention but it will simply give encouragement to those predisposed to engage in illegal activities.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Inspections of Chemical Production Facilities

Schedule 1

The production of Schedule 1 chemicals shall be carried out only in a single small-scale facility approved by the State Party, and in other facilities as set forth in Part VI of the Verification Annex. Production of Schedule I chemicals at these facilities is subject to restrictions in terms of the amounts permitted to be produced and stored. These facilities are subject to systematic inspections by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. The OPCW has conducted 228 inspections at Schedule 1 facilities since Entry into Force of the Convention in April 1997.

Schedule 2

Schedule 2 facilities are subject to initial and subsequent inspections by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. The OPCW has conducted 581 inspections at these facilities since Entry into Force of the Convention in April 1997.

Schedule 3

Schedule 3 facilities are subject to inspections by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. The OPCW has conducted 342 inspections at these facilities since Entry into Force of the Convention in April 1997.

Discrete Organic Chemicals (DOC)

DOC facilities are subject to inspections by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. The OPCW has conducted 1052 inspections at these facilities since 29 April 2000.

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