Annex
The Conduct of
Inspections Under the
Chemical Weapons
Convention and Related Issues
Detailed Description
(as of 31 December 2002)
1. Introduction
1.1 International
verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention and consultation
and cooperation amongst the
States Parties are primary objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).[1] A
key aspect of this is the conduct by the Secretariat of on-site inspections,
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention.[2]
1.2 The requirement
for States Parties to receive such inspections is prescribed under Article IV (paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 16); Article
V (paragraphs 3, 6, 15 and 19); and Article VI (paragraphs 2 to 6, and
9). The requirement to receive a challenge inspection for the sole purpose
of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non‑compliance
is stipulated in paragraph 8 of Article IX. Additionally, a State Party
may request an IAU of chemical weapons under paragraph 9 of Article X
(Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons).
1.3 The general
rules governing the various types of inspections under the Convention are
set out in the Verification Annex, Part II (General Rules
of Verification), and Part III (General Provisions for Verification
Measures pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI, paragraph 3).
1.4 The specific
procedures for each distinct category of inspection are shown in table
1 below.
Table 1: Specific procedures for inspections
| Category
of Inspection |
Reference |
| Chemical
weapon destruction |
Verification
Annex, Part IV (A), Section D |
| Old
and abandoned chemical weapons |
Verification
Annex, Part IV (B) |
| Destruction
of chemical weapon production facilities |
Verification
Annex, Part V, Section C |
| Schedule
1 chemicals and related facilities |
Verification
Annex, Part VI, Section E |
| Schedule
2 chemicals and related facilities |
Verification
Annex, Part VII, Section B |
| Schedule
3 chemicals and related facilities |
Verification
Annex, Part VIII, Section B |
| Other
chemical production facilities |
Verification
Annex, Part IX, Section B |
| Challenge
inspections |
Verification
Annex, Part X |
| Investigations
in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons |
Verification
Annex, Part XI |
(a) compliance
with the relevant provisions of the Convention, and their consistent implementation
in all inspected States Parties;
(b) timeliness;
(c) effectiveness;
(d) technical
and procedural credibility; and
(e) protection
of confidentiality.
1.6 This
background paper identifies issues that have an important bearing on the
effectiveness and technical credibility
of OPCW inspections.
1.7 The
ability of the OPCW to conduct on-site inspections effectively rests on
a number of factors. These include, inter alia:
(a) qualified
and trained inspection team personnel;
(b) adequate,
approved inspection equipment, and the necessary technical support structure
to maintain, store, ship, use, certify, and calibrate the equipment;
(c) the
necessary infrastructure for inspection planning, mission support and reporting,
including planning staff, a fully-equipped operations and planning centre,
and sampling and chemical analysis capabilities;
(d) adequate
procedures for all stages of the inspection process;
(e) adequate
budgetary provisions for the conduct of on-site inspections; and
(f) the
national implementation measures required to support on-site inspections,
as required by the Convention.
1.8 This
background paper presents an overview of the developments in these areas
since EIF of the Convention, and focuses on current
capabilities and problems.
2. General
overview
2.1 The
purpose of routine inspections is to verify the accuracy of the information
provided by inspected States Parties in declarations
relating to a particular facility, and to confirm that activities at the
declared facility are in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The
active involvement of the inspected State Party (ISP) in the demonstration
of its compliance with the various provisions of the Convention is an important
feature of a successful inspection. Inspection teams (ITs) are instructed
to be open‑minded and flexible with regard to the proposals that the
ISP may have to implement in terms of the inspection mandate and the provisions
of the Convention.
2.2 The
general approach taken during inspections is that of impartial fact finding,
with every effort being made to find cooperative
solutions, should any issues arise. All inspections are carried out
under the remit of an inspection mandate issued to the inspection team leader
by the Director-General. Each inspection mandate clearly identifies the
goals of the inspection as set out in the relevant section of the Convention,
and also provides specific operational instructions relevant to the unique
requirements of the facility to be inspected.
2.3 Inspections
are carried out as professionally and expeditiously as possible, minimising
the intrusion and inconvenience to the inspected
facility. Particular care is taken to protect both militarily and commercially
sensitive information by strict adherence to the provisions of the Annex
on the Protection of Confidential Information (Confidentiality Annex) of
the Convention; the Confidentiality Policy of the OPCW, adopted by the Conference
at its First Session (C-I/DEC.13, dated 16 May 1997, and Corr.1, dated 20
March 2000); and the Manual of Confidentiality Procedures, promulgated by
the Director-General, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
Annex.
2.4 The
Secretariat, as of 31 December 2002, had carried out inspections in a total
of
51 States Parties; 18 States Parties have had CW-related facilities inspected,
and
49 States Parties have had industrial facilities inspected. The total number
of conducted inspections were 1,327 (including inspection team rotations
at CW destruction facilities). A more detailed overview of the verification
activities of the Secretariat can be found in the consolidated unclassified
Verification Implementation Report, 1997 - 2002. The number of inspections
actually conducted differed from those approved in the decisions by the Conference
in the programme of work and budget for the respective years under review. The
main reasons for these differences were planning uncertainties before EIF
of the Convention; delays in the submission of declarations (particularly
under Article VI); delays in, and changes to, CW destruction operations as
compared to destruction plans and budgetary assumptions, and budget shortfalls
(evident since the year 2000). Since verification of destruction of chemical
weapons accounted for the largest allocation of resources (measured in inspector
days) within the Inspectorate, and since there were limitations on the degree
to which inspectors could be redirected to other programmed inspection activities,
any unavoidable delays in CW destruction activity inevitably had a significant
impact on the overall relationship between actual versus programmed inspection
activity.
3. Inspection
team personnel
Recruitment and initial training
3.1 Before
EIF, as part of the concluding work of the Preparatory Commission for the
OPCW, Training Group A of future inspectors
underwent five months of training at 24 locations in 14 member countries
of the Preparatory Commission. As a result, the OPCW had, at the beginning
of its operations, 111 suitably qualified and well-trained inspectors available
for the initial inspection campaign. These included 42 chemical production
technologists/industrial chemists; 29 CW-munitions specialists; 17 analytical
chemists; 14 chemical production logisticians; five paramedics; and four
medical specialists.
3.2 Training Group
B underwent very similar training from January to May of 1998. By the
end of 1998, 205 inspectors were on the staff of the Secretariat.
3.3 In addition
to the inspectors trained in groups A and B, a number of qualified headquarters
staff, mostly from the Verification Division, are
designated as OPCW inspectors and inspection assistants. In doing so, the
Secretariat was able to include some of the Secretariat staff most experienced
in conducting verification activities in its pool of designated inspectors. This
is particularly important for the conduct of technical visits, and for other
“non-routine” inspections.
3.4 As of 31 December
2002, the Secretariat’s inspection personnel included 173 full-time inspectors. The
OPCW has no inspection assistants, although these are provided for by the
Convention, for example for medical,
security, and administrative support, and interpretation services. The functions
prescribed by the Convention for inspection assistants are either carried
out as secondary assignments by the inspectors, or provided or arranged for
by the inspected States Parties as necessary amenities for the IT. Table
2 gives a breakdown of the inspectors currently on the staff of the OPCW’s
Inspectorate Division.
Table 2: Breakdown by category of the inspectors on the staff
of the OPCW
as of 1 June 2002
| Category |
Number of Staff Members |
| Chemical
production technologists/ industrial Chemists |
69 |
| Chemical
production logisticians |
25 |
| Chemical
weapons munitions Specialists |
50 |
| Analytical
chemists |
20 |
| Paramedics/medical
specialists |
9 |
| Total
no. of inspectors |
173 |
4. Designation
of OPCW inspectors
4.1 The Convention
established procedures for designating OPCW inspectors in Section A of Part II of the Verification Annex. In
accordance with these procedures, the initial list of inspectors proposed
for designation
was submitted to all States Parties on 19 May 1997, and this is updated
as required. There is no compartmentalisation of staff in the Inspectorate
Division, neither in relation to industry versus CW-types of inspections,
nor in relation to geographical regions or individual countries. Consequently,
all inspectors are included in the list submitted to States Parties for their
consideration and possible designation.
4.2 Many States
Parties have exercised their right not to accept individual inspectors. Although
Member States need not say why they do not accept an individual inspector,
the reasons for non-acceptance appear to fall into
categories: the exclusion of nationals who come from certain States Parties
which would pose problems to the receiving State Party; the exclusion of
a State Party’s own nationals (because they could not be granted privileges
and immunities in their own country of citizenship); and exclusions focused
on individual inspectors. Two States Parties, when informed by the Secretariat
that the reduced number of designated inspectors could cause operational
problems, took appropriate corrective measures.
5. Skill
maintenance and enhancement training
5.1 Inspectors undergo regular standardised training to maintain
and enhance the technical skills relevant to conducting inspections. During
periods of lower-than-average inspection activity, the Inspectorate has increased
the amount of training given to inspectors. Resources for such training
have been provided by the OPCW, or through generous offers by some States
Parties, or indeed from private companies within the host country.
5.2 All
inspectors receive generic refresher training in the preparation for, and
conduct of, inspections. In addition, the Inspectorate continues to organise
classes and seminars of specific interest to the various professional specialities. Some
CW-munitions specialists, for example, have received training, which has
led to radiation certification through the American Society of Non-Destructive
Technicians. This qualifies them safely to handle the OPCW’s approved
equipment for performing non-destructive evaluation. The only other internationally
recognised training provided to inspectors is in first aid.
6. Health
and safety issues
6.1 Health
and safety are major concerns in the conduct of on-site inspections. The Convention
requires that inspectors observe the safety regulations established at the
inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments
within a facility and for personal safety (paragraph 43 of Part II of the
Verification Annex). The OPCW’s approach to health and safety, including
the safe conduct of inspections, is prescribed by the OPCW Health and Safety
Policy and OPCW Health and Safety Regulations, as approved at the First Conference
(C-I/DEC.8, dated 14 May 1997).
6.2 Mandatory
regular refresher training and skills maintenance activities are an important
part of the Secretariat’s health and safety programme. In addition, all
inspectors are subject to an annual medical examination and fitness testing,
to ensure their ongoing ability to meet the often challenging demands of
their work. These annual examinations are supplemented by a thorough review
of their medical files and of the health status of all the team members before
they leave for an inspection. This allows day-to-day changes in their physical
condition to be considered when decisions about deploying or assigning inspectors
are taken. Accurate, current medical documentation is included in the health
and safety package that accompanies all teams. The OPCW’s excellent safety
record during its first five years of inspection activity is detailed in
subparagraphs 12.6 - 12.10 below.
7. Summary
on inspection personnel
To
sum up, the OPCW has at its disposal well-trained and well-qualified inspectors
with ample experience in the conduct of on-site inspections. The
number of inspectors is adequate for the current (2003) inspection tasks. This
background paper does not examine future trends in recruiting inspectors.
8. Procedures
for the planning and conduct of on-site inspections
8.1 As
stated in paragraph 42 of Part II of the Verification Annex to the Convention,
detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections
were to be adopted by the Conference, for inclusion in the Secretariat’s
Inspection Manual. The First Session of the Conference adopted the following
decisions in regard to this (other lists of activities in different types
of inspections that had been developed by the different expert groups of
the Preparatory Commission were never formally adopted):
(a) guidelines
on detailed procedures for verification, and for the conduct of inspections
at chemical weapons destruction facilities, in accordance with Part II,
paragraph 42, of the Verification Annex (C-I/DEC.6, dated 14 May 1997);
(b) procedures
for the inspection of equipment, in accordance with the provisions of Part
II, paragraph 29, of the Verification Annex (Paris Resolution, subparagraph
12(f) (C-I/DEC.7, dated 14 May 1997);
(c) procedures
for implementing the safety requirements for activities of inspectors and
inspection assistants, in accordance with paragraph 43 of Part II of
the Verification Annex (C-I/DEC.8, dated 14 May 1997);
(d) verification
activities at a temporary holding area within a CW destruction facility (C-I/DEC.19,
dated 16 May 1997);
(e) sampling
and analysis during investigations of alleged use (C-I/DEC.47, dated 16 May
1997);
(f) the
use of approved equipment during on-site inspections (C-I/DEC.50, dated 16
May 1997);
(g) measures
in relation to approved equipment following completion of inspection activities
(C-I/DEC.51, dated 16 May 1997); and
(h) additional
decisions taken by the Conference and the Council, which form part of the
official record of the OPCW, and provide further guidance to ITs as part
of the documentation that they take with them on inspections.
8.2 In
1997, the Secretariat issued a training manual which was based on these
decisions, and the results of the earlier work undertaken
by the expert groups of the Preparatory Commission. This training manual
was based on the results of the work of the Commission’s expert groups. In
particular, it contained the different lists of inspection activities that
had been developed by these expert groups. In the year 2000, based on the
practical experience gathered since EIF, the Secretariat undertook an internal
review of the training manual, and developed its inspection manual on this
basis. The OPCW Inspection Manual was formally approved by the Director-General,
and subsequently distributed in January 2001 within the Secretariat as a
Quality Control Document. Copies have been provided to those States Parties
who have so requested.
8.3 Complementing
the procedures in the inspection manual, standard operating procedures
(SOPs) and work instructions (WIs) were developed
by the Inspectorate and Verification Divisions. These documents describe
in detail what is to be done to achieve the desired results, the steps to
be taken, and the controls to be applied during the conduct of inspection-related
activities. These SOPs and WIs were developed in conformity with the OPCW
Quality Management System (QMS). The Inspectorate and the Verification Divisions
and others continue to develop SOPs and WIs as required, in order to ensure
effectiveness, safety, uniformity, and confidentiality in the conduct of
inspection-related activities.
9. Inspection
equipment
List of approved equipment
9.1 A
list of approved equipment – along with their operational requirements,
technical specifications and common acceptance
criteria – was approved at the first session of the Conference in May of
1997 (C-I/DEC.71 and Corr.1, both dated 23 May 1997). This list provided
the Secretariat with a basis for purchasing equipment for inspections. There
have been no additions to this list in the intervening five years.
9.2 The
decision by the Conference on the list of approved equipment included provision
for States Parties to familiarise themselves
with the approved equipment. To facilitate this, the Secretariat has invited
States Parties which are interested in doing so, to send technical experts
to the OPCW’s Equipment Store in Rijswijk. On average, three to four States
Parties per year take the opportunity to familiarise themselves with items
of inspection equipment. Furthermore, the Secretariat has issued an information
package on CD‑ROM containing technical and supplier information on
equipment which it has actually purchased for conducting inspections.
9.3 There
are still adequate stocks of approved inspection equipment to carry out
scheduled inspection activities. As yet, no mission
has ever had to be postponed or cancelled due to the unavailability of equipment. That
is not to say that the stock is sufficient for all eventualities, and there
is a growing need to replace ageing and worn‑out equipment. If a request
for an IAU or a challenge inspection were to occur during heavy routine mission
activities, the Secretariat could find itself having to prioritise the allocation
of equipment.
9.4 On
the occasions when the Secretariat has been unable to procure either whole
items of approved equipment or any of their individual
components, it has so far been able to find acceptable alternatives. In
such cases, the Secretariat has informed the States Parties of the substitution
and the reason for it. The States Parties have then had thirty days to familiarise
themselves with the equipment, either by acquiring it themselves, or by visiting
the OPCW’s Equipment Store, before the items have been used on inspections. This
method of substitution and subsequent revision of the technical specifications
of items has proven to be a practical solution to procurement problems. There
were, however, cases when States Parties did not take up the offer of familiarisation
and, subsequently, excluded the equipment at the POE.
Issues related to the use of approved inspection equipment
Maintenance and replacement of approved equipment
9.5 The
general maintenance of all inspection equipment is conducted continuously
in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations. Several
items of inspection equipment are periodically returned to the manufacturers
for mandatory checks and/or calibration, if required. Initial, in-house
maintenance of items returned after inspections has resulted in the lowering
of overall maintenance and replacement costs.
9.6 In
recent years, inspection equipment procured in 1997 and 1998 has needed
more and more maintenance. Much of this equipment
actually needs to be replaced, as it is either beyond repair, or uneconomic
to maintain (because suppliers no longer support these items). Due to financial
constraints, however, replacement has not been possible.
Individual protective equipment
9.7 At
this time, there are no unresolved areas of discussion between the Secretariat
and any State Party concerning the use by inspectors
of their individual protective equipment (IPE). In accordance with
the OPCW’s Health and Safety Policy, and at the request of ISPs, the Secretariat
has often approved the use of ISP-supplied IPE, if this equipment meets the
requirements of the OPCW, or for use in case of emergencies. While this
might be an acceptable solution in certain specific circumstances, the use
of OPCW IPE is preferable whenever possible, as the inspectors are more familiar
with it, the equipment fits properly, and integrates with working procedures.
Gas chromatograph/mass-spectrometers (GC/MS)
9.8 There
are five analytical gas chromatograph/mass spectrometers that have been
in operation since 1996/1997, which will soon
reach the end of their useful lives. The Secretariat has budgeted for the
replacement of these five instruments beginning in 2003, with completion
scheduled for 2005. In anticipation of this, the OPCW Laboratory has started
to look at possible replacements.
9.9 Two
suitable instruments from different vendors are currently under evaluation. The
new equipment would need to be integrated into the current quality system
of the OPCW Laboratory, as both the existing
and the replacement instruments will have to be operated in parallel, until
such time as the new equipment is ready to be fielded, and all the old instruments
have been replaced.
Hydrogen concentration measurement equipment
9.11 This item of
approved equipment, which is used for non-destructive evaluation, contains
a radioactive source at a strength which imposes special
requirements for transportation and storage. Moving it around has proved
to be problematic, and the Secretariat is exploring possible solutions to
this problem.
Agent monitoring at CWDFs for health and safety
9.12 The Secretariat
does not have the appropriate approved equipment to monitoring CW agents
on-site for health and safety purposes. It has tried
to use approved items of equipment (hand-held CW detectors) to meet this
need, but without much success. The Secretariat is in search of suitable
instruments, and appropriate measures will need to be taken by the OPCW to
approve this type of equipment, once it has been located.
Changes to the approved list and new items of approved
equipment
9.13 It
was the view of the Secretariat that there existed a need for a formal
procedure for
revising the list of approved equipment, as was explained
in a Secretariat Note
(EC-29/S/1, dated 7 May 2002). In pursuit of the above, the Conference approved
procedures for updating the list of approved equipment (C-7/DEC.20, dated
11 October 2002).
9.14 Furthermore,
the Secretariat sees a need to revise certain aspects of the technical
specifications of the approved equipment, and the Secretariat
began informal discussions with States Parties with a view to resolving this
issue. The original specifications were part of the Conference decision
on the list of approved equipment. As a result of these consultations, the
Secretariat proposed a draft decision for procedures for revising the technical
specifications for on-site inspection equipment (EC-28/DEC/CRP.4, dated 15
February 2002), and issued a background information paper (EC-29/S/2, dated
7 May 2002) giving the reasons why these revisions are necessary, namely,
changes in technology, or vendors discontinuing the manufacture of items
or equipment, the operating characteristics of which fall within the existing
specifications. To this end, the Council approved procedures for revising
the technical specifications for approved equipment (EC-31/DEC.8, dated 12 December 2002).
10. Sampling
and analysis
10.1 Paragraphs
52 through 58 of Part II of the Verification Annex establish the general
procedure for sampling and analysis during on-site
inspections. Key provisions are that, in the normal course of events, samples
be taken by a representative of the ISP or the inspected facility; that,
where possible, the analysis of samples be performed
on-site, either by the IT using its approved equipment or (at the request
of the IT) in its presence by the ISP; and that off-site analysis be performed
by designated laboratories certified by the Director-General and selected
for a particular inspection. To implement these provisions, the Secretariat
and the States Parties had to build up an appropriate analytical database,
develop and test procedures for sampling and analysis, establish a quality
system for the OPCW Laboratory, and introduce a system of proficiency testing
for the designation of laboratories of States Parties.
OPCW
Central Analytical Database
10.2 The
OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) is maintained in two versions,
a hard-copy version and an electronic version. The hard-copy
version was originally a paper copy of analytical data: mass spectra (MS),
nuclear magnetic resonance spectra (NMR), infrared spectra (IR), and gas
chromatography retention indices (GCRI). In 2000, the OCAD was for
the first time issued to States Parties on CD-ROM. The electronic version
of the OCAD at present contains only MS data, and allows the analytical data
to be searched as a library for use, together with an analytical instrument,
such as the Secretariat’s GC/MS inspection equipment. The first full electronic
version was issued in 2001 on CD-ROM.
10.3 In
line with the use of information technology for the presentation of the
OCAD, the Validation Group is gradually moving from
a paper copy validation of the data to an electronic validation, simplifying
the validation process and reducing the possibility of errors.
10.4 To
make the OCAD easier to use for verification purposes, a comparison of
chemicals declared with the data on chemicals available in
the OCAD is needed, the aim being to include data on chemicals declared,
but which currently is not present in the OCAD. This will assure that the
inspection team has the right tools to confirm the declared chemicals during
on-site analysis.
10.5 The
Secretariat will continue to release regular updates to the OCAD, as long
as new data is submitted by States Parties. In
particular, States Parties’ laboratories participating in the official proficiency
tests have shown a keen interest in the OCAD, because of its importance for
identifying scheduled compounds.
10.6 The Secretariat
released a new version of the OCAD, which was approved by the Council at
the end of 2002. Its contents are shown in table 3 below.
Table
3: Contents of the OPCW Central Analytical Database
| |
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
|
MS
|
529
|
712
|
904
|
1169
|
1495
|
2138
|
|
IR
|
209
|
265
|
329
|
422
|
670
|
670
|
|
NMR
|
864
|
936
|
966
|
1058
|
1255
|
1305
|
|
GC(RI)
|
87
|
155
|
175
|
805
|
2011
|
2598
|
10.7 The Validation
Group established rules for naming the chemicals
to be included in the OCAD, and laboratories were requested to follow these
rules (specified in S/196/2000, dated 15 June 2000) when submitting new analytical
data. It is important to note that these rules are under constant revision
by the Validation Group at its meetings, and summaries of its meetings report
any changes.
Procedures
and equipment for on-site analysis
10.8 The Secretariat’s
analytical standard operating procedures (SOPs) for on-site use were made
available to the States Parties which requested
them (S/119/99, dated 11 June 1999). The purpose of these documents
was to establish OPCW procedures for collecting, preparing, and analysing
samples on-site. Since 1999, some procedures have been revised, and new
procedures have been added. They remain available to States Parties, if
they make a request to the Director of Verification.
10.9 OPCW on-site
analysis equipment and procedures have been in use by inspection teams
at a CWDF in India since the year 2000, and were used
successfully during a Schedule 2 industry mission in March 2001.
10.10 OPCW
on-site analysis equipment and procedures were used successfully during
the exercises conducted by the Secretariat, e.g.
the IAUs in 1999 in the Czech Republic, in Poland in 2000, and for a challenge
inspection exercise in Brazil in 1999. In each case, the inspection team
collected and analysed the samples using approved equipment and procedures
within the short time available.
10.11 Requesting
the use of blinded software, which limits the use of databases to on-site
databases derived from the OCAD,
may not always be in the best interest of the ISP, because the instrument
will scan only a limited library of spectra in search of a reasonable match. The
certainty level of the analysis may thus decrease, or in rare cases, false-positive
results may be obtained. By comparing the spectra obtained to commercial
databases, which are available only if the GC/MS system is operated in open
mode, the instrument can distinguish between specific compounds with a greater
degree of certainty. Another issue which has to be decided during on-site
negotiations between IT and ISP are the “security levels” of AMDIS[3],
which limit the amount of information that is revealed by the software. At
the highest security level of AMDIS (level four), only the number of compounds
matching a spectra in the OCAD is presented, and the identity of a particular
compound is not revealed.
Procedures and capabilities for off-site analysis
Designated laboratories, proficiency testing
10.12 Eleven
official proficiency tests were conducted by the Secretariat in the period
between EIF of the Convention and December
2002, to certify laboratories designated to perform analysis of authentic
samples, in accordance with the criteria for designation approved by the
Conference at its First Session (C-I/DEC.60 and C‑I/DEC.61, both dated
22 May 1997) and the Council on its Twentieth Session (EC‑XX/DEC.3,
dated 28 June 2000). As a result, 13 laboratories have been designated out
of approximately 40 participants from States Parties world-wide. Three designated
laboratories were temporarily suspended after the sixth test in accordance
with the Council’s decision on the guidelines on the designations of laboratories
for the analysis of authentic samples (EC-XX/DEC.3, dated 28 June 2000). One
of these performed successfully in the following three tests and, therefore,
regained its full status after the ninth test in 2001. One additional
designated laboratory was temporarily suspended after the tenth test in 2001. At
the end of 2002, from the 13 designated laboratories, three remained suspended.
Accreditation of the OPCW laboratory
10.13 In close cooperation
with the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO),
the OPCW Laboratory undertook a project to define
the scope of its accreditation. The following three items were identified
and agreed upon by the Quality Steering Committee in 1999 for the first phase
of the Laboratory’s accreditation process under ILAC Guide 13 and ISO 17025:
(a) the
organisation of proficiency testing for designated laboratories and laboratories
seeking designation by the OPCW;
(b) the organisation
of the OCAD, and the transfer of data from it to on-site databases; and
(c) the testing
of OPCW GC/MS inspection equipment.
10.14 The
OPCW Laboratory applied for accreditation to the Dutch Accreditation Council
(RvA), and received an initial assessment visit in December 2000. The OPCW
Laboratory resolved the minor non-compliance issues remaining from the initial
assessment, and was granted accreditation on 28 March 2001. This accreditation
was in accordance with ILAC G13:2000: “ILAC Guidelines for the Requirements
for the Competence of Providers of Proficiency Testing Schemes”, and the
criteria described in ISO/IEC 17025:1999. The two accreditation numbers
issued by RvA are R011 and L338.
10.15 The
OPCW Laboratory receives regular internal and external audits of its quality
system. RvA conducts yearly external audits. The Office of Internal Oversight
(OIO), supported by internal technical experts, conducts three to four internal
audits annually.
10.16 The
next phase of accreditation for the OPCW Laboratory, as directed by the Quality
Steering Committee, relates to the handling of authentic samples for off-site
analysis, covering the process of preparation and analysis of control samples.
Procedures for the transfer of samples off-site
10.17 Since
EIF of the Convention, States Parties have been conducting informal consultations
on a draft decision on procedures in relation to the security, integrity,
and preservation of samples, and for ensuring the protection of the confidentiality
of samples transferred for off-site analysis.
10.18 The
OPCW Laboratory drafted a set of SOPs relating to the handling and transfer
of samples for off-site analysis, based on the results of those consultations. The procedures
have been tested internally, and could be applied by the Secretariat, if
the need arises.
10.19 Problems
with the timely transport of samples have arisen in trial exercises. In
one case, a sample remained at the POE of the host country for over 15 months
– clearly, an unacceptable delay in urgent cases. The Secretariat has exerted
much effort since then to address the problem of the timely transportation
of samples. An exercise to test the newly developed process was successfully
completed during January and February 2003. The Secretariat accompanied
the samples in transit to and from the Organisation, as would be done for
off-site analysis of original verification samples. The entire cycle – all
transport, preparation of control samples at the OPCW laboratory, analysis
by, and receipt of, the results from two designated laboratories – was completed,
however, in more than the twenty day period that had been hoped for.
Preparation of control samples
10.20 The
informal consultations mentioned above in subparagraphs 10.19 - 10.21 recommend
that authentic samples for off-site analysis be accompanied by spiked control
samples and matrix blanks.
10.21 The
consultations further recommend that such control samples and the matrix
blanks be prepared and analysed by the OPCW Laboratory. In anticipation
of adoption of the above-mentioned draft decision, and in order to prepare
for off-site analysis, the OPCW Laboratory has continued its activities in
relation to the preparation and analysis of the control samples.
10.22 Following
an assessment of resource requirements, designated laboratories were invited
in December 2000 to participate in stability studies of potential spiking
chemicals for future control samples. Five designated laboratories volunteered
to assist the Secretariat. These studies, which are currently being conducted,
will yield a list of sufficiently stable spiking chemicals from which the
OPCW Laboratory may select compounds to prepare control samples in cases
where off-site analysis is necessary. Until these studies are completed, the
OPCW Laboratory is maintaining a set of control samples for contingency purposes.
10.23 The
OPCW Laboratory evaluated several suitable LC/MS (liquid chromatography/mass-spectrometer)
systems for use in analysing control samples. An appropriate system was
procured and installed at the end of 2002.
11. Standing
arrangements
11.2 As of 31 December 2002,
the Secretariat had received the following mandatory notifications required
to be submitted within 30 days after EIF: notifications of POEs for inspection
teams – from 98 States Parties, or 67%; and notifications concerning SDCNs
for non‑scheduled aircraft – from 79 States Parties, or 54%. By the
same date 115, or 78%, of all States Parties had provided details concerning
their National Authorities, and 82, or 56%, of all States Parties had submitted
information on their national implementing legislation.
11.3 These
figures, for the period from EIF until 31 December 2002, are given in the
chart below:
Visas
and United Nations Laissez Passer (UNLPs)
11.4 Paragraph
10 of Part II of the Verification Annex requires each State Party to issue,
no later than 30 days after acknowledging
receipt of the list of designated inspectors, two-year multiple entry/exit
visas and/or transit visas, and any other documents required to enable each
inspector (or inspection assistant) to enter, and to remain on, its territory
for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities. This provision has,
in many cases, proved difficult to implement, as the Secretariat has reported
to the Council and to the States Parties on several occasions.
11.5 As
of 31 March 2003, of the 151 States Parties, 100 have indicated that they
were in a position to comply fully with the requirement
contained in Part II, paragraph 10 of the Verification Annex, namely, to
provide the required documentation, valid for at least two years, to allow
inspection team members to enter or cross their territory in order to carry
out inspection activities. Of the 100 States Parties concerned, 42 do not
require visas. Inspection teams can enter and leave those States Parties
using national passports or identity cards in combination with their United
Nations Laissez Passer (UNLPs). The remaining 58 States Parties have
issued, or agreed to issue, two-year multiple entry visas for designated
inspectors. In some cases, States Parties, on their own initiative, have
provided every designated inspector with a two-year visa; in the case of
other States Parties, where the formalities for issuing visas take a long
time to complete, the Secretariat has asked them to provide such a visa.
11.6 The
remaining States Parties fall into two categories: those that can issue
visas for less than two years or single entry visa (21),
and those from which the Secretariat has received an incomplete or no reply
to its requests for information (30).
11.7 The
Secretariat has negotiated the terms for acquiring additional UNLPs – enough
to ensure that no mission would be placed in jeopardy
simply for the lack of space to affix a visa. As in preceding years, the
budget for 2003 will again contain a line item for these additional UNLPs. With
two current UNLPs in his/her possession, each inspector could travel on inspection
business to about 64 States Parties. In the few States Parties where UNLPs
are not recognised, visas have been affixed to the personal passports of
the IT members.
11.8 To
date, only one mission has had to be postponed because of delays in issuing
visas. The instance was taken up and resolved
prior to the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council in November 2001.
Standing
diplomatic clearance numbers for non-scheduled inspection aircraft
11.9 The
Convention permits the use of non-scheduled flights for Article IX inspections,
or in cases where the use of scheduled commercial
aircraft would result in delays. States Parties are, in such cases,
required to provide clearance for overflight by, and landing of, such aircraft
within the time limits established by the Convention. To ensure this,
each State Party is required to issue a SDCN for non‑scheduled aircraft
transporting inspection teams and their equipment (paragraphs 22 to 25 of
Part II of the Verification Annex).
11.10 The
SDCN has caused problems for a significant number of States Parties. The Secretariat
has on several occasions approached States Parties with a view to reminding
them of their obligations in this
respect, and has reported to the Council and the States Parties on this situation.
11.11 Fifty-two
States Parties have not responded positively to the Secretariat’s request
for notification of their SDCNs for non‑scheduled
aircraft. This number includes States Parties which do not have an international
airport within their territory. Furthermore, five require advance notification
of between two to 15 days; one prohibits the transport of dangerous goods,
and the SDCNs from seven States Parties have expired.
Communications with National Authorities, including inspection
notifications
Contact points in National Authorities
11.12 In Article VII (paragraph 4), the Convention sets
out that each State Party, in order to fulfil its obligations under the Convention,
shall designate or establish a National Authority to serve as the national
focal point for effective liaison with the Organisation and other States
Parties. Each year, the Secretariat sends out a request to each State Party
for confirmation of its National Authority’s contact information and, each
year, the Secretariat is unable to establish phone or fax contact with about
five States Parties. In such cases, the request for an update is sent
through the post.
11.13 Almost one quarter of the States Parties (32) have
not as yet designated a National Authority. In these cases, the Secretariat
channels all information and requests through the Permanent Representative
of that State Party to the OPCW. It should be noted that, for inspection
notification purposes, this procedure may not always be adequate.
Inspection notifications
11.14 Notification of an impending inspection is sent by
the Secretariat to the ISP, in accordance with the deadlines specified in
the Convention. In the majority of cases, acknowledgements from National
Authorities to the Secretariat’s notifications of inspections are received
within the period of one hour specified in the Convention. Delays, when
they occur, are generally from infrequently inspected States Parties, which
may be unprepared to issue such a rapid response .
11.15 On those occasions when no acknowledgement has been
received, the Secretariat has had to persist until a written or verbal acknowledgement
has been made. This has entailed sending out duplicate notifications,
making telephone calls to the nearest embassy or consulate, and contacting
the ISP’s
Foreign Ministry.
11.16 In some cases, States Parties have specified periods when they would
have difficulty in receiving inspections. The causes have ranged from natural
disasters, to the participation of National Authority representatives in
a conference. The Secretariat has taken due account of the circumstances
when planning missions, while maintaining the principle that, in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention, the inspected State Party, which has
been notified of the arrival of the inspection team, shall ensure its immediate
entry into the inspected State Party’s territory. In two exceptional cases,
individual missions had to be postponed after a notification had been sent.
11.17 On a number of occasions, States Parties have informed the Secretariat
that the facilities to be inspected were declared in error, or were no longer
in business. In such cases, the IT size and/or the mandate may have been
adapted to the circumstances, but the ITs arrived as scheduled in the original
notification.
Points of entry (POEs) and related procedures
11.18 Each State Party is required to designate one or
more POEs for the passage of OPCW ITs into their territory, in such a way
that any inspection
site within the State Party’s territory can be reached from at least one
POE within 12 hours (paragraph 16 of
Part II of the Verification Annex).
11.19 Ninety-eight States Parties (67%) have designated
at least one POE. On several occasions, after receiving notification of
an impending inspection, the Secretariat has been notified of the designation
of an additional POE, one closer to the inspection site. When possible,
the Secretariat has made travel arrangements to accommodate such requests,
even though the requisite 30 days’ notice had not been provided.
11.20 On one occasion, the IT was flown to the capital of
the State Party concerned, which had not previously designated a POE. There
remain 49 States Parties which have still not designated any POE..
11.21 At
the POE, the representative of the ISP has the right to check the inspection
equipment in the presence of the IT. Few problems have been encountered
when the equipment was properly packed and accompanied by the appropriate
documentation. Some States Parties consistently reject certain pieces of
approved equipment; the global positioning system (GPS) is the item most
frequently rejected at POEs. They did, however, consistently offer
alternative means of verifying the location of the facility to be inspected,
and it was thus possible to implement the inspection mandates. One State
Party has continued to refuse pieces of approved equipment well after the
30 days’ notification period offered for familiarisation, essentially because
it had not familiarised itself with the equipment. Also, ITs have experienced
circumstances where the ISP refused the use of approved equipment at the
inspection site (for reasons other than safety), even though they had not
turned it back at the POE.
12. Conduct of inspections
General
12.1 Since EIF of the Convention, the Secretariat has performed over
1,300 inspections. Sixty-two percent of the inspections performed (involving
85% of inspector days expended) were conducted in relation to chemical weapons
or related facilities. The remainder were conducted with respect to facilities
declared under Article VI of the Convention.
12.2 The performance of the ITs during the conduct of inspections has
been recognised as being technically proficient and highly professional,
with the ITs strictly following the inspection mandate and the provisions
of the Convention. No incident of breach of confidentiality has ever occurred
during an on-site inspection.
Transportation
12.3 The Convention provides a period of twelve hours for the IT to
reach the inspection site from the POE. In some cases, agreements have been
reached between the Secretariat and States Parties which allow for, inter
alia, recovery time for the IT after long flights, and which thus extend
the time-limit beyond the 12 hours. Notwithstanding this, instances where
internal travel time alone significantly exceeds 12 hours continue to occur. This
is particularly true in some of the larger countries, where all inspections
are routed through a single designated POE.
12.4 Several items of approved inspection equipment (or components thereof)
are classified under transport regulations as “dangerous goods”. The Secretariat
is generally able to transport dangerous goods to and from POEs. Significant
problems are still encountered with the onward transport of such items from
the POE to the inspection site. Due to internal transportation restrictions
regarding dangerous goods, the Secretariat has often been unable to have
its approved equipment delivered in time to be used during inspections. The
Secretariat is searching for alternatives to items of equipment which contain
components that are classified as dangerous goods.
Communications
12.5 Paragraph 44 of Part II of the Verification Annex
stipulates that ITs shall have the right to communicate with their headquarters
throughout their stay in a State Party; that they may use their own, duly
certified, approved equipment; and that they may request the ISP to provide
them with access to other telecommunications. Furthermore, ITs have the
right to use their own two-way system of radio communications between personnel
patrolling the perimeter and other IT members. By and large, the effective
conduct of inspections has not been impaired by problems involving IT communications
with headquarters.
Health and safety during on-site inspections
12.6 The OPCW has established an excellent safety record during its
first five years of inspection activity. In October 2000, the Organisation's
inspectors completed 50,000 inspection days free of serious injuries or accidents
causing lost time since the commencement of inspection activities. The
Director-General has characterised this as a significant accomplishment,
and has paid tribute to the commitment of the States Parties towards the
safe conduct of inspections.
12.7 ITs have been able to fulfil their mandates, while observing the
requirements of the OPCW Health and Safety Policy, as well as the national
requirements of States Parties and those specific to particular sites. This
has been achieved by diligent adherence to policies and procedures, and by
close cooperation with State Party personnel. In some cases, concerns over
health and safety matters have meant finding alternative means of verifying
compliance.
12.8 There have been instances of potential exposure of inspectors to
CW agents. Once alerted to the accidental release of agent, the inspectors
were able to take immediate action, which included masking up and evacuation. In
no case were symptoms of any exposure noted.
12.9 No injuries or medical evacuations have been caused by chemical
exposure. During the few medical emergencies due to illness that have required
further treatment at an ISP hospital, ITs have all reported maximum assistance
and cooperation from ISPs. All such incidents were satisfactorily dealt
with, and resulted in a full return to health by the inspectors involved. In
some instances, emergency family matters arose during the conduct of a mission
(e.g. the serious illness of a child). Without exception, States Parties
reacted with understanding and cooperation, giving full assistance in arranging
the urgent departure of the inspector. Safety concerns during transit of
ITs have been brought to the attention of several States Parties. Again,
the States Parties involved have been cooperative and willing to address
and resolve such issues.
12.10 On-site risk assessment and management cannot occur without the
correct equipment for detecting and monitoring the potential chemical hazards
to which inspectors might be exposed. It is important that both the OPCW
and States Parties establish and maintain a capability to provide near real-time
detection and monitoring of hazardous chemicals in order to minimise the
risks of exposure. It is also important that the OPCW continue to keep abreast
of and use new technology, antidotes, and skills to maintain a healthy and
safe working environment.
Sampling and analysis
12.11 Sampling and analysis have thus far had little or no role in the
conduct of routine inspections, other than those at CWDFs. In March of 2001,
on-site analysis to verify the absence of Schedule 1 compounds and their
decomposition products was undertaken during a subsequent Schedule 2 inspection. At
present, OPCW approved analytical equipment is routinely used at one CW destruction
facility. On no other occasion had sufficient manpower and equipment been
brought on an inspection to allow for on-site analysis using OPCW approved
analytical equipment. This was partly a reflection of the requirements for
initial inspections, and partly of technical, logistical and cost constraints. On
a number of occasions, ITs have requested that sampling and on-site analysis
be conducted by the ISP, and witnessed by the IT. This is standard
procedure at most CW destruction facilities, and has also been used during
Article VI inspections.
Debriefing
12.12 In accordance with paragraph 60 of Part II of the
Verification Annex, ITs present to the representative of the ISP their
preliminary findings in
written form, according to a standardised format, together with a list of
any samples and other material to be taken away from the site.
12.13 Since early 1998, following consideration by the
Council, copies of the inspectors’ notebooks have been provided to the
ISP when the inspection
has been completed, if the ISP so requested.
Final inspection reports
12.14 The Secretariat attempts to send the final inspection reports (FIRs)
to the ISPs within the 10-day period laid down by the Convention. This deadline
has not always been met. Reasons for delay include the length of time between
completion of inspection and return to headquarters, and preparing several
FIRs simultaneously when sequential inspections have been performed. Translations
into official (OPCW) languages other than English are completed later, as
resources allow, and are sent separately to the ISP.
12.15 Only one FIR has ever been issued for a CWDF. The FIR for the Johnston
Atoll Chemical Agent Destruction System (USA) was issued within the Convention’s
timeline. There have been no problems regarding the timelines of interim
reports at CWDFs. Normally, they are given to the ISP within three days
after the end of the reporting period.
Financial aspects of on-site
inspection conduct
12.16 The principle of “possessor pays” is set out in paragraph
16 of Article IV and paragraph 19 of Article V of the Convention, and decisions
on this matter were taken by the Conference (C-I/DEC.74*, dated 23 May 1997,
and subparagraph 2(c) of decision C‑II/DEC.17*, dated 5 December 1997;
C-III/DEC.8, dated
17 November 1998; and C-IV/DEC.5, dated 29 June 1999). The costs of
Article VI inspections are met from the Organisation’s general operating
budget. Paragraph 26 of Part II of the Verification Annex allows for the
inspected State Party to be reimbursed for amenities requested by the Secretariat
and provided to the inspection team during the course of an inspection. The
procedures for this have been communicated to all States Parties with facilities
subject to inspection (NV/ODDG/47320/01, dated 14 June 2001).
12.17 The mechanism for the payment of the cost of verification under
Articles IV and V (i.e. during the same year in which such inspections
have been conducted) has now been established, and measures are being taken
to effectively implement it.
12.18 General improvements in the cost-effectiveness of
the inspection regime have been introduced since the initial inspections
of 1997. Measures implemented by the Secretariat have included the conduct
of sequential inspections (a concept not explicitly provided for in the Convention);
the consecutive inspection of facilities of the same type in more than one
State Party when this would cut down travel time and costs; and the reduction
of the size of teams and the duration of inspections, and other cost-saving
measures. The expenses incurred per inspection today are considerably lower
than was originally anticipated when the Convention was getting under way,
and lower than those incurred during inspections during the early years of
OPCW activity.
12.19 The Secretariat has noted wide variation in the amounts invoiced
by States Parties for services provided during industrial inspections. The
cost per translator-day runs from 140 to 1100 euros; and the cost for commuting
between the inspectors’ accommodation and the inspection site from 200 to
825 euros per day. In cases where costs have been extraordinarily high,
the Secretariat has initiated consultations with the State Party to find
a way of reducing them or, in exceptional cases, attempted to arrange its
own services (e.g. the use of a taxi to transport a team between the inspection
site and the hotel). The Secretariat has requested (NV/ODDG/47320/01 of
14 June 2001) that the National Authorities produce copies of the original
invoices from the contracted parties who provide the services. However,
these are not always received, leaving the Secretariat with no means of substantiating
the claims.
13. Challenge inspection
Overview
13.1 No challenge inspection has so far been undertaken by the OPCW. The
focus of attention since the formation of the Organisation has been to develop
procedures and working instructions, and to train staff in their use. Exercises
have been undertaken with the assistance of various States Parties in order
to test and improve procedures and systems.
Designation of inspectors for challenge inspections
13.2 Paragraph 1 of Part X of the Verification Annex sets out that a
challenge inspection shall be carried out only by inspectors and inspection
assistants specially designated for this function. This paragraph further
sets out that these inspectors and inspection assistants should be selected
from amongst the inspectors and inspection assistants designated for routine
inspections. The designation of these inspectors should follow the procedures
provided for in Part II, Section A of the Verification Annex.
13.3 The list of designated inspectors is currently in the process of
being updated; the original list was selected in 1999. Some specific shortages
exist because staff members who had received specialised training (such as
non-destructive evaluation (NDE) qualified CWMS personnel) have left the
OPCW. This issue is receiving particular attention at the moment.
13.14 Sampling and analysis could be important components
of any challenge inspection, and have been considered elsewhere in this
report.
13.16 Since
1998, several challenge inspection exercises have been held at various locations,
using different scenarios; they are summarised in table 4 below.
Table 4: Challenge inspection exercises
|
Location
|
Type of exercise
|
Dates
|
Observation
|
|
United Kingdom –
RAF Valley
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
February 1998
|
10 inspectors
|
|
United Kingdom at the Royal School
of Artillery – Larkhill
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
June 1999
|
Three participants from the OPCW
(one inspector and two observers)
|
|
OPCW – The Hague
|
Call out exercise
|
Year 1999
|
Total of 154 inspectors and staff
members involved
|
|
The Netherlands –
Wassenaar
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
September 1999
|
42 inspectors – military field
exercise
|
|
Brazil –
Săo
Paulo
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
October 1999
|
10 inspectors
Industry plant
|
|
United Kingdom – Culdrose Royal
Navy Air Base
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
June 2000
|
Three inspectors
|
|
United Kingdom –
RAF Stafford
|
Mock challenge inspection
|
June
2001
|
Three inspectors and one staff
member
|
|
United States – Washington
|
Table-top exercise
|
April 2001
|
Four inspectors
|
|
United States – Naval Weapons Centre
in Maryland
|
Naval Surface Warfare Centre
|
July 2001
|
