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OPCW | Secretariat |
| Office of the Deputy Director-General | ||
| S/294/2002 | ||
| 6 February 2002 | ||
| Original: ENGLISH | ||
| (Unofficial electronic version) | ||
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT
OPCW capabilities relevant to the global struggle against terrorism
Introduction
This background paper identifies the assets that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (hereinafter the “OPCW”) could contribute to the global struggle against terrorism, should it be called upon to do so. It complements the Secretariat background paper on initial considerations regarding the OPCW’s contribution to the global struggle against terrorism (S/277/2001, dated 14 November 2001). This paper is intended to assist the deliberations of the OPCW Executive Council and the working group it established “to examine further the OPCW’s contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts, including specific measures, taking into account resource implications” (EC-XXVII/DEC.5, dated 7 December 2001). As mentioned in the Note by the Director-General on possible responses to global terrorist threats (S/292/2002 dated 29 January 2002), the Director-General included a previous version of this paper in his response to United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala.
The global struggle against terrorism will require careful coordination between the different agencies involved. One aspect of such coordination and advance planning is the identification of the capabilities – both in nature and quantity – that these agencies can contribute, on the basis of the assumption that there will be some overall coordination of activities and assets. This paper has been compiled to provide information about the OPCW’s capabilities in this context.
The capabilities identified in this paper include those already existing within the Secretariat, as well as those capabilities which the Member States have undertaken to provide through the OPCW in response to a call for assistance under Article X of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also includes reference to other capabilities of Member States to which the OPCW has been offered access. Furthermore, this paper identifies the expertise and specialised knowledge available to the Director‑General from both the Scientific Advisory Board and the Board’s temporary working groups, as well as from the OPCW protection network composed of experts from Member States.
The paper analyses the possible contribution of the OPCW from the perspective of its knowledge, its operational and technical expertise, and the existence of competent and trained personnel, validated data, tested procedures, and suitable equipment and facilities. The paper does not address the cost implications of any such OPCW contribution. It also does not quantify the assets available to the OPCW, which are changing with time – as noted above, such quantification would, of course, be necessary in the further coordination of the counter-terrorism effort. In this regard it should, however, be noted that, as the capacities of the Secretariat with respect to the possible deployment of personnel and equipment reflect the requirements of implementing the Convention as anticipated during the 1990s, the latter do not necessarily correspond to the requirements for an OPCW contribution to the global struggle against terrorism since 11 September 2001, and in the first decade of the twenty‑first century.
The paper focuses on those OPCW capabilities that relate to the possible involvement of toxic chemicals in terrorist activities. While it is structured to address the different requirements of dealing with chemical threats posed by terrorist organisations before a terrorist incident (including prevention), as well as during and after such an incident, it also identifies other relevant OPCW capabilities.
The paper is divided into the following sections:
Introduction
1. Preventive measures
1.1 Development and enactment of legislation
1.2 Security measures at sites containing toxic chemicals
1.3 Increasing the protective capability against toxic chemicals, including through training
1.4 Risk assessment related to chemical threats
1.5 Available expertise
2. Immediate measures after a terrorist use of toxic chemicals
2.1 Detection and early warning in relation to releases of toxic chemicals, safety monitoring and chemical analysis
2.2 Measures to assess the impact of the terrorist use of toxic chemicals
2.3 Investigations of incidents suspected to involve toxic chemicals
2.4 Coordination and delivery of protection in case of the use of chemical weapons
3. Measures that need to be taken after a terrorist use of toxic chemicals
3.1 Medical countermeasures against toxic chemicals
3.2 Decontamination after exposure to toxic chemicals
4. Other relevant capabilities: operational, administrative and other
1. preventive Measures
1.1 Development and enactment of legislation
The preparation and enactment by each State Party of implementing legislation, including penal legislation, is required under the Convention. So are legal cooperation and the affording of appropriate legal assistance between Member States. In relation to the struggle against terrorism, penal legislation will enable OPCW Member States to prosecute as criminal offences, not only the use of toxic chemicals by terrorists, but also any form of preparation for such use (including, inter alia, the development of chemical weapons or assistance therewith including financing, the acquisition or production of relevant chemicals, the construction of a CW production facility, CW testing, possession and storage, and environmental damage). Other forms of implementing legislation will enable Member States to exercise the necessary degree of monitoring in their respective areas of jurisdiction in relation to activities related to relevant chemicals, such as trade including imports and exports. Legal cooperation and assistance between Member States will help to ensure that terrorist organisations attempting to use toxic chemicals cannot exploit loopholes in the net of prohibitions created by Member States, and also cannot escape the prosecution of criminal acts involving toxic chemicals.
The OPCW has experience in the development of legislation, including criminal law, related to both the toxic and precursor chemicals that could be used for CW purposes. This expertise could be used to provide support in the development and enactment of domestic legislation in countries currently lacking an adequate set of prohibitions and other necessary and enforceable laws related to both toxic chemicals and precursors. The OPCW has also been addressing issues related to legal cooperation between its Member States, including in relation to extradition.
The Secretariat’s capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) legislative support (international law, examples of existing national legislation, including the possible enactment of integrated fast-track legislation, and regulations in relation to the monitoring of chemical activities, including trade);
(b) relevant documentation (an OPCW legislation package including, inter alia, a legislator checklist, examples of legislation, and model texts for domestic implementing legislation);
(c) expertise related to a proposed "Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, relating to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Convention", presented at the OPCW International Symposium on Cooperation and Legal Assistance for the Effective Implementation of International Agreements, 7 ‑ 9 February 2001 (S/251/2001, dated 22 March 2001); and
(d) capacity building in certain aspects of law enforcement, including advising other international organisations (such as the WCO) in relation to the inclusion of modules concerning toxic chemicals in their respective training programmes for officers from national law enforcement agencies.
In addition, the Secretariat has been working with legal experts from a number of Member States on such issues as the development of model legislation to implement and enforce the provisions of the Convention, including penal legislation. These experts can be mobilised by the Secretariat as an additional resource of legal support. Furthermore, a network of legal experts from Member States in Latin America and the Caribbean has recently been created. The members of this network have been working with Convention‑related aspects of national legislation, and may be called upon to render legal support.
1.2 Security measures at sites containing toxic chemicals
One important dimension of preventive action is to maintain adequate security at sites where toxic chemicals are being stored, in order to prevent the diversion/theft of such chemicals. In order to deny terrorists access to such sites, security measures are required for locations where chemical weapons (including old and/or abandoned chemical weapons) are being stored. In addition, security must also be a concern for industrial and other locations where legitimate chemical activities are taking place, but where there is a danger that terrorist groups might attempt to gain access to otherwise legitimate chemicals, in order to render them into chemical weapons or to release them into the environment.
The OPCW has acquired considerable experience in relation to the security of facilities and locations where toxic chemicals are stored. This experience has been acquired by Member States in their implementation measures for sites containing chemical weapons, as well as through other activities. The Secretariat has, in the conduct of its inspection activities, gained insight into practices for securing sites containing toxic and other relevant chemicals. These experiences may be useful in assessing weak points in measures taken to prevent access to toxic and precursor chemicals, and for developing common minimum standards of security at sensitive chemical facilities and improving the security situation at such sites.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) advising on, and assessing, the physical security of facilities where toxic or precursor chemicals are being held, including both CW storage facilities and industrial facilities – although experience in this field rests largely with Member States, the Secretariat can provide advice and can refer enquiries to Member States; and
(b) experience in the conduct of audits, for example, in the fields of security, finance, confidentiality, and electronic security.
1.3 Increasing the protective capability against toxic chemicals, including through training
An adequate protective capability is an essential aspect of the prevention of, and preparation for, a possible terrorist attack with toxic chemicals. Protection can reduce the impact of such an attack, and may therefore reduce the probability that terrorists will resort to such means. Even if a chemical terrorist attack cannot be prevented, an adequate protective capability can help to reduce loss of life and human suffering, and would undoubtedly play a central role in any post‑attack emergency measures.
The Convention requires the Secretariat to provide expert advice and assistance to Member States, upon their request, on how to develop and improve their capacity to protect themselves against chemical weapons. The OPCW may assist in the assessment of specific needs to develop and maintain an adequate protective capability with respect to the possible use of toxic chemicals.
This capability, which involves assets from Member States, including experts of the OPCW protection network, as well as capacities at the Secretariat, includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) the OPCW databank on protection – a databank containing information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons, which was established in accordance with the Convention for use by any requesting OPCW Member State(s); The databank is being compiled by the Secretariat from freely available sources, as well as from information provided by Member States;
(b) the OPCW protection network (see subparagraph 1.5 below for detail. This is a network of experts from Member States with experience in the area of protection against toxic chemicals, including CW agents. These experts are ready to provide expertise and assistance whenever this is requested by a Member State);
(c) the ability to provide expert advice in the area of protection;
(d) expert support for national seminars on protection;
(e) OPCW sponsored seminars and field exercises conducted by several Member States, as part of their undertakings to provide assistance through the OPCW;
(f) the maintenance and use of protective equipment: the Secretariat has experience and limited maintenance capabilities in this field;
(g) the maintenance and use of detection equipment: the Secretariat has experience and limited maintenance capabilities in this field;
(h) training: the OPCW has experience both in delivering comprehensive training courses in the area of countermeasures against toxic chemicals (detection, protection, decontamination, medical countermeasures), and in assisting Member States to develop and deliver such training in a form which is tailored to specific regional or local needs. This training is eminently practical in nature. If appropriate, it can, with the assistance of Member States, even involve controlled confidence-building exercises using simulants or other chemical agents under safe conditions. This capability rests both with training institutions in certain Member States, and with assets of the Secretariat. It includes:
- comprehensive curricula, and audio-visual and other course materials on subjects relevant to the management of chemical incidents;
- experienced trainers;
- training equipment to allow practical exercises in detection, protection, decontamination, and medical treatment (the four cornerstones of chemical incident management); and
- portable audio-visual equipment.
1.4 Risk assessment related to chemical threats
The probability that terrorists might use toxic chemicals as a means of attack depends, inter alia, on their perception of the effectiveness of such attacks. If there is a perception that the nature and scale of planned countermeasures are such that casualties would be relatively limited, it may be less likely that terrorists would resort to attacks with toxic chemicals. At the same time, a proper understanding of the relative risks associated with different possible scenarios for terrorist attacks with toxic chemicals is essential for the planning of adequate countermeasures. This includes the development of emergency response plans, the identification and training of personnel, and the identification of the equipment, supplies (e.g. medicines) and other support required to counter possible chemical attacks.
The
OPCW – amongst other things through its protection network and the staff of
its Secretariat – has expertise in addressing the risks associated with different
possible scenarios for chemical attacks. This expertise can assist in assessing
the risk potential for a given environment, as well as in identifying the measures
necessary to increase readiness to withstand terrorist chemical attacks. The
OPCW can also use specialised knowledge relevant to risk assessment through
its Scientific Advisory Board, for example in relation to individual chemicals
which pose a particular threat (examples of toxic chemicals for which such knowledge
is available include ricin, saxitoxin, perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB), O,O‑diethyl
S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate (amiton), 3-quinoclidinylbenzilate
(BZ), and 10‑chloro-5,10-dihydro-phenarsazine (adamsite)).
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) an understanding of offensive and defensive tactics relating to CW;
(b) knowledge of the locations where chemical weapons, including old and/or abandoned CW, are stored/situated;
(c) an understanding of weapons design and of other matters related to the dispersal of toxic agents into the environment;
(d) an understanding of chemical weapons safety;
(e) an understanding of, and information on, industrial safety;
(f) knowledge of the capabilities of national chemical industries; and
(g) data on individual toxic chemicals which may have to be assessed.
1.5 Available expertise
Access to scientific, technical, medical and other expertise is essential for preventive and protective measures against the possible use of toxic chemicals by terrorists. Without such expertise, it would not be possible to plan adequately for emergency responses. Access to such expertise can help to identify and assess risks, to develop the necessary response capabilities, to assess an actual incident situation, and to determine the specific countermeasures that are needed.
Aside from its in-house expertise, which is detailed elsewhere in this paper, the OPCW has access to specialist knowledge through its Scientific Advisory Board. This Board is made up of 20 eminent scientists from Member States with expertise, inter alia, in chemistry, toxicology, chemical analysis, the properties of CW agents and their safe destruction, industrial chemistry, and process engineering. Furthermore, the Board has established a number of temporary working groups on specific subjects (analytical procedures, inspection equipment, CW destruction technologies, biological processes in the manufacturing of chemicals, and specific chemicals and their properties). A group on biomedical samples is currently being established. Should this be required, the OPCW can also access the specialist knowledge of the temporary working groups of its Scientific Advisory Board.
In the area of protection, specifically, the OPCW has set up the OPCW protection network, whose members are nominated by Member States on the basis of their experience in CW and related issues. These experts meet regularly in The Hague to share expertise and knowledge, and to enhance coordination within the network.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) access to international experts in subjects such as chemistry, toxicology, protection, detection, decontamination, medical treatment and general CW subjects;
(b) the ability to identify and dispatch experts to assist Member States to develop their capacity for managing chemical incidents; and
(c) the ability to identify and dispatch experts to assist Member States to manage the consequences of chemical incidents.
2. Immediate measures after a terrorist use of toxic chemicals
2.1 Detection and early warning in relation to releases of toxic chemicals, safety monitoring and chemical analysis
After a suspected terrorist chemical attack, a number of countermeasures need to be taken without delay. These include, inter alia, the medical treatment of victims, the establishment of preparedness for any possible follow-up attack (protection and early warning), an investigation of the incident to establish whether and which toxic chemicals have been involved, an assessment of downwind hazards and the implementation of related contingency plans, and the decontamination of personnel, equipment, vehicles, and, as may be necessary, soil, buildings and other surfaces. One essential component of these immediate measures is chemical analysis and safety monitoring. This is essential to establish the exact nature of an incident and to determine the measures that are needed to control the situation, to avoid secondary contamination, and to confirm the effectiveness of the countermeasures taken.
In its conduct of inspections, the Secretariat has acquired considerable experience in the conduct of safety monitoring in environments where toxic chemicals may be present, including on-site analysis aimed at establishing the presence or absence of toxic chemicals. This capability may be relevant in order to establish whether a toxic agent has been used. It can also be useful to provide advice on how to develop an effective national or regional early warning capability for toxic chemicals. The capacity for the deployment of these assets is limited at present, as the related capabilities at the Secretariat in terms of personnel and equipment were developed on the basis of requirements identified in the mid-1990s, in relation to the conduct of inspections, and – to a more limited degree – to the provision of assistance, but not to the contribution of the OPCW to counter-terrorism operations. At the same time, the OPCW would be in an excellent position to set up arrangements at its in‑house laboratory to render instant support to teams in the field involved in an emergency response to any chemical incident which might occur. Such emergency measures can be severely hampered if the first responders, although well equipped and trained, were to lack immediate access to validated analytical data and methods needed for the investigation of a suspected chemical incident. Instant access for response teams in the field to such data at the OPCW would drastically shorten the time required to establish the absence or presence of certain toxic chemicals – something which is particularly important during the early phase of an emergency response to a suspected chemical attack.
In conjunction with its designated laboratories for off-site chemical analysis, the OPCW has the capability to establish the chemical structure/identity of unknown agents that might have been used. Through both its protection network and the experts nominated by Member States in relation to investigations of alleged use, the OPCW can call upon the expertise of specialists from its Member States.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) a group of OPCW inspectors with advanced training in analytical chemistry, as well as in the use of OPCW analytical equipment and related sampling and on-site analytical procedures;
(b) tested and standardised procedures for sampling (sample taking, sample processing, chain of custody procedures, storage) and on-site chemical analysis (from bulk to trace concentrations);
(c) analytical equipment for safety monitoring (hand-held detectors of different specifications);
(d) analytical instruments for field analysis (transportable GC/MS, and field kits for sample collection, processing and transportation). This represents the capability to set up and operate, with maximum speed and efficiency, a fully‑fledged field laboratory capable of all essential operations, from sample collection to sample preparation (clean-up) and chemical analysis on site;
(e) non-destructive evaluation (e.g. of munitions or vessels suspected of containing chemical agents), which involves OPCW Inspectorate personnel trained and certified in the use of different types of NDE equipment (X-ray and ultrasonic pulse echo equipment (UPE)), and the equipment and procedures for its use under field conditions;
(f) the OPCW Laboratory has experience, inter alia in quality control, including the management of proficiency tests, the measurement of the reference mass spectra of relevant chemicals, the structural elucidation of agents (including those whose structure is unknown) by mass spectrometry, and the micro-synthesis of standards and reference compounds. The OPCW Laboratory could:
- undertake an analysis of samples within the limitations of its environmental permit;
- provide remote interpretation of mass spectral data from any MS instrument (such data can be sent by e-mail);
- provide support and advice for analytical strategies, sample collection, sample preparation (clean up), analytical methods, and the microsynthesis of reference standards (by phone, fax, e-mail); and
- if desirable, the Secretariat could set up Internet access to the Central OPCW Analytical Database (see below) to permit on-line searches by authorised users;
(g) the Central OPCW Analytical Database includes the MS spectra and GC retention indices for the most well‑known chemical warfare agents and their degradation products, as well as for structurally related compounds, in addition to a somewhat smaller number of NMR and FT/IR spectra for similar compounds;
(h) access to currently designated laboratories certified for the chemical analysis of toxic chemicals relevant to the Convention. These laboratories have an accepted quality control regime in place, are accredited in accordance with internationally recognised standards for chemical analysis, and have been participating successfully in OPCW proficiency testing; and
(i) tested and standardised procedures for monitoring safety in industrial and military (CW) sites.
2.2 Measures to assess the impact of the terrorist use of toxic chemicals
An essential aspect of the planning and implementation of countermeasures after an attack with toxic chemicals is to understand the likely impact of such a toxic release under the specific circumstances in question. Predicting and monitoring the progression of a toxic release is a highly specialised undertaking that requires experience and knowledge of the physical and chemical properties of toxic chemicals, as well as of the physics and chemistry of their behaviour in the environment, and of human toxicology.
A number of Member States have extensive experience in this regard, as a result of past programmes related to CW and/or past and present programmes in the field of chemical defence. Also, the Secretariat has on its staff a number of professionals who are well‑trained and experienced in such assessments. Through its Scientific Advisory Board the OPCW also has access to relevant scientific and technical information, as well as to specialised expertise.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) information on toxic chemicals and their properties;
(b) expertise in, and knowledge of, chemical science;
(c) expertise and knowledge in relation to the behaviour of chemicals in the environment (vapour/aerosol cloud dispersion, agent precipitation and deposition, secondary contamination, agent behaviour in soils and water, etc.);
(d) information on, and expertise in, industrial chemical processes;
(e) the identification of chemical hazards;
(f) the evaluation of chemical hazards; and
(g) the OPCW protection databank (see subparagraph 1.3 above).
2.3 Investigations of incidents suspected to involve toxic chemicals
As already mentioned in subparagraph 2.1 above, if there is an incident involving the suspected release of a toxic chemical, it is of paramount importance for the exact nature of the incident to be established as soon as possible. This includes such questions as whether toxic chemicals have in fact been released, which chemical(s) have been involved, the quantities in which they were released, and the specific circumstances and techniques of the release. In addition to its importance as a guide to the determination of post-attack emergency measures, such detailed knowledge will greatly facilitate preparations for possible follow-up attacks, as well as the securing and protection of evidence.
The Secretariat has established the capability to conduct investigations of the suspected use of chemical weapons (this capability could also be applied to investigate the release of certain toxic industrial products and intermediates). Such investigations aim to establish whether a toxic chemical has been used, which agent(s) has/have been employed, and what additional assistance and protection are required. OPCW inspection teams can, if required, be reinforced by “qualified experts” nominated by Member States and designated by the Director-General, if certain expertise is not available among OPCW inspectors (e.g. in such areas as epidemiology or microbiology). Investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons may, depending on the circumstances, lead on to decisions to deliver assistance and protection.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) the ability to dispatch OPCW investigation teams (including equipment) at short notice;
(b) a detailed familiarity with the logistics of inspection teams and inspection team travel, and also of equipment shipments, including procedures for hazardous cargo;
(c) field sampling and analysis (see subparagraph 2.1 above);
(d) chain-of-custody procedures for samples and other types of evidence;
(e) off-site analysis at designated laboratories (see subparagraph 2.1 above);
(f) other investigative methods (including interviews, photography, physical measurements, and medical examinations);
(g) on-site risk assessment and the on-site determination of protection and assistance needs;
(h) the maintenance and use of global positioning systems;
(i) the conduct of inspections in chemical industry facilities; and
(j) the conduct of inspections in military facilities containing chemical weapons.
2.4 Coordination and delivery of protection in case of the use of chemical weapons
Under the assistance provisions of the Convention, the OPCW is continuously reviewing and improving its capacity and operational concept for the coordination and delivery of protection in cases involving the threat or actual use of chemical weapons. The Convention’s provisions on assistance would also apply to terrorist chemical attacks. To assist a country which has been attacked to cope with that attack, the coordination and delivery of protection against toxic chemicals is a matter of high priority, and will help to limit the loss of life, and control/manage the situation as it develops.
This capability, which is based on assets from Member States and the limited resources of the Secretariat, includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) the capacity of the Secretariat to coordinate and deliver protection against CW, thus utilising the undertakings of Member States in relation to their offers of assistance under Article X of the Convention;
(b) undertakings by Member States to provide assistance through the OPCW. Such assistance includes individual and collective protective equipment, detection and CW reconnaissance teams and equipment, decontamination equipment and methods, medical personnel and equipment/treatments/antidotes, airlift capability, training capabilities and emergency/humanitarian assistance experience. Some of these undertakings are of a binding nature, in the form of bilateral agreements on assistance;
(c) a limited stockpile of means of protection at the OPCW headquarters for immediate deployment, to support OPCW assistance teams and to provide initial assistance; and
(d) the OPCW Voluntary Fund for Assistance, established under Article X of the Convention, and intended for the provision and delivery of direct emergency or supplementary assistance. Such assistance to the recipient countries may take the form of the provision of experts, financing for individual or group training, and the provision of protection equipment and medical supplies. The fund is administered by the Secretariat, while decisions on its use are taken by the Executive Council. However, if there are victims of the use of chemical weapons and if immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General is empowered by the Convention to take such decisions.
3. Measures that need to be taken after a terrorist use of toxic chemicals
3.1 Medical countermeasures against toxic chemicals
Medical countermeasures can limit the impact of the use of toxic chemicals, while also reducing casualties and minimising human suffering, both during emergency treatment and when long-term care is needed (for example, when mustard gas is used). Such measures are an essential aspect of any systematic preparation for the eventuality of the release of toxic chemicals in the vicinity of populations. The medical treatment of victims of a chemical attack may extend from immediate emergency care at the time of the incident, to the management of long-term effects for many years afterwards.
The OPCW has access to, and comprehensive institutional knowledge of, medical countermeasures in relation to exposure to chemical warfare agents and toxic chemicals used in industry. Within the Secretariat this expertise rests with the Health and Safety Branch, which includes a number of medical doctors and safety specialists with experience in dealing with the effects of CW and industrial safety, as well as with a group of medical doctors and paramedics from the OPCW Inspectorate. Additional assets can be mobilised through the OPCW’s Assistance and Protection Branch and from the OPCW protection network, as well as through the offers of assistance submitted by Member States under Article X of the Convention.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) access to national medical centres with current experience of the treatment of the victims of exposure to mustard gas and nerve gas;
(b) national offers under Article X in relation to the dispatch of medical teams, treatment, field hospitals and hospital beds, as well as other medical care;
(c) medical information and expert advice in relation to chemical casualties;
(d) the availability of selected toxicological data in relation to toxic chemicals;
(e) the availability of material safety data sheet (MSDS) files;
(f) information on prophylactic measures and the treatment of poisoning relating to toxic chemicals; and
(g) a limited number of trained medical staff (doctors and paramedics) equipped with portable equipment for medical support after chemical incidents and other types of incident (for example, cases of general trauma, and cardiac arrest), in order to provide expert medical support for response teams and experts.
3.2 Decontamination after exposure to toxic chemicals
If toxic chemicals have been released, affected people, equipment, structures (buildings, vehicles, etc.) and certain aspects of the local environment will require decontamination. This may include the need to treat, inter alia, personnel and clothing, soil, roads and passageways, walls and other parts of buildings, and the inner and outer surfaces of vehicles such as cars, trucks, buses, trams, trains, and rail cars. Decontamination is essential to minimise chemical casualties, to support rescue operations in chemically contaminated zones, and to reduce the possibility of secondary contamination.
The Secretariat has developed procedures, and can provide advice on, and training in, work in areas contaminated by toxic chemicals, as well as on contamination control and the decontamination of equipment and personnel. The OPCW can also provide information and advice on the decontamination of special items (for example, the decontamination of surfaces, soil, and clothing), and can also take advantage of the expertise available to its Member States, amongst other things through the OPCW protection network.
This capability includes, inter alia, the following:
(a) established and tested procedures for setting up decontamination lines for personnel and equipment, including staff trained in these operations;
(b) limited amounts of equipment and materials for the decontamination of personnel, as well as the equipment and procedures necessary for monitoring safety; and
(c) access to several decontamination teams, as well as to decontamination equipment pledged by Member States under Article X of the Convention.
4. Other relevant capabilities: Operational, administrative and other
In addition to the capabilities listed above, the Secretariat has acquired skills and expertise in operational, administrative and other areas which, under certain circumstances, could be useful to increase the effectiveness of countermeasures against chemical terrorist attacks. These resources could support investigations, could facilitate coordination amongst the different agencies involved in rescue operations, or could be of use in other ways.
Examples of such capabilities are, inter alia, the following:
(a) specialised editing, interpretation and translation services in the six official languages of the OPCW, with knowledge of the technical, legal and political terminology related to chemical weapons, toxic chemicals, chemical industry operations, and related scientific and technical issues;
(b) the full resources of the existing OPCW Operations and Planning Centre (team support in the field, secure voice communications, logistics planning, and the transportation of personnel and cargo, including arrangements for the movement of dangerous goods);
(c) points of contact in the National Authorities of Member States, and standing arrangements for moving personnel and equipment to, from, and within the territory of Member States;
(d) arrangements to acquire visas from Member States, if necessary at short notice;
(e) experience in arranging standing diplomatic clearance numbers for non-scheduled aircraft; and
(f) experience in arranging pre-assigned radio frequencies for short-range communication devices.
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