Eighth Session

(26 - 30 September 1994)

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPLOYMENT OF INSPECTORS

1. Introduction

1.1 Certain aspects of the discussions at the Consultations on Travel Documents and Visas for OPCW Officials held on 3 August 1994 suggest that some Member States may not be fully aware of the Secretariat's planning assumptions with respect to the deployment of inspectors, particularly during the first 3 years after entry into force (EIF). This Note intends to clarify the situation by setting out the current thinking of the Secretariat on the related issues of the qualifications, training and deployment of inspectors.

2. Qualifications

2.1 Excluding medical personnel (i.e. doctors and paramedics), most inspectors will normally have a degree in chemistry, chemical engineering or equivalent.

2.2 With the exception of the three inspection assistants and the paramedics, all inspectors will have a minimum of six years' experience after graduation. Most will have experience in either the chemical industry or a CW-related field or both.

2.3 The Vacancy Notices for inspectors make it clear that inspectors will be expected, when required, to participate in all types of inspections, performing functions different from their particular specialisation. For example for Inspector (CW/Munitions Specialist), the appropriate extract from the relevant Vacancy Notice reads as follows:

"Participates in on-site inspections primarily involving, but not limited to, chemical weapons related facilities".

3. Training

3.1 All inspectors will take the Module 1 training course. This course is designed to give professionally qualified personnel an introduction to and basic grounding in the Convention and the OPCW, as well as the knowledge and skills required for carrying out inspections under the Convention.

3.2 It is assumed that the allocation of inspectors to Module 1 training courses in different countries will take into account the need to expose candidates for appointment to positions in an international organisation such as the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to different cultures, as well as to ensure an even level of training. One consequence of this is that, wherever possible, candidates would be assigned to a Module 1 course conducted outside their own geographical region.

3.3 Module 2 training will be used to reinforce a candidate's primary specialisation with a view to applying it to the objectives of verification. In most cases inspectors/inspection assistants will also be trained in a secondary specialisation to enhance their ability to function in other roles.

3.4 Ideally all inspectors would receive on-site, Module 3 training at all types of facilities. Due to the constraints of both time and money it will not be practical to do this, and inspectors will therefore initially receive either industrial or CW-related Module 3 training. However, this is purely a training arrangement and does not imply any link with the future operational use of particular inspectors. For example, Schedule 1 on-site training will be handled as part of the industrial site block. Furthermore, after EIF the inspectors will receive complementary training, as necessary. However, declared Schedule 1 sites may be routinely inspected by either industrial or CW oriented teams, depending on the nature of the individual site.

4. Inspector deployment

4.1 When a team is being formed for a specific inspection, many factors will need to be taken into consideration. The key factors, however, are likely to be specialisation, experience, training, language skills and nationality. Given the limited size of the Inspectorate, the optimisation of all these factors in every case will clearly not be practicable. This will be particularly true in case of, for example, medical inspection personnel. Therefore, in order fully to meet inspection mandates, maximum flexibility in inspector deployment will be essential.

4.2 Many inspectors will have a dual role from the beginning. Analytical chemists, for example, will be members of teams wherever the need for analysis arises, whether it be a CW or an industry-based inspection. As another example, chemical production logisticians may well be required to carry out inspections at both industry facilities and CW production plants; and a chemical production technologist, being a professional chemical engineer, should be capable of functioning at any type of production or destruction facility.

4.3 During the initial months after EIF the emphasis will be primarily on CW and Schedule 1 facilities. At a subsequent stage, this emphasis will shift towards industry inspections. In order to cope with this change it will be necessary to redeploy inspectors, if necessary after additional training, as the particular need arises.

4.4 In the case of challenge inspections it will be necessary for the Secretariat to assemble and dispatch a team at very short notice. In order to be able to do this, the Secretariat must have maximum flexibility in the deployment of inspectors, including being able to deploy suitably qualified Headquarters staff who have also been designated as inspectors and approved by States Parties. Similar considerations will apply in investigations into alleged use.

5. Conclusion

The Executive Secretary believes that any arrangements to be agreed by Member States in regard to travel documents and visas for OPCW officials should be such as to permit the Technical Secretariat to retain maximum flexibility in the deployment of inspectors within the limits established by the Convention.

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