Eighth Session

(26 - 30 September 1994)

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SOME ASPECTS OF INSPECTION WORKLOAD AND INSPECTOR UTILISATION IN THE YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE (EIF) OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

1. Introduction

1.1 In the course of the meeting of the Expert Group on Programme of Work and Budget held on 6 - 17 June 1994, the Secretariat was requested to prepare and circulate a paper outlining some of the factors which might influence the inspection workload and hence the resources devoted to inspections in the first three years after the entry into force of the Convention.

1.2 The Secretariat remains concerned about the current estimates of the number of facilities liable for inspection. As Member States will recall, in an effort to get some estimate of the size of the problem, the Executive Secretary requested in his Note (PC-III/4 of 15 June 1993) information from Member States on the number of facilities likely to be declared by them at EIF. In response to this request, the Secretariat received written responses from 22 Member States. In addition three Member States provided the Executive Secretary with information in this area in the course of his official visits to them.

2. Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities (CDWFs)

2.1 Published information on current plans for the destruction of chemical weapons suggest that, as the destruction programmes in the United States and the Russian Federation gather pace, the number of CWDFs in operation concurrently will increase substantially. The Secretariat understands, for example, from information in the public domain on the United States chemical weapons destruction programme that, by the year 2000, as many as eight CWDFs could be in operation concurrently within the United States.

2.2 The Secretariat also assumes that the Russian Federation is still finalising its concept for chemical weapons destruction. It seems probable, however, that a similar situation may obtain in the Russian Federation i.e. that a CWDF will be constructed at each chemical weapons storage facility. Thus the OPCW could be faced with a situation some five to seven years after EIF where as many as 15 CWDFs could be in operation in the United States and the Russian Federation at any one time.

2.3 Whilst it may be assumed that the verification of these destruction operations will primarily be handled under the bilateral agreement between the two countries concerned there will, nevertheless, be a requirement within the Technical Secretariat for additional inspectorate resources to carry out the required complimentary verification measures. Secretariat estimates indicate that, if all other current planning assumptions remain unaltered, e.g. that no more than one other country, in addition to the Russian Federation and United States, will declare as a CW possessor at EIF, the increase in the number of inspectors required to carry out these complimentary verification activities during the first 10 years after EIF could be of the order of 100 - 150.

2.4 The two Member States principally concerned with chemical weapons destruction have also indicated that they intend to undertake further development work on alternative processes for chemical weapons destruction and that this may take place at sites other than those currently scheduled for the location of destruction facilities. It is anticipated that this work will be on-going at EIF and therefore, it again will have significant implications for the inspection workload during the first year and particularly immediately after EIF.

3. Old Chemical Weapons

3.1 Current planning assumptions are that approximately 40 old and abandoned chemical weapons sites will be declared and that the initial inspections of these sites would be carried out at the rate of 12-13 per year over the first three years after EIF. A survey of open literature publications on this issue suggests that the actual number of sites may be much greater than this with corresponding implications for the inspection workload.

3.2 The trend in recent discussions in the relevant Expert Groups on the subject of old chemical weapons, if taken to their logical conclusion, could result in there being no such thing as an old chemical weapon produced between 1925 and 1946. If old chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 were to be regarded as chemical weapons for verification purposes, then it would be necessary to complete the inspection of such weapons in the first six months after EIF, and facilities constructed to dispose of such weapons would need to be monitored in the same manner as CWDFs.

3.3 The latter development would have major resource implications, which were examined in the Note by the Executive Secretary on this subject (PC-V/B/9 of 11 December 1993). This concluded that approximately 70 additional inspectors would be required to meet the increased workload. At present no budget allocation has been sought to cover this possible contingency.

4. Industry Facilities

4.1. The responses to the Executive Secretary's Note (PC-III/4) would suggest that the Secretariat's original planning assumptions were broadly correct. However, the Secretariat believes that the estimates for industry facilities are very conservative. It is especially concerned about the figures for Schedule 1 facilities, which will need to include pharmaceutical and medical activities, whose management's are in the main unaware of the detailed requirements of the Convention and are not involved with the chemical industry directly. Moreover, the figure for Schedule 2 facilities focuses on production and makes little or no reference to processors and consumers. As a "rule of thumb" one might expect approximately five processors or consumers to be associated with each producer. In the Secretariat's view therefore the current estimate for Schedule 2 chemical sites may represent only 20% of the true figure. Even a doubling of the number of sites to be inspected in the first 3 years would have a major impact on the inspection workload. The problem is that there is very little information anywhere on the numbers for this type of facility. Although the Secretariat will continue its efforts to obtain more accurate data, it may well be that a clear picture will not finally emerge until the initial declarations due in the 30 days after EIF are received.

4.2 It was for this reason that the Executive Secretary sent out a further Note - PC-VI/12 of 29 March 1994, requesting an update on the information supplied in the responses to the earlier request. So far only four responses have been received. The Executive Secretary appeals once more to Member States to provide this information as soon as possible to assist with inspection planning.

5. Other Factors

5.1 In addition there are a number of elements in the current assumptions in relation to the planning of inspection activities for the first year after entry into force of which it may be timely to remind Member States. These are as follows:

(a) first, there is no specific provision of inspectors for the conduct of challenge inspections or investigations of alleged use. If such inspections/investigations are required to be carried out, they will be done by drawing on existing inspector resources, thus almost certainly disrupting the regular inspection cycle. It is therefore important, as the planning assumptions approved by the Commission provide, to retain a sufficient surge capability to reduce to the extent possible the effects of such requirements on the inspector force;

(b) secondly, it has been assumed that all inspectors, in principle, should be equally usable in all State Parties and to some extent in all situations. Whilst all inspectors will have a particular specialisation it is a basic planning assumption that, should the need arise, an inspector may serve as a team member in a role different from his particular specialisation. In addition, at this point, it has been assumed that State Parties will only make very limited use of their right under the Convention to exclude some members of the Inspectorate from inspections on their territory and no allowance has been made for this factor in planning the size of the Inspectorate. Current planning assumes that inspection teams will contain no more than the absolute minimum of citizens of the inspected State Party, and in no case will citizens of the inspected State Party comprise the majority of team members. In accordance with Part X of the Verification Annex of the Convention, it is understood that for a challenge inspection, inspectors of the same citizenship as the requesting or inspected State Party will not be included in the inspection team;

(c) thirdly, it has been assumed that the inspection of chemical weapons production facilities which were destroyed long before the Convention entered into force would be of a low priority and that, for this reason, such facilities would not necessarily be inspected in the first six months after EIF.

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