(27 June - 1 July 1994)

EXPERT GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ASSOCIATED ISSUES

REPORT

1. Introduction

1.1 In accordance with the recommendation of Working Group B contained in Part I of the Annex to the Report of Working Group B (PC-VI/B/8), the Expert Group on Chemical Weapons and Associated Issues met in The Hague from 30 May 1994 to 3 June 1994 to address the outstanding issues related to chemical weapons production, storage and destruction facilities, and old and abandoned chemical weapons.

1.2 Mr. Sylwin Gizowski of Poland served as Chairman of the Group. He was assisted by the following Friends of the Chair:

Dr. Graham Cooper of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on CW production issues;

L.Col. James Knapp of Canada, on CW storage issues;

Lt. Col. Patrick Dewez of France, on CW destruction issues; and

Dr. Peter Krejsa of Austria, on old and abandoned CW issues.

1.3 The work of the Group was facilitated by non-papers submitted by the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, as well as by material tabled by the Secretariat.

2. Tasks of the Group

2.1 The indicative list of tasks assigned by the Commission for consideration by the Group is listed in PC-VI/22.

2.2 Given the large number of issues and the limited time available, the Group agreed to concentrate its effort on resolving one or two issues from each cluster.

3. Chemical weapons production issues

3.1 The Group addressed the issue of temporary conversion of a CW production facility to a CW destruction facility and agreed that this should be governed by the following understandings set out in paragraphs 3.2 to 3. 11 in this Report.

3.2 A State Party intending to convert temporarily a chemical weapons production facility for use in the destruction of chemical weapons shall notify the Technical Secretariat not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for the State Party or no later than 30 days after its decision to convert temporarily the facility for purposes of destruction;

3.3 In the absence of clear provisions within the Convention concerning the precise contents of such a notification the following information shall be provided:

3.3.1 the name, address, and precise location of the facility;

3.3.2 a site diagram indicating all the structures and areas that will be involved in the destruction of chemical weapons and which also identifies all structures of the chemical weapons production facility that is to be temporarily converted;

3.3.3 the types of chemical weapons, and the type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed at the temporarily converted facility;

3.3.4 the destruction method(s);

3.3.5 a process flow diagram indicating which parts of the production process and which items of specialised equipment will be converted for the destruction of chemical weapons;

3.3.6 the seals and inspection equipment potentially affected by the conversion; and

3.3.7 a schedule identifying the time allocated to each of the following operations;

(a) process design,

(b) temporary conversion of the facility,

(c) installation of equipment,

(d) process commissioning,

(e) chemical weapon destruction operations,

(f) closure.

3.4 After the initial notification, the State Party shall document the status of the temporary conversion of the chemical weapons production facility in the plans that it provides pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 29 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex.

3.5 The State Party shall provide to the Secretariat detailed facility information pursuant to paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 of Part IV(A) not less than twelve months prior to the start of destruction operations in order to assist in the development of preliminary inspection procedures for use at the facility.

3.6 No later than 90 days after receiving the initial notification of the intent to convert temporarily a chemical weapons production facility, the Technical Secretariat shall have the right to visit the facility to familiarise itself with the proposed temporary conversion and to study possible inspection measures that will be required during the conversion.

3.7 No later than 60 days after such a visit, the State Party shall conclude a transitional facility agreement with the Technical Secretariat containing additional inspection measures covering the temporary conversion period. This agreement shall specify procedures for inspections, including the use of seals and monitoring equipment, to ensure that no chemical weapons production takes place during the temporary conversion process. It shall remain in force from the beginning of the temporary conversion until the converted facility begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility.

3.8 The inspected State Party shall not remove or convert any part of the facility, or remove or modify any seal or other agreed item of inspection equipment that may have been installed before concluding the transitional facility agreement.

3.9 Arrangements for the commissioning phase shall be governed by the transitional facility agreement. Once the facility begins operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility, it shall be subject to systematic verification as provided for under Part IV(A)(c).

3.10 During destruction, the inspectors shall have access to all parts of the temporarily converted production facility, including those that are not directly involved with the destruction of chemical weapons.

3.11 Prior to the commencement of work at the facility to convert it temporarily for chemical weapons destruction purposes and after the facility has ceased to function as a facility for chemical weapons destruction, the facility shall be subject to the provisions of Part V.

3.12 The Group also held an extensive discussion on the issue of permanent conversion of a CWPF for non-prohibited purposes. The discussion was facilitated by text provided by two delegations. Substantive discussion centred around proposed general guidelines which could be used for the preparation and review of general and detailed plans for the conversion of CWPFs. In this context, differences were apparent concerning whether there was the right for the converting State Party to retain standard equipment and standard buildings at a converted CWPF. Differences also have been registered with regard to specific ways to apply criteria to determine specialised equipment and special features of buildings. Another point in discussion was whether the Commission was mandated to elaborate guidelines regarding conversion beyond the criteria for toxicity and corrosiveness mentioned in Part V, paragraph 71 (b) and which the Commission is tasked to develop in accordance with paragraph 12 (p) of the Annex on the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission (as approved by States signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention, meeting in Paris on 13 January 1993). Whilst there are many areas of common ground, consensus on this issue could not be achieved at this time. However, the discussion highlighted the areas where further consultation is required and the Group encourage that those Member States with an interest in this issue hold further informal consultations on the areas of disagreement with a view to reach a consensus. The Group could return to this issue at its next meeting.

4. Chemical weapons storage issues

4.1 A discussion was held on the issue of the status of chemicals identified under Part IV(A), subparagraph 1(c)(iv). The Secretariat produced a background paper on this subject which formed the basis for the discussion. However, no consensus on this issue could be reached within the Group.

4.2 The Group reviewed the agreements reached that are contained in paragraph 9 of the Annex to PC-V/B/WP.13 and in Appendix B to the same Report on criteria for determining the frequency and duration of inspections which are subject to Part IV(A), paragraphs 41 and 42. The Group decided that these agreements should be recommended to the Commission for approval. The Group noted that the criteria used to determine the frequency of inspection of a chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF) should also be considered in deciding the duration of each inspection. The determining criteria for the duration of an inspection will include agent weight, the number of items, the storage configuration, and the specific types and numbers of these specific types of chemical weapons that are defined in Article II, paragraph 1. The duration of the inspection will be facility dependant, negotiated, and included in each facility agreement after the initial inspection. As a general rule, the duration should be between 48 and 168 hours.

5. Old and abandoned chemical weapons

5.1 The Group revisited the question of "usability" with a view to completing its development of criteria for determining "usability" with respect to chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946. However, no further progress on this issue could be made at this juncture.

5.2 The Group continued its work on the issue of abandoned chemical weapons. A paper prepared by the Secretariat served as a useful basis for the Group's discussion. The discussion of this document revealed those areas where consensus could be achieved and those areas where further discussion will be required. The Friend of the Chair proposed to continue informal consultations on this subject and suggested that the Group return to this issue at its next meeting.

6. Chemical weapons destruction issues

6.1 Informal consultations by the Friend of the Chair on CW destruction facilities indicated that it would not be possible at this meeting to achieve consensus on any of the topics within this cluster of issues.

7. Declarations handbook and inspection formats

7.1 The Group discussed whether declaration formats and inspection report formats could be developed drawing on material developed for use under the bilateral agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Group recommended that the Secretariat be requested to develop the declarations handbook and inspection report formats, based on material already developed by the Expert Groups and, where appropriate, using material from the bilateral formats. The draft handbook should be made available for discussion and comment by the appropriate Expert Groups.

8. Verification costs under Articles IV and V

8.1 The Group discussed the issue of "costs of verification" mentioned in Articles IV and V with a view to establishing the scope of this term. Divergent views were expressed.

8.2 One approach was that these were part of the direct inspection costs referenced in Part II, paragraph 26. These costs could in turn be divided into general support costs and the costs of verification arising during the inspection. One delegation tabled a non-paper on this subject.

8.3 Another approach was that the cost of verification related to Articles IV and V is much broader than this and should include, in addition to direct inspection costs, the costs of implementation of verification such as those pointed out in the Convention under Part III, paragraphs 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16 and Part V, paragraphs 44 and 49 and other costs, including a proportion of the overhead costs reflected in the budget of the Organisation.

9. Model facility agreements

9.1 The Group discussed and agreed on a concept for model facility agreements (MFAs) for CW facilities and this is described in subparagraphs 9.2 to 9.5 below.

9.2 The facility agreement (FA) shall be completed not later than 180 days after EIF, in accordance with Part III, paragraph 4. Very little of this time will be spent by an OPCW inspection team (IT) on each site to be inspected. Therefore the process by which the FA is developed, from the time an IT arrives at the site until a draft FA is approved by the Executive Council, must be clearly understood. Part III of the Verification Annex provides that the FA, based on models, shall provide for detailed arrangements to govern inspections at each facility.

9.3 The imperatives for an FA are:

9.3.1 a concise stipulation of basic rights, obligations, and procedures of the inspected State Party and the OPCW; and

9.3.2 it must be tailored to the inspection site.

9.4 The purpose of MFAs is to facilitate the drafting of each individual FA. Part 1, paragraph 19 of the Verification Annex (VA) provides that a model agreement shall specify the general form and content for an agreement concluded between a State Party and the Organisation.

9.5 Taking into account the shortness of the period within which all FAs must be completed, and the need to facilitate to the extent possible the work on the FA on the site, the Group agreed to incorporate within the MFA some of the indicative details which relate to the arrangements to be concluded by agreement on-site. It is understood that the above-mentioned details will be designed to fit the majority of cases which will be met on-site. However, given the specific need of an individual facility, these details may be changed as necessary as long as these changes or modifications are consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

9.6 The attributes of a model facility agreement should:

9.6.1 be generic text to express in a standardised manner the basic obligations, rights and procedures of the inspected State Party and the OPCW for the specific type of facility to be inspected: a CWSF; a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF); and a chemical weapons production facility (CWPF);

9.6.2 have the capability to allow to negotiate and/or incorporate details on procedures and technical requirements specific to an individual facility.

10. Recommendations

10.1 The Group recommended that Working Group B adopt the agreed concepts (subparagraphs 9.2 to 9.5 of this Report) for model facility agreements for CW facilities.

10.2 The Group recommended that Working Group B request the Commission:

10.2.1 to adopt the understandings developed in paragraphs 3.2 to 3.11 of this Report in respect of chemical weapons production facilities temporarily converted to chemical weapons destruction facilities;

10.2.2 to request the Secretariat to develop the declarations handbook and inspection report formats for review and comment by the appropriate Expert Groups;

10.2.3 to adopt the criteria for the determination of the frequency of inspections developed by the Expert Group on Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities and outlined in paragraph 9 of the Annex to PC-V/B/WP.13, and in Appendix B to the same Report;

10.2.4 to note that the criteria used to determine the frequency of inspection of a CWSF should also be considered in deciding the duration of each inspection. The determining criteria for the duration of an inspection will include agent weight, the number of items, the storage configuration and the specific types and numbers of these specific types of chemical weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 1. The duration of the inspection will be facility dependant, negotiated, and included in each facility agreement after the initial inspection. As a general rule, the duration should be between 48 and 168 hours;

10.2.5 to request the Secretariat to produce draft model facility agreements for CWPFs, CWSFs and CWDFs using the concepts developed by the Group and to make them available for review by the appropriate Expert Groups; and

10.2.6 to request an appropriate Group or Groups to address the issues which were not fully resolved at this meeting and the other outstanding issues assigned by the Commission in its Report (PC-VI/22).

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