Preparatory Commission for the  Organisation for the         PC-XIV/B/WP.8 3       
Prohibition  of Chemical Weapons                             July 1996 Original:   
                                                             ENGLISH

Fourteenth Session

(22 - 26 July 1996)

SWEDEN

PREPARATIONS FOR INSPECTIONS UNDER THE CWC - DEVELOPMENT OF INSPECTION MANUALS

Introduction

This paper is an expanded version of the oral presentation made by the author during the Workshop on Inspection Logistics in The Hague from 26 to 28 February 1996. It presents some of the preparatory work that has been done for inspections in Sweden. As this preparatory work is an ongoing process, we are not able to present a solution to all the issues at hand at this stage. This paper is presented with the aim of assisting other Member States with their preparatory work. During the workshop referred to above the Secretariat and Member States presented many useful ideas which will be taken into consideration in the ongoing preparations in Sweden and which, to a certain extent, have also been incorporated into this paper.

The specific background to this preparatory work is the fact that Sweden, which has a limited chemical industry, will receive inspections with relatively long time intervals in between. It is therefore not reasonable to devote a permanent organisation or staff to such activities.

As a part of developing its organisational capacity, amongst other things to receive inspections under the CWC, Sweden has begun to develop "inspection manuals", which will have to cover the possible range of inspection scenarios: routine inspections of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 facilities (plus DOCs) and challenge inspection at military, governmental (non-military), and civilian facilities. The intention is to develop a specific manual for each of the types of inspection. The reason for that is to minimise the risk of confusion which is inherent in documents that are full of cross-references and exceptions.

These manuals will serve as hands-on instruction for all those involved in the inspection process, from the duty officer receiving the notification to those saying farewell to the inspection team at the POE. The intention is not to develop thick, inaccessible handbooks, but to have comprehensive checklists for the personnel involved, which will also provide easy access to the relevant texts of the Convention and to guidelines for the conduct of inspections that have been developed within the Preparatory Commission.

The National Authority in Sweden will be small, and will act as an office for coordinating the implementation of the Convention. Many of the tasks to be performed during implementation will be done with the assistance of various authorities and governmental offices. The National Authority will be located in a newly formed governmental authority called the National Inspectorate for Strategic Products, or the ISP.

The people involved in receiving inspections will thus have to be called in from their normal tasks to perform the different functions that are required when notice is given of an inspection. In addition, the personnel involved will change over time. The smooth conduct of inspections in Sweden will consequently rely to a large extent on thorough written documentation which will provide a step-by-step outline of activities and responsibilities. These manuals will naturally be supplemented by recurring training of the personnel involved. It is our firm belief that, in order to preserve continuity, comprehensive and continuously updated written documentation is necessary.

Starting points

For the preparatory work and the initiation of the development of the inspection manuals, input was initially obtained from the following sources:

(a) the time limits for the different activities during the various types of inspection as can be deduced from the text of the Convention. A graphic representation of the time limits that apply to the different types of inspection is presented in the Annex to this paper;

(b) in the text of the Convention, and in the appropriate Expert Group Reports, the responsibilities for and the actions to be taken by the ISP were identified;

(c) an important step was to identify any situations, such as the need for specific decisions, where the Swedish legislation for the implementation of the CWC would make specific demands. One such situation is the possible need for a governmental decision, during an inspection, to nominate the authority which will represent the government during the inspection. However, there are specific restrictions on the right of the leader of the escort team to take decisions in matters pertaining to interests of vital national importance. This requires a mechanism in accordance with which, if necessary, governmental decisions can be taken during ongoing inspections. The Swedish legislation also requires that the inspection team, in certain situations, be assisted by the Swedish police; and

(d) a last and very important additional input is the information obtained from declarations received from the chemical industry. Sweden started to collect this data as early as autumn 1994, and accordingly now has data indicating the specific facilities that will eventually receive initial and routine inspections. This will greatly facilitate our work, as we can start to prepare for the specific logistical arrangements for these facilities.

The authorities involved

As Sweden will have no permanent body from which to form the escort team, early identification of the relevant authorities and other bodies that will be involved in the different steps of an inspection is essential.

The preparatory work in Sweden has been done by a core group coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Military Headquarters, the National Defence Research Establishment and the National Chemicals Inspectorate (KemI). KemI is the authority which, since 1994, was responsible for the collection of data for chemical industry declarations. When the ISP was designated as the National Authority for the implementation of the CWC, it became principally responsible for the ongoing coordination and conduct of the preparatory work.

In addition to the authorities directly involved in the work of the core group, the cooperation of police, customs, civilian aviation authorities and the chemical industry organisation, amongst others, has been and will be required.

For all CWC inspections the National Authority will be designated as the authority representing the Swedish Government. The National Authority will thus be tasked to supervise all practical arrangements. As early as the preparatory stage, the different tasks will have to be delegated to different governmental offices and authorities. The tasking will vary, depending on the type of inspection, e.g. routine Schedule 1, routine chemical industry, challenge military installation, challenge industrial facility etc. During an inspection the National Authority will be the point of reference for any support in decision-making that could be requested by the escort team.

For ongoing planning it is crucial to describe the responsibility of each authority in the planning and preparation process, as well as during the actual inspections.

The possibility that a governmental decision may be required during an inspection makes it necessary to have in place a group that can develop, at short notice, the basis for such a decision. It can be assumed that the decision needed for the carrying out of initial and routine inspections can be taken well in advance, and that there will not normally be any need for decisions during ongoing inspections of these types. The decision-making mechanism must, however, be in place to cope with such situations in case of a challenge inspection or an extraordinary situation during a routine inspection.

CONTENT OF INSPECTION MANUALS

The actual content of the inspection manuals will vary, depending on the type of inspection which they cover. For routine inspections the manuals will also, to a certain extent, cover site-specific information and arrangements. The headings given apply to a manual developed for routine inspections. In the case of challenge inspection, some parts of the manual for routine inspections may not be applicable or will be modified to be able to cope with the specific features of that type of inspection. The text of the CWC and the agreed procedures for the conduct of different elements of inspections elaborated by OPCW will constitute an important part of the manuals.

I. Initial part

a. Instructions for the duty officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

This includes routines for the acknowledgement to the OPCW of the notification of the National Authority/ISP, and, if so instructed, of the site to be inspected.

b. Instructions for the initial actions of the NA/ISP

Call in the personnel required to handle the work at the NA/ISP. Determine the type of inspection and confirm that all required information is included in the notification in accordance with the format defined in the manual. If this has not already been done, notify the inspection site in accordance with the pre-arranged procedure and transmit the complete notification. The leader and members of the working committee should be alerted.

Call in the leader and other members of the national escort team in accordance with the list. Arrange with the inspected site to receive the member of the escort team who will initially be sent there.

Notify the point of entry, including customs etc., of the time and means of arrival of the inspection team. Ascertain that the required working and recreational space and means of communication are available.

Activation of transport, lodging, police escort etc. in accordance with prearranged procedures.

Arrange information for the press including issuing prepared press releases.

II Basic instructions for the escort team

There is a need for a clearly formulated general mandate for the leader of the escort team during the whole of the inspection process. It should clearly state when the leader is mandated to take her/his own decision and when instructions from the NA/ISP or the working committee (=Government) are required. These powers should be such that, in all normal circumstances, any decision can be taken by the leader of the team. Instruction from the NA/ISP might, however, be needed in the case of unresolved requests for access.

III Preparations at the inspection site

In the case of routine inspections, the inspection site will have to be prepared through advance cooperation between the site and the NA. For most of this, simple checklists can be prepared. The role of the member of the escort group who initially arrives at the site is to confirm the preparations and to assist the site personnel. This will include, inter alia:

Confirmation of the designated contact person on the site for communication between the escort group/inspection team.

Provide working premises for the inspection team, including communications and any need for laboratory space.

Localities for briefings etc.

Verify that the material required for the pre-inspection briefing is ready.

Verify that the required key personnel of the site are available during the inspection.

Identify any confidential information and the procedures to protect that information.

Provide basic information for the personnel at the site on the rules of conduct for the inspection including rules for interviews.

Prepare for a tour of the site.

IV Receiving the inspection team

Instructions for the leader of the escort group for the initial meeting with the inspection team, including clearing the inspectors and their equipment through customs and the immigration service, agreement about time "zero", and the receipt of the inspection mandate. Confirm and agree on the arrangements for transport, accommodation etc.

Instructions for the inspection of the inspection equipment. Alternatively, this could be performed at the inspection site.

V Conduct of inspections

This will to a large extent be based on the text of the CWC and the procedures developed by the OPCW. To some extent this is available from the work of the Preparatory Commission.

Pre-inspection briefing

Initial inspection plan and discussion of it

Guided tour of the site

Sampling and chemical analysis

Taking of photographs

Interviews with site personnel

Access to documentation

The handling of requests for additional access - managed access

Documentation of information collected by the inspection team

De-briefing

Identification of any non-relevant or sensitive information in the preliminary findings

ANNEXES TO THE INSPECTION MANUALS

- Time frames for the conduct of the specific inspection

- Listing of and means of contacting NA personnel

- Format for the information to be contained in the inspection request

- Format for acknowledgement of the notification on inspection

- Listing of and means of contacting the designated leader of the national escort

- Listing of and means of contacting the designated members of the national escort

- Points of contact at declared facilities subject to routine inspection

- Details of pre-arranged travel and lodging for declared facilities subject to routine inspection

- Listing of leader and members of the working committee

- OPCW Policy on the Protection of Confidential Information

- OPCW Policy on Health and Safety

ANNOTATED CHECKLIST 1: PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

Instructions to the duty officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The duty officer must have explicit instructions for the initial actions at notification. This should enable him/her to determine the type of inspection and who to contact for any further actions that need to be taken. This requires a list of persons, with alternates, to be called in from the NA and any other required body.

Leader of working committee

Develop a list of persons with suitable knowledge and sufficient authority to prepare any decision by the Government in the eventuality that, in the case of an extraordinary situation during a routine inspection or during a challenge inspection, a decision by Government may be required.

Members of working committee

Develop a list of additional expertise that may be required for this group, in relation to legal matters, inspection procedures etc. Different inspection scenarios and types of decisions will to some extent require different expertise. These persons must be identified, must be briefed on their possible tasks, and means of contacting them must be established.

National Authority

The central role of the NA during an inspection requires the development of internal procedures for the different inspection scenarios. Persons, with alternates, designated to lead the work at the NA must be available on call at notification.

Leader of escort team

Persons, with alternates, designated to function as escort team leaders for the different types of inspection must be available on call at notification.

Members of escort team

For each inspection scenario the designated members, with alternates, must be available on call at notification. The escort team is assumed to be small. One important function is the presence of one member of this team at the inspected site as soon as possible after notification to assist the site in the preparations for the inspection.

Assistance to the inspection team in sampling and chemical analysis

A person designated to assist in and supervise any chemical sampling and chemical analysis will play a specific role in the escort team (the actual sampling can be performed by site representatives or the inspection team).

Interpreters

If so requested by the inspected site, interpreters (English-Swedish-English) with sufficient technical knowledge must be available to assist during the inspection.

Point of contact and contact persons at declared facilities

For each of the declared facilities it shall be clearly stated who, with alternates, shall be contacted at notification of inspection. Alternative means of contact - telephone, pager etc. - must also be stated. This information is collected in connection with the declarations and is to be continuously updated.

Part of this is the requirement to supply site representatives during the inspection. Simple information should be developed to assist the process of inspection.

Point of contact and contact persons at non-declared facilities

For certain installations, e.g. military facilities and non-military governmental installations, this can, to a considerable extent, be prepared in advance.

Use of unscheduled aircraft

Routines must be established within the aviation authorities for the rapid clearance of such flights and for the parking, security and service required. Most of this can be handled by the regular routines of the airline which is being used.

POE - customs and immigration services

Routines must be established within the customs and immigration services for the rapid clearance of the inspectors and their equipment.

POE - locations

At the designated POEs, locations should be arranged in advance to receive the inspection team and to inspect the inspection equipment. In the case of a challenge inspection this could also include a requirement for locations for initial negotiations between the escort team and the inspection team and possible accommodation of the team.

POE - inspection of inspection equipment

In the case of routine inspections it would be preferable in most cases to conduct this inspection at the facility to be inspected. This would eliminate the need for multiple unpacking and packing of the equipment. Personnel must be trained for this purpose and must be available to be part of the national escort on notification of inspection.

Safety and immunity of the inspection team

This requires a prior arrangement with the police. For declared sites this can be agreed in advance. One main issue would be to guarantee safe transport of and safe accommodation for the inspectors.

Transport and accommodation

For declared facilities subject to routine inspections this can be arranged in advance. Many of the practical details can be arranged with the aid of a commercial travel agency.

Working premises for the inspection team

For declared facilities subject to routine inspections this will be arranged in advance. To facilitate the necessary arrangements in the case of a challenge inspection, a short list of the basic requirements shall be developed.

Communication

Preparations for pre-inspection briefing

Control of vehicular traffic

The control of vehicular traffic by the inspected State Party during the initial stage of a challenge inspection must be prepared in advance. This includes both guidelines for the personnel involved and plans for the equipment to be used.

Police assistance for the control of vehicular traffic

As any inspection of vehicular traffic during a challenge inspection will require the participation of Swedish police, the procedures for this must be developed and agreed in advance.

Police assistance to guarantee access

Instructions to the police must be developed for the eventuality that they could be required to assist the inspection team to obtain access.

ANNOTATED CHECKLIST 2: ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPCW

NA in Sweden

The OPCW shall be informed that the ISP is designated as the National Authority of Sweden. The TS and the NA shall agree on the means for communication e.g. for declarations.

Point of notification

The requirement that notification shall be confirmed within one hour makes it necessary to use a point of contact which operates on a round-the-clock basis. For Sweden, this will be the Foreign Office. The means of communicating notifications to Sweden must be agreed with the TS.

POE(s)

The point(s) of entry shall be declared within 30 days of EIF. For practical reasons this will be prepared in advance, in cooperation with the PTS/TS. An important factor is the location of declared facilities and the envisaged mode of transport for the inspection team and its equipment, e.g. is the TS planning to use surface transport (train, road, boat) for an inspection in southern Sweden? A decision on the applicability of consecutive inspections will also influence the decision on the POE. The initial planning in Sweden assumed that only Arlanda airport would be declared as the POE. This assumption is now under review.

Communications

For declared facilities the available telephone and fax lines will suffice for contact between the inspection team and its headquarters. This would also probably apply to a challenge inspection. However, to guarantee communications in the latter case, a radio telephone system must be available as backup. The compatibility of the TS secure phone systems with the Swedish telephone system must be verified with the TS.

During a challenge inspection, and, if so requested, during routine inspections, Sweden could provide the inspection team with a two-way radio system or could allow the inspection team to use its own approved system. The choice between these options will depend on the type of facility to be inspected. For declared facilities this can be agreed in advance with the TS.

Inspection language

Sweden will inform the PTS/TS that the inspection language in Sweden shall be English.

Procedure for reimbursement

For transport, accommodation etc. during routine inspections the procedure can be agreed in advance. In other situations which could involve the use of non-scheduled transport, the costs incurred could be billed in arrears.

Designation of inspectors

Within 30 days of the receipt of the list of proposed inspectors, inform the TS of the acceptance, or possible non-acceptance, of each inspector and inspector assistant.

Entry visa for inspectors

It will not be necessary to issue multiple entry/exit visas for the designated inspectors in the case of Sweden, as "UN passports" will suffice.

Transport of inspection equipment

In cases where air transport of equipment is required within Sweden, it would be preferable if this were arranged from The Hague, in cooperation with the Swedish NA. This would ensure the safe and timely transport of the equipment.

Transport of hazardous samples

The proposed modes for possible transportation of hazardous samples must be checked with Swedish civilian aviation and other transport authorities to determine that they comply with Swedish regulations.

Use of non-scheduled aircraft

Communicate to the TS the necessary information to allow the rapid clearance of an unscheduled flight into Swedish airspace and the rapid granting of a landing permit.

Logistical arrangements for declared facilities

The planning of the logistical arrangements for declared facilities can be communicated to the TS for any comments. Agreement must be reached in advance on whether Sweden or the TS shall make the necessary reservations for transport, accommodation etc. This would also require prior knowledge of the approximate amount of equipment to be transported.

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