Preparatory Commission for the                                 PC-XIV/15             
Organisation for the Prohibition                               22 July 1996          
of Chemical Weapons                                            Original:  ENGLISH    
                                                                                     

(22 - 26 July 1996)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF BULGARIA

TO THE FOURTEENTH SESSION OF THE OPCW PREPARATORY COMMISSION, THE HAGUE, 22 JULY 1996

1. The Commission has come close to the final stage of the long countdown to the entry into force (EIF) of the Convention. The steady course of the ratification process is going to bring us soon to the "trigger point" when the Commission will face a qualitatively new situation.

Member States will put the final touches in national preparations that would enable them to fulfil their legally binding undertakings at EIF. The Commission itself will have to "change the gear" of its negotiations, or run the risk not to deliver the expected results at the First Session of the Conference of States Parties (FSCSP). This is a perspective which breeds a sense of urgency and desire for greater efficiency.

2. Actions to meet the new challenges in Phase II and to start preparations for the FSCSP are major objectives of the current Session. In addressing these issues the Commission is assisted by the two Notes (PC-XIV/5 and PC-XIV/3) of the Executive Secretary who offers interesting ideas on how to facilitate the transition. The underlying message of these suggestions is clear - we can no longer afford a "business as usual" course of action, if the Commission is to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Paris Resolution.

3. The delegation of Bulgaria hopes that the Member States possessing chemical weapons - the United States and the Russian Federation - will be among those that will have deposited their instruments of ratification by EIF. It is difficult to imagine a politically credible and viable Convention without the Member States expected to eliminate their chemical weapon arsenals.

The Convention is a disarmament treaty relying on an intrusive mechanism to verify compliance. We urge Member States to do everything possible to preserve this nature of the treaty. The elaborate verification arrangements currently being contemplated could be justified only if the major emphasis in the OPCW activities continues to be the elimination of all CW stockpiles and of the CW production capabilities.

We wish to believe that Member States now, and States Parties later on, will not be forced to change the basic assumptions concerning the composition of ratifying States at EIF, and would thus be able to preserve the present basis of the Programme of Work and Budget of the Organisation.

4. The Bulgarian delegation hopes that all necessary arrangements will be made to ensure that the Organisation and its Member States are in a position to commence on time the verification activities envisaged in the Convention. At EIF, States Parties will need a fully operational OPCW capable to fulfil its statutory functions. We all have to recognise the practical implications of this understanding. In this context, we have welcomed the assurances heard in various forms that at EIF the Secretariat will be ready to carry out the necessary verification operations.

Our delegation appreciates the practical difficulties that the Secretariat has to overcome in preparing for EIF in the absence of a fixed "trigger point". The measures proposed by the Executive Secretary to reduce the residual degree of uncertainty in this exercise seem really necessary. These actions will have to guarantee that the tight time-frames for the initial verification activities, set out in the Convention, will be fully respected.

The question is, however, whether these measures - which we support - would prove to be adequate enough. Perhaps, the Commission could be even more forward looking and attempt to make a couple of steps further in the direction already indicated by the Executive Secretary.

5. In this context, we believe that following the established methods of planning may have, this time, to be coupled with the introduction of an ad hoc intersessional mechanism which would allow the Commission to change its normal patterns of work. This has to be done as soon after the "trigger point'' as practicable, if we are not in a position to decide at this Session on a more productive methodology of work.

A brief special session of the Commission might be the ideal tool to come to grips with all the details of a new situation and, if necessary, adjust our normal proceedings, particularly if the "trigger point" occurs not close enough to the next regular Session. Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, the Commission could authorise its Chairman to convene a combined meeting of Working Groups A and B, which may take decisions in clearly defined areas where further actions might be urgently needed.

6. The delegation of Bulgaria is pleased to note that the preparations for the First Session of the Conference of States Parties has become a permanent item on the Agenda of the Commission. The background papers developed by the Secretariat under this item offer useful guidance on a range of issues whose early solution by the Commission could ensure smooth beginning of the Conference. If States Parties are to meet the requirements of the Convention for a number of actions within the first 30 days after its EIF, the First Session should be convened several days after the EIF date.

The draft decision (PC-XIV/3) concerning the establishment of a Committee to address the substantive, institutional and procedural aspects of the preparations for the FSCSP provides the necessary basis for a clear-cut negotiating mandate. My delegation supports this proposal with the amendments suggested during the recent informal consultations to reflect the requirements of paragraph 11 (e) of the Paris Resolution, and earnestly hopes that the Commission will be in a position to adopt it.

One of the important objectives of this exercise is to ensure that the Conference will have enough time to deal with the substantive items on its agenda and give the necessary legal status to the understandings developed by the Commission. Such a development would reduce the chances that the FSCSP will become bogged down in debating unresolved organisational issues.

7. This delegation expects that the Commission will continue to consider, in a more goal-oriented manner, the issue of the top structure of the OPCW Secretariat. We hope that on the basis of the recent proposals by delegations and the Executive Secretary the Commission may be in a position to arrive at a relatively lean structure. It should be based on a functional approach combining cost-efficiency with the requirement to build up a truly international Secretariat. Recognition of the principle of equal share of senior management positions among the five regional groups would provide a solid ground for achieving an early consensus.

8. The Bulgarian delegation sees merit in continuing to support the actions by the Executive Secretary to improve the current geographical mix of staff members. The imbalances established in the Secretariat - both among the five regions and within some of these regions - do remain a matter of serious concern to many delegations.

We understand the wish of the Executive Secretary, as expressed in his Note (PC- XIV/5) of 4 July 1996, to preserve the necessary degree of managerial stability and financial prudence by focusing in Phase -II on the ratifying status of the Member States having submitted qualified and experienced candidates. The informal consultations on section 6 of the Note have provided clear guidance on how the recruitment policy should be applied in Phase - II. The goal is to build up by EIF a fully operational Secretariat with significantly improved geographical distribution at all professional levels.

9. We share the view of the Executive Secretary that much work remains to be done in the Commission to resolve the outstanding issues. We also hope that delegations will display sufficient flexibility and willingness to compromise when the Commission approaches the final stage of its negotiations, particularly on chemical weapons and chemical industry issues, as well as on Article XI of the Convention.

10. The delegation of Bulgaria urges Member States to make all necessary efforts to sustain a constructive dialogue on the procedures for implementation of Article XI. The debate in the Expert Group on Technical Co-operation and Assistance (TCA) addressing various ideas, including our proposal, has clearly indicated that delegations could, if they wish, create a common basis for chemical trade arrangements on the legal grounds of the Convention.

We believe that a fundamental task of the Expert Group on TCA is to develop such operational procedures that would make the principle of free trade within the CWC-community of States Parties work in real life. We should not forget that for the great majority of Member States access to chemicals - both scheduled and unscheduled, and to chemical equipment and high technology, is almost everything in the Convention.

One of the underlying assumptions, however, continues to be that States Parties benefiting from free trade relations for purposes not prohibited under the Convention will comply with all related provisions of the treaty. States Parties are, for instance, under obligation, in accordance with Article I and the Verification Annex, to observe restraints and, in some cases, even prohibitions, concerning transfers to States not parties. These restraints coupled with the requirement for export licensing controls, cover all scheduled and unscheduled chemicals which may become CW-precursors.

To retain the credibility of the free trade system within the CWC-community, States Parties will have to ensure that they maintain an adequate fence around the new trading arrangements, which does not leak into activities relating to CW-programmes.

The Expert Group on TCA faces, among other things, the challenging task to establish how the principle of free chemical trade among States Parties and the principle of transfer restraints with respect to States not parties, could be applied together in a balanced way. We should preclude any significant practical obstacles to the exchange of high technology, which might arise from differing interpretations of the terms of the Convention.

In the absence of agreed implementing procedures addressing this issue, one could well expect that two kinds of developments may happen after EIF.

On one hand, if the importance of the CWC-principle of free trade is overstated without due regard to its limits vis-à-vis transfers to States not parties, supplying States may start fearing that inadequate export licensing controls or policies could lead to non-compliance with Article I of the Convention. Such a development might, on its part, poison the overall atmosphere and affect real access to chemicals, equipment and high technology by States Parties complying with the treaty. We are afraid that there may already exist enough ambiguities or qualifying factors in the treaty to "justify", when one wishes so, possible exemptions from the CWC-free trade arrangements, if appropriate atmosphere of mutual trust is not maintained.

On the other hand, if the importance of the CWC-principle of transfer restraints & adequate export licensing controls is overemphasised without due regard to eliminating existing impediments to free trade amongst States Parties, then another kind of fears - this time by recipient States Parties - could lead to equally poisoned atmosphere with negative implication for the fate of the treaty as a whole.

What may be needed, therefore, are agreed practical arrangements that would facilitate a well balanced application of these two fundamental principles of the Convention relating to trade in chemicals and equipment and to technological exchange. The goal of developing such arrangements, and possibly an OPCW mechanism as a long-term task, would be to maintain enough transparency and to breed confidence among States Parties. These arrangements should not be contemplated as a replacement of the OPCW promotional activities, but rather as a complement to the positive measures meant to actively promote free trade and information exchange.

Many specific elements of the transparency- and confidence-building mechanism are contained in the Bulgarian draft non-paper submitted to delegations in the Expert Group on TCA, which remains on the negotiating table. We approach, however, this difficult issue with an open mind and are ready to consider complementary, or even alternative, suggestions leading to the same result. It is our belief that all such measures should be based on the Convention and would not go beyond its conceptual framework.

We expect that the newly elected Chairman of the Expert Group on TCA will continue to follow in this Group a negotiating strategy which would establish common ground among delegations and gradually try to widen it. Our hope is that progress could be made on a stage-by-stage basis, bringing the Commission and the OPCW closer to a comprehensive final solution.

Mr. Chairman, I request that this statement be issued as an official document of the Fourteenth Plenary Session.

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